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“'. [LAND MANUF‘G CO.
(Fed. Gas. No 17,322; 3 Sumn. 189.)
U. S. Circuit Court, D. Maine.
1838.
In equity. On bill for injunction.
Bill in equity by Joshua Webb against
the Portland Manufacturing Company to
restrain the diversion of water from plain
tiff,s mill. On the stream on which the mill
was situated were two dams, the distance
between which was about 40 or 50 rods, oc
cupied by the mill-pond of the lower dam.
Plaintif! owned certain mills and mill privi
leges on the lower dam. Defendants also
owned certain other mills and mill privileges
on the same dam. To supply water to one
of such mills, defendants made a canal from
the pond at a point immediately below the
upper dam. The water thus withdrawn by
them for that purpose wasabout one-fourth
of the water to which defendants were en
titled as mill-owners on the lower dam, and
was returned into the stream immediately
below that dam. A preliminary question’
suggested by the court, was argued on the bill
and answer.
May Term,
0. S. Daveis, for plaintiff. P. Mellen and
Mr. Longfellow, for defendants.
STORY,..J. The question which has been
argued upon the suggestion of the court is of
vital importance in the cause, and, if de
cided in favor of the plaintiff, it supersedes
many of the inquiries to which our attention
must otherwise be directed. It is on this ac
count that we thought it proper to be argued
separately from the general merits of the
cause.
The argument for the defendants, then,
presents two distinct questions. Wm iswhether, to maintain the present suit, t is es
sential for the plaintiff to establish any actual
damage. The second is whether, in point of
law, a mill-owner, having a right to a certain
portion of the water of a stream for the
use of his mill at a particular dam, has a
rlght to draw off the same portion or any
less quantity of the water, at a considerable
distance above the dam, without the consent
of the owners of other mills on the same dam.
In connection with these questions. the point
will also incidentally arise whether it makes
any difference that such drawing off of the
water above can be shown to be no sensible
injury to the other mill-owners on the lower
dam.
As to the first question, I can very well
understand that no action lies in a case where
there is damnum absque injuria; that is,
where there is a damage done without any
wrong or violation of any right of the plain
tii1'. But I am not able to understand how
it can correctly be said, in a legal sense, that
an action will not lie, even in case of a
mug or violation of a right, unless it is
0
followed by some perceptible damage, which
can be established as a matter of fact; in
other words, that injuria sine damno is not
actionable. See Mayor of Lynn, etc., v.
Mayor of London, 4 Term R. 130, 141, 143,
144; Com. Dig. “Action on the Case," B 1,
2. On the contrary, from my earliest reading,
I have considered it laid up among the very
ei nts of the common law that wherever
the is a wrong there is a remedy to redress
it; and that every injury imports damage in
the nature of it; and, if no other damage is
established, the party injured is entitled to
a verdict for nominal damages. A fortiori
this doctrine applies where there is not only
a violation of a right of the plaintiff, but the
‘act of the defendant, if continued, may be
come the foundation, by lapse of time, of
an adverse right in the defendant; for then
it assumes the character, not merely of a
violation of a right tending to diminish its
value’ but goes to the absolute destruction
and extinguishment of it. Under such cir
cumstances, unless the party injured can pro
tect his right from such a violation by an
action, it is plain that it may be lost or de
stroyed, without any possible remedial re
dress. In my judgment, the common law
countianances no such inconsistency, not to
call it by a stronger name. Actual, percepti
ble damage is not indispensable as the foun
dation of an action. The law tolerates no
further inquiry than whether there has been
the violation of a right. If so, the party in
jumd is entitled to maintain his action for
nominal damages, in vindication of his right,
if no other damages are fit and proper to
remunerate him. So long ago as the great
case of Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 6
Mod. 45, Holt, 524, the objection was put
forth by some of the judges, and was an
swered by Lord Holt, with his usual ability
and clear learning; and his judgment was
supported by the house of lords, and that of
his brethren overturned. By the favor of an
eminent judge, Lord Holfs opinion, apparent
ly copied from his own manuscript. has
been recently printed. In this last printed
opinion (page 14) Lord Holt says: “It is im
posible to imagine any such thing as injuria
sine damno. Every injury imports damage
in the nature of it." S. P. 2 Ld. Raym. 955.
And he cites many cases in support of his
position. Among these is Starling v. Turner,
2 Lev. 50. 2 Vent. 25, where the plaintiff
was a candidate for the office of bridge-mas
ter of London bridge, and the lord mayor re
fused. his demand of a poll. and it was de
termined that the action was maintainable
for the refusal of the poll. Although it might
have been that the plaintiff would not have
been elected, the action was nevertheless
maintainable; for the refusal was a viola
tion of the plaintiffs right to be a candidate.
So in the case cited, as from 23 Edw. III. 18,
tit. "Defense," (it is a mistake in the MS.,
and should be 29 Edw. III. 18b: Fitz. Abr.
tit. “Defense," pl. 5,) and 11 Hen. IV. 47,
4 NOMINAL DAMAGES.
where the owner of a market, entitled to toll
upon all cattle sold within the .market,
brought an action against the defendant for
hindering a person from going to the market
with the intent to sell a horse, it was, on the
like ground, held maintainable; for though
the horse might not have been sold. and no
toll woifid have become due, yet the hindering
the plaidtif! from the possibility of having
toll was such an injury as did import such
damage, for which the plaintillf ought to re
mver. So in Hunt v. Dowman, Cro. Jac.
478, 2 Roile, 21, where the lessor brought an
action against the lessee for disturbing him
from entering into the house leased, in order
to view it, and to see whether any waste
was committed; and it was held that the
action well lay, though no waste was com
mitted and no actual damage done, for the
lessor had a right so to enter, and the hinder
ing of him was an injury to that right, for
which he might maintain an action. So Her
ring v. Finch, 2 Lev. 250, where it was held
that a person entitled to vote, who was re
fused his vote at an election, might well
maintain an action therefor, although the can
didate, for whom he might have voted. might
not have been chosen, and the voter could
not sustain any perceptible or actual damage
by such refusal of his vote. The law gives
the remedy in such case. for there is a clear
violation of the right. And this doctrine, as
to a violation of the right to vote, is now in
controvertibly established; and yet it would
be impracticable to show any temporal or
actual damage thereby. See Harman v. Tap
penden, 1 East, 555; Drewe v. Coulton, 1d.
563, note; Kilham v. Ward, 2 Mass. 236;
Lincoin v. Hapgood, 11v Mass. 350; 2 Vin.
Abr. "Action, Case," note c, pl. 3. In the
case of Ashby v. White, as reported by hard
Raymond, (2 Ld. Raym. 953,) Lord Holt
said: “If the plaintifl? has a right, he must
of necessity have a means to vindicate and
maintain it, and a remedy, if he is injured
in the exercise or enjoyment of it; and. in
deed, it is a vain thing to imagine a right
without a remedy; for want of right and
want of remedy are reciprocal." S. P. 6
Mod. 53.
The principles laid down by Lord Holt are
so strongly commended, not only by authori
ty, but by the common sense and common
justice of mankind, that they seem absolutely,
in a judicial view, incontrovertible. And they
have been fully recognized in many other
cases. The note of Mr. Sergeant Williams to
Mellor v. Spateman, 1 Saund. 346a, note 2;
Wells v. Wailing, 2 W. Bl. 1233; and the case
of the Tuubridge Dippers, (Weller v. Bakem
2 Wils. 41-i,—are direct to the purpose. I am
aware that some of the old cases inculcate a
different doctrine, and perhaps are not recon
cilable with that of Lord Holt. There are
also some modern cases which at first view
seem to the contrary. But they are dis
tinguishable from that now in judgment; and,
lf they were not, ego assentior scazvolcc. The
case of Williams v. lllorland, 2 Barn. & c. 9.
10, seems to have proceeded upon the ground
that there was neither any damage nor any
injury to the right of the plaintiff. Whether
that case can be suppor.ted upon principle it
is not now neeessary‘to say. Some of the
dicta in it have been subsequently impugned.
and the general reasoning of the judges seems
to admit that, if any right of the plaintiff
had been violated, the action would have
lain. The case of Jackson v. Pesked, 1 Maule
& S. 235, turned upon the supposed defects
of the declaration, as applicable to a mere
reversionary interest, it not stating any act
done to the prejudice of that reversionary in
terest. I do not stop to inquire whether
there was not an overnicety in the applica
tion of the technical principles of pleading
to that case, although, notwithstanding the
elaborate opinion of Lord Ellenborough, one
might be inclined to pause upon it. The case
of Young v. Spencer, 10 Barn. & G. 145, turn
ed also upon the point whether any injury
was done to a reversionary interest. I cou
fess myself better pleased with the ruling o
the learned judge (\Ir. Justice Bayley) a
the trial than with the decision of the cour
in granting a new trial. But the court ad
mitted that, if there was any injury to th
reverslonary right. the action would lie; am .
although there might be no actual damag
proved, yet, if anything done by the team
would destroy the evidence of title, the a
tion was maintaiuabl_;. A fortiori, the actir
must have been held maintainable, if ti
act done went to destroy the existing rigt
or to found an adverse right.
On the other hand, Marzettl v. Willian
1 Barn. & Adol. 415, goes the whole leng
of Lord Holt’s doctrine; for there the pla’
tif! recovered, notwithstanding no acti J
damage was proved at the trial; and .\
Justice Taunton on that occasion cii4 .
many authorities to show that where .
wrong is done, by which the right of (v
party may be injured, it is a good cause
action, although no actual damage he s
tained. In Hobson v. Todd, 4 Term R.
73, the court decided the case upon the v
distinction,which is most material to .=
present case, that if a commoner might I!
maintain an action for an injury, howe
small, to his right, a mere wrong-(
might, by repeated torts, in the cours‘
time establish evidence of a right of (
mon. The same principle was afterw:
recognized by Mr. Justice Grose, in Pii
v. Wadsworth, 2 East,‘162. But the
of Bower v. Hill, 1 Bing. N. G. 549, i
sustains the doctrine for which I cont 1
and, indeed, a stronger case of its apI
tion cannot well be imagined. There
court held that a permanent obstructh
a navigable drain of the plaintiffs, th .
choked up with mud for 16 years, war
tionable, although the plaintiff receive‘ no
immediate damage thereby; for, if i‘ I
esced in for 20 years, it would become ('
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r diversion of water complained of
dence of ‘a renunciation and abandonment
of the right of way. The case of Blanchard
v. Baker, 8 Greenl. 253, 268, recognizes the
same doctrine in the most full and satisfac
tory manner, and is directly in point; for
it was a case for diverting water from the
plaintiff,s mill. l,should be sorry to have
it supposed for a‘ moment that Tyler v.
Wilkinson, 4 Mason, 39?, Fed. Gas. No. 14,
312, imported a different doctrine. On the
contrary-, I have.always considered it as
proceeding upon the same doctrine.
Upon the whole, without going further in
to an examination of the authorities on this
isubject, my judgment is that, whenever
§\‘\there is a clear violation of a right, it is not
necessary in an action of this sort to show
actual damage; that every violation im
ports damage; and, if no other he proved,
the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict for nom
inal damages; and a fortiori that this doc
trine applies whenever the act done is of
such a nature as that by its repetition or
continuance it may become the foundation
or evidence of an adverse right. See, also,
.\Iason v. Hill, 3 Barn. & Adol. 304, 5 Barn.
& Adol. 1. But if the doctrine were other
wise, and no action were maintainahle at
law, without proof of actual damage, that
would furnish no ground why a court of
equity should not interfere, and protect such
a right from violation and invasion; for, in
a great variety of cases, the very ground of
the interposition of a c.“-urt of equity is that
the injury done is irremediable at law, and
that the right can only be permanently pre
served or perpetuated by the powers of a
court of equity. And one of the most ordi
nary processes to accomplish this end is by
a writ of injunction, the nature and efllcacy
of which for such purpose I need not state,
as the elementary treatises fully expound
them. See Eden, 1nj.: 2 Story, Eq. Jur. c.
23, §§ 86-059; Bolivar \Iauuf‘g Co. v. l\‘epon
set .\ianufg Co., 16 Pick. 241. If, then, the
in the
present case is a violation of the right of
‘the plaintiff, and may permanently injure
that right, and become, by lapse of time.
the foundalon of an adverse right in the
defendants, I know of no more fit case for
the interposition of a court of equity, by
way of injunction, to restrain the defend
ants from such an injurious act. If there
be a remedy for the plaintiff at law for dam
ages, still that remedy is inadequate to pre
,\Vent and redress the mischief. If there be
no such remedy at law, then, a fortiori, a
,.court of equity ought to give its aid to vindi
cate and perpetuate the right of the plain
tifl. A court of equity will not, indeed, en
tertain a bill for an injunction in case of a
mere trespass fully remediable at law. But,
if it might pccasipn irreparable mischief or
permanent injury, or destroy a right, that
is the appropriate case for such a bill. See
,.:. °tory, Eq. Jur. §§ 926-928. and the cases
;.’.0e cited; Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch.
315; Van Bergen v. Van Bergen, 3 Johns.
Ch. 282; Turnpike Road v. Miller, 5 Johns.
Ch. 101; Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2
Johns. Ch. 162. 0
Let us come, then, to the only remaining
question in the cause, and that is whether
any right of the plaintiff, as mill.owner on
the lower dam, is or will be violated by the
diversion of the water by the canal of the
defendants. And here it does not seem to
me that, upon the present state of the law,
there is any real ground for controversy, al
though there were formerly many vexed
questions, and much contrariety of opinion.
The true doctrine is laid down in Wright v.
Howard, 1 Sim. 8:. S. 190, by Sir John Leach,
in regard to riparian proprietors, and his
opinion has since been deliberately adopted
by the king’s bench. Mason v. Hill, 3 Barn.
& Adol. 304, 5 Barn. & Adol. 1. See, also,
Bealey v. Shaw, 6 East, 208. “Prima facie,"
says that learned judge, “the proprietor of
each bank of a stream is the proprietor of
half the land covered by the stream; but
there is no property in the water. Every
proprietor has an equal right to use the wa
ter which flows in the stream; and conse
quently no proprietor can have the right to
use the water to the prejudice of any other
proprietor, without the consent of the other
proprietors who may be affected by his oper
ations. \‘1\,o proprietor can either diminish
the quantity of water which would otherwise
descend to the proprietors below, nor throw
the water back upon the proprietors above.
Every proprietor, who claims a right either
to throw the water back above or to diminish
the quantity of water which is to descend
below, must, in order to maintain his claim,
either prove an actual grant or license from
the proprietors affected by his operations, or
must prove an uninterrupted enjoyment of
twenty years. which term of twenty years
is now adopted upon a principle of general
convenience. as affording conclusive presump
tion of a grant." The same doctrine was
fully recognized and acted upon in the case
of Tyler v. Wilkinson, 4 Mason, 397, 400
402; and also in the case of Blanchard v.
Baker, 8 Greeni. 253, 266. In the latter case
the learned judge (Mr. Justice Weston) who
delivered the opinion of the court, used the
following emphatic language: “The right to
the use of a stream is incident or appurtenant
to the land through which it passes. It is an
ancient and well-established principle that it
cannot be lawfully diverted, unless it is re-
turned again to its accustomed channel, be
fore it passes the land of a proprietor below.
Running water is not susceptible of an ap
propriation which will justify the diversion
or unreasonable detention of it. The pro
prietor of the water-course has a right to
avail himself of its momentum as a power,
which may be turned to beneficial purposes."
The case of Mason v. Hill, 5 Barn. & Adol.
1, contains language of an exactly sim
import, used by Lord Dennzan in delivering"
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the opinion of the court. See, also, Gardner
v. Village of Newburgh' 2 Johns. Ch. 162.
Mr. Chancellor Kent has also summoned up
the same doctrine, with his usual accuracy,
in the brief, but pregnant, text of his Com
mentaries, (3 Kent, Com. [3d Ed.] lect. 42,
p. 439;) and I scarcely know where else it
can be found reduced to so elegant and sat
isfactory a formulary. In the old books
the doctrine is quaintly, though clearly, slat
ed; for it is said that a water-course begins
ex jure naturae, and, having taken a certain
course naturally. it cannot be [lawfully] di
verted. Aqua currit, et debet currere. ut cur
rere solehat. Shury v. Plggot, 3 Bulst. 339,
Poph. 166.
The same principle applie to the owners
of mills on a stream. They have an un
doubted right to the flow of the water as it
has been accustomed of right and naturally
to flow to their respective mills. The pro
prietor above has no right to divert or un
reasonably to retard this natural flow to‘
the mills below; and no proprietor below has
a right to retard .or turn it back upon the
mills above to the prejudice of the right
of the proprietors thereof. This is clearly
established by the authorities already cited;
the only distinction between them being that
the right of a riparian proprietor arises by
mere operation of law as an incident to his
ownership of the bank, and that of a mill
owuer as an incident to his mill. Bealey v.
Shaw, 6 East, 208; Saunders v. Newman, 1
Barn. & Aid. 258; Mason v. Hill, 3 Barn. &
Adol. 304, 5 Barn. & Adol. 1; Blanchard v.
'
Baker, 8 Greenl. 253, 268; and Tyler v. Wil
kinson, 4 Mason, 39?, 400-405,—are fully in
point. Mr. Chancellor Kent in his Commen
taries relies on the same principles and fully
supports them by a large survey of the au
thorities. 3 Kent Comm. (3d Ed.) lect. 52,
pp. 441-445.
Now, if this be the law on this subject,
upon what ground can the defendants insist
upon a diversion of the natural stream from
the plalutiffs mills, as it has been of right
accustomed to flow thereto? First, it is said
that there is no perceptible damage done to
the plaintiff. That suggestion has been al
ready in part answered. If it were true, it
could not authorize a diversion, because it QI
impairs the right of the plaintiff to the full,
natural flow of the stream, and may become
the foundation of an adverse right in the de
fendants. In such a case actual damage is
not necessary to be established in proof. The
law presumes it. IThe act imports damage
to the right. if damage be necessary. Such
a case is wholly distinguishable from a mere
fugitive, temporary trespass. by diverting or
withdrawing the water a short period with
out damage, and without any pretense of
right. In such a case, the wrong, if there be
no sensible damage. and it be transient in its
nature and character. as it does not touch
the right, may possibly (for I give no opin
ion upon such a case) be without redress at
law; and certainly it would found no ground
for the interposition of a court of equity by
way of injunction.
But I confess myself wholly unable to com
prehend how it can be assumed, in a case
like the present, that there is not and cannot
be an actual damage to the right of the plain
tiff. What is that right? It is the right of‘
having the water flow in its natural current
at all times of the year to the plaintiffs
mills. Now, the value of the mill privileges
must essentially depend, not merely upon the
velocity of the stream, but upon the head of
water which is permanently maintained. The
necessary result of lowering the head of wa
ter permanently would seem, therefore, to
be a direct diminution of the value of the
privileges; and, if so, to that extent it must
be an actual damage.
Again, it is said that the defendants are
mill-owners on the lower dam, and are en
titled, as such, to their proportion of the
water of the stream in its natural flow. Cer
tainly they are. But where are they so en
titled to take and use it? At the lower dam;_
for there is the place where their right at
taches. and not at any place higher up the
stream. Suppose they are entitled to use
for their own mills on the lower dam half
the water which descends to it, what ground
is there to say that they have a right to draw
off that half at the head of the mill-pond‘),
Suppose the head of water at the lower dam
in ordinary times is two feet high, is it not
obvious that, by withdrawing at the head
of the pond one-half of the water, the wa
ter at the dam must be proportionally low
ered? It makes no difference that the de
fendants insist upon drawing off only one
fourth of what they insist they are entitled
to; for, pro tanto, it will operate in the same
manner; and, if they have a right to draw
ofl! to the extent of one-fourth of their priv
ilege, they have an equal right to draw ofl!
to the full extent of it. The privilege at
tached to the mills of the plaintiff is not the
privilege of using half, or any other propor
tion merely, of the water in the stream, but
of having the whole stream;-ndiminished
in its natural flow, come to t. flower dam
with its full power, and there to use his
full share of the water-power. The plaintiff
has a title, not to a half or other proportion
of the water in the pond, but is, if one may
so say, entitled per my et per tout to his
proportion of the whole bulk of the stream,
undivided and indivisible, except at the lower
dam. This doctrine, in my judgment, irre
sistibly follows from the general principles
already stated; and, what alone would be de
cisive, it has the express sanction of the su
preme conrt of Maine in the case of Bian
chard v. Baker, 8 Greenl. 253, 270. The court
there said, in reply to the suggestion that
the owners of the eastern shore had a right
to half the water, and a right to divert it to
that extent: “It has been seen that, if they
had been owners of both sides, they had no
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right to ‘divert the water without again re
turning it to its original channel, (before it
passed the lands of another proprietor.) Be
sides, it was possible, in the nature of things,
that they could take it from their side only.
An equal portion from the plaintiff,s side
must have been mingled with all that was
diverted."
A suggestion has also been made that the
defendants have fully indemnified the plain
tiff from any injury, and in truth have con
ferred a benefit on him, by securing the wa
ter, by means of a raised dam, higher up
the stream, at Sebago pond, in a reservoir,
so as to be capable of affording a full supply
in the stream in the dryest seasons. To this
suggestion several answers may be given.
In the first place. the plaintiff is no party to
the contract for raising the new dam, and has
no interest therein, and cannot. as a matter
of right, insist upon its being kept up, or
upon any advantage to be derived therefrom.
In the next place, the plaintiff is not com
peliable to exchange one right for another,
or to part with a present interest in favor oi
the defendants at the mere election of tin
latter. Even a supposed benefit cannot be
forced upon him against his will; and, cer
tainly, there is no pretense to say that, it
point of law, the defendants have any righ
to substitute, for a present existing right oi
the plaintiffs, any other which they may
deem to be an equivalent. The private prop
erty of one man cannot be taken by another
simply because he can substitute an equiva
lent benefit.
Having made these remarks upon the points
raised in the argument, the subject, at least
so far as it is at present open for the con
sideration of the court, appears to me to be
exhausted. Whether, consistently with this
opinion, it is practicable for the defendants
successfully to establish any substantial de
fense to the bill, it is for the defendants, and
not for the court, to consider. I am author
ized to say that the district judge concurs in
this opinion'
Decree accordingly.
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PAUL v. SLASON et al.
(22 Vt. 231.)
Supreme Court of Vermont.
Term, 1850.
Trespass for taking two cords of wood,
two baskets, two pitchiorks, two horses.
one harness, and one wagon. Plea, the
general issue, with notice, that the defend
ant Charles H. Slason attached the prop
erty by virtue of a writ, which he was le
gally deputised to serve, in favor of one
Langdon against the plaintiff, and that the
other defendants aided him in so doing, at
his request. ’1‘rial by jury, September
Term, 1848,—HALL, J ., presiding. On trial
it appeared, that on the twenty sixth day
of September, 1844, the defendant Francis
Rutland. Jan.
‘ Slason commenced a suit in the name of
Benjamin F. Langdon against the plaintiff,
and that the defendant Charles H. Slason,
who was legally deputized to serve the
writ. which was returnable to the county
court, attached the property in question,
except one pitchiork, and that the defend
ant Pelkey assisted in removing the prop
erty. It also appeared, that on the same
day Charles H. Slason and Pelkey made
use of the horse, wagon and harness, part
oiI theproperty attached, in removing grain
and other property, which was attached
at the same time, on the same writ, and
upon the same farm, and continued to use
them for this purpose through the clay;
and that on the next day Charles H. Sla
son was seen driving the same horse and
wagon, with the harness, in the highway
in the vicinity,—but upon what business
did not appear. It also appeared, that the
defendants took a pitchfork belonging to
the plaintiff, and used it during the day, on
which the attachment was made, in remov
ing the grain &c. The defendants offered
in evidence the files and record of the su
preme court, in the suit in favor of Lang
don against the plaintiff, in which the prop
erty in question was attached, ior the pur
pose of proving, that judgment was ren
dered therein in favor of Langdon ;-—to
which evidence the plaintiff objected; but
it was admitted by the court. ‘1‘he defend
ants then offered in evidence an execution,
purporting to have been issued upon the
judgment in the supreme court above men
tioned,dated February 21,18-i8;—to the ad
mission of which the plaintiff objected, in
sisting, that an exemplified copy of the
judgment should be produced, beiore
the execution could be ‘given in evi- ‘233
dence, and that theexecution, and the
issuing thereof, could be shown only by a.
certified copy of the record of the judgment;
—but the objection was overruled by the
court.
The defendants then offered in evidence
the return of one Edgerton, as sheriff, upon
the said execution, to show that the wagon
in question was sold thereon End the pro
ceeds applied in payment of the debt. To
the admission of this evidence the plaintiff
objected, upon the ground, that from the
return it appeared, that the property was
sold two days after the sheriff received the
execution for service, as shown by his in
dorsement upon it. The counsel for the de
fendants then suggested, that there was a
mistake in the return, in stating the day
of the sale, and moved the court, that the
sheriff have leave to amend his return in
that particular. To this the plaintiff ob
jected; but the court permitted the sheriff
to amend his return, so as to state the day
of sale to have been one month later than
stated originally in the return. The de
fendants then offered in evidence the re
turn, as amended; to which the plaintiff
objected,—but the objection was overruled
by the court. The defendants then offered
in evidence the return of the sheriff upon the
original writ in favor of Langdon against
the plaintiff, showing an appraisal of the
horse and some other property attached,
and that the plaintiff had furnished secu
rity to the sheriff and received possession of
the property. It appeared,that the money
had not been paid on the security, and no
application of the property had ever been
made upon the execution by the sheriff, or
by any other person. The defendants also
proved,that oneMcCune had executed a re
ceipt to the sheriff ioraportlon of the prop
erty attached, and that the property, ex
cept the wagon which was sold upon the
execution, went into the possession of the
plaintiff. The plaintiff requested the court
to charge the jury,—1. That the defend
ants could not justify the taking of the prop
erty in question under the writ in favor of
Langdon, if the property attached, or any
portion thereof, were put to use by the of
ficer who had attached it. 2. That prop
erty attalched must be considered as in the
custody of the law, and the attaching of
ficer has no authority to put it to use; and
if, in this case, they iound, that, upon the
property being attached by Charles H. Sla
son, he put the horse, wagon and harness,
to use, and continued to use them,
during the greater part ‘of the day, '234
in removing the other property at
tached, he rendered himself a trespusser ab
initio, and could not justify taking the
property, or any part thereof, under the
attachment. 3. Thatiftheofficercouldjus
tify the taking of the property under the
attachment, if he so used any part of it, he
could not jutify the taking of the horse,
wagon and harness so used; but, as to the
property so used, the authority was ren
dered void by the abuse. 4. That the use of
the horse, wagon and harness, on the next
day after the attachment, was unjustifia
ble, and rendered the officer a trespasscr
ab Initfo. 5. Tlmt the application of the
plaintiff to have the property appraised,
under the statute, in order to regain the
possession of it, and giving security to the
sheriff, was not a waiver of the right of
action against the defendant for the tres
pass; but that the plaintiff was entitled to?
recover the amount thus secured by him.
6. That if a portion of the property were
delivered to the receiptor, the plaintiff was
entitled to recover its value, unless it had
come to his possession. 7. That if thejury
found, that the defendants took the plain- .
tiff,s pitchiork and used it during the day,
without right, he was entitled to recover
its value, unless it were returned,—and
that,lf returned, he was entitled to re
cover nominal damages. 8. That the sale
of the wagon and the application of its








Langoon could have no effect upon the
amount of damages in this suit. But the
court charged the jury, that, from the tes
timony, the attachment and disposition
of the property attached was a justification'
for the defendants, unless they had been
guilty of such an abuse of the property, as
to make them trespassers ab fnitio,,—that
whether the defendants were trespassers a b
lnitio depended upon the character of the
use of the property by them, after the at
tachment;—that the use of the horse,
wagon and harness,in removing and secur
ing otherproperty of the plaintiff, attached
the same day, on the same writ and on the
same farm with the horse, wagon and har
ness,—the use being for a part of the day
only,—would not necessarily be such an
abuse of the ofiicer’s authority,as to make
the defendants trespassers ab fnltio; but
that if they iound, either that such use of
the property by the defendant was wan
ton, and with a design to injure the plain
tiff, or that the property was injured by
it so as nmterially to diminish its value,
the defendants would he trespassers
'235 ‘in the original taking and be liable
in this action ;—that whether the driv
ing of the horse and wagon by the officer,
the next day after the attachment, was an
abuse of his authority depended upon the
purpose and business, for which they were
driven; that ii the jury found, that the of
ficer was using the horse and wagon ior
other purposes than that of removing and
securing them in a convenient place for
keeping, under the attachment, the defend
ants would be liable; but if for such a pur
pose, they would not be liable. In regard
to damages, the court instructed the jury,
that, the property having either been sold
and applied on the execution, or delivered
to the plaintiff on security furnished by
him, the plaintiff would not be entitled to
recover the full value of it; but that the
measure of damages would be the amount,
which the property had been diminished in
value by the defendants’ abuse of it. In
regard to the pitchiork the court charged
the jury. that if they believed,from the evi
dence, that the defendants took and carried
it away, they should give the plaintiff its
value ; that if it was used and left upon the
premises, so that the defendant received it
again, and it.was injured by the use, the
plaintiff would be entitled to recover the
amount of the injury; but that if they
found, that it was merely used ior a por
tion of a day in removing the plaintiffs
property, there attached, and was left
where it was iound, so that the plaintiff
had it again, and that it was not injured
by the use,they were not bound o give the
plaintiff damages ior such use.’ The jury
returned a verdict ior the defendants. Ex
ceptions by plaintiff.
M. G. Evarts and Thrall & Smith, ior
plaintiff, cited Lamb v. Day 8 Vt. 407; 3
Stark. Ev. 1108; 1 Chit. Pl. 171; 5 Bac. Abr.
161; Strong v. Hobbs, 20 Vt. 185; Hart v.
Hyde, 5 Vt. 328; Orvis v. Isle La Mott, 12
Vt. 195; Fletcher v. Pratt, 4 Vt. 182,: and
Brainard v. Burton, 5 Vt. 97. I
E. Edgerton, for defendants, cited 2
Greenl.Ev.§ 253; Ib.283,§ 276,n.5; 1 Stark.
Ev. 151, § 33; Mickles et al. v. Ilaskin, 11
Wend. 125; Lamb v. Day, 8 Vt. 407‘
‘












POLAND, J. The first question. ar sin,
in this case, is in relation to the char e o
the county court to the jury as to th us
of the horse, wagon and harness by the dc
fendants, in removing the other propert;
of the plaintiff, which was attached at the
same time. The jury were charged, the‘
if they were only used in removing thl
other property, and were not injured Ol
lessened in value thereby, such use would
not make the defendants trespassers at
Inltio.
It was an early doctrine of the commor
law, that when a party was guilty of ar
abuse of authority given by the law, he be
came a trespasser ab inftlo, and lost th.
protection of the authority, under whict
he originally acted,—as, if beasts, taker
damage feasant, or distrained for rent
were killed, or put to work, by the party
taking them, he might be sued in trespasl
as for an original wrongful taking. Thl!
doctrine has fully obtairied in this coun
try, and was acted upon by this court it
the case of Lamb v. Day et al., 8 Vt. 407
where it was held, that the defendants
who had attached the plaintiff,s mare (om
being creditor and the other ofilcer) ant
worked her ior several weeks in running
a line of stages, without the plaintiffs con
sent, became trespassers ab inftio. The
doctrine has, to our knowledge, never been
extended to any case, except where there
has been a clear, substantial violation oi
the plaintiff,s rights, and of such a char
acter as to show a wanton disregard or
duty on the part of the defendants, Wer1"‘
the acts of the defendants, in using tht
horse, wagon and harness under the cir
cumstances and for the purpose mentionet
in this case, such an abuse of the propert;
and of the authorityuuder which it wa
taken, as ought to deprive them of the ben
efit of its protection?
It was the duty of the offlcer to remov
the property, in order to make his attacl
ment effectual, and the expense of such r(
moval must be borne by the debtor; an‘
instead of the plaintiff being injured by th
use of the property, he was really benefitet
by it. The doctrine, for which the plain
tiff contends, goes‘ the extent of saying
that any use of the property makes the of
ficer a trespasser;—so that if an officer at
tach a horse and wagon, and use the horse
for the purpose of drawing away the
wagon from the possession of the debtor,
he becomes a tort ieasor. We are wholly
unable to satisfy ourselves, that the law
has ever gone to so unreasonable an
'23? extent, or ‘has ever been applied to
any case, except those where the
property has been injured, or has been used
by the oflicer ior his own benefit. or ior the
benefit of some one other than the debtor.
This was the rule laid down by the county
court, and we are fully satisfied of its cor
rectness.
2
. The next question arises upon the
charge to the jury in relation to the driv
ing of the horse and wagon by the officer
on the next day afterthe attachment. The
case states, that the ofiicer was seen driv
iug the horse and wagon in the highway,
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out pon what business did not appear.
The jury were charged, that if they iound,
the ‘ the officer was using the horse and
wa on ior other purposes, than that of re
mo ,ng and securing; them in a place ior
con eniently keeping them, whileunder the
attachment, the defendants would be lla
ble‘—otherwise not.
The officer, no doubt, had the right to
drive the horse and wagon for the purpose
suggested in the charge; but the plaintiff
claims, that the legal presumption should
be, in the absence of express proof as to
the object and purpose of driving the horse
and wagon, that it was ior an unlawful
purpose. But in our opinion this would be
contrary to the ordinary rule of legal pre
sumption in relation to all persons, and
especially persons acting under legal au
thority. Omnla praasumuntur rite acta is
a maxim, which is always applied to the
conduct of persons acting under the author
ity of law. Although there was no direct
evidence as to the object and purpose of
driving the horse and wagon, the jury
might well infer the object from the time,
circumstances and direction of the driving;
and we think it was properly left to them
to determine. We think, it was upon the
plaintiff to show the act of the officer to
be unlawful; and if he had it left to the jury
to decide, even without any evidence to
prove it, we do not see, that he has any
ground of complaint.
3. Another question is also raised upon
the charge to the jury in relation to the
use of the pitchiork by the defendants.
Under the charge thejury must have iound,
that the pitchiork was used by the defend
ants only in moving the plaintiffs proper
ty, that it was left where they found it,
that the plaintiff received it again, and
that it was in no way or manner injured.
They were told by the court, that if they
found all these facts proved, they were not
obliged to give the plaintiff any damages
for the fork.
It is true, that, by the theory of the
‘238 law, whenever an invasion of ‘a right
is established,though no actual dam
age be shown, the law infers a damage to
the owner of the property and gives nom
inaldamages. This goes upon the ground,
either that some damage is the probable
result of thedefendant’s act, or that his act 4
would have effect to injure the other,s
right, and would be evidence in future in
favor of the wrong doer. This last applies
more particularly to unlawful entries upon
real property, and to disturbance of incor
poreal rights, when theunlawful act might
have an effect upon the right of the party
and be evidence in favor of the wrong doer.
if his right ever came in question. In these
cases an action may be supported, though
there be no actual damage done,—becausc
otherwise the party might lose his right.
So, too, whenever any one wantonly in
vades another’s rights ior the purpose of
injury, an action will lie, though no actual
damage be done; the law presumes dam
age, on account of the unlawful intent.
But it is believed,that no casecanbe iound,
where damages have been given for a tres
pass to personal property, when no unlaw
fui intent, or disturbance of a right, or pos00,".l,\-. in 0lQnnIn and uIlmn nnt. nnlv nil
probable, but all possible, damage is ex
pressly disproved.
The English courts have recently gone
far towards breaking up the whole sys
tem of giving verdicts, when no actual in
jury has been done, unless there be some
right in question, which it was important
to the plaintiff to establish. In the case of
Williams v. Mostyn, 4 M. & W. 145, where
case was brought for the voluntary escape
of one Langiord, taken on mesne process,
and it was admitted, that the plaintiff had
sustained no actual damage, or delay, the
defendant having returned to the custody
of the plaintiff, a verdict; was found for the
plaintiff for nominal damages. But, on
motion, the court directed a nonsuit to be
entered, saying that there had been no
damage in fact or in law. So in a suit
brought by the owner of a house againsta
lessee, ior opening a door without leave.
the premies not being in any way weak
ened, or injured, by the opening, the court
refused to allow nominal damages, and re
mitted the case to the jury to say, whether
the plaintif.f’s reversionary interest had in
point of fact been prejudiced. Young v.
Spencer, i.013. & C. 145, [21 E. C. L. 70.] Mr.
Broome, in his recent work on Legal Max
ims, lays down the law in the iollowing
language,—"' Farther, there are some in
juries of so small and little consideration in
the law, that no action will lie ior them;
for instance, in respect to the pay
ment ‘of tithes, the principle which ‘239
may be extracted from the cases ap
pears to be, that for small quantities of
corn, involuntarily left in the process of
raking, tithe shall not be payable, unless
there be any particular fraud, or intention
to deprive the parson of his full right."
If any farther authority is deemed neces
sary,in support of the ruling of the county
court on this point, we have only to refer
to that ancient and well established maxim ,
—de minimis non curat Ie.r,—which seems
peculiarly applicable in this case, and would
alone have been ample authority upon thisI
agree with I
Mr. Sedgwick, that the law should hold
part of the case; ior we fully
out no inducement to useless or vindictive
litigation. Sedgwick on Dam. 62. This
disposes of all the questions raised upon
the charge.
4. The remaining questions in the case
arise upon the admission of the original
files and record of the case Langdon v.
Paul. Th.1 plaintiff objected to the intro
duction of the original record, and claimed,
that the judgment could only be proved by
an exemplified copy of the record. But we
think the objection not well iounded. If
the clerk of the supreme court were willing
to bring the original record into court, we
think it might well be used. He
could not becompelled to do so, and might
have required the party to procure a copy
of the same; but when the original record
is brought into court, we think it would
be very difficult to give any substantial
reason, why it is not evidence of as high a
character, as a copy of the same record
would be. The practice of receiving orig
inal l‘(3cOI‘ds as evidence has been universal,
as we believe, in this state, and is often
much more convenient than to procure
. conies. Nve et al. v. Kellam. 18 Vt. 594.
probably v
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In relation to the amendment of the exe
cution by the officer, it is very clear. that
the county court had no power to permit
any such amendment; but we cannot per
ceive, that the case was in any way affected
by it. If the ofllcer. who held the execu
tion, was guilty oi any irregularity in his
proceedings in the sale o! the wagon upon
the execution, it could not have the effect
to make these defendants trespassers, who
took the property rightiully, and were in
no way responsible for the act of the sher
ifl. who had the execution.
We find no error in the proceedings of the
aountg
court, and their judgment is ai—
rme .
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LUCAS v. MICHIGAN CENT.,R. CO.
(56 N. VV. 1039, 98 Mich. 1.)
Supreme Court of Michigan. Dec. 4, 1893.
Error to circuit court, Wayne county; Cor
nelius J. Reilly, Judge.
Action by Calvin Lucas against the Mich
igan Central Railroad Company for damages
for wrongful ejection from defendant,s train.
Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings
error. Reversed.
Henry Russel, (Ashley Pond, of counsel,)
for appellant. Dickinson, Thurber & Stev
enson, for appellee.
McGRATH, J. Plaintiff purchased an ex
cursion ticket at Dexter, good to Detroit
and return, and rode to Detroit thereon. At
about 8 o’clock on the evening of the same
day he took the train at Detroit for Dexter,
taking a seat in the smoking car. When a
few miles out of Detroit, the conductor took
up his ticket. When the train arrived at
Ypsilanti. plaintiff left the smoker, and took
a seat in a regular passenger car. After the
train left Ypsilanti, the conductor came to
plaintiff, and demanded his fare. Plaintiff
informed him that he had given him his
ticket in the other car. The conductor then
asked him for his check. Plaintiff replied
that he had not been given a check. The
conductor threatened to put him oil’, but did
not at that time, but told him that he would
have to pay his fare, or get off at Ann Ar
bor. Plaintiff responded that he had sur
rendered his ticket, and_ would not pay his
fare. After the train left Ann Arbor, the
conductor returned, and, plaintiff refusing
to pay his fare, the conductor called the
brakcman, and they together pulled plaintiff
from his seat, took him through the car, and
put him off, about one mile west of Ann
Arbor and eight miles east of Dexter. Plain
tiff testiiied that when his ticket was taken
up no check was given him; that when the
conductor came to him the second time, and
again just before he was put off, he told the
conductor that if he would go back with him
into the smoking car he would prove his as
sertions by the man who sat with him, but
that the conductor told him that he had no
time to bother with him; that the conduc
tor insisted that he (plaintiff) had gotten on
at Ypsilanti; that he was ejected from the
car by force at about 10 o,clock at night;
that the night was very dark; that he could
not even see the fences on either side of the
track, and that he was.compelled to walk
home. It was not claimed on the trlalthat
plaintiff had not surrendered a ticket, but
the conductor insisted that he had given him
and all of the excurslonists checks; that he
told plaintiff that if he would bring one
man that know him, that said he came from
Detroit, it would be all right, but he would
not do that; that he used no force in eject
ing him; and denied that plaintiff had re
quested him to go into the smoking car for
the purpose of identification. One of plain
tifiT,s witnesses, who was in the smoker,
testified that the conductor gave plaintiff no
check when the ticket was taken up. An
other witness, who was in the car from.
which plaintiff was ejected, testified that she
was an excursionist, as were others who
were with her; that no checks were given
to her or the other excursionist with her,
and that she heard plaintiff say to the con
ductor that if he would go into the smoking
car with him (plaintiff) he could prove that
he got on at Detroit, and had given up his ,
ticket, and the conductor refused to go.
Plaintiff had a verdict for $1,200, and de
fendant appeals.
The alleged errors rclatc to the refusal of
requests to charge, and to the instructions
given on the question of damages. The de
fendant was entitled to have the jury in
structed as to the law applicable to its ver
sion of the case. After the surrender of
his ticket, plaintiff had left his seat in the
smoking car, and taken a seat in another
car. If plaintiff received a check from the
conductor, and, when his fare was demand
ed, did not produce the check, and, when re
quested, refused to go into the other car for
identification, he could not recover. The
check, if given, was given him for the very
purpose of identification. It was notice to
him that the conductor would rely upon its
production, and not upon recollection. The
defendant was entitled to the instruction
that there was no evidence of malicious in
tention on the part of the conductor; but,
under the circumstances of this case, if the
jury believed the testimony introduced on
behalf of plaintiff, the plaintiff was enti
tled to recover, not only those damages,
which are ordinarily termed "actual dam
ages." but for whatever injury to his feel
ings or of indignity, pain, and disgrace such
conduct would tend to produce in vi w of
the time, place, and circumstances. Con
duct may be so hasty and ill-timed, and so
far disregard proper precaution and the
rights of others, as to be reckless and op
pressive, and the law regards recklessness
and oppression as aggravating the injury. \
Post Co. v. .\IcArthur, 16 Mich. 453; Josse
lyn v. McAilister, 22 Mich. 310; Kreiter v.
Nichols, 28 Mich. 499; Elliott v. Hcrz, 29v
Mich. 202; Kehrig v. Peters, 41 Mich. 475,
2 N. W. 801; Ross v. Leggett. 61 Mich. 445,
28 N. W. 695. If plaintiff,s legal rights were
violated by the expulsion from the train, it
was for th to consider the injury to his
feelings tha onduct would be likely to
produce, in of his consciousness that
he was witho ult, and had a right to re
main upon the train to his destination. Rail
road Co. v. Flagg, 43 Ill. 364; Carsten v.
Railroad Co., 44 Minn. 454, 47 N. W. 49;
Railroad Co. v. Rice, 64 Md. 63, 21 Atl. 97;
Railroad Co. v. Holdridge, 118 Ind. 281, 20
N. E. 837. It was expressly held in Raii4
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road Co. v. Winter’s Adm’r, 143 U. S. 60,
12 Sup. Ct. 356, that if plaintiff was right
fully on the train as a passenger, he had the
right to refuse to be ejected‘ from it, and
to make a suflicient resistance to being put
ofl! to denote that he was being removed by
compulsion, and against his will; and the
fact that under such circumstances he was
put o the train was of itself a good cause
of act n against the company. Defendant,s
belie! cannot be held to justify unreasonable
or reckless conduct. Welch v. Ware, 82
ich. 77; Raynor v. Nims, 37 Mich. 34.
WThe
court was in error, however, in in
structing the jury that plaintil! was enti
tled to exemplary damages in the absence
of any explanation as to what was meant
by that term. Post Co. v. Mt'Arthur, supra.
The court had already instructed the jury
that plaintifl! was entitled to recover as ac
tual damages “for such pain and mortifica
tion and disgrace as the act entailed," and
\then
informed the jury that if plaintiff made
\a proposition to the conductor to step back
into the other car, and allow him to prove
that he got on at Detroit, and surrendered
his ticket, then he was entitled to recov
er, in addition to his actual damages,
what the law calls “exemplary damages."
The jury were left free to add to the amount
which they found that plaintiff had suffered
from mortification, pain, and disgrace a fur
ther sum as a punishment. ‘he aim of
law which gives redress for pr vate wrongs
is compensation to the injured, rather than
the prevention of a recurrence of the wrong.)
The law recognizes the fact that an injury
may be intensified by the malice or will
tulness or oppressiveness or recklessness ot
the act, and simply allows damages com
mensurate with the injury when these ele
ments are present. The added injury in
consequence of their presence is not always
susceptible of proof, hence the matter is left
to the sound discretion o! the jury. Courts,
however, should call attention to the ele
ments that should be considered by juries in
this class of cases, and caution them from
acting upon improper theories. Josselyn v.
McAillster, 22 Mich. 310; Scripps v. Reilly, 38
Mich. 10; Stilson v. Gibbs, 53 Mich. 280, 18
N. W. 815; Wilson v. Bowen, 64 Mich. 133,
31 N. W. 81. It is urged that the defendant
is not liable in exemplary damages for the
oppressive or reckless conduct of the con
ductor, and Railroad Co. v. Prentice, 147
U. S. 101, 13 Sup. Ct. 261, is relied upon. In
that case the act was wholly without the
line or scope of the conductor,s authority,
and the court expressly recognize the rule
that, if any wantonness or mischief on the
part of an agent acting within the scope of
his employment causes additional injury to
the plaintiff in body or mind, the principal
is liable to make compensation for the whole
injury suffered. and a number of cases are
cited in support of the doctrine. For the
errors mentioned, the judgment is reversed,
and a new trial ordered. The other justices
concurred.
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CHELLIS v. CHAPMAXJ
(26 N. E. 308, 125 N. Y. 214.):
Court of Appeals of New York. Jan. 13, 1891.
Appeal from supreme court, general
term, iourth department.
Watson M. Rogers. for appellant. Han
nibal Smith, ior respondent.
GRAY, J. This plaintiff has recovered a
verdict ior $8,000, as damages ior the
breach by defendant of his promise to
marry her. The proofs abundantly justi
fied the jury in finding as they did. but the
defendant insists that the trial judge erred
in his rulings upon the evidence, and in
his charge. He does not raise any ques
tion about the fact of his agreement to
marry the plaintiff. and, indeed, he could
not well do so, as it was established out
of his own mouth; but he thinks his case
was prejudiced by theadmission ofcertain
evidence, and by the wayin which the trial
judge submitted the question of the dam
ages to the consideration of the jury, and
that he should. thereiore. have a new trial.
The general term, in affirming the judg
ment, have passed upon various points
raised by the appellant, and we might well
remit the case without further expression
of opinion; but some of the questions still
insisted upon seem to deserve further con
sidera tion from us. Evidence of the defend
ant,s general reputation as to wealth, at
the time of the agreement ofmarriage, was
admitted against the objection to its cor‘
petency upon the subject of damages in
such an action. The exception to its ad
mission presents an interesting question,
and one which may be deemed Wgether free from difficulty. Such ice,
on first consideration, seems to 'couflict
with the general rule that in actions ior
a breach of contract evidence as to the de
fendant’s wealth is inadmissible. The
plaintiff. in such actions, is entitled to re
cover only those damages which she may
prove that she has suffered in consequence
of the defendant,s failure to perform on
his part. The defendant,s solvency, or in
solvency, has nothing to do with the is
sue, and furnishes no measure ior the com
putation of damages. And this rule of ex
clusion as to such evidence has been also
applied to cases where damages are sought
to be recovered for seduction, or ior crim
inal conversation. James v. Biddington,
6 Car. & P. 589; Dain v. Wycoff, 7 N. Y.
191. Baron AnnsnsoN, in James v. Did
dington, an action by a husband for crim
inai conversation with his wife, asigned
as the reason ior holding such evidence to
be improper that “the plaintiff is entitled
to as much damages as a jury think is a
compensation for the injury he has sus
tained, and the amount of the defendant’s
property is not a question in the case.”
Judge GARDINI-IR. in Dain v. Wycoff. an
action by a father ior the seduction of his
daughter, reasoned, upon the exclusion of
proof of what defendant was worth, that
the jury should not be allowed “ to go
beyond the issue between the parties liti
gating, and, after indemnlfying the plain
t‘Afiirming 7 78.
tiff ior the injury‘ sustained by him. pro
ceed as conservators of the public morals
to punish the defendant in apri vate action
ior an offense against society." The prin
ciple underlying the exclusion of this kind
of evidence. in the latter class of cases, is
that viIid,i(:tlV601,|I)1tniiIlvt!dtiln§§§§_,W0iild
be improper, as the recovery in them
should be confined to what the jury may
deem to be a sufficient compensation ior
the injury sustained by the plaintiff) But
the present action is quite other in its nat
ure, and constitutes an exception to that
general rule upon the subject of damages
ior violation oicontract obligations which
has been assented to by the judges of the
courts in this country and in England. it
is apparent that, in such an action as this,
there can be no hard and fast rule of dam
ages, and that they must be left to the
discretion ofthe jury. Of course, that dis
cretion is not so absolute as to be inde
pendent of a consideration of fheevidence.
It is one which is to be exercised with re
gard to all the circumstances of the par
ticular case, and, as it has frequently been
said, where the verdict has not been
influenced by prejudice, passion. or cor
ruption, the ver ict will not be disturbed
by the court. That the amount of the
suitor’s pecuniary means is afactor ofsome.
importance in the case of a de and of
marriage cannot fairly be
denied?
It is a
circumstance which very frequen y must
have its particular influence upon the mind
of the woman in determining the question
of consent or refusal; and, as I think,i
a proper case, very naturally and properly
so. The ability of the man to support her
in comiort, and the station in life which
marriage with him holds forth, are mat
ters which may be weighed in connection
with an agreement to marry.
In the case at bar the plaintiff was 47
years of age, and the defendant 74. Six
years previously he had smght her ac
quaintance, unsolicited by her, and with
matrimonial views on his pa t. He had
visited her more or less freq ently, and
had twice proposed marriage beiore their
engagement in 1886. She was and had
been supporting herself as ateacher and I
superintendent in city schools. He had
never been married, and had lived in the
country as a farmer. He was possessed of
pecuniary means, considerable in amount
in the general estimation of his neighbors,
and not inconsiderable if we take his own
estimate. Though pretending to some
cultivation of mind, which, among other
ways, if we may judge from this record,
he seemed to delight in displaying by a
versification of the homely though not very
inspiring or romantic topies and events of
his farm life and surroundings, be yet was
seemingly lacking in those outward graces
of the person which are not infrequently
deemed a substitute ior more solid posses
sions. Nor does he seem to have had re
course to the adventitious aids of the ward
robe to adorn his exterior person, and
thereby to compensate for personal short
comings. I think that the jury should be
made aware of all thecircumstances which
in this case, and in every such case, might
be supposed to have presented themselves
to the mind of the plaintiff when asked to
change her position by marriage. Of
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these circumstances, the home offered,
which ior its comiorts ‘and case would de
pend upon the more or less ample pecuni
ary means of the defendant, the freedom
from the personal exertions ior daily sup
port, the social position accompanying
the
have their proper bearing upon the ques
tion of marriage.
utation ior wealth of a man are matters
which, as this world is constituted, often
aid in determining his social positiou,not
withstanding he may have other and more
intelligible rights to it, and despite objec
tionable characteristies or traits.
thereiore, the defendant has demanded an
engagement of marriage, it seems proper
enough that the jury should know what
possible reiniorcement his suit may have
, and what were the inducements
offered by his social standing and sur
roundings.
dingtnn, supra, Baron Annr:non, while
holding it improper to give evidence of the
amount of defendant,s property in an ac
tion for criminal conversation, said: “In
case of breach of
he amount of the defendant's property is
very material, as showing what would
ve been the station of the plaintiff in





in the courts of other states, to some of
whose decisions the respondent,s brief has
directed our attention.
Connell, 30 N. Y. 285: Lawrence v. Cooke,
56 Me. 187; Bennett v. Beam, 42 Mich. 346,
4N.
In Mayne, Damages, (Wood,s Ed. § ,77,)
upon the strength of the English authori
ties
I apprehend, however, that the difficulty,
éé
but you cannot go into particular items
as to his property. " I think we must con
reason of the thing. that evidence of the
reputation of the defendant as to wealth
is admissible in these cases. The belief
of the plaintiff must have been influ
enced by the opinions or beliefs of the
members of the community in which the
defendant resided. She could not be pre
sumed to have personal cognizance of
a matter. which is so peculiarly one
within the individual’s exclusive knowl
edge, and what credence she gave to gen
eral report was not without justiflcation.
She had some right to rely upon it. The
action is intended as an indemnity ior the
temporal loss which the plaintiff has sus
tained, and that embraces the mortifica
tion to the feelings. the wounded pride,
and all the disappointments from the fail
ure of the marriage, as well in the losses
it has occasioned as in the blow to the
affections.
The appellant insists upon the error of
the trial judge in submitting to the jury
the question of exemplary damages. But
we think, in such a case, that it is the
province of the jury to determine upon
the proof of the facts and of the surround
ing circumstances what damages should
be awarded. If the conduct of the defend
ant in violating his promise is character
ized by a disregard of the plaintiff,s feel
ings or reputation; if he has placed her,
or induced her to place herself, in a false
position, or to forego temporal advan
tages; if the breach of his promlsels un
justifiable; if he spreads upon the record
matters in defense of the action which are
senndalous, and tend to reflect discredit
n on the plaintiff, or stain her reputa
ton.—then these are all circumstances
which may be considered by the jury, and
marriage, all these are facts which
The wealth and the rep
Where,
In the case of James v. Bid
promlse of marriage,
n And see Berry v. Da Costa, L. R.
P. 331; Wood v. Hard, 2 Bing. N. C.
It has been so held in this court, and
Kniffen v. Mc
W. Rep. 8: Allen v. Baker, 86 N. C. 91.
I have cited, the same rule is given.
in the question beiore us,of theevidom1.e,is may be availe of by them to enhance
not so much in adducing proof as to de- the dlimfigeB. Here the trial indge (lid
fendant,s pecuniary means. as in the mode not say in his charge that this was a case
of their proof.
we are bound to do under the authorities,
that the amount of defendant,s property
is material in such an action, then evidence
of the reputation which
wealth is unobjectionahle.
the common knowledge of the community,
and,
defendant has the opportunity to correct
it,
alnd
of giving the exact facts upon the
trio .
not to establish an ability to pay, but to
show the social standing which defend
ant’s means did, or might. command.
Knlffen v. McConnell, 30 N. Y. 289, which
was an action for a breach of promise
of marriage. Judge InonAnAm,
ing the opinion of the court, held that “it
my be objectionable to particularize the
wtdant’s property, and such evidence
" [nit
.v he circumstances of the defendant.
r. extent I think it admissible."
ior the infliction of punitive damages. He
instructed the jury, in substance, th t if
the plaintiff was entitled to damages
they should certainly give compensatory
damages, and that, in the exercise of their
discretion based on the proofs and circum
stances of the case, they might award
exemplary or punitive damages. Upon
this subject, of when such damages might
be awarded. he read at length from the
opinions of this court in Thorn v. Knapp.
42 N. Y. 474, and Johnson v. Jenkins, 24
N. Y. 252, for the purpose of showing the
rule to be applied. It is clear that he
left it to them to arrive at a decision up
on the propriety of giving exemplary
damages from a consideration of the de
fendant’s motives and conduct. Now,
there was evidence in the case upon which
a verdict might well include exemplary
damages. The wedding day was agreed
upon, the usual preparations were made
by the plaintiff, and relatives and guests
were hidden to the ceremony. But the de
fendnnt did not appear. He alleged phys
ical ailments in excuse of not fulfilling his
marital engagement, but there was evi
dence that he was evading it, and sham
ming iliness. He admits that he had no
fault to find with her. She had resigned
her position to marry him. He denies re
But assuming, as I think
he enjoys for
Reputation is
if it is exaggerated or incorrect. the
The admission of the evidence is
In
deliver
"l he confined to general reputation
4d judge does not reason upon
,t I am not aware that this de
,er been questioned, and I do
well can be. In Kerioot v.
ost. & F. 160, an action ior
,nise of marriage, in 1860,
: “ You mayask inagener
he defendant,s property,
clnde upon authority, as well as upon the .
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questing her to do so; but his attempt at
denial is weakened by his subsequent ad
mission that he expected her to do it.
Then,in his pleading, he charges the plain
tiff with having no affection ior him. but
with entertaining a purpose to procure
money from him, on the pretense of his
.promise to marry her, and his breach
thereof. These were elements in the case
which might properly enter into the de
cision of the jury as to the amount of
damages.
The appellant alleges another error in
the charge, when the trial judge in
structed the jury: “In fixing the amount
[of damages] the plaintiff is entitled at
least to such damages as would place her
in as good pecuniary condition as she
would have been if the contract had been
fulfilled.” This was, of course, a careless
use of language, but itcould not have prej
udiced the defendant’s case. It was very
plain from all the charge,in whatpreceded
as in what immediately iollowed the sen
tence picked out ior objection. that the
trial judge intended to and did instruct his
jury that they should compensate the
plaintiff ior what she had lost and was
deprived of by the failure of the marriage.
They might aflix to the marriage with
the defendant that pecuniary value which,
in their judgment, upon all the circum
stances of the case’ it would have to tho
plaintlfi. The jury could not reasonably
have understood thejudge otherwise. It
may often occur in a charge to the jury
that particular words or expressions used,
when taken by themselves, will be objec
tionable or seem to be erroneous; but they
should not be considered independently of
contextual phrases. If, when read in con
nection with the rest oi thecharge, the sense
of language used is made clear, and its
meaning explained, and the instruction is
not uncertain as to the subject-matter, the
result of the trial should not be disturbed
for more inaccuracies or carelessness in
speech. There is no occasion ior a further
discussion of any questions, and the judg
ment and order appealed from should be
afllrmed, with costs. All concur, except
EARL and PrccxaAn, JJ., who dissent. on
the ground that it was error to receive
proof of the defendant,s wealth by repu
tation.
J udgment aiflrmed.
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\I..INTYRE, Adm,r, v. SHOLTY, Adm,r.
(13 N. E. 239, 121 Ill. 660.)
Supreme Court of Illinois. Sept. 27, 1887.
Error to appellate court, Third district; 0.
T. Reeves, Judge.
Blades & Neville, for plaintiff in error.
Kerrick, Lucas & Spencer and Tipton & Bea
ver, for defendant in error.
MAGRUDER, J. This is an action of tres
pass, brought by defendant in error against
plaintiff in error, in the circuit court of Mc
Lean county, under the “Act requiring com
pensation for causing death by wrongful act,
neglect, or detault;" being chapter 70 of the
Revised Statutes, entitled “Injuries." Hurd.
Rev. St. 1885, p. 695. Jury was waived by
agreement, and the case was tried without a
jury before the judge of the circuit court,
who gave judgment for the plaintiff for
$2,500. This judgment has been aflirmed by
the appellate court, and is brought before us
for review by writ of error to the latter eourt.
Hannah Sholty was the wife of Levi Sholty,
a farmer living in McLean county, near
Bloomington. About February 17, 1886, a
working-man upon Levi Sholty,s farm di
covered a man in the barn, who. to all ap
pearances, had been concealing himself there
for some time. The person so concealed‘ is
proven to have been defendant,s intestate,
Benjamin D. Sholty, a brother of Levi Sholty.
Some efforts seem to have been made on
February 17th or 18th to get the oflicers of
the law in Bloomington to go out to the farm
and arrest Benjamin D. Sholty, called by the
witness David Sholty. This effort, however,
failed. Accordingly. Levi Sholty and his
hired man, and a number of his neighbors,
gbthered at his house on the afternoon of
February 18, 1886, for the purpose of watch
ing for the intruder, and getting; him out of
his hiding-place. The barn was 40 or 50 feet
wide, and from S0 to 100 feet long. It was
situated about 150 or 200 feet north-west
from the house. The granary was in the
western end of the barn, and, hence. in the
end that was furthest from the house. About
6 o,clock in the evening, David Sholty was
discovered in the granary by his brother Levi
and one McCoy, who were on watch just out
side of the granary door. He shot at them
twice with a pistol, while they were trying to
prevent his escape, and to capture him. Oth
ers who were waiting in the house came to
'
their assistance. A rope was obtained, with
“‘e intention of tying him, if captured. Pres
.tly there was a cry of fire, and the flames
are seen to be breaking out at the eastern
d of the barn, being the end nearest to
irds the house. At this time Mrs. Hannah
lolty, plaintiffs intestate, went from the
use towards the barn, and had advanced
out half of the distance between the two,
ien David Sholty appeared in the door at
LAw n1u1.—2
the eastern end of the barn, with a shot..:,un.
He was plainly visible in the light made by
the fire that had broken out. He called upon
Mrs. Sholty and her daughter Mary, who was
with her, to stop. They stopped, turned, and
had advanced a few feet on their way back
towards the house, when David Sholty ffred
at them with the gun in his hand. Both
were shot. The daughter was wounded in
the wrist, and the mother was killed. This
action is brought by her husband. as admin
istrator of her estate, to recover damages for
her death, against the administrator of the
estate of David Sholty, who is said to have
perished .in the flames of the burning barn.
The defendant introduced no testimony, ex
cept that the examination of one witness was
begun, and abandoned, after a few prelimi
nary questions, on account of the ruling of
the court as hereafter stated. The defense
proposed to show by the witness on the stand,
and by others there present in court, that de
fendant’s intestate, Benjamin 1). Sholty, was
insane at the time Mrs. Sholty was killed.
The court refused to receive evidence of his
insanity, and exception was taken to the rul-
1
ing. The question presented relates to theI
liability of an insane person for injuries com-''
mitted by him.
it is well settled that, though a lunatic is
not punishable criminally, he is liable in a
lvil action for any tort he may commit
owever justly this doctrine may have been
originally subject to criticism, on the grounds
of reason and principle, it is now too firmly
supported by the weight of authority to be
disturbed. It is the outcome of the prin
, ‘‘
that in trespass the intent is not couch 0
Mr. Sedgwick, in his work on Dam
(marg. page 456,) says that, on princil
lunatic should not be held liable for his torti
ous acts. Opposed to his view, however. is
a majority of the decisions and text writers.
There certainly can be nothing wrong or un
just in a verdict which merely gives compen
sation for the actual loss resulting from an
injury inflicted by a lunatic. He has proper
ly no will. His acts lack the element of in
tent, or intention. Hence it would seem to
follow that the only proper measure of dam
ages in an action against him for a wrong,
is the mere compensation of the party injur
ed. Punishment is not the object of the
law whenvpersons unsound in mind are the
wrong-doers. There is, to be sure, an appear
ance of hardship in compelling one to respond
for that which he is unable to avoid, for
want of the control of reason. But the ques
tion of liability in these cases is one of pub-\
lic policy.
liable for his torts, those interested in his
estate, as relatives, or otherwise, might not
have a suflicient motive to so take care of
him as to deprive him of opportunities for in
flicting injuries upon others. There is more
injustice in denying to the injured party the
recovery of damages for the wrong suffered
by him, than there is in calling upon the rela
it an insane person is not held .
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tives or friends of the lunatic to pay the ex
pcnsc of his confinement, if he has an estate
ample enough for that purpose. The liability
of iunaties for their torts tends to secure a
more efiicient custody and guardianship of
their persons. Again, if parties can escape
the consequences of their injurious acts upon
the plea of lunacy, there will be a strong
temptation to simulate insanity, with a view
of masking the malice and revenge of an evil
heart. The views here expressed are sus
tained by the following authorities: Cooley,
Torts, 99-103; 2 Saund. Pi. & Ev. 318; Shear.
& R. Neg. § 57; Weaver v. Ward, Hob. 13-i;
Morse v. Crawford, 17 Vt. 499; Behrens v.
McKenzie, 23 Iowa, 333; Krom v. Schoon
maker, 3 Barb. 6-i7; also cases in note to said
case, in Email, Lead. Gas. 642. In the light
of the principles thus announced we find no
error in the ruling of the circuit court upon
this subject.
Plaintiff in error also contends that there
should have been no recovery in this case be
cause of alleged contributory negligence on
the part of Mrs. Sholty. It is claimed that
she knew of her brother-in.law,s madness,
and that he was armed, when she started to
go from the house towards the stable; and
that by doing so, under the circumstances.
she was guilty of a want of proper care and
prudence. \\’e forbear to express any opin
ion as to whether or not there could be any
such thing as contributory negligence in a
case of this kind, and under such circum
stances as are herein disclosed. It is suffi
cient to say that there is a considerable
amount of evidence in the case bearing upon
this question. If it could be properly raised,
the facts necessary to do so were fully de
veloped in the testimony presented to the
court by the plaintiii’ below. Therefore,
plaintiff in error should have submitted to the
trial court a proposition to be held as law
embodying his theory of cohtributory negli
gence as applicable to the facts of the case,
in accordance with section 41 of the practice
act. Hurd, Rev. St. 1885, p. 904. He did
not do so, and hence the question is not prop
erly before us for our consideration.




SIIEn( v. HOBSON, Adm,r.
(19 N. W. S75, 6-} Iowa. 146.)
Supreme Court of Ioiva. June 11, ISS4.
Appeal from circuit court, Clayton county.
Action for damages on account of slander
ous words spoken of plaintiff by defendant’s
intestate. There was a verdict and judg
ment for plaintiff for $1,000. Plaintiff ap
ocals.
J. W. Rogers & Son, for appellant. Mur
dork & Larkin. Ainsworth & Hobson, Noble &
Updegraff, and Cyrus.Wellington, for appel
lee.
REED, J. The action . was originally
brought against Henry but during its
pendency he died, and defendant, Hobson,
administrator of his estate, was substituted
as defendant. The alleged slanderous words
imputed to plaintiff a want of chastity. They
are alleged to have been spoken in the pres
ence of plaintiffs husband, and were to the
effect that Rush had had sexual intercourse
with plaintiff.
At the trial plaintiff asked the court to give
the following instructions:
"(1) If you find that the defendant, Henry
Rush, did publish in substance the words al
leged in petition as the grounds of the action,
and that said publication was made mali
ciously and wantonly, you are instructed that
you may give exemplary damages. (2) You
are instructed that if you tind from the evi
dence that the slanderous words were pub
lished, and that the same were dictated or
accompanied by malice, oppression, or gross
negligence, you can give exemplary damages
in your verdict." The court refused to give
these instructions, but told the jury that
“damages on account of maliciously speak
ing the words, or, in other words, exemplary
damages, are not to be given." Error is as
signed hy plaintiff on the giving of this in
struction, and the refusal to give those asked.
\/[The question raised by the assignment is
whether exemplary or punitory damages may
be awarded against the personal representa
tive of a deceased wrong-doer. There is no
doubt but, at common law, the remedy for
injury such as plaintiff complains of deter
mines upon the death of the wrong-doer. 1
Chit. Pl. 89. But under our statute (Code. §
2525) all causes of action survive, “and may
he brought, notwithstanding the death of the
person entitled or liable to the same." Plain
tifi"s position is that, under this section, the
right is preserved to her to have damages of
this character assessed on account of the
wrongful and malicious act by which she has
suffered, notwithstanding the death of the
one who committed the act.
the position is not sound. It cannot be said,
in any case,—unless the right is created by
statute,.—that the person who suffers from
the wrongful or malicious acts of another,
has the right to have vindictive damages as
sessed against the wrong-doer. Such dam-‘
ages are awarded as a punishment of the man
who has wickedly or wantonly violated the
rights of another, rather than for the
com‘pensation of the one who suffers from his
wrongful act. It is true, they are awarded
to the one who has been made to suffer, but
not as a matter of right; for, while he is en
titled, under the law, to such sum as will
fully compensate him for the injury sustain
ed, thequestion whether punitory damages
shall be assessed, and the amount of the as
sessment, is left to the discretion of the jury.
Plaintiff had a right of action, on account of
the slanderous words spoken by Rush, for
such sum as would compensate her for the
injury. This was her cause of action, and
this is what was preserved to her by the stat
ute at his death. But she had no personal in
terest in the question of his punishment. So
far as he was concerned, the punitory power
of the law ceased when he died. To allow ex
emplary damages now, would be to punish
his legal and personal representatives for his
wrongful acts; but the civil law never in
flicts vicarious punishment. Our holding as
to the object of assessing exemplary dmnages
in any case is abundantly sustained by the
authorities, both in this state and elsewhere.
We content ourselves, however, with citing
the following cases in this state: Hendrick
son v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa, 379; Garland v.
Wholeham, 26 Iowa, 185; Ward v. Ward, 41
Iowa, 686. .
We think, therefore, that the holding of the






LAICE SHORE & )I. S. RY. CO. v. PREN
TICE.
(13 Sup. Ct. 261, 147 ‘U
.
s. 101.]
Supreme Court of the United States. Jan. 3,
1893.
No. 58.
In error to the circuit court of the United
States for the northern district of lllinois.
Action by Chalmer M. C. Prentice against
the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Rail
way Company to recover damages for unlaw
ful arrest of plaintiff, while a passenger, by
the conductor of one of the company,s trains.
Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defrnd
ant brings error. Reversed.
Statement by Mr. Justice GRAY:
This was an action of trespass on the case.
brought October 19, 1886, in the circuit court
of the United States for the northern district
'o)‘ iilinois, by Prentice, a citizen of Ohio,
against the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern
ltailway Company, a corporation of Illinois.
to recover damages for the wrongful acts of
the defendant,s servants.
The declaration alleged, and the evidence
introduced at the trial tended to prove. the
following facts:. The plaintiff was a 'physi
clan. The defendant was engaged in operat
ing a railroad, and conducting the business
of a common carrier of passengers and
freight, through Ohio, Indiana. Illinois, and
other states. On October 12, 1838, the plain
tiff, his wife, and a number of other persons
were passengers, holding excursion tickets.
on a regular passenger train of the defend
ant’s railroad. from Norwalk. in Ohio, to
Chicago. in Illinois. During the journey the
plaintiff purchased of several passengers
their return tickets. which had nothing on
them to show that they were not transfera
ble. The conductor of the train, learning
this, and knowing that the plaintiff had been
guilty of no offense for which he was liable
to arrest, telegraphed for a police ofllcer, an
employe of the defendant, who boarded the
tram as it approached Chicago. The con
ductor thereupon, in a loud and angry voice,
pointed out the plaintiff to the oflieer. and
ordered his arrest: and the oflicer, by direc
tion of the conductor. and without any war
rant or authority of law, seized the plaintiff,
and rudely searched him for weapons, in the
presence of the other passengers, hurried him
into another car, and there sat down by him
as a watch, and refused to tell him the cause
of his arrest, or to let him speak to his wife.
While the plaintiff was being removed into
the other car, the conductor, for the purpose
of disgrzu.lug and humiliating him with his fel.
low passengers, openly declared that he was
under arrest, and sneeringly said to the plain
tiff,s wife, “Where,s your doctor now?" On
arrival at Chicago. the conductor refused to
let the plaintiff assist his wife with her par
cels in leaving the train. or to give her the
check for their trunk; and, in the presence
of the passengers and others. ordered him to
be taken to the station house, and he was
fo.rcil)ly‘taken tl\ere._and deia‘ned until the
conductor arrived; and, knowing that the
plaintiff had been guilty of no offense, en
tered a false charge against him of disorder
ly conduct, upon which he gave bail and was
released, and of which, on appearing before
a justice of the peace for trial on the next
day, and no one appearing to prosecute him,
he was iinally discharged.
The declaration alleged that all these acts
were done by the defendant,s agents in the
line of their employment, and that the de
fendant was legally responsible therefor; and
that the plaintiif had been thereby put to
expense, and greatly injured in mind, body,
and reputation.
At the trial, and before the introduction of
any evidence, the defendant, by its counsel,
admitted “that the arrest of the plaintiff was
wrongful, and that he was entitled to recover
actual damages therefor;" but afterwards
excepted to each of the following instructions
given by the circuit judge to the jury:
“If you believe the statements which have
been made by the plaintiflf and the witnesses
who testiiied in his behalf, (and they are not
dt.uied,) then he is entitled to a verdict which
will fully compensate him for the injuries
which he sustained, and in compensating him
you are authorized to go beyond the amount
that he has actually expended in employing
counsel; you may go beyond the actual out
lay in money which he has made. He was
arrested publicly. without a warrant, and
without cause; and if such conduct as has
been detailed before you occurred, such as
the remark that was addressed by the con
ductor to the wife in the plaintiff,s presence.
in compensating him you have a right to con
sider the humiliation of feeling to which he
was thus publicly subjected. If the com
pauy, without reason, by its unlawful and op
pressive act, subjected him to this public hu
miliation, and thereby outraged his feelings,
he is entitled to compensation for that inju
ry and mental anguish."
“[ am not able to give you any rule by
which you can determine that; but; bear in
mind, it is strictly on the line of compensa
tion. The plaintiff is entitled to compensa
tion in money for humiliation of feeling and
spirit, as well as the actual outlay which he
has made in and about this suit."
“And, further, ‘after :figreeing upon the
amount which will fairly compensate the
plaintiii for his outlay and injured feelings,
you may add something by way of punith,e
damages against the defendant, which is
sometimes called
’sltliart
money,’ if you are
satisfied that the com uctor’s conduct was iile-
gal, (and it was illegal,) wanton, and oppress
ive. How much that shall be the court can
not tell you. You must act as reasonable
men, and not indulge vindictive feelings
towards the defendant."
‘
"if a public corporation, like an individual.
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acts oppressively, wantonly, abuses power,
and a citizen in that way is injured. the citi
zen. in addition to strict compensation, may
have. the law says, something in the way of
smart money; something as punishment for
the oppressive use of power."
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff
in the sum of $10,000. The defendant moved
for a new trial. for error in law, and for ex
cessive damages. The plaintiff thereupon. by
leave of court, remitted the sum of $4,000,
and asked that judgment be entered for $6,
000. The court then denied the motion for
a new trial. and gave judgment for the plain
tiff for $6,000. The defendant sued out this
writ of error.
Geo G. Greene, for plaintiff in error. W.
A. Foster, for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the case
as above, delivered the opinion of the court.
The only exceptions taken to the instruc
tions at the trial, which have been argued in
this court, are to those on the subject of puni
tive damages.
i The single question presented for our de
‘cision, therefore, is whether a railroad cor
poration can be charged with punitive or ex
emplary damages for the_illcgal, wanton, and
oppressive conduct of a conductor of one of
its trains towards a passenger.
This question, like others affecting the lia
bility of a railroad corporation as a common
carrier of goods or passengers,—such as its
right to contract for exemption from respon
sibility for its own negligence, or its liability
beyond its own line, or its liability to one of
its servants for the act of another person in
its employment,-——is a question, not of local
law, but of general jurisprudence, upon
uhich this court, in. the absence of express
statute regulating the subject, will exercise
its own judgment, uncontrolled by the de
cisions of the courts of the several states.
Railroad (Jo. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 368;
Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins.
Co., 129 U. S. 397, 443, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 409;
Myrick v. Railroad Co., 107 U. S. 102. 100. 1
Sup. Ct. Rep. 425; Hough v. liailway Co., 100
U. S. 213, 226.
The most distinct suggestion of the doc
trine of exemplary or punitive damages in
England before the American Revolution is
to be found in the remarks of Chief Justice
Pratt (afterwards Lord Camden) in one of
the actions against the king,s messengers for
trespass and imprisonment, under general
warrants of the secretary of state. in which,
the plaintiff,s counsel having asserted. and
the defendant,s counsel having denied. the
right to recover “exemplary damages," the
chief justice instructed the jury as follows:
"I have formerly delivered it as my opinion
on another occasion, and I still continue of
the same mind. that a jury have it in their
power to give damages for more than the
injury received. Damages are des‘gned, not
iii»
only as’ a satisfaction to the injured person.
but likewise as a punishment to the guilty,
to deter from any such proceeding for the fu
ture, and as a proof of the detestationisfthe
jury to the action itself." Wilkes v. Wood,
Lofft, 1, 18, 19, 19 Howell, St. T. 1153, 1167,
See, also. 1Iuckle v. Money, 2 WHs. 205, 207;
Sayer, Dam. 218. 221. The recovery of dam
ages, beyond eompensation for the injury re
ccived, by way of punishing the guilty, and
as an example to deter others from offending
in like manner, is here clearly recognized.
Iin this court the doctrine is well settled
that in actions of tort the jury. in addition to
the sum awarded by way of compensation
for the plaintiff,s injury. may award exem
plary, punitive, or vindictive damages, some-
times called “smart money," if the defend
ant has acted wantonly, or oppressively, or
with such malice as implies a spirit of mis
chief or criminal indifl’crem;e to civil obliga
tions; but such guilty intention on the part
of the defendant is required in order to
charge him with exemplary or punitive dam
ages. The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. .146,
538. 569; Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363,
371; Railroad Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202,
‘..‘.13,214; Railway (3o. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 48!),
493. 495; li:tilway Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. .
512, 521, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 110; Barry v. Ed
muuds, 116 S. 530, 5 2, 563, 6 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 501; Railway Co. v. Harris, 122 U. S.
597, 609. 610, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1286; Railway
Co. v. Beckwith,.129 U. S. 26, 36, 9 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 207.
Exemplary or punitive‘ .damages, being
awarded, not by way of compensation to the
sufferer, but by way of punishment of the.
offender, and as a warning to others, can \
only be awarded against one who haspartici-_
pnted in the offense. A principal, therefore,
though of couise liable to make compen-,
sation for injuries done by his agent within .
the scope of his employinent, cannot be held
liable for exemplary or punitive damages,
merely by reason of wanton. oppressive, or
malicious intent on the part of the agent.
This is clearly shown by the judgment of this
court in the case of The Amiable Nancy, 3
Wheat. 7.46.
In that case. upon a libel in admiralty by
the owner, master, supercargo. and crew of
a neutral vessel agahist the owners of an
American prlvateer, for ill..‘gally and wanton
ly seizing and plundering the neutral vessel
and maltreating her ofiicers and crew, Mr.
Justice Story, speaking for the court, in 1818,
laid down the general rule as to the liability
for exemplary or vindictive damages by way
of punishment, as follows: “Upon the facts
disclosed in the evidence, this must be pro
nounccd a case of gross and wanton outrage,
without any just provocation or excuse. Un
der such circumstances. the honor of the
country‘ and the duty of the court equally
require that u. just compensation should be
made to the unoffending neutrals for all the







this were a suit against the
original wro gdoers, it’ might be proper to
:o yet farther, and isit upon them, in the
shape of exemplary damages, the proper pun
ishment which belongs to such lawless mis
conduct. But it is to be considered that this
is a sui against the owners of the privateer,
upon whom the law has, from motives of pol
icy, devolved a responsibility for the conduct
of the ofliccrs and crew employed by them,
and yet. from the nature of the service, they
can scarcely ever be able to secure to them
selves an adequate indemnity in cases of loss.
They are innocent of the demerit of this
transaction, having neither directed it, nor
countenanced it
,
nor participated in it in the
slightest degree. Under such circumstances,
we are of the opinion that they are bound
to repair all the real injuries and personal
wrongs sustained by the libclants, but they
are not bound to the extent of vindictive
damages." 3 Wheat. 558, 559.
The rule thus laid down is not peculiar to
courts of admit.alty; for, as stated by the
same eminent judge two years later, those
courts proceed, in cases of tort, upon the
same principles as courts of common law, in
allowing exemplary damages, as well as dam
ages by way of compensation or remunera
tion for expenses incurred, or injuries or loss
is sustained, by the misconduct of the other
party. Manufacturing Co. v. Flskc, 2 Mason,
11:), 121.t In Keene v. Lizardi, 8 La. 26, 33,
Judge Martin said: “It is true, juries some
tinn.s very properly give what is called ’smart
money.’ They are often warranted in giving
vindictive damages as a punishment inflicted
for outrageous conduct; but this is only jus
‘Mable
in an action against the wrongdoer,
1 nd not_ against persons who. on account of
their relation to the offendcr, are only conse
quentially liable for his acts, as the princi
pal is responsible for the acts of his factor or
agent." ,1‘o the same effcct arc The State
ltighis, Crabbe, 42, 47, 48; The Golden Gate,
Me.‘\ll. 104; Wardrobe v. Stage Co., 7 Cal.
118; Bonlard v. Calhomt. 13 La. Ann. 445;
Detroit Daily Post Co. v. .\IcArthur, 16 Mich.
447;’ Grund v. Van Vleck, 69 ill. 478, 481; Beck
er v. Duprcc, 75 ill. 167; Roscnkrans v. Bar
ker. 115 11l. 331, 3 N. E. Rep. 93; Kirksey v.
Jones, 7 Ala. 622, ,20; Pollock v. Gantt, 69
Ala. 1:73, 379; liviston v. Cramer, 57 Wis.
570. 15 N. W. Rep. 700; Haines v. Schultz,
50 N. J. Law, 481, 14 Atl. Rep. 488; .\icCarlhy
v. Dc ..\rmit, 99 Pa. St. 63, 72; Clark v. New
sam. 1 Exch. 131, 140; Ullssold v. Machell,
‘.:(i I’. C. Q. B. 422.
The rule has the same application to cor
porations as to individuals. This court has
often, in cases of this class, as well as in
other cases. afiinned the doctrine that for
acts done by the agents of a corporation, in
the course of its business and of their em
ploymnut, the corporation is responsible in
the same manner and to the same extent as
t Fed Cas. No. 1,081.
an individual is responsible under similar
circumstances. Railroad Co. v. Quigley, 21
How. 202, 210; ‘Bank v. Graham. 100 U. S.
609, 702; Salt Lake City v. Holl’stor. 118 U.
S. ‘£545, 201, 6 Sup. Ct. licp. 10.35; ltail\\.‘:’.y
Co. v. I.larris, 122 U. S. 597, 008, 7 Sup. -Ct.
Rep. 1286.
A corporation is doubtless liable, like an
individual, to make compensation for any
tort committed by an agent in the course of
his employment, although the. act is done
wantonly and recklessly, or against the ex
prcss orders of the pringipal. Railroad Co.
v. Derby, 14 How. 468; Steamboat Co. v.
Brockett, 121 U. S. 637, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1039;
Howe v. Ncwmarch, 12 Allen, 49; Ramsden
v. liailroad Co., 104 Mass. 117. A corpora
tion may even be held liable for a libel, or a
malicious prosecution, by its agent within the
scope of hb) employment; and the malice
necessary to support either action, if proved
in the agent, may be imputed to the corpora
tion.
211; Salt Lake ‘City v. Hollistcr, 118 U. S.
256, 262, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1055; Reed v. Bank,
130 Mass. 443, 4-i5, and cases cited; Krule
vitz v. Railroad Co., 140 Mass. 573, 5 N. E.
Rep. 500; McDermott v. Journal, 43 N. J.
Law, 458, and 44 N. J. Law, 430; Bank v.
Owston, 4 App. Gas. 270. But, as well ob
served by Mr. Justice Field, now chief jus
tice of Massachusetts: “The logical difliculty
of imputing the actual malice or fraud of an
agent to his principal is perhaps less when
the principal is a person than when it is a
corporation; still the foundation of the impu
iatlon is not that it is inferred that the prin
cipal actually participated in the malice or
fraud, but, the act having been done for his
beneiit by his agent acting within the scope
of his employment in his business. it is just
that he should he held responsible for it in
damages." Lothrop v. Adams, 133 Mass. 471,
480, 481.
Though the principal is liable to make com-I
pensation for a libel published or a malicious!
prosecution instituted by his agent, he is not}
liable to be punished by exemplary‘ damagesi
for an intent in which he did not participate.
In Detroit Daily Post Co. v. McArthur, in
Eviston v. Cramer, and in Haines v. Schuliz.
above cited, it was held that the publisher of
a newspaper, when sued for a libel published
therein by one of his reporters without his
knowledge, was liable for com pensatory dam
ages only, and not for punitive damages. un
less he approved or ratified the publication;
and in Haines v. Schultz the supreme court of
New Jersey said of punitive damages: “The
right to award them rests primarily upon the
single ground,—wrongful motive." ‘‘It is the
wrongful personal intention to injure that
calls forth the penalty. To this wrongful in
tent knowledge is an essential prerequisite."
“Absence of all proof bearing on the essen
tial question, to wit, defendant,s motive, can
not be permitted to take the place of evi
dence, without lcading to a most dangerous
Railroad Co. v. Quiglcy, 21 How. 202, .
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extension of the doctrine respondent supe
rior.“ .30 l\,. J. Law, -'iS4, 485, 14 Atl. Rep.
458_ Whether a principal can be criminai1y
prosecuted for a libel published by his agent
without his participation is a question on
which the authorities are not agreed; and,
where it has been held that he can, it is ad
mitted to be an anomaly in the criminal law.
Com. v. Morgan. 107 \Iass. 199, 203; Reg. v.
liolbrook, 3 Q. B. Div. 60, 63, 64, 70, 4 Q. B.
Div. 42, 51, 60./4 No doubt, a corporation, like a natural per
son, may be held liable in exemplary or puni
tive damages for the act of an agent
wlthlm
‘
thethe scope of his employment, provided
criminal intent, necessary to warrant the im
position of such damages, is brought home to
the corporation. Railroad Co. v. Quigley,
Railway Co. v. Arms, and Railway Co. v.
Harris, above cited; Caldwell v. Steamboat
-Co., 47 N. Y. 282; Bell v. Railway Co., 10 C.
'
B. (N. S.) 287, 4 Law T. (N. S.) 293.
Independently of this. in the case of a cor
poration. as of an individual, if any wanton
ness or mischief on the part of the agent,
acting within the scope of his employment,
causes additional injury to the plaintiff in
body or mind, the principal is, of course, lia
ble to make compensation for the whole in
jury suffered. Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S.
22, :i sup. Ct. Rep. 696; Meagher v. Drlscoll.
99 Mass. 281, 285; Smith v. Holcomb, Id. 552;
Ilawes v. Knowles, 114 Mass. 518; Campbell
7. Car Co., 42 Fed. Rep. 484.
In the case at bar, the defendant’s counsel
having admitted in open court “that the ar
rest of the plaintiff was wrongful, and that
he was entitled to recover actual damages
therefor." the jury were rightly instructed
that he was entitled to a verdict which would
fully compensate him for the injuries sus
tained, and that in compensating him the
jury were authorized to go beyond his ont
lay in and about this suit, and to consider
the hnlrdliniion and outrage to which he had
been subjected by arresting him publicly
without warrant and without cause, and by,
i the conduct of the conductor, such as his re
l mark to the plaintiff’s wife.
But the court, going beyond this, distinctly
instructed the jury that, “after agreeing upon
the amount which will fully compensate the
plaintiff for his outlay and injured feelings,"
they might “add something by way oi.‘ puni
tive damages against the defendant, which is
sometimes called ’smart money,"’ if they
were "satisfied that the conductor,s conduct
was illegal, wanton, and oppressive."
The jury were thus told, in the plainest
terms, that the corporation was responsible in
pmiitivc damages for wantonness and‘oppres
sion on the part of the conductor, ailhotrgh
not actually participated in by the corpora
tion. This ruiing appears to us to be iit"on
‘t-istent with the principles above stated, un
supported by any decision of this court, and
opposed to the preponderance of wcll.consid
.cred precedents.
In Railroad Co. v. Derby, which was an ac
tion by a passenger against a railroad cor
poration for a personal injury suffered
through the negligence of its servants. the
jury were instructed that "the damages, if
any were recoverable, are to be conffned to
the direct and immediate consequen s of the
injury sustained;" and no except oibwas
taken to this instruction. 14: How. 470, 471.
In Railroad Co. v. Quigley, which was an
action against a railroad corporation for a
libel published by its agents, the jury re
turned a verdict for the plaintiff under an in
struction that "they arc not restricted in giv
ing damages to the actual positive injury
sustained by the plaintlff, but may give such
exemplary damages, if any, as in their opin
ion are called for and justiiied, in view of all
the circumstances in this case, to render
reparation to the plaintiff, and act as an ade
quate pnnishment to the defendant." This
court set aside the verdict, because the in
struction given to the jury did not accurately
define the measure of the defendant,s liabil
ity; and. speaking by Mr. Justice Campbell,
stated the rules applicable to the case in these
words: “For acts done by the agents of the
corporation, either in oontractu or in dellcto,
in the course of its businessand of their em
ployment, the corporation is responsible, as
an individual is responsible under similar cir
cumstances." “Whenever the injury com
plained of has been indicted maliciously or
wantonly. and with circumstances of con
tumely or indignity’ the jury are not limited
to the ascertainment of a simple compensa
tion for the wrong committed against the ag
grieved pcrson. But the malice spoken of in
this rule is not merely the doing of an un
lawful or injurious act. The word implies
that the act complained of was conceived
in the spirit of mischief. or criminal indifffer
ence to civil obligations. Nothing of this
kind can be imputed to these defendants."
21 How. 210, 213, 214.
In liallway Co. v. Arms, which was an ac
tion against a railroad corporation, by a pas
senger injured in a collision caused by the
negligence of the servants of the corporation,
the jury were instructed thus: “it you find
that the accident was caused by the gross
negligence of the defendant,s servants con
iroiiim: the train, you may give to the plaintiff
punitive or exemplary damages." This court,
speaking by Mr. Justice Davis, and approving
and applying the rule of exemplary damages, '
as stated in .Quigley’s (Jase, held that this
was a misdirection, and that the failure of
the cmpioyes to use the care that was re
quired to avoid the accident, “whether called
‘gross“ or ‘ordinary‘ negligence, did not an
thori/.c the jury to visit the company with
damages beyond the limit of compensation
for the injury actually inflicted. To do this.
there must have been some willful miscon
duct, or that entire want of care which would
raise the presumption of a conscious indiEfer
ence to consequences. Nothing of this kind
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. planned and done.
edit be ‘imputed to the persons in charge of
the train; and the court. therefore, misdi
rected the jur ,." 91 U. B. 495.
In Railway Co. v. Harris, the railroad com
pany, as the record showed, by an armed
force of several hundred men, acting as its
agents and empioyes, and organized and com
manded by its vice president and assistant
general manager, attacked with deadly weap
(1n5 the agents and employes of another com
pany in possession of a railroad, and forcibly
drove them out, and in so doing fired upon
and injured one of them, who thereupon
brought an action against the corporation,
and recovered a verdict and judgment under
an instruction that the jury "were not lim
ited to compensatory damages. but could give
punitive or exemplary damages, if it was
found that the defendant acted with bad in
tent, and in pursuance of an unlawful pur
pose to forcibly take possession of the rail
way occupied by the other company, and in
so doing shot the plaintiff." This court,
speaking by Mr. Justice Harlan, quoted and
approved the rules laid down in Quigley,s
Case, and aflirmed the judgment, not because
any evil intent on the part of the agents of
the defendant corporation could of itself
make the corporation responsible for exem
plary or punitive damages, but upon the sin
gle ground that the evidence clearly showed
that the corporation, by its governing officers,
participated in and dircctcl all that was
122 U. S. 610, 7 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 1286.
"be president and general manager, or, in
h s absence. the vice president in his place,
actually wielding the whole executive power
of the corporation, may well be treated as so
fa ‘representing the corporation and identi
fit with it that any wanton, malicious, or
oppressive intent of his, in doing wrongful
acts in behalf of the corporation to the in






of a train, or other subon inate agent or serv
ant of a railroad corporation, occupies a very
ditferent position, and is no more identified
with his principal, so as to affect the latter
with his own unlawful and criminal intent,
titan any agent or servant standing in a cor
responding relation to natural persms carry
ing on a manufactory, a mine, or a house of
trade or commerce.
The law applicable to this case has been
vfound nowhere better stated than by Mr.
Justice Brayton, afterwards chief justice of
Rhodo Island, in the earliest reported case
of the kind, in which a passenger sued a rail
road corporation for his wrongful expulsion
from a train by the conductor, and recovered
a verdict, but excepted to an instruction to
the jury that “punitive or vindictive dam
ages, or smart money, were not to be allowed
as against the principal, unless the principal
participated in the wrongful act of the agent,
expressly or implledly, by his conduct an
thorizing it or approving it, either before or
after it was committed." This instruction
was held to be right, for the following rea
sons: “In cases where punitive or exemplary
damages have been assessed. it has been
done, upon evidence of such wlllfuiness, reck
lessness, or wickedness. on the part of the
party at fault, as amounted to criminality,
which for the good of society and warning
to the individual, ought to be punished. if
in such cases, or in any case of a civil nature,
it is the policy of the law to visit upon the
offender such exemplary damages as will
operate as punishment, and teach the lesson
of caution to prevent a repetition of criminal
ity, yet we do not see how such damages can
be allowed, where the principal is prosecuted
for the tortious act of his servant, unless
there is proof in the cause to implicate the
principal and make him particeps criminis of
his agent,s act. No man should be punished
for that of which he is not guilty." “Where
the proof does not implicate the principal,
and, however wicked the servant may have
been, the principal neither expressly nor im
plledly authorizes or ratifies the act. and the
criminality of it is as much against him as
against any other. member of society, we
think it is quite enough that he shall be liable
in compensatory damages for the injury sus
tained in consequence of the wrongful act of
a person acting as his servant." Hagan v.
Railroad Co., 3 R. I. 83, 91.
The like view was expressed by the court
of appeals of New York, in an action brought
against a railroad corporation by a passenger
for injuries suffered by the neglect of a
switchman, who was intoxicated at the time
of the accident. It was held that evidence
that the switehman was a man of intent
pcrate habits, which was known to the agent
of the company having the power to employ
and discharge him and other subordinates,
was competent to support a claim for ex
emplary damages, but that a direction to the
jury in general terms that in awarding dam
ages they might add to full compensation for
the injury "such sum for exemplary damages
as the case calls for, depending in a great
measure, of course, upon the conduct of the
defendant," entitled the defendant to a new
trial; and Chief Justice Church, delivering
the unanimous judgment of the court, stated
the rule as follows: “For injuries by the
negligence of a servant while engaged in the
business of the master, within the scope of his
employment, the latter is liable for compen
satory damages; but for such negligence,
however gross or culpable, he is not liable to
be punished in punitive damages unless he
is also chargeable with gross misconduct.
Such misconduct may be established by show
ing that the act of the servant was author
ized or ratified, or that the master employed
or retained the servant, knowing that he was
incompetent, or, from bad habits, unfit for
the position he occupied. Something more
than ordinary negligence is requisite; it must
be reckless, and of a criminal nature, and
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ch,\arl_v established. Corporations may incur
this liability as well as private persons. It a
milroad company, for instance, knowingly
and wantonly employs a drunken engineer
or switchman, or retains one after knowledge
of his habits is clearly brought home to the
t.mnpany, or to a superintending agent au
thorized to employ and discharge him, and in
_iury occurs by reason of such habits, the
company may and ought to be amenable
to the severest rule of damages; but I am not
aware of any principle which permits a jury
to award exemplary damages in a case which
does not come up to this st:mdard, or to
graduate the amount of such damages by
their views of the propriety of the conduct of
the defendant, unless such conduct is of the
character before specified." Clcghorn v.
Railroad Co., 56 N. Y. 44, 4?. 48.
Similar decisions, denying upon like grounds
the liability of railroad companies and other
corporations, sought to be charged with puni
tive damages for the wanton'or oppressive
acts of their agents or servants, not partic
ipated in or ratified by the corporation,
have been made by the courts of New Jenaey,
Pennsylvania. Delaware, lilichigan, Wiscon
sin. California, Louisiana, Alabama, Texas,
and West Virginia.
It must be admitted that there is a wide
divergence in the decisions of the state courts
upon this question, and that corporations
have been held liable for such damages un
der similar circumstances in New Hamp
shire, in .\Iaine, and in many of the western
and southern Stzltcs. But of the three lead
ing cases on that side of the question. Hop
kins v. Railroad Co., 36 N. H. 9, can hardly
be reconciled with the later decisions in Fay
v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342, and Bixby v. Dunlap,
56 N. H. 456; and in Goddard v. Railway Co.,
57 Maine, 202, 228, and Railway Co. v. Dunn,
IQIOIOvQ.
19 Ohio St. 162, 590. there were r ng11i§
senting opinions. In many, if not most, of the
other cases, either corporations were put
upon dliiferent grounds in this respect from
other principals, or else the distinction be
tween imputing to the corporation such
wrongful act and intent as would render it
liable to make compensation to the person
injnred, and imputiug to the corporation the
intent necessary to be established in order
to subject it to exemplary damages by way of
punishment, was overlooked or disregarded.
Most of the cases on both sides of the ques
tion, not speciiically cited above, are collected
,
in 1 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) i 380.
In the case at bar, the plnintil! does not ap
pear to have contended at the trial, or to
have introduced any evidence tending to
show, that the conductor was known to the
defendant to be an unsuitable person in any
respect. or that the defendant in any' way
participated in, approved, or ratified his treat
ment of the plaintiff; nor did the instructions
given to the jury require them to be satisfied
of any such fact; before awarding punitive
damages; but the only fact which they were
required to iiud, in order to support a claim
for punitive damages against the corpora
tion, was that the conductor’s illegal conduct
was wanton and oppressive. For this error.
as we cannot know how much of the verdict
was intended by the jury as a compensation
for the plaintiffs injury, and.how much by
way of punishing the corporation for an in
tent in which it had no part, the judgment
must be reversed, and the case remanded to
the circuit court, with directions to set aside
the verdict, and to order a new triaL
Mr. Justice FIELD, Mr. Justice HARLAN,
and Mr. Justice LAMAR took no part in this
decision.
26 EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
GODDARD v. GRAND TRUNK RY. OF
CANADA.
(57 Me. 202.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. 1869.
Action against the Grand Trunk Railway of
Canada to recover damages for an assault
made on a passenger by a brakeman in defend
ant,s employment. There was a verdict for
plaintiff, to which defendant excepted.
G. F. Shepley, for plaintiff. P. Barnes, for
_.defendant.
WALTON, J. Two questions are presented
for our consideration: First, is the common
carrier of passengers responsible for the will
ful misconduct of his servant? or, in other
words, if a passenger who has done nothing
to forfeit his right to civil treatment, is as
.saulted and grossly insulted by one of the
carrler’s servants, can he look to the carrier
for redress? and, secondly, if he can. what is
the measure of relief which the law secures
tohim? These are questions that deeply
concern, not only the numerous railroad and
steamboat companies engaged in the trans
portation of passengers, but also the whole
traveling public; and we have endeavored to
give them . that consideration which their
great importance has seemed to us to de
mand.
if.“Qf the carri
, It appears in
evidence. that the plaintiff was a passenger
in the defendants’ railway car; that, on re
quest. he surrendered his ticket to a brake
man employed on the train, who, in the ab
sencc of the conductor, was authorized to
demand and receive it; that the brakeman
afterwards approached the plaintliif, and, in
language coarse, profane. and grossly insult
ing, denied that he had either surrendered or
shown him his ticket; that the brakeman
called the plaintiff a liar, charged him with
attempting to avoid the payment of his fare,
and with having done the same thing before,
and threatened to split his head open and
spill his brains right there on the spot; that
the brakeman stepped forward and placed
his foot upon the seat on which the plaintiff
was sitting, and, leaning over the plaintiff,
brought his fist close down to his face, and
that, in fact, he had paid his fare, had rct.elv
ed a ticket, and had surrendered it to this
very brakeman who delivered it to the con
ductor only a few minutes before, by whom
it was afterwards produced and identified;
that the defendants were immediately noti
fied of the misconduct of the brakeman, but,
instead of discharging him, retained him in
his place; that the brakeman was still in
the defendants’ employ when the case was
tried and was present in court during the
trial. but was not called as a witness, and no
attempt was made to justify or excuse his
conduct.
Upon this evidence the defendants contend
that they are not liable, because, as they say.
the brakeman,s assault upon the plaintlff
was willful and malicious, and was not di
rectly nor implledly authorized by them.
They say the substance of the whole case is
this, that “the master is not responsible as a.
trespasser, unless by direct or implied au
thority to the’ servant, he consents to the un
lawful act."
The fallacy of this argument, when applied \to the common carrier of passengers, consists
in not discriminating between the obligation
which he is under to his passenger, and the
duty which he owes a stranger. It may be
true that if the carrier’s servant willfully
and maliciously assaults a stranger, the mas
ter will not be liable; but the law is other
wise when he assaults one of his master,s
passengers. The carrier,s obligation is tq‘
carry his passenger safely and properly, and
to treat him respectfully, and if he intrnsts‘
the performance of this duty to his servants,
the law holds him responsible for the man
ner in which they execute the trust. The
law seems to be now well settled that
the‘)carrier is obliged to protect his passenger’
from violence and insult. from
whatever)source arising. He is not regarded as an in
surer of his passenger’s safety against every
possible source of danger; but he is bound to -
use all such reasonable preca,utions as human
judgment and foresight are capable of, to
make his passenger,s journey safe and com
fortable. He must not only protect his pas
senger against the violence and insults of.
strangers and co-passengers, but a fortloI‘i,
against the violence and insults of his own
servants.shaking it violently, told him not to yip, if
he did he would spot him, that he was a
damned liar, that he never handed him his
ticket. that he did not believe he paid his
fare either way; that this assault was con
tinued some fifteen or twenty minutes. and
until the whistle sounded for the next sta
If this duty to the passenger is \f
not performed, if this protection is not fur- \.
nished, but on the contrary, the passenger is 1
assaulted and insulted, through the negii- .
gence or the willful misconduct of the car- '




tlon; that there were several passengers
present in the car. some of whom were
ladies. and that they were all strangers to
the plaintiff; that the plaintiff was at the
time in feeble health, and had been for
some time under the care of a physician, and
at the time of the assault was reclining lan
guidly in his .4‘.at; that he had neither said
nor done anything to provoke the assault;
And it seems to us it would be cause of
profound regret if the law were otherwise.
The carrier selects his own servants and can
discharge them when he pleases, and it ’s
but reasonable that he should be responsible
for the manner in which they execute their
trust. To their care and fidelity are intrust
ed the lives and limbs and comfort and con
venience of the whole traveling public, and it
EXE .\l i’LA RY DAMAGES. 27.
is cortainly as important that these servants
should be trustworthy as it is that they
should be competent. It is not sufficient that
they are capable of doing well, if in fact
they choose to do ill; that they can be as
polite as a Chesterfield, if, in their inter
course with the passengers, they choose to '
be coarse, brutal, and profane. The best se-
v
curity the traveler can have that these serv
ants will be selected with care, is to hold
those by whom the selection is made respon
sible for their conduct. {
This liability of the master is very clearly
expressed in a recent case in Massachusetts.
The court say, that wherever there is a con
tract between the master and another per
son, the master is responsible for the acts of ,
his servant in executing that contract, a1- |
though the act is fraudulent and done with
out his consent. Howe v. Newmarch, 12 Al
len, 55 (paragraph nearest the bottom of the
page). And Messrs. Angeli and Ames, in
their work on Corporations ([8th Ed.] p. 404,
§ 38), say: “A distinction exists as to the .
of its servant toward one to whom the corpof
ration owes no duty except such as each citi- .
(liability
of a corporation for the willful tort{
_zen owes to every other; and that toward'
one who has entered into some peculiar con
tract with the corporation by which this duty ,
is increased; thus it. has been held that a ,
railroad corporation is liable for the willful '
tort of its servants whereby a passenger on I
the train is injured." i
In Brand v. Railroad Co., 8 Barb. 368, the ‘
court say, a passenger on board a stage-coach ‘
or railroad-car, and a person on foot‘in the
‘
street, do not stand in the same relation to i
the carrier. Toward the one the liability of i
the carrier springs from a contract, ex- i
press or implied, and upheld by an adequate I
consideration. Toward the other he is under
‘
no obligation but that of justice and humani- i
ty. Hence a passenger, who is injured by a 1
servant of the carrier, may have a right of
action against‘ him when one not a passen
ger, for a similar injury, would not.
In .\10ore v. Railroad Co., 4 Gray, 465, the ‘
plaintiff was forcibly put out of a car for not
giving up his ticket or paying his fare, when 1
in fact he had already surrendered his ticket
v
to some one employed on the train. The de
fendants insisted that they were not respon
slble for the misconduct of the conductor;
and further, that an action for an assault
would not lie against a corporation. But the
court held otherwise, and the plaintiff recov
ered.
In Seymour v. Greenwood, 7 iiuri. & N. '
354, the plaintiff was assaulted and taken
out of the defendant’s omnibus by one .if
his servants. The defendant insisted that
he was not liable, because it did not appear
that be authorized or sanctioned the act of
‘
the servant. But it was held in the ex
chequer chamber. afllrmiug the judgment of
the exchequer court. that the jury did right
in returning a verdict for the plaintiff.
In Railroad Co. v. Finncy, 10 Wis. 388. the
plaintiff was unlawfully put out of a car by
the conductor. After stating that it was in
sisted, by the counsel for the railroad, that
in no case could a cause of action arise
against the principal for the willful miscon
duct of the agent, thg court went on to say,
that after a careful examination of the posi
tion, they were satisfied it was not correct;
that where the misconduct of the agent
causes a breach of the principai’s contract,
he will be liable whether such misconduct
be willful or merely negligent.
In Railroad Co. v. Vandiver, 42 Pa. St. 365,
a passenger received injuries, of which he
died, by being thrown from the platform of
a railroad car because he refused to pay his
fare or show his ticket, he averring he had
bought one but could not find it. The evi
dence showed he was partially intoxicated.
It was urged in defense that if the passen
ger,s death was the result of force and vio
lence, and not the result of negligence, then
(such force and violence being the act of the
agents alone without any comrnirnd or order
of the company) the company was not re
sponsible therefor. But the court held oth
crwise. "A railway company," said the
court, “selects its own agents at its own
pleasure, and it is bound to employ none
except capable,,prudent, and humane men.
In the present case the company and its
agents were all liable for the injury done to
the deceased."
In Weed v. Railroad Co., 17 N. Y. 362, the
jury found specially that the act of the serv
ant by which the plaintiff was injured, was
willful. The court held the willfuiness of
the act did not defeat the plaintiffs right to
. look to the railroad company for redress.
In Railroad Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 4(%.
where the servant of a railroad company
took an engine and run it over the road for
his own gratification, not only without con
sent, but contrary to express orders, the su
preme ccurt of the United States held that
the railroad company was responsible.
In Railway Co. v. Hinds, 53 Pa. St. 512, a
, passenger,s arm was broken in a fight be
tween some drunken persons that forced
their way into the car at a station near an
agricultural fair, and the company was held
‘
responsible, because the conductor went on
collecting fares, and did"not stop the train
and expel the rioters, or demonstrate, by an
earnest effort, that it was impossible to do
so.
In Flint v. Transportation Co., 34 Conn.
554, where the plaintiff was injured by the
discharge of a gun dropped by some soldiers
engaged in a scuffle, the court held that pas
senger carriers are bound to exercise the ut
most vigilance and care to guard those they
transport from violence from ‘whatever
sourcc arising; and the plaintiff recovered a
verdict for $10,000.
In Landreaux v. Bell, 5 La. 0. S. 275. the
court say, that carriers are responsible for
,n.___L________-2-------———=-————-—~=
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the misconduct of their servants toward pas
sengers to the same extent as for their mis
conduct in regard to merchandise committed
to their care; that no satisfactory distinction
(v can be
drawn between the two cases.
; In Chamberlain v. Chandler, 3 Mason, 2422,
1 Judge Story declared lg language strong and
emphatic, that a passenger,s contract enti
v ties him to respectful treatment; and he ex
pressed the hope that every violation of this
right would be visited, in the shape of dam
ages, with its appropriate punishment.
In Nieto v. Clark, 1 Cliff. 145, where the
steward of the ship assaulted and grossly in
sulted a female passenger, Judge Clifford de
clares, in language equally emphatic, that
the contract of all passengers entitles them
to respectful treatment and protection
against rudeness and every wanton interfer
ence with their persons from all those in
charge of the ship; that the conduct of the
s"teward disqualified him for his situation,
and justiiied the master in immediately dis
charging him, although the vessel was then
in a foreign ‘port. And we have his authori
ty for saying that he has recently examined
the question with care, in a case pending
in the Rhode Island district, where the clerk
of a steamboat unjustifiably assaulted and
maltreated a passenger, and that he enter
tains no doubt of the carrier‘s liability to
compensate the passenger for the injury thus
received, whether the carrier previously au
thorized or subsequently ratified the assault
or not. A report of the case will soon be
published. See 3 Cliff.
And ll, recent and well-considered case in
Ziiaryland (published since this case has been
pending before the law court, and very much
like it in all respects). fully sustains this
view of the law. Railroad Co. v. Biocher,
\_27 no. 77.‘
The grounds of the carrier’s liability may
be briefiy stated thus:
The law requires the common carrier of
passengers to exercise the highest degree of
care that human judgment and foresight are
capable of, to make his passenger’s journey
safe. Whoever engages in the business im
pliedly promises that his passenger shall
have this degree of care. In other words,
the carrier is conclusively presumed to have
promised to do what, under the circumstan
ces, the law requires him to do. We say
conclusively presumed, for the law will not
allow the carrier by notice or special con
tract even to deprive his passenger of this
degree of care. If the passenger does not
have such care, but on the contrary is un
lawfully assaulted and insulted by one of the
very persons to whom his conveyance is in
trusted, the carrier,s implied promise is bro
ken’ and his legal duty is left unperformed,
and he is necessarily responsible to the pas
senger for the damages he thereby sustains.
The passenger,s remedy may be either in
assumpsit or tort, at his election. In the
one case, he relies upon a breach of the
carrier,s common-law duty in support of his
action; in the other, upon a breach of his
implied promise. The form of the action is
important only upon the question of dam
ages. In 3gtions4t3fM8_g§‘ttwt_iip*sit,_the damages
are generally limited to compensation. In
actions ofIto_rt,‘ the jury atiewaliowed greaterlatmtiti. in _[‘)’t.:oper"t.Ulises, may give ex
emplary damages.
II. We now come to the second branch of
the ase. What i .t:eiicf
\viaich th.enlaw securesto the .in-iuregl_p_a_rfit-)';
or, in other words, can he recover exemplary
damages? We hol that b can. The right
of the jury to give exemplary damages for
injuries wantonly, recklessly, or maliciously
inflicted, is as old as the right of trial by
jury itself; and is not, as many seem to su
pose, an innovation upon the rules of tit
common law. It was settled in England
more than a century ago.
In 1763, Lord Chief Justice Pratt (after
wards Earl of Camden), with whom the oth
er judges concurred, declared that the jury
had done right in giving exemplary damages.
Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 2(i;'>.‘
In another case the same learned judge
declared with emphasis, that damages are .
designed not only as a satisfaction to the in
jured person, but likewise as a punishment
to the guilty. 5 Camp. Lives Chan. (Am
Ed.) p. 214. .
In 1814, the doctrine of punitive damages
was stringently applied in a case where the
defendant, in a state of intoxication, forced
himself into the plaintiffs company, and in
solently persisted in hunting upon his
grounds. The plaintiff recovered a verdict
for five hundred pounds, the full amount of
his ad damnum, and the court refused to
set it aside. Mr: Justice Heath remarked
in this case that he remembered a case where
the jury gave five hundred pounds for mere
ly knocking a man,s hat off, and the court
refused a new trial. It goes, said he, to pre
vent the praciice of dueling,‘ if juries are
permitted to punish insult by exemplary
damages. Merest v. Harvey, 5 Taunt. 442.
See. also, to the same effect. Sears v. Lyon,
2 Starkie, 317 (decided in 1818).
In 1844. Lord Chief Baron Pollock said, that
in actions formalicious injuries, juries had
always been allowed to give what are called
vindictive damages. ‘Doe v. Filliter, 13 Mees.
& W. 50.
In 1858, in an action of trespass for tak
ing personal property on a fraudulent bill
of sale, the defendant,s counsel contended
that it was not a case for the application
of the doctrine of exemplary damages; but
the court held otherwise. No doubt, said
Pollock, C. B., it was a case in which vin
dictive damages might be given. Thomas v.
Harris. 3 Iluri. & N. 961.
In 1860, in an action for willful negligence,
the defendant contended that the plaintiffs
declaration was too defective to entitle him
to exemplary damages; but the court held .
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otherwise; and the judge who tried the case
remarked that he was glad the court had
come to the conclusion that it was competent
for the jury to give exemplary damages, for
he thought the defendant had acted with a
high hand. Emblen v. Myers, 6 Hurl. & N.
5i. .
“Dann_1ges.exemplary," is now a familiar
titie’in the best English law reports. See
6 Hurl. & N. 969.
it was the firmness with which Lord Cam
den (then Chief Justice Pratt) maintained and
enforced the right of the jury to punish with i
exemplary damages the agent of Lord Hal
ifax (then secretary of state) for the illegal
arrest of the publishers of the North Briton,
that made him so immensely popular in Eng
land. Nearly or quite twenty of those cases
appear to have been tried before him, in all
of which enormous damages were given, and
in not one of them was the verdict set aside.
In one of the cases a verdict for a thousand
pounds was returned for a mere nominal im
prisonment at the house of the officer mak
ing the arrest, and the court refused to set it
aside. Beilrdmore v. Carrington, 2 Wils.
2-i4.
“After this," says Lord Campbell, in his
Lives of the Chancellors, “he became the
idol of the nation. Grim representations of.
him laid down the law from sign-posts, many
busts and prints of him were sold not only
in the streets of the metropolis. but in the
provincial towns; a fine portrait of him, by
Sir Joshua Reynolds, with the flattering in
scription, ‘in honor of the zealous asserter
of English liberty by law,‘ was placed in
the guildhall of the city of London; ad
dresses of thanks to him poured in from all
quarters; and one of the sights of London,
which foreigners went to see, was the great
Lord Chief Justice Pratt."
v
In this country, perhaps Lord Camden is
better known as one of the able English
statesmen who so eloquently defended the
American colonies against the unjust claim
of the mother country to tax them. Lord Camp
bell says some portions of his peeches upon
that subject are still in the mouths of school
boys. But in England his immense popularity
originated in his firm and vigorous enforce
ment of the doctrine of exemplary damages.
And we cannot discover that th€1EEaTity of
his rulings in this particular was ever seri
ously called in question. On the contrary,
we find it admitted by his political opponents
that he was a profound jurist and an able and
upright judge. His stringent enforcement of
the right of the jury to punish flagrant
wrongs with exemplary damages, arrested
not only great abuses then existing, but it
has had a salutary influence ever since. It
won for him the title of the “aserter of
English liberty by law."
In this country the right of the jury to
give exemplary damages has been much dis
cussed. it seems to have been first opposed
by .\ir. Theron Metcalf (afterwards reporter
and judge of the supreme court of ‘.\Iassachu
setts), m an article published in 3 Am. Jur.
387, in 1830. The substance of this article
was afterwards inserted in a note to Mr.
Greenleaf‘s work on Evidence. Mr. Sedg
wick, in his work on Damages, took the op
posite view, and sustained his position by
the citation of numerous authorities. Profes.~;
or Greenleaf replied in an article int 9
Bost. Law Rep. 529. Mr. Sedgwick rejoined
in the same periodical (volume 10, ,. 49).
Essays on different sides of the question
were also published in 3 Am. Law Mag. N.
S. 537. and 4 Am. Law Mag. N. S. 61. But
notwithstanding this formidable opposition,
the doctrine triumphed, and must be regard
ed as now too firmly established to be shaken
by anything short of legislative enactments.
In fact the decisions of the courts are nearly
unanimous in its favor.
In a case in the supreme court of the
United States, .\Ir. Justice Grier, in delivering
the opinion of the court, says, it is a well
established principle of the common law, that
in all actions for torts the jury may inflict
what are called punitive or exemplary dam
ages having in view the enormity of the
offense rather than the measure of compensa
tion to the plaintlff. “We are aware." the
judge continues, “that the propriety of this
doctrine has been questioned by some writers;
but if repeated judicial decisions for more
than a century are to be received as the
best exposition of what the law is. the ques
tion will not admit of argument." Day‘ v.
\Voodworth, 13 How. 363.
1n a case in North Carolina. the court refer
to the note in Professor Greenleaf’s work on
Evidence, and say that it is very clearly wrong
with respect to the authorities; and in their
judgment wrong on principle; that it is fortu
nate that while juries endeavor to give ample
compensation for the injury actually received,
they are also allowed such full discretion as
to make verdicts to deter others from fla
grunt violations of social duty. And the
same court hold that the wealth lTf"fhe0de
fendant isa proper circumstance to be weigh
ed by the jury. because a thousand dollars
may be 1i‘less>punishment to one man than
a hundred dollars to another. In one case
the same court sustained a verdict which in
terms assessed the actual damages at $100,
and the exemplary damages at $1,000. The
court held it was a good verdict for $1,100.
Pendloton v. Davis, 1 Jones (N. C.) ‘J8; .\Ic
Aulay v. Birkhead, 13 Ired. 28; Gilrcath v.
Allen, 10 Ired. 67.
In fact, Professor Greenleaf is himself an
authority for the doctrine of exemplary dam
ages. Speaking of the action for assault and
battery, he says the jury are not confined to
the mere corporal injury, but may consider the
malice of the defendant, the insulting char
acter of his conduct, the rank in life of the
several parties. and all the circumstances of
the outrage, and thereupon award such ex
emplary damages as the circumstances may
__ ,_=:._10_._.. -_‘,“e.,__-_..==*._-A
30 EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
in their judgment require. 2 Gt.eenl. Ev. § 89.
But if the great weight of Professor Green
leafs authority were to be regarded as op
posed to the doctrine, we have, on the other
hand, the great weight .of Chancellor Kent,s
opinion in favor of it. He mys, surely this
is the true and salutary doctrine. And after
reviewing the English cases, he continues by
saying it cannot be necessary to multiply in
stances of its application; that it is too well
settled in practice, and too valuable in prin
ciple to be called in question. Tiilotson v.
Cheetham, 3 Johns. 56, 64.
This brief review of the doctrine of ex
emplary damages is not .so much for the pur
pose of establishing its existence, as to cor- l
rect the erroneous impression which some
members of the legal profession still seem to
entertain, that it is a modern invention, not ‘
sanctioned by the rules of the common law.
We think every candid-minded person must
admit that it is no new doctrine; that its ex
istence as a fundamental rule of the common
law has been recognized in England for more
than a century; that it has been there strin
gently enforced under circumstances which
would not have allowed it to pass.unchal
lenged, if any pretext could have been found
for doubting its validity; and that in this
country, notwithstanding an early and.vig
orous opposition, it has steadily progressed,
and that the decisions of the courts are now
nearly unanimous in its favor. It was sanc
tioned in this state, after a careful and full
review of the authorities, in Pike v. Dilling,
48 Me. 539, and cannot now be regarded as
an open question.\ But it is said that if the doctrine of ex
be reg’gried as es- 1emplary damage mu
tablished in ‘suits against natural
v
persons
for their own ‘willful and malicious torts, it
ought not to be :iTpii€d"to Hiflioraflons for
the torts of their servants,’ especially where
the tort is committed by a servant of so low
a grade as a brakemun on a railway train
and the tortious act was not directly nor im
piiedly authorized nor ratified by the corpora
tion; and several cases are cited by the defend
ants‘ counsel, in which the courts seem to
have taken this view of the law; but we
have carefully examined these cases, and in
none of them was there any evidence that the
servant acted wantonly or maliciously; they
were simply cases of mistaken duty; and
what these same courts would have done if
a case of such gross and outrageous insult had v
been before them, as is now before us, it is
impossible to say; (and long experience has
shown that nothing is more dangerous than
to rely upon the abstract reasoning of courts,
when the casesbefore them did not call for
the application of the doctrines which their
reasoning is intended to establish._7
We have given to this objection much con
sideration, as it was our duty to do, for the.
presiding judge declined to instruct the jury
that if the acts and words of the defendants’




thorized nor ratified by the defendant, the




"e confess that it seems to us that
there s no class of cases where the doctrine
of exemplary damages can_b?’E1'5_HeM1efi-.
ciaily applied than to railroad“cbi,fi>’r7i_ons
in their capacity of common earriéi’s"o'f_pas
sengers; and it might a.s well not be applied
to them at all as to limit its application to
cases where the servant is directly M
pliedly commanded by the corporation to
maltreat and insult a passenger, or to cases
where such an act is directly or Implied
ly ratified; for no such cases will ever oci
cur. A corporation is an imaginary being‘.
It has no mind but the mind of its servants’;
it has no voice but the voice of its servants;.‘
and it has no hands with which to act but;
the hands of its servants. All its schemes off,
mischief, as well as its schemes of public en
terprise, are conceived by human minds and
executed by human hands; and these minds
and hands are its servants’ minds and hands.
All attempts, therefore, to distinguish be
tween the guilt of the servant and the guilt
of the corporation; or the malice of the serv
ant and the malice of the corporation; or the
punishment of the servant and the punish
ment of the corporation, is sheer nonsense;
and only tends to confuse the mind and con
found the judgment Neither guilt, malice,‘
nor suffering is predicable of thi ideal ex
istence, called a corpmation. And yet under
cover of its name and authority, there is in
fact as much wickedness, and as much that
is deserving of punishment, as can be found
anywhere else. And since these ideal exist
ences can neither be hung, imprisoned. whip-
ped, or put in the stocks,—since in fact no
corrective influence can be brought to bear
upon them except that of pecuniary loss,—it
does seem to us that the doctrine of exem
plary damages is more beneficial in its ap
plication to them, than in its application to
If those who are in the
1 habit of thinking that i
t is a terrible hard
ship to punish an innocent corporation for
the wickedness of its agents and servants;
will for a moment reflect upon the absurdity
of their own thoughts, their anxiety will be
cured. Careful engineers can be selected
who will not run their trains into open draws:
and careful baggage men can be secured,.
who will not handle and smash trunks and
band-boxes as is now the universal cutom;
and conductors and brakemen can be had‘
who will not assault and insult passengers:
and if the courts will only let the verdicts
of upright and intelligent juries alone, and
let the doctrine of exemplary damages have
its legitimate influence, we predict these
great and growing evils will be very much.
lessened, if not entirely cured. There is but
one vuinerable point about these ideal exist
ences, called corporations; and that is. the
pocket of the monied power that is concealed‘
behind them; and if that is reached they will‘
'.wince. When it is thoroughly understood
“
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that it is not profitable to employ careless
and indifferent agents, or reckless and inso
lent servants, better men will take their pla
ces, and not before.
It is our judgment, therefore, that actions
against corporations, for the willful and ma
licious acts of their agents and servants in
executing the business of the corporaticn,
should not form exceptions to the rule allow
ing exemplary damages. On the contrary,
we think this is the very class of cases, of
all others, where it will do the most good,
and where it is most needed. And in this
conclusion we are sustained by several of the
ablest courts in the country.
In a case in .\Iississippl, the plaintiff was
carried four hundred yards beyond the sta
tion where he had told the conductor he
wished to stop; and he requested the con
ductor to run the train back, but the conduct
or refused, and told the plaintiff .to get off
the train or he would carry him to the next
station. The plaintiff got off and walked
back, carrying his valise in his hand. The
plaintiff testified that the conductor,s manner
toward him was insolent, and the defendants
having refused to discharge him, the jury re
turned a verdict for four thousand five hun
dred dollars, and the court refused to set it
aside. They said the right of the jury to
protect the public by punitive oamages, and
thus prevent these great public blessings
from being converted into the most danger
ous nuisances, was conclusively settled; and
they hoped the verdict would have a stain
tary influence upon their future management.
Railroad Co. v. Hurst, 36 Miss. (360.
In New Hampshire, in an action against
this identical road, where, through gross
carelessness, there was a collision of the
passenger train with a freight train, and the
plaintiff was thereby injured, the judge at
nisi prius instructed the jury that it was a
proper case for exemplary damages; and the
full court sustained the ruling, saying it
was a subject in which all the traveling pub
lic were deeply interested; that railroads had
practically monopolized the transportation
of passengers on all the principal lines of
travel, and there ought to be no lax adminis
tration of the law in such cases; and that it
would be difiicult to suggest a case more loud
ly calling for an exemplary verdict. (If mere
carelessness, however gross, calls loudly for
an exemplary verdict. what shall be said of
an injury that is willful and grossly insult
ing?) Hopkins v. Railroad Co., 36 N. H. 9.
Judge Redfield, in his very able and useful
work on Railways, expresses the opinion
that there is quite as much necessity for
holding these companies liable to exemplary
damages as their agents. He says it is difli
cult to perceive why a passenger, who suffers
iDndignity and insult from the conductor of
a train, should be compelled to show an ac
tual ratification of the act, in order to sub
ject the company to exemplary damages. 2
Redf. R. R. 231, note. But if such a ratifi
cation is necessary, he thinks the corpora
tion, which is a mere legal entity, inappre
ciable to sense, should be regarded as always
present in the person of its servant, and as
directing and ratifying the servant’s acts
within the scope of his employment, and thus
be made responsible for his willful miscon
duct. 1 Redf. R. R. 515 et seq.
And in a recent case in Maryland (publish
ed since this case has been pending before
the law court), a case in all respects very
similar to the one we are now considering,
the presiding judge was requested to instruct
the jury that the plaintiff was not entitled
to recover vindictive or punitive damages
from the defendants, unless they expressly
or impliedly participated in the tortleus act,
authorizing it before or approving it after it
was committed; but the presiding justice
refused so to instruct the jury, and the full
court held that the request was properly re
jected; that it was settled that where the
injury for which compensation in damages
is sought, is accompanied by force or malice,
the injured party is entitled to recover exem
plary damages. Railroad Co. v.
Biocherf7\Id. 277. . '
But the defendants say that the damages
awarded by the jury are excesive, and they
move to have the verdict set aside and a
new trial granted for that reason. That the
verdict in this case is highly punitive, and
was so designed by the jury, cannot be doubt
ed; but by whose judgment is it to be meas
ured to determine whether or not it is ex
cessive? What standard shall be used? It
is a case of wanton insult and injury to
the plaintiff,s character, and feelings of self
respect, and the damages can be measured
by no property standard. It is a case where
the judgment will be very much influenced
by the estimation in which character. self
respect, and freedom from insult are held.
To those who set a very low value on char
acter, and think that pride and self-respect
exist only to become objects of ridicule and
sport, the damages will undoubtedly be con
sidered excessive. It would not be strange
if some such persons, measuring the sensibil
ities of others by their own low standard,
should view this verdict with envy, and re
gret that somebody will not assault and in
sult them, if such is to be the standard of
compensation. While others, who feel that
character and self-respect are above all price,
more valuable than life itself even, will re
gard the verdict as none too large. We re
peat, therefore, that it is a case where men,s
. judgments will be likely to differ. And sup
pose the court is of opinion that the dam
ages in this case are greater, much greater
even, than they would have awarded. does
it therefore follow that the judgment of the
court is to be substituted for that of the
jury? By no means. It is the wisdom of theV
law to suppose that the judgment of the jury
is more likely to be right than the judgment
of the court, for it is to the former and not
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to the latter that the duty of estimating dam
ages is confidsi. Unless the damages are so
large as to satisfy the court that the verdict
was not the result of an honest exercise of
judgment, they have no right to set it aside.
A careful examination of the case fails to
satisfy us that the jury acted dishonestly, or
that they made any mistake in their appli
cation of the doctrine of exemplary dama
ges. We have no doubt that the highly puni
tive character of their verdict is owing to
the fact that, after Jackson,s misconduct was
known to the defendants, they still retained
him in their service. The jury undoubtedly
felt that it was due to the plaintiff, and due
to every other traveller upon that road, to
have him instantly discharged; and that to I
retain him in his place, and thus shield and
protect him against the protestation of the
plaintiff, made to the servant himself at the
time of the assault, that he would lose his
place, was a practical ratification and ap
proval of the servant,s conduct, and would
be so understood by him and by every other
servant on the road.
And when we consider the violent, long
continued, and grossly insulting character of
the assault; that it was made upon a per
son in feeble health, and was accompanied
by language so coarse, profane, and brutal;
that so far as appears it was wholly unpro- ,
voked; we confess we are amazed at the con- I
duct of the defendants in not instantly dis
charging Jackson. Thus to shield and pro
tect him in his insolence, deeply implicated
them in his guilt. It was such indifference
to the treatment the plaintiff had received,
such indifference to the treatment that other
travelers might receive, such indifference to
the evil influence which such an example
would h,ave upon the servants of this and
other lines of public travel, that we are not
prepared to say the jury acted unwiscly in
making their verdict highly punitive. We
cannot help feeling that if we should inter
fere and set it aside, our action would be‘
most unfortunate and detrimental to the pub
lic interests. On the contrary, if we allow it
to stand, we cannot doubt that its iniiuence
will be salutary. It will be an impressive
lesson to these defendants, and to the man
agers of other lines of public travel, of the
risk they incur when they retain in their
service servants known to be reckless, ill
mannered, and unfit for their places. And it
will encourage those who may suffer insult
and violence at the hands of such servants,
not to retaliate or attempt to become their
own avengers, as is too often done, but to
trust to the law and to the courts of jus
tice, for the redress of their grievances. It
will say to them, be patient and iaw-abid
ing, and your redress shall surely come, and
in such measure as will not add insult to
your previous injury.
On the whole, we cannot doubt that it is
best for all concerned that this verdict be
allowed to stand.
We see nothing in the rulings or charge of
the presiding judge, of which the defendants
can justly complain. And there is nothing
to satisfy us that the jury were prejudiced
or unduly biased; or that they made any
mistake either as to the facts or the law.
Our conclusion, therefore, is, that the excep
tions and motion must be overruled.
Motion and exceptions overruled.
'
APPLETON, C. J., and DICKERSON,
BARROWS, and DAN l<‘Oli,1,H, JJ ., concurred.
TAPLEY, .I., ‘did not concur upon the ques
tion of damages, and gave his opinion as fol
lows:
In so much of the opinion of Mr. Justice
1 WALTON.as determines the question of the
liability of the defendants to answer in dam
ages for the acts of the brakeman Jackson I
concur; but I do not concur in sustaining the
rulings of the court at the trial of the cause
fixing the rule of damage for the jury; and I
‘ regard it so clearly wrong in principle, in
equitable and unjust in practice, and so en
tirely wanting in precedent, that my duty re
quires something more than a silent dissent.
So much of the opinion as discusses the
right of a jury to give in civil actions puni
tive damages, I do not propose now to re
view or express any opinion of or concerning,
but it is to the application of the rule made
in this case by the justice presiding at the
trial of the cause. The rulings upon this
matter are happily so clearly expressed and
positive in terms, that no reasonable doubt
concerning the proposition involved in them
can be entertained. if by possibility any
doubt could have arisen concerning them, the
opinion he has drawn in the case sets them
at rest.
The case shows that “on the subject of
damages the presiding justice instructed the
jury as follows: If the plaintiff has proved
his case so that he is entitled to recover
some damages, the question arises how much.
That is a question which you must deter
mine, being guided by the rules of law as I
shall state them to you. In the first place,
the plaintiff is entitled to such damages as
he has actually suffered, and in estimating
the amount, you will not be limited to what
' he has lost in dollars and cents. In fact,
there is no evidence that he has suffered pe
cuniarily to any extent. You are to consider
. the injury to his feelings, his wounded pride,
his wounded self-respect, his mental pain
and suffering, occasioned by the assault, and
the feeling of degradation that necessarily
resulted from it. There are few men proba
bly that would not rather suffer a severe
pecuniary loss than a personal and insulting
assault. Hence if one man should spit in
‘ another’:-3 face in public, the jury would not
be limited to ten cents damages on the
ground that that sum would pay him for
washing his face. A man,s feelings, self-re
I spect, and pride of charuct»er are as much an
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der the protection of the law in such case as
his property. And in estimating the dam
ages for a personal assault attended with
opprobrious and insulting language, the jury
have a right to consider the character and
standing of the person assaulted, and the in
jury to his feelings, as well as the injury to
his person, and then to give him such dam
ages as, in view of all the circumstances,
will be a just compensation for the injury
actually suffered. This amount must be left,
in every case, to the sound judgment and
discretion of the jury."
Pausing at this point of the instructions,
we shall notice that they embrace all the el
ements of compensatory damages recognized
by courts of the most liberal views in these
matters; and embrace elements which many
courts denominate exemplary; and they are
stated in so clear and concise a manner, and
accmnpanied by so forcible an illustration,
that had they stopped at this point the plain
tiff might well have expected his verdict to
cover the utmost his injuries would war
With the rule thus far I am content,
although carrying it to the very verge and
utmost limit of precedent. I call attention
to it at this point to show that the jury had,
at this time, instructions which covered all
the tangible and intangible elements of as
sessment in such cases Instructions which
if adhered to and followed by the jury re
store him to the condition in which the as
saulting party found him, so far as money
can do it. Under these instructions he is to
be made whole in the eyes of the law, just
as if the injury had not been done; in every
particular compensated so far as money can
do it; what is done bevond is not to com
pensate, it is not to meet mere speculative or
intangible injuries, is not to give him any
thing due him. for he has his full desert.
These elements reach everything he, as an
individual, can claim by reason of any in
fringement of his rlglits.
These instructions having been given, so
full, clear, and liberal, the presiding judge
proceeds to give the next element of damage,
which has not for its basis any injury, inva
sion of right or privilege, discomfort, incon
venience, or indeed anything relating to the
plaintiff, or anything in which he has any in
terest above that possessed by every other
member of the community. It is not act or
deed, word or menaee,—these have all been
adjusted; but it is mere motive, thought, in
terest, and secret desire. Being evil, mor
ally wrong, somebody must be punished for
their existence, and the judge says:
“There is also another important rule of
law bearing upon the question of damages.
if the injury was wanton, malicious, com
mitted in reckless and willful disregard of
the rights of the injured party, the law ai
iows the jury to give what is called punltory
or exemplary damages. It blends the inter
ests of the injured party with those of the
public, and permits the jury not only to give
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damages sufficient to, compensate the plain
tiff, but also.to punish the defendants. I
feel it my duty, however, to say, that you
ought to be very cautious in the application
of this rule. The law does not require you
to give exemplary damages in any case, and
where the damages which the plaintlff is en
titled to recover in order to compensate him
for the injury he has actually suffered is
sufiicient to punish the defendants, and serve
as a warning and example to others, the jury
ought not to give more. But if they think
it is not enough, then the law allows them
to add such further sum as will make it
enough for that purpose. But they should
be careful in fixing the amount not to allow
more than is just and reasonable, and not
to allow their judgment to be swerved by
their passions. Defendants’ counsel request
ed the presiding judge to instruct the jury,
that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover
against the defendant company, any greater
damages than he might against Jackson
himself, for the same cause of action upon
similar evidence. Upon which request the
presiding judge stated to the jury: I de
cline to give you such instruction. I have
endeavored to give you the correct rules by
which the damages, if any, are to be as
sessed in this case; and I think you cannot
rightfully be required to enter into ,9, con
sideration of the damages which a party not
now before the court, and has not thereiore
had an opportunity to be heard, ought to
pay, and then measure the damages in this
case which has been heard, by those which
you think ought to be just in another which
has not been heard; we will endeavor to de
cide this case right now, and when Jackson,s
case comes before u~ if it ever does, we will
endeavor to decide that right.
‘Defendants’ counsel. further requested the
presiding judge to instruct the jury, that if
the jury find that the acts and words of
Jackson were not directly nor impliedly au
thorized, nor ratified by the defendants, then
the plaintiff is not in any event entitled to
recover vindictive damages against the de
fendants, nor damages in the nature of
smart-money, which request was not com
plied with, the presiding judge having al
ready instructed the jury upon what state
of facts the plaintiff would be entitled to
such damages."
I have copied all the instructions “on the
subject of damages." it will be seen that
these latter instructions are substantially
that the jury having given full compensa
tory damages, may give others in their dis
cretion to punish these defendants for the
wanton, willful. and malicious act of their
brakeman in assaulting a passenger, al
though they neither direetly nor impliedly au
thorized or ratified the act.
This proposition must be sustained, if at
all, upon one of two grounds; either that it
is competent to punish one man for the crim
inal intent of another, or that the malice of
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the brakeman in this case was that of the de
fendant corporation.
A brief notice of some of the authorities
touching the liability of the master for the
acts of his servant will, I think, show the
ground of liability, the reason for the rule,
and exhibit a marked distinction between the
ordinary case of master and servant and the
case at bar.
In 2 Dane, Abr. c. 59, art. 2, it is said:
"The master is not liable for the willful,
voluntary, or furious act of his servant."
“If my servant distrain a horse lawfully by
my order, and then use him, this conversion
is his act, and trover lies against him; for
my order extends only to distraining the
horse, and not to using him; this is his own
act."
"Nor is the .master bound for the volun
tary acts of his servants; i‘or if he be bound,
servants may ruin their masters by willful ‘
‘
plied, and the servant in that act was not inacts; nor are willful acts, wrongs author
ized by their masters."
"If i order my servant to do what is law
ful, and he does more, he only is liable; it
is his own act, otherwise he might ruin me,
and in such case there can be no express or
implied command from me for what he does
beyond his orders; and whenever the ques
tion is how far the master is liable for his 1
servant,s acts, the material inquiry must be,
v
how far he expressly or impliedly author
ized it."
"The master is liable for the negligent act
of his servant, but not for his willful wrong;
is liable in 'trover; for which rule several
reasons may be given: (1) A willful wrong
is the servant,s own act. (2) To allow him
by his willful tortlous act to bind his master
and subject him to daumges, would be to al-
'
low servants a power to ruin their masters.
(Ii) In such cases there is no command from
the master expressed or implied to do a will
ful wrong."
In 4 Bac. Abr. tit. “Master and Servant,"
it is said: “The master must also answer
ior torts, and injuries done by his servant
in the execution of his authority. But
though a master is answerable for damages
occasioned by the negligence or unskillful
ness of his servant acting in the execution of
his orders, yet he is not answerable in tres
pass for the willful act of his servant done
in his absence, and without his direction or
assent."
Chancellor Kent says: “The master is on
ly answerable for the fraud of his servant
while he is acting in his business, and not
for fraudulent or tortlous acts, or misconduct
in those things which do not concern his duty '
to his master, and which when he commits,
he steps out of the course of his service.
But it was considered in McManus v.
Cricket, 1 East, 106. to be a question of great
concern and of much doubt and uncertainty,
whether the master was answerable in dam
ages for an injury willfully committed by
his servant while in the performance of his
master,s business, without the direction or
assent of the master. The court of K. B.
went into an examination of all the authori
ties, and after much discussion and great
consideration, with a view to put the ques
tion at rest, it was decided that the master
was not liable in trespass for the willful act.
of his servant in driving his master,s car
riage against another, without his master,s
direction or assent. The court considered
that when the servant quitted sight of the
object for which he was employed, and with
out having in view his master,s orders, pur
sued the object which his own malice sug
gested, he no longer acted in pursuance of‘
the authority given him, and it was deemed
so far a willful abandonment of his master,s
business. This case has received the sanc
tion of the supreme court of Massachusetts
; and New York, on the ground that there was
no authority from the master express or im
the employment of his master."
In Wright v. Wilcox, 19 Wend. 343, Cowen,
J., who gave the opinion of the court, says:
“If the act was willful, the master is no more
liable than if his servant had committed any
other assault and battery. All the cases
agree that a man is not liable for the willful
mischief of his servant, though he be at the
time in other respects engaged in the service
of the former." After citing several cases
he adds: “Why is a master chargeable for
the act of his servant? Because what a man
does by another he does by himself. The act
is not within the scope of his agency." He
says: “The authorities deny that when the
. servant willfully drives over the man, he is
in his master,s business. They held it a de
parture, and going into the servant,s own in
dependent business."
In Turnpike Co. v. Vanderbilt, 1 Hill. 480.
case of a collision of steamboats, the su
preme court held that if the collision was
willful on the part of the defendant,s serv
ant, the defendant was not liable, referring
to Wright v. Wilcox. The case afterw:ml
went to the court of appeals (2 Com. 479)
where the doctrine applied in the supreme
court was sanctioned; and it was further
held that the corporation was not liable, al
though the willful act producing the injury
was authorized and sanctioned by the presi
dent and general agent thereof; because a
general or special agent, when he commits or
orders a willful trespass to be committed,
acts without the scope of his authority.
In Hibbard v. Railroad Co., 15 N. Y. 455.
which was “an action against the corpora
tion for ejecting a passenger from the cars,
who, having once exhibited his ticket, re-
, fused so to do when again requested by the
. conductor," Brown, J., in giving his opinion
says, speaking of a requested instruction
concerning damages, “the object of the re
. quest was, that the court should discriminate
between those acts of the company,s agent
done in the execution of its directions, and‘
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those done in the excess of its instructions
and without authority or approbation. This
I think should have been done. The plaintiff
may have been injured by the use of unnec
essary force to effect what the company had
a right to do. The conductor and those who
aided him are not the company. They are
its agents and servants, and, whatever tor
tious acts they commit by its direction, it is
responsible for and no other. This is upon
the principle that what one does by another
he does by himself. For injuries resulting
from the carelessness of the servant in the
performance of his master,s business the lat
ter is liable. But for the willful acts of the
servant the master is not responsible, be
cause such willful acts are a departure from
the master’s business;" and cites the case of
Wright v. Wilcox, and cases there cited.
In the same' case Comstock. J., says: “If
the conductor had no right to eject the plain
tiff from the train after he had complied with
the request and produced the ticket, then I
do not see upon what principle the defendants
can be made liable for the wrong. The reg
ulation and instructions to the conductor, as
we have said, were lawful, and they did not
in their terms or construction profess to jus
tify the trespass and eviction. The result is,
the wrong was done without any authority,
and, thereiore, that those who actually did it
are alone unanswerable." “if he mistook the
authority conferred upon him both when he
committed the trespass and when he was ex
amined as a witness, it cannot alter the law
or change the rights of the parties. His own
mistake as to the extent of his powers cannot
make the railroad company liable for acts not
in fact authorized." These cases are all cited
in a subsequent case. Weed v. Railroad Co.,.
17 N. Y. 362. -
The rule is thus stated in Story, Ag. § 456:
“But although the principal is liable for the
torts and negligence of his agents, yet we are
to understand the doctrine with its just limi
tations, that the tort or negligence occurs in
the course of the agency. For the principal
is not liable for the torts or negligences of
his agent in matters beyond the scope of the
agency unless he has subsequently adopted
them for his use or benefit. Hence it is that
the principal is never liable for the unauthor
ized, the willful, or the malicious act or tres
pass of his agent."
Mr. Hilliard, in his work on Torts, says:
“In general, a master is liable for the fault
or negligence of his servant; but not for his
willful wrong or trespass. The injury must
arise in the course of the execution of some
s,ervice lawful in itself, but negligently or un
sklilfuily performed, and not be a wanton vio
lation of law by the servant, although occu
pied about the business of his employer." Hil.
Torts, c. 40.
In Parsons v. Winchell, 5 Cash. 592, Met
calf, J., says: “But the act of a servant is
not the act of a master even in legal intend
ment or effect unless the master personally di
rects or subsequently adopts it. In other cas
es, he is liable for the acts of his servant
when liable at all, not as if the act were done
by himself, but because the law makes him
answerable therefor. He is liable, says Lord
Kenyon, ‘to malse compensation for the dam
age consequential for his employing of an un
skillful or negligent servant.’ " 1 East, 108.
Of this latter class of cases, Story says:
“In every such case the principal holds out
his agent as competent and fit to be trusted;
and thereby, in effect, he warrants his fidelity
and good conduct in all the matters of the
agency." Story, Ag. § 452.
In Southwick v. Estes, 7 Cush. 385, Dewey.
J., instructed the jury “that if the act of the
servant were not done negligently but willful
ly with the intention of disregarding the di
rections of the master, he would not be re
sponsible therefor." This instruction was held
correct, and the case of Mt.Manus v. Crickett
was cited by the court.
In Railroad Co. v. Langley, 21 How. 202,
Mr. Justice Campbell in delivering the opin
ion of the court says, “the result of the cases
is that for acts done by the agents of a corpo
ration either in contractu or in delicto in the
course of its business and of their employ
ment, the corporation is responsible as an in
dividual is responsible under similar circum
stances."
In Weed v. Railroad Co., 17 N. Y. 362, this
rule was invoked to relieve the defendants
from the consequences of the willful act of the
conductor in the detention of a train whereby a
passenger was made sick and suffered perma
nent injury in her health. Strong, J., in deliv
ering the opinion of the court says: “The de
fendants insist that they are not liable for the
willful act of the conductor followed by such
a result; and they invoke, in support of their
position, the rule, well sustained by principle
and authority, that a master is not liable for
a willful trespass of his servant." He then
proceeds to say: “It is important, therefore,
to inquire whether that.ruie extends to a case
like the present, and for that purpose to con
sider the basis on which it is founded. The
reason of the rule clearly appears by the eas
es in which it has been declared and applied."
He then examines many of the cases where
the rule has been stated and applied, and cites
also Story, Ag. § 456, and then says: “All
the cases on the subject, so far as I have ob
served, agree in regard to the principle of the
rule, and also in limiting the rule to that prin
ciple. For acts of an agent within his au
thority, the principal is liable, but not for
willful acts without his authority." Railroad
Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 468. He then proceeds,
in reference to the case then under considera
tion, to say: “In the light of this examina
tion of the class of cases which has been con
sidered, it cannot fail to be seen that there
is an important difference between those cas
es and the one before the court. The former
are cases of willful, unauthorized, wrongful
acts by agents, unapproved by their princi
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the actor. .A review of the authorities, touch
ing this question, will be found in the case of
pals, occasioning damage, but which do not
involve nor work any omission or violation
of duty by their principals to the persons in
jured; wrongs by the agents only with which
the principals are not legally connected. In
the present case, by mean! of the wrongful,
willful detention by the conductor, the obli
gation assumed by the defendants, to carry
the wife with proper speed to her destination,
was broken. The real wrong to the wife in
this case, and from which the damage pro
ceeded, was the not carrying her in a reason
able time to Aspinwail as the defendants had
undertaken to do’ and this was a wrong of
the defendants unless the law excused them
for their delay on account of the misconduct
of their agent." In the conclusion of his dis
cussion he says, the rule of law, relied on by
the defendants to sustain their position, is in
applicable to the case, and that it makes no
differcnce whether the act was willful or neg
ligent as to the liability of the defendants for
a nonfulfiliment of their contract. From an
examination of these authorities, I think it
will be found that the principal is liable for
the act of his agent in three classes'of cases:
I. Where the act is done by the previous
command of the principal, or is subsequently
ratified or adopted by him.
This command may appear from proof of
specific directions, or implied from the circum
stances of the case.
II. Where the agent negligently, unskiilful
ly or otherwise improperly performs the du-.
ties pertaining to his employment.
III. Where the act of the agent has caused
the breach of a contract, or prevented the per
formance of an obligation due from, and ex
isting between, the principal and a third. per
son.
The liability. in the first class of cases, rests
solely upon the maxim, “Qui facit per ailum
facit per se;" and in no other cases is he liable
as an actor. but in those cases where he has
commanded the act or subsequently ratified it,
which is regarded in law as a previous com
mand.
The authorities, ancient and modern, are be
lieved to be uniform upon this proposition, and
wherever a liability attaches for an unauthor
ized act, it is founded upon some other rea
son.
In the second clas the agent is held out as
competent and fit to be trusted (by the prin
cipal), and he, in effect, warrants his fidelity
and good conduct in all the matters of the
agency; by reason of this, as Lord Kenyon
says, he becomes liable “to make compensa
tion for the damage consequential for his em
ploying of an unskiliful or negligent servant."
As to whether this warranty covers the willful
tortious acts of the agent while engaged in and
about the master,s business, the authorities do
not all agree. Some hold that as soon as the
act becomes a willful trespass, the master is
no longer liable; others hold that for acts done
in the course of his employment the master
is responsible whatever may be the animus of
Railroad Co. v. Baum, 26 Ind.
The liability, in the third class of cases,
rests not upon the lawfuiness or unlawful
ness of the act done by the agent, but as
grounded upon the failure of the principal
to perform a contract or fulfill an obligation
with the party injured. In this class of
cases it matters not whether the act be a
“willful trespass" or not; whether it was
done in the course of the employment of the
servant is immaterial; if the act produces
the breach of the contract, or causes a fail
ure to fulfill the existing obligation, the lia
bility to answer attaches. The gravamen of
the charge is not that the agent has done
this or that act, but that the principal has
not fulfilled his agreement.
That the case at bar comes within this
class of cases I think there can be no doubt.
and the liability of the defendants is well
placed upon those grounds, by Mr. Justice
WALTON, and could be sustained upon no
other.
In the light of these authorities and de
cisions, ancient and modern, emanating from
courts of the highest jurisdiction, character,
and ability, what is the true rule of dam
ages in the case at bar? Or, putting the
question in a more pertinent form, were the
defendants liable to punitory damages, such
as “is sufllcient to punish the defendants
and serve as a warning and example to
others."
If the act of Jackson was a willful, wan
ton, and malicious trespass upon his part.
and was neither directly nor impiledly au
thorized or ratified by the defendants, the
was neither in fact nor legal intendment
the act of the defendants. This is quite
clear from reason and authority. Although
it may be one which devolved upon them a
liability, it is in no sense their act; so that.
if ordinarily the malice of the acting agent
was so inseparably connected with the act
that it would attach to the principal, nolens
volens, in those cases where, by legal in
tendment, it was his, the principai’s act, in
this case it would not, it being neither in
act or legal inteudment the act of the de
fendants.
The requested instruction clearly present
ed the proposition that unless the act was
authorized directly or implledly, or subse
quently ratified by the defendants, they
could not be chargeable with the motive and
intent of the actor. This was refused and
the rule left, that, regardless of authoriza
tion or ratification, they might be punished
for the willful, wanton, and malicious acts
of Jackson.
The ruling, it is apparent, extends to cases
not within the first class, and the result of
placing it in either of the other classes is to
punish one for the malice of another. To
relieve the case from this difliculty an ef
fort ls made to make corporations an excep
c,Y
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tion to the rule, although all the authorities,
whether found in elementary treatises or
judicial decisions, place them upon the same
footing. The idea put forward seems to be,
that the servant is the corporation. In order,
however, that the position may certainly
stand as it is made, and the argument pro
ceed upon no erroneous deductions of mine’
I quote: “A corporation is an imaginary be
ing. It has no mind but the mind of its
servants; it has no voice but the voice of
its servants, and it has no hands with which
to act but the hands of its servants. All its
schemes of mischief. as well as its schemes
of public enterprise, are conceived by hu
man minds and executed by human hands,
and those minds and hands are its minds
and hands. All attempts, therefore, to dis
tlnguish between the guilt of the servant
and the guilt of the corporation; or the
malice of the servant and the malice of the
corporation; or the punishment of the serv
ant and the punishment of the corporation is
’sheer nonsense,’ and only tends to confuse
the mind and confound the judgment."
In relation to this proposition one inquiry
may be made, viz.: Have these servants no
"minds," no "hands," and no “schemes" ex
cept those of the corporation? Are all their
schemes, all their acts, and all the emana
tions of their minds those of the corporation?
If they have any other, shall the corpora
tion be punished for them?
Does not the argument attach a respon
sibility to the corporation for all the acts of
a person in its employ? If it does not,
where is the dividing line? It is all, or part.
What part? This is the question which law
writers and judges have been answering for
many years, and whether, in the estimation
of any, it be or not “sheer nonsense," they
have distinguished between those acts of
the agent for which the corporation is, and
those for which it is not liable.
‘What its “voice" commands, what its
"hands" do, and the “schemes_ which it ex
ecutes, it should be and is held responsible
for, whether done by direct or implied au
thority or subsequently ratified by them;
and when they do this in wanton and will
ful disregard of the rights of others, they
may, under the law as now administered,
be punished by punitive damages.
But when the “voice" which speaks, and
the “hand" which executes, is not that of
the principal, however wanton, willful, and
malicious it may be, the "stones." even, “cry
out" against inflicting upon him a punish
ment therefor, and the more wanton and
malicious the act, the more horrible is the
doctrine. ‘
Corporations are but aggregated individ
uals acting through the agency of man.
They may consist of a single individual, or
more, and they are no more ideal beings
when thus acting than the individual th.us
acting. For certain acts the individual.
responsible. For the same acts the body of
individuals, denominated a corporation, are
held responsible. The principal and agent,
in both cases, are separate and independent
beings. Agents presuppose a principal,
somebody to act for. Somebody whose or
ders they are to execute, and somebody for
whom they are to perform service; some
body who is answerable to them, and who
may be answerable for the acts done under
their direction. Mr. Justice Brown, in Hib
bard v. Railroad Co., before cited, says, "The
conductor and those who aided him are not
the company; they are its agents and serv
ants." If the employee and servant is the
corporation, in fact or legal intendment, it
does not act through agents. Its acts are
all the direct acts of principals without the
intervention of any other power, and it car
ries us back to a responsibility for all the
acts of a person employed by a corporation,
whether those acts have any .relation to his
particular employment or not, a proposition
too absurd and monstrous in its results to be
entertained at all. Mr. Justice Campbell, in
giving the opinion of the supreme court of
the United States, in the case before cited
(21 How. 202), says, the result of the cases is
that for acts done in the course of its busi
ness and of their employment “the corpora
tion is responsible, as an individual is re
sponsible, under similar circumstances."
I, therefore, come to the conclusion that if
liable at all to be punished for the malice
of Jackson, it must be upon some other
ground than their legal identity with him,
and that in no sense can his malice be said
to be their malice; and there seems to be
strong indications in the charge of the pre
siding judge, that he, at that time, placed it
upon no such grounds. The defendants, in
view of this assumption by the plaintiff, “re
quested the presiding judge to instruct the
jury that the plaintiff is not entitled to re
cover against the defendant company any.
greater damages than he might recover
against Jackson himself, for the same cause
of action upon similar evidence." This in
struction the court declined to give, and re
marked to the jury, “I think you cannot
rightfully be required to enter into a consid
eration of the damages which a party, not
now before the court, and has not. therefore,
had an opportunity to be heard, ought to pay,
and then measure the damages in this case
which has been heard by those which you
think might be just in another case which
has not been heard. We will endeavor to
decide this case right now, and when Jack
son,s case comes before us. if it ever does,
we will endeavor to decide that right."
I think the argument is very strong from
this remark, that it was not the malice and
ill-will of Jackson that was designed to be
punished. for he says his case has not been
heard. The court say, substantially, we
know not what excuses or justification he
though not manually engaged in it, is held I may offer when heard, if ever, "and when
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his case comes before us, if.‘ ever it does, we
will endeavor to decide that right." One
would suppose that it was some “wanton.
malicious act, committed in reckless and will
ful disregard of the rights of the injured par
ty," by these defendants that was to receive
such punishment as should “serve a warning
and example to others," and not such an not
done by Jackson.
to proceed and say Jackson, for his act, may
deserve one punishment, and those defend
ants, for their acts, may deserve another;
and I cannot well forbear the inquiry here,
if there is not here some evidence of an “at
tempt to distinguish between the guilt of
the servant and the guilt of the corporation;
or the malice of the servant, and the malice
of‘the corporation; or the punishment of the
servant, and the punishment of the corpora
tion?" Was it here that "sheer nonsense"
was enacted, and “the mind confused," and
the "judgment confounded"?
If it was the malicious act of the defend
ants that was to be punished, the enormity
of Jar.kson’s wrong had indeed nothing to do
with it. If it was the malicious wrong of
Jackson that was to be punished, why should
a party, innocent of all wrong in the matter,
be punished more than the wrong-doer him
self. If he was the corporation, why would
not all the acts of extenuation and justifica
tion surrounding him be also the acts of the
corporation, and be proper elements to be
considered in graduating or fixing the pen
alty? How could his case come before us, if
he was the corporation? Would it be to be
punished for the act of the corporation?
If we hold both guilty and both liable, it
must be founded upon the idea of two actors,
and that the employee is not only the corpo
ration but somebody else, and the nonentity
of agent becomes itself a nonentity, and in
stead of a mere imaginary thing which swal
lows up and extinguishes all the relations of
principal and agent, and renders any attempt
to distinguish between them “sheer non
sense," we do have two distinct, independent,
accountable subjects, susceptible of being
brought before the courts to answer and be
punished, and we are not left to the ideal ac
tion of punishing an ideal existence. Again;
if the actor is brought before the court and
punished, would he be punished for the act
of the corporation or his own act? for the
malice of the corporation, or his own malice?
If imprisoned, should we say the corporation
was imprisoned?
If not, and he is (as undoubtedly he may
be) called to answer for an assault, and pun
ished for an assault, when we come to fix the
punishment, do we not distinguish between
his guilt and the guilt of the corporation, his
malice and the malice of the corporation?
And when the rule is required that we pun
ish him in the same manner and to the same
extent as the corporation, should we not reply
very much as did the presiding judge at the
trial? 1 think there can be no two opinions
The argument would seem
‘
about the matter, and that there is manifestly
a distinction between the two, and that there
are two to distinguish between, and that
when the act is authorized by any previous
command or subsequent adoption, it is not,
and cannot in the nature of things be made
the act of another than the actor. Laws may
be made making others responsible’ therefor,
but it is the act of him who does .it, and not
of him who neither does nor authorizes it;
and no amount of judicial legislation or re
finement can make it so; as before remarked,
it is not possible in the nature of things.
Again, if this servant is the corporation,
what becomes of the law regulating the lia
bility of the principal for an injury received
by an employee while in the business of the
corporation. It is held, that if the injury
was produced by the carelessness or negli
gence of the master or corporation, they must
respond in damages; but lf produced by the
act of a fellow-servant, they are not liable.
Is not here a distinction recognized between
the guilt of .the servant and the guilt of the
corporation? Is not here a manifest distinc
tion noted and acted upon between the serv
ant and corporation? If the servant is the
corporation, it is the act of the corporation
when done by the fellow-servant. But these
cases say, no. You assume the risks arising
from the acts of your fellow-servants, but
not the acts of your principal, the corpora
tion; when the corporation is negligent you
may recover, but when it is the servant, you
cannot. Again, I ask, how can this be, if the
servant is the corporation? This new idea,
it appears to me, has in it more of ingenuity
than logic or substance; it is altogether ideal,
and if it finds place in the law, it will be
among its fictions.
The learned judge then adds, “And it might
as well not be applied to them at all, as to
limit its application to cases where the serv
ant is directly and specially directed by the
corporation to maltreat and insult a passed
ger, or to cases where such an act is directly
and specifically ratified; for no such cases
will ever occur." The instruction requested
and refused, used the term directly or “im
pliedly," and with this sentence so amended,
I have simply to say, that if no such case
ever does occur, there is no occasion, right,
or propriety in inflicting the punishment. If
the act is neither directly nor impliedly author
ized or ratified, there is in it no wantonness,
no malice, and no ill-will toward the person
injured, and no public wrong by them done
to be redressed or atoned for. Repentance
with them is absolutely impossible. The ar
gument is simply this: if we do not punish
you when you do not directly or impliedly
authorize or adopt a wrong, we shall never
have an opportunity, for you never will thus
authorize or adopt one. The argument is
clearly stated by the learned judge. and I
leave it as he left it, remarking, that if the
end to be attained is the punishment of rail
road corporations whether guilty or innocent,
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the rule requiring them first to be guilty of
wrong had better be abolished.
That the learned judge meant to state his
argument thus, is, I think, apparent from the
remark which immediately follows: "that if
those who are in the habit of thinking that
it is a terrible hardship to punish an inno
cent corporation for the wickedness of its
agents and servants, will for a moment reflect
upon the absurdity of their own thoughts,
their anxiety will be cured."
In Railroad Co. v. Baum, 26 Ind. 70, the
court say: “Nor will sound policy maintain
the application of a rule to railways or cor
porations on this subject, which shall not be
alike applied to others, as has been intimated
in some quarters. The suggestion is not fit
to be made, much less sanctioned, in any tri
bunal pretending to administer justice impar
tially." I
In another case it is said: "The law lays
down the same rule for all, and we cannot
make a diliterent rule in the case of a serv
ant of a railway company and an ordinary
tradesman;" “and, therefore, treating Phil
lips as the servant, the company are not lia
ble for his tortious act any more than other
individuals would be." Roe v. Railroad Co.,
7 Eng. Law & Eq. 54?.
With the criticism (if it be entitled to that
appellation) of the opinion upon railroads and
their management I have, in the position I
now occupy, no occasion to deal. My duty
I consider performed, and best performed,
when I have endeavored to ascertain the law
as it is, and apply it to causes as they are
presented, rather than in making rules for
any real or supposed grievances. The law
mahing power is ample to afford the neces
sary means of redress where none now ex
ists; and did these great and growing evils
really exist, we might reasonably expect to
find the law-makers, the people, those who
must suffer by their existence, exercising
their corrective powers.
If the evil is not sufficient to induce the
sufferers to provide a remedy, it will hardly
justify the judiciary in leaving the clear path
of the duty of expounding the law, and as
suming the powers and responsibilities of
law-makers. Perhaps there has been no one
thing that has introduced into the law so
much confusion and embarrassment as the
engrafting policy of courts; adding here a lit
tle and there a little, till the original is cover
ed with these judicial excrescences; and not
unfrequently the jewel is lost in its surround
ings of dross.
The plaintiff, in the printed brief of his ar
gument presented in this case, saysr "it,
therefore, an individual master, perhaps per
sonally innocent of positive evil intent is
liable to punishment by exemplary damages
for the malice of his servant, for a much
stronger reason ought a soulless corporation
to be responsible for the wicked and wanton
acts of its sole representative."
In my judgment, if the premise were right
in this proposition, there is no reason why
the conclusion is not right. But I know
of no case where the master, innocent of all
wrong upon his own part, has been held to be
liable to punishment for the malice of his
servant. It is only where he has been a par
ticipator in some manner in the wantonness
and malice displayed in the act, and it is
his own wanton and malicious act that is
then punished. The plaintiff says further:
"Besides, if corporations cannot be reached
in exemplary damages for the malice of
their servants, they escape entirely, and thus
stand infinitely better than citizens who are
liable in punitory damages; not only for their
own personal acts, which latter it is obvious
a corporation can never be guilty of in the
strict sense." If citizens were liable in puni
tory damages for the malice of their servants,
in nowise participated in by themselves, the
conclusion that corporations would stand bet
ter than citizens, if they escaped a punish
ment for the malice of their servants, is irre
sistible; but again I say, I know of no law,
authority, or reason for holding an innocent
citizen to punishment for the malice of his
servant or agent. It is quite as much as
one can reconcile with just accountability to
hold him to compensate for injuries malic
iously indicted in the course of his employ
ment, without adding punishment.
The theory of punitive damages is the in
fliction of a punishment for an offense com
mitted. It presupposes the existence of a
moral wrong, an infraction of the moral code;
it wrong in which the community has some
interest in the redress, and in securing im
munity from in the future. It presupposes
also an offender, and designs to punish that
offender. To punish one not an offender is
against the whole theory, policy, and practice
of the law and its administrators. “It is
better that ten guilty men should escape than
one innocent man should suffer." Before the
smallest fine can be inflicted, evidence, leav
ing no reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
party to be thus punished, must be adduced.
Evidence that he possessed the evil intent.
wicked and depraved spirit; that it was he
that was regardless of social duty. The idea
of punishing one who is not particeps criminis
in the wrong done is so entirely devoid of
the first principles and fundamental elements
of law, that it can never find place among the
rules of action in an intelligent and virtuous
community. There is no parallel, for it is
in the administration of the law, and courts
of the highest repute have, whenever the
question has arisen, declared it unsound in
principle and inequitable in practice.
In Hagan v. Railroad Co., 3 R. I. 188.
Broughton, J., in delivering the opinion of
the court says: “in cases where punitive
or exemplary damages have been assessed,
it has been done upon evidence of such will
fuiness, recklessness, or wickedness on the
part of the party at fault as amounted to
criminality, which for the good of society and
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security to the individual ought to be pun
ished. if, in such cases, or in any case of
a civil nature, it is the policy of the law to
visit upon the offender such exemplary dam
ages as will operate as a punishment, and
teach the lesson of caution to prevent repeti
tion of such criminality, yet we do not see
how such damages can be allowed, when a
principal is prosecuted for the tortious act
of a servant, unless there is proof in the case
to implicate the principal, and make him
particeps criminis of his agent,s act. No
man shall be punished for that of which he
is not guilty. Cases may arise in which
the principal is deeply implicated in the serv
ant,s guilt or fault,—cases in which the con
duct of the principal is such as to amount
to a ratification. In all such cases. the prin
cipal is particeps criminis, if not the princi
pal offender; and whatever damages might
properly be visited upon him who commits
the act, might be very properly inflicted upon
him who thus criminally participates in it.
But where the proof does not implicate the
principal, and however wicked the servant
may have been, the principal neither express
ly nor impiledly authorizes or ratifies the act,
and the criminality of it is as much against
him as against any other member of society,
we think it is quite enough that he shall be
liable in compensatory damages for the injury
sustained in consequence of the wrong of a
person acting as his servant."
In Railroad v. Finney, 10 Wis. 388, which
was a case for putting a passenger off the
cars before reaching the end of the route to
which his ticket entitled him, the court be
low instructed the jury that “in this-case,
if you find the complaint sustained by evi
dence, you may give such damages as shall
compensate the plaintiff for his loss by the
act of the defendant, and also such exempla
ry damages as you may find proper under
the circumstances." The defendants request
ed an instruction “that they should give the
plaintiff such damages only as would com
piensate him for his loss by reason of putting
off the cars; that they could not give vindictive
or punitory damages, called sma rt-money." This
instruction was refused. The court, in giv
ing their opinion, say: “The judge improp
erly refused to instruct the jury as requested
by defendants‘ counsel, that the plaintiff was
only entitled to recover such sum as would
compensate him for his actual loss by being
put off the cars, and that he was not entitled
to vindictive damages or smart-money. If
it be admitted that the action of the con
ductor in expelling the plaintiff from the cars
was willful and malicious, or so grossly neg
ligent. oppresive, or insulting as to bring the
case within the rule authorizing exemplary
damages. if the suit had been brought against
him; yet there was not one word of testi
mony offered showing, or tending to show,
that such conduct on his part was either pre
viously directed, or subsequently ratified or
adopted by the company; although they may
be liable in this action to indemnify the
plaintiff for the actual loss or damage which
he sustained by reason of the misconduct of
the conductor, because it occasioned a breach
of their duty or obligation to carry him from
Madison to Edgerton. Still it does not fol
low that they may be visited with damages
by way of punishment, without proof that
they directed the act, or subsequently con
firmed it. Defendants are not to be visited
with damages by way of punishment, with
out proof that they directed the act to be
done, or subsequently confirmed it. Such
damages are given by way of punishing the
malice or oppression, and are graduated by
the intent of the party committing the wrong.
But how can such damages be assessed
against a principal with such intent? Sure
ly they cannot be. But in an action against
the principal for the act of the agent, how
can the question of their assessment be prop
erly submitted to the jury when there is no
evidence connecting the principal with such
intent on the part of the agent? Clearly it
cannot." The damages in this case were
$175, and the judgment of the court below
was reversed.
Turner v. Railroad Co., 34 Cal. 594, was
an action for unlawfully ejecting the plaintiff
from a car by the conductor. The court be
low ruled “that the injury, if committed, and
if a willful one on the part of the defendants
in their servant the conductor, and accom
panied by malice or such acts as in their
nature tended to show a purpose of resent
ment or ill-will, or a disposition to degrade
the plaintiff, entitled her to what is called
exemplary damages." After some comment,
and citing Story, Ag. § 456, 19 Wend. 343.
and 14 How. 486, before referred to, the
court say: “Tested by these principles, it is
obvious that in this case the defendant was
not liable for any malicious and wanton con
duct of the conductor. If liable at all, its
liability must be confined to the actual dam
ages which the plaintiff suffered. To render
the defendant liable to punitive damages, it
was incumbent on the plaintifl! to show that
the act complained of was done with the
authority either express or implied of the
defendant, or was subsequently adopted by
the company." “If her expulsion resulted
from the malice of the conductor, or was ac
companied by violence or personal indignity,
the conductor alone is responsible for such
damages as she may be entitled to for this
cause beyond the actual damages resulting
from her exclusion from the car, unless as
before stated the company expressly or tacit
ly participated in the malice and violent con
duct of the conductor. In other words. if
the act of the conductor was wholly unau
thorized, the company is liable for the actual‘
damage, and the conductor alone for the puni
tive damages. if any."
There is another case in the same volume
(34 Cal. 58tl,—Plcasants v. Railroad Co.), and
decided upon the same grounds.
,
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In (‘lark V. Newsou. 1 Exch. 131. and 1
Welsh. H. & G. (a case of joint trespass by
two), Pollock, O. B., said: “I think it would
be very wrong to make the malignant motive
of one party a ground of aggravation of dam
ages against the other party who were al
together free from any improper motive. In
such case the plaintiff ought to select the
party against whom he means to get ag
gravated damages."
In relation to the views thus expressed, it
is said by Mr. Justice WALTON, in his opin
ion, that: "In none of them was there any
evidence that the servant acted wantonly or
maliciously; they were simply cases of mis
taken duty. And what these same courts
would have done if a case of such gross and
outrageous insult had been before them. as
is now before us, it is impossible to say; and
long experience has shown that nothing is
more dangerous than to rely upon the ab
stract reasoning of courts, when the cases be
fore them did not call for the application of
the doctrines which their reasoning is intend
ed to establish" Waiving, for the present,
the question of fact as to whether they were
or not simply cases of mistaken duty, we
find in each of them the question of puni
tive damages legitimately and clearly raised
and discussed, and the reasoning, such as it
is, is before the profession. The cases are
not cited as mere authority by reason of
their being decided cases by courts of com
petent jurisdiction, but because the reason
ing is believed to support the decision. If the
reasoning is bad, fallacious, inconclusive,
some would adopt the plan of exhibiting
these facts by a course of reasoning of their
own, rather than by promulgating a general
proposition that it is unsafe to rely upon
their reasoning. If the reasoning is sound
and applicable to case at bar, it does not
matter that it was, or was not necessarily
called out in the case into which it has been
introduced, and it requires some other an
swer than mere criticism upon course of pro
ceeding by the judges in those cases.
That the gentlemen, composing the several
courts alluded to, supposed the cases called
for the decisions and reasonings they made,
cannot well be doubted, and an examination
of the cases as reported in the printed vol
umes of the reports referred to, will, I think,
leave the reader in no doubt concerning that
question.
There are some other cases to be found in
the books not referred to on the defendant,s
brief to which I will advert as indicating the
views of some of the courts in other states.
Ackerson v. Railway Co., 32 N. J. Law,
254, was an action to recover damages for
injuries sustained while traveling in their
cars by reason of the carelessness and diso
bedience of the employees of the road. The
court say: “It appeared on trial that the de
fendants had adopted all needful rules and
regulations for the running of their trains,
and had employed competent [)t‘lsv.‘ns as ten
ders of the switch at which the accident oc
curred. No care or caution, required for the
safety of the passengers, had been omitted
by the company. Through the carelessness
and disobedience of their agents the acci
dent happened." "In fact, the only fault or
negligence complained of was that of the
employees of the company. Where a rail
road company adopts all rules and regula
tions ncedful for the safety of passengers,
and employs competent agents, whose duty it
is to see that these rules and regulations are
observed, 1 do not think that the company,
in case of injury to the passengers happen
ing by reason of the failure of the agent to
perform his duty, can be held liable for puni
tive damages. If, however, the company, as
such, is in fault, a different rule applies.
The company, for its own carelessness, may
be justly held liable for smart-money. This
rule does not prevail where the carelessness
is only that of a subordinate agent. There is
no justice in punishing the company after it
has done all in its power to prevent an in
jury. The agent, if guilty of negligence, may,
in certain cases, be proceeded against by in
dictment. I cannot yield to the argument so
earnestly urged by the counsel of the plain
tiff, that by construction of law the compa
ny is guilty of gross negligence whenever its
agent is, and is, therefore, to be treated the
same as if through its own negligence the in
jury happened. I think the verdict was
against the charge of the court in that it is,
to some extent at least, for punitive dam
ages. Full compensation to the plaintiff for
all real loss, present and prospective, was the
measure of damages."
I,0rter v. Railway 01., 32 N. J. Law, 261,
argued at the same time, was determined up‘
on the rules announced in this case.
These cases well indicate the views of the
court in New Jersey. McKeon v. Railway
Co., 42 Mo. 79, was an action for an injury
done to a passenger. The court, in giving
their opinion, say: “If the conduct of this
driver was willful and malicious with intent
to injure the plaintiff, he might be liable to
indictment for assault with intent to kill, or
some other crimmal offense; but his em
ployer, was not responsible for his crimes,
nor liable for his acts of willful and mali
cious trespas. The company was answera
ble only for his negligence, or his incapacity,
or unskillfuiness in the performance of the
duties assigned .to him. In such cases we
have no hesitation in saying, that punitory
damages, or any damages beyond a full com
pensation for the injury sustained, cannot be
allowed."
Railroad Co. v, Smith, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 556,
was a case where the evidence tended to
show that the car of the plaintiffs was upset
by the carelessness of their driver, and de
fendant injured thereby. The instruction
was, “That if the car was thrown from the
track by the fast and careless driving of the
defendants’ (now plaintiffs‘) agent, they
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should find for plaintiff (now defendant), and
that the jury are not necessarily restricted to
actual damages, but may, in their discre
tion, award such exemplary damages as they
.deem just and proper in view of all the facts
in the case." The court say, the facts did
not authorize a punishment of the defend
ants, and the court below should have re
stricted them to compensatory damages, and
for this reason the judgment was reversed.
In the case of Hill v. Railroad Co., 11 La.
Ann. 292. the court used the following lan
guage: “In actions of this kind, it is not
within the province of the jury, although
negligence is clearly proven, to give vindic
tive damages, as is sometimes allowed in
case of willful and malicious injuries. The
company, in such cases, is not to be pun
ished for the negligence of its agents as a
crime."
Keene v. Lizardi, 8 La. 27, was an action
brought to recover damages of defendants,
ship-owners, for injuries to plaintiffs wife,
at the hands of a master of a vessel on which
she was a passenger. The evidence showed
gross neglect and wanton outrage on the part
of the master against the lady. In deliver
ing the opinion of the court, the judge said:
“It is true, juries sometimes give what is
called smart-money. They are often war
ranted in giving vindictive damages as a
punishment inflicted for outrageous conduct.
But this is only justifiable in an action
against the wrong-doer, and not against per
sons who, on account of their relation to the
offender, are only consequentially liable for
his acts, as the principal is liable for the
acts of his factor or agent."
In Railroad Co. v. Rogers. 28 Ind. 1, it is
said: "Whatever rule of damages would ap
ply in a suit against a natural person, ought
to apply in a suit against a corporation. Any
discrimination in that regard would shock
the public sense of impartial justice, and
would be an unjust innovation. ,l‘he instruc
tions. governing subordinate employees and
agents. may be devised in such utter disre
gard of the rights of others, that obedience
to them will result in palpable wrong to in
dividuals; whether it was so here was a
question for the jury,"—thus putting the
question whether the acts are done in obedi
.ence to instructions that the execution of
would result in palpable wrong.
Post Co. v. McArthur, 16 Mich. 447, was an
action by .\lcArthur for publishing an al
lr;:ml libel. The court say: “The employ
nu..nt of competent editors, the supervision,
by proper persons, of all that is to be insert
ed, and the establishment and habitual en
forcement of such rules as would probably
exclude improper items, would reduce the
blame-worthiness of a publisher to a mini
mum for any libel inserted without his priv
ity or approval, and should confine his lia
bility to such damages as include no redress
for wounded feeling, beyond what is inevita
ble from the nature of the libel. And no
amount of express malice in his employees
should aggravate damages against him,when
he has thus purged himself from blame."
“While, therefore, in the present case the re
porters were guilty of carelessness in receiv
ing hearsay talk of legal charges, which
could only be lawfully published in accord
ance with the documentary facts, and while
there could be no justification for publishing
outside scandal against an individual from
any source whatever, yet the defendants
were only responsible beyond the damages
recoverable under any circumstances, for
such a libel to the extent of their own con
duct in the case, or want of care used in
guarding their columns against the insertion
of such articles."
In the case of Railroad Co. v. Baum, before
cited, the court sav: “But when the act is
unnecessary to the performance of the mas
ter,s service, and not really intended for that
purpose, but is done by the servant to grat
ify his own malice, though, under pretense
of executing his employment, it is not done
to serve the master, and is not, in fact, with
in the scope of the employment, and the mas
ter is not, therefore, liable." "Under these
circumstances, last enumerated, it is not easy
to perceive, in the nature of things, any just
reason for holding the master responsible.
_It will not do to say he shall answer in dam
ages, because by employing the servant he
gives him opportunity to maltreat those with
whom he comes in contact in discharging his
duties, that reason would hold the shop-keep
er for any outrage committed by his clerk up
on a customer; the merchant for the like
conduct of his journeyman; and, indeed, it
would be equally applicable to almost every
department of business in the conduct of
which it is necessary or convenient to em
ploy assistants to deal with the public. Even
the inn-keeper, whose cook feloniously min
gles poison with the food of a guest, must
then respond in damages."
In Kleen v. Railroad Co., 37 Cal. 400, the
court say: “As to the general rule upon that
subject there can be no doubt. If the act
of the conductor, in pulling the plaintiff oil?
the cars was a wanton and malicious act,
committed out of the course of his agency,
the defendant cannot be held responsible for
the manner in which he did it
, unless, how
ever, the defendant expressly authorized the‘
act."
In the case of The Amiable Nancy,3 Wheat.
546, which was a suit for a marine trespass,
Mr. Justice Story, in delivering the opinion
of the court, among other things says: "Up
on the facts disclosed in the evidence, this
must be pronounced a case of gross and
wanton outrage without any just provoca
tion or excuse; under such circumstances, the
honor ‘of the country and the duty of the
court equaily require that a just compensa
tion should be made to the unoffending neu
trals for all the injuries and losses actually
sustained by them. And if this were a suit
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against the original wrong-doers. it might be
proper to go yet further and visit upon them,
in the shape of exemplary damages the prop
.er punishment which belongs to such lawless
misconduct. But it is to be considered that
this is a suit against the owners of a priva
teer upon whom the law has, from motives of
policy, devolved a responsibility for the con
duct of the ofiicers and crew employed by
them, and yet from the nature of the service
they can scarcely ever be able to secure to
themselves an adequate indemnity in cases
of loss. They are innocent of the demcrit of
this transaction, having neither directed it,
nor countenanced, nor participated in it in
the slightest degree. Under such circum
stances, we nre of opinion that they are
bound to repair all real injuries and personal
wrongs sustained by the libellants, but they
are not bound to the extent of vindictive
damage%."
In Wardrobe v. Stage Co., 7 Cal. 118, the
jury found for actual and exemplary dam
ages in the sum of $2,500. The chief jus
tice, in delivering the opinion of the court,
quoted with approval the opinion of Judge
Story in The Amiable Nancy, and said:
"When it appears that the coach at the time
of the accident was driven by a servant or
agent of the owner, the rule in such case is,
that the principal is liable only for simple
negligence, and that exemplary damages can
not be enforced against him."
In the case of Moody v. McDonald, 4 Cal.
_ 7, the facts were similar to the above, and
in the action brought against the principal
for tortious acts of his servant, where the
jury gave $2,500 damages, and $2,500 smart
money, the court disallowed the verdict for
the smart-money, holding the principal liable
only for compensatory damages.
In .\IcLellan v. Bank, 24 Me. 566, the court
say: "The first question obviously presented
by the case is, can a corporation aggregate
be chargeable with malice? Such corpora
tions have been held answerable in trover;
and might, perhaps, in other actions s0unding
in tort for all acts done by their oflicers un
der circumstances implying authority to do
them. But it may well be doubted if such
corporations can be implicated by the acts of
their servants in transactions in which mal
ice would be necessary to be found in order
to the sustaining an action against them
therefor."
Two cases are cited by Mr. Justice WAL
TON as sustaining the rulings of the presid
ing judge; one in New Hampshire, and one
in Mississippi.
In the case in New Hampshire (Hopkins v.
Railroad Co., 36 N. H. 1) the ruling com
plained of was, “That if the jury should find
the defendants guilty of gross negligence at
the time of the collision, and the plaintiffs
injury was occasioned by such negligence,
they might in their discretion give exemplary
damages."
“To this instruction two objections are
made:
(1) That it is not a case for exemplary
damages, because the negligence, which is
the foundation of the suit, was the negligence
of the defendant’s servants;
(2) Because the facts of the case disclose
no fraud, malice, violence, cruelty, or the like,
nor any turpitude or moral wrong."
Upon the last point, the court hold that
“gross carelessness in such case implies a
heedless disregard for human life, and for
the safety of passengers who intrust them
selves to the care of the road, which brings
the case very strongly within the rule that
the wrong complained of, to warrant exem
plary damages, must have something of a
criminal character.’’_
In relation to the first objection the court
say: “The defendants are a corporation, and
can act in no way but by their ofliccrs,
agents. and servants; and when their ofli
cers, agents, or servants act within the scope
of their authority and employment, it is the
act of the corporation, and their negligence
is the negligence of the corporation;" and
they cite Aug. & A. Priv. Corp, 386, and
Chestnut Hill Turnpike v. Rutter, -I Serg. &
R. 6.
It will be noticed that the learned chief
justice, who drew this opinion, makes only
such acts of the agent, as are authorized by
the corporation, their acts. It is such as are
within the scope of their authority as well
as employment. He does not say that un
authorized acts by the agent become the acts
of the principal. His proposition conforms
to the rules which we have before deduced
from the authorities. A recurrence to the au
thorities, cited by him, will show this. Sec
tion 386, Ang.&A. Priv. Corp, which is cited,
reads as follows: “Yet it is somewhat re
markableihat the question whether an action
of trespass would be against a corporation
should not. until within a very late period,
have been the subject of express judicial‘de
cision. In the case of Maud v. Canal Co. it
was expressly decided by the English court
of common pleas, in 1842, that trespass will
lie against a corporation. The action was
brought for breaking and entering locks on
a canal, and seizing and carrying away bar
ges and coal. The trespasses, it was proved,
had been committed by an agent of the com
pany, which was incorporated by an act of
parliament, and the barges and coal, it ap
peared, had been seized for tolls claimed to
be due them. The only question being
whether trespass would lie against a corpo
ration aggregate for an act done by their
agent within the scope of their authority.
The court held, that when it is established
that trover will lie against a corporation,
there could be no reason why trespass should
not also lie against them; that it was impos
sible to see any distinction between the two
actions."
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This section which is cited relates alone to
the question whether or not trespass can be
maintained when the act done was within
the scope of their authority; that is the au
thority conferred by the corporation, and it
is held, when the act is done by the author
ity of the corporation, it is the act of the cor
poration, and trespass will lie.
The next section. save one, which follows
(388) says: "it is of importance, however, to
be observed, that an action of trespass can
not be sustained against a private corpora
tion for an act done by one of its agents un
less done communicato consilio, or. in other
words, unless the act has been directed, suf
fered, or ratified by the corporation. A cor
poration is liable for an injury done by one
of its servants in the same manner and to
the same extent only as a natural individual
would be liable under like circumstances.
The well-known rule of law is, that if the
cause of an injury to a person be immediate,
though it happens accidentally, the author of
it is answerable in trespass as well as in
case; but a master, whether a natural indi
vidual or an artificial one, is not liable for a
willful act of trespass of his servant."
With these authorities before him we can
not well suppose he meant to include any
unauthorized act of the agent. He was too
good a lawyer to say that an act done‘
against the master’s orders and directions
was the act of the master. Did these, how
ever, leave us in doubt, what follows upon
the same page of his opinion would seem to
put the matter at rest, for he proceeds to
say: "Corporations may be sued in trespass
for the authorized acts of their servants;
and if the trespass is committed by their au
thority, with circumstances of violence and
outrage such as would authorize exemplary
damages against an individual defendant, it
is not easy to discover any ground for a dif
ferent ruie of damages against the corpora
tion which the law charges with the conse
quences of the act as the responsible party.
If a corporation like this is guilty of an act
or default such as, in case of an individual,
would subject him to exemplary damages,
we think the same rule must be applied to
the corporation."
This we understand to be in harmony with
all the authorities, and comes within the
first class of cases to which 1 have referred.
The act is theirs, because done by their au
thority. Being theirs, they are held as would
be an individual defendant. If unauthor
ized, it is not their act, although they may,
upon other principles, be liable to compen
sate for the injury done.
The ground upon which exemplary dam
ages is allowed is, that the trespass is com
mitted by their authority with such circum
stances of violence and outrage as would an
thorize exemplary damages against an indi
vidual defendant. I regard the law, as stat
ed by the chief justice, as directly sustain
ing the views that I present. viz.: that to be
chargeable with the animus of the transac
tion, it must be theirs by previous authority,
direct or implied, or subsequently adopted or
ratified by them. The instruction in the
court below required the defendants to be
guilty of gross negligence to subject them to
exemplary damages; and the sum total of
the decision was that this was right, and
that if the act was done by the authority of
the defendants. it was the act of the princi
pal. What evidence there was, if any, that
the defendants participated in the act which
produced the injury, does not appear; nor
does it appear that the jury found the de-
fendants were guilty of gross carelessness.
All the remarks of the chief justice are made
upon the hypothetical case of an injury hap
pening through the gross carelessness of the
defendant corporation. .
The case in Mississippi came before the
court on a motion to set aside the verdict.
The discussion in the opinion is upon the pro
priety and authority of the court to set aside
verdicts on account of the amount of dam
ages in those cases where there is no fixed
rule of computation. and the authorities cit
ed are almost all of them upon this point.
There was no ruling excepted to, and no
question of law presented. Upon the matter
of punitive damages, referred to by Judge
lValton in his opinion, they say: “The case
is much stronger for the defendant in error,
than were the facts in the case of Heirn v.
McCaughan, 32 Miss. 18. The decison in that
case was conclusive in this, as to the form of
action as well as the right of the jury, in such
cases, to protect the public, by punitive dam
ages, against the negligence, folly. or wick
edness which might otherwise convert these
great public blessings into the most danger
ous nuisances."
It will be perceived that this case. so far
as any consideration of punitive damages
was concerned, was regarded as settled by
the cae in 32 Miss.
Looking at that case I find it was an action
brought for an act done by a partner. Ileirn
with others were owners of a vessel. Grant,
one of the owners, Wits the captain. The
court say, by Hand, .].: “There was testi
mony tending to show that the captain in
charge of the boat, which was published to
stop at Pascagouia at the time specified, will
fully and capriciously disregarded the obli
gation incurred by the publication, and that.
the failure occasioned great bodily exposure,
and mental suffering and disappointment to
the plaintiffs (now defendants); these circum
stances were properly submitted to the jury,
to be considered by them, with the circum
.stances of excuse or extenuation relied upon
by the defendants; and it was their province
to determine whether there was such fraud
or willful neglect of duty causing oppression
to the plaintiffs, and under such circumstan
ces of aggravation as to warrant exemplary
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damages. This was the substance of the rui
ings of the court upon this point, and we per
ceive no error in them."
This is the case which decided all that was
said in 36 Miss. about punitive damages, and
was an action brought against several part
ners for the act of one of them. The value
of this case, in support of the principle that
a railroad corporation may be punished for
ihe malice of an employee, cannot, I think,
he considered great, especially when, in the
case in the litith, we find this remark: “It
is not enough that, in the opinion of the
court, the damages are too high. It may not,
rightfully, substitute its own sense of what
would be a reasonable compensation for the
injury, for that of the jury." Since the opin
ion in this case was drawn. and since writ
ing this opinion, my attention has been di
rected bv Mr. Justice WALTON to the case
of Railroad Co. v. Blocher, 27 Md. 277, as
a case sustaining the ruling of the court in
the case at bar.
Upon an examination of that case, it will be
found that a difiiculty arose between the con
ductor of train upon the appellant,s road and
appellee about his ticket; the one contend
ing it had been surrendered to the conductor,
and the other averring it had not, and to
prevent being put oflf the train, the appellee
paid his fare; it subsequently appeared that
he was right, and properly surrendered his
ticket when called upon so to do. He alleged
that the conduct of the conductor was vio
lent and insulting.
At the tria! of the ease, the appellants re
quested the court to instruct the jury as
follows:
“[7) If the jury believe the conductor
caught the appellee violently, etc., by the
collar and dragged him from his seat, while
a passenger in the train, the appellee is not
entitled to recover for the same in this action
against the appellants, unless they believe
the appellants authorized the act. and adopt
ed and jnstifled it since its committal.
“(8) That if the jury believe the conductor
wrongfully extorted from the appellee the
fare from Martinsburg to Baltimore, after
the appeilee had surrendered his ticket, etc.,
the appeliee was not entitled to recover vin
dictive or punitive damages from the appel
lants, unless they expressly or impliedly par
ticipated in the tortlous act authorizing it be-
fore, or approving it after, it was com
mitted."
Concerning these two requests, the court
say: "The conductors and employees of the
corporation represent them in the discharge
of these functions, and being in the line of
their duty in collecting the fare or taking up
tickets, the corporation is liable for any
abuse of their authority, whether of omission
or commission. Vide Redt. R. R. 381, note
ti, and authorities there cited. The court
was. therefore. right in rejecting so much oi.’
the defendants‘ prayers, as limited their lia
after.
bility to such tortlous acts of their agents as
they had either personally authorized or sub
sequently approved."
v
The seventh and eighth prayers, requiring
the plaintiff to prove either previous author
ity or subsequent approval of the acts of the
conductor to. render the defendant liable,
were rejected for reasons before assigned
(those above copied). “The prayer of the ap
pellee claims compensatioE'Ior injury to his
feelings and degradation of character. The
appellant,s eighth prayer aflirms he is not
entitled to recover vindictive or punitory
damages against the company, unless they
expressly or impliedly participated in the
tort, by authorizing it before, or approving it
We have already declared our opinion
on the latter branch of this proposition.
This court, in the case of Gaither v. Blowers,
11 Md. 552, said, that where the injury was
accompanied with force or malice, the in
jured party might recover exemplary dam
ages. The action being vi et armis, or in
that character, the jury were authorized to
give whatever damages the evidence showed
the immediate consequence of the wrong
warranted. and which necessarily resulted
from the act complained of. 2 Greenl. Ev.
ii 80, 254; McNamara v. King, 2 Gilman,
436; .\lc’l‘avish v. Carroll, 13 Md. 439."
This is all that is said upon this question.
I have quoted the requested instructions, and
the remarks of the court upon them. The
conclusion of the court, and the law of that
case, is found in these words: “The action
being vi et armis, or in that character. the
jury were authorized to give whatever dam
ages the evidence showed the immediate
consequences of the wrong warranted, and
which necessarily resulted from the act com
plained of."
A careful examination of that case will dis
close the fact that the question of damage
raised and decided, was whether the plain
tlff had a right in such case to recover "for
injury to his feelings, and degradation of
character." This was the prayer of the ap
pellee, and he asked no more, and no other
instruction was given. These were treated
as exemplary damages by the appellants, and
they sought, by their request, to limit the
damages to the actual physical and pecunia
ry injuries. An examination of the authori
ties cited by the court in their opinion will
lead to the conclusion that they regarded
that as the question. and considered such
damages exemplary damages. They cite Mr.
Greeuleat for the rule they lay down, and I
hazard the opinion that Mr. Greenleat never
expected to be quoted as an authority for
punitive damages in civil actions. (See his
note to section 253. volume 2, on Evidence.)
The case of Gaither v. Blowers, referred to,
goes no further than Mr. Greenleat, and his
language, totidem verbls, is used as the au
thority for the doctrine advanced.
Mr. Greenleaf. in the note referred to,
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speaking of the term “exemplary damages."
as used by the courts in a case he is review
ing, says: “From this and other expressions
it may well be inferred, that by actual dam
ages the court meant those which were sus
ceptible of computation, and that by exem
plary damages or smart-money they intended
those damages which were given to the plain
tiff for the circumstances of aggravation at
tending the injury he had received, and go
ing to enhance its amount, but which were
left to the discretion of the jury, not being
susceptible of any other rule."
- The rulings, in the case at bar, covered all
these intangible matters before reaching the
point of punishing the defendant corporation.
They had been told “to consider the injury to
his feelings, his wounded pride, his wounded
self.respect, his mental pain and suffering oc
casioned by the assault, and the feeling of
degradation that necessarily resulted from it."
This was going as far as the court in Mary
land went or was asked to go, and does not
reach the ground of complaint in the case at
bar. I find no evidence in it of a design togo
beyond this; the rule was declared in plain
terms to be such damages as "the evidence
showed the immediate consequence of the
wrong warranted, and which necessarily re
sulted from the act complained of." This
certainly does not include damages by way
of punishing the defendants. Such damages
would not be the immediate consequence of
the wrong, and necessarily resulting from it.
Some comment is made concerning the re- .
tention of Jackson in the defendant,s em
ploy. All that I find, in the report of the
case concerning the matter, is a statement,
made by the plaintiff in his testimony, that .
he had seen him several times since, in per
formance of duties upon the train.
So far as any question arises upon the rule
of damages laid down in the instruction, it is
quite apparent this is perfectly immaterial,
and could be regarded, in any event, only as
remote evidence of ratification. If he was
retained in their employ, we do not know un
der what circumstances; possibly they were
such as would have furnished to the mind of
any reasonable man a perfect justification;
sitting here. we must take the report as we
find it. The opinion states that the jury un
doubtedly regarded it as “a practical ratifi
cation and approval of his conduct." Could
they have done so if they had been correctly
instructed in the theory now advanced?
What was there to ratify? Yea, more, who
was there to ratify? if the servant is the
corporation, and the act of commission was
the act of the corporation, was there any
thing to ratify? Was it not an original act
of the corporation? Did they ratify their
own act ,.
’ if the act of commission was orig
inally theirs, the act of retention was a sub
sequent act, having no relation to the first.
Did that infringe any right of his? 1t’ it
did, it was a new and substantive cause of
compaint not embraced in this declaration.
If, however, the theory which is now ad
vanced is not only novel but unsound, and
that previous command or subsequent ap
proval was necessary to warrant the inflic
tion of punishment, the matter was of vital
importance, and the defendants should have
had the advantage of the instruction. it is
not quite right, I think, to now assume that
the jury regarded it as a ratification. Possi
bly the gentlemen composing that jury were
not quite prepared to find that the gentle
men composing the administrative and ex
ecutive departments of that corporation were
so lost to all that is decent and honorable
among men, and so blind to their own inter
ests that they would justify an act con
demned by everybody. Giving full force to
the encomiums bestowed in the opinion upon
juries, might we not conclude that they
would be more likely to infer, from the cir
cumstances, that such amends had been made
as honorable gentlemen would require, rather
than convict them of .an act that any prison
.convict would cry out against?
Will it do to shield the verdict with that
which the jury were substantially told was
immaterial?
I have not considered this case upon the
motion, or upon any facts supposed to be
proved by the evidence reported, nor have I
considered the question whether, under the
plaintii\"s declaration' he can recover upon
the grounds set forth in the opinion. I have
only considered the rule advanced by the in
structions. Under this rule a railroad corpo
ration may exercise all possible care in the
'
selection of servants, and strictly enjoin them
from day to day against any irregularity of
conduct; yet if one of them. unmindfui of
'
his duty, regardless of his master,s interest,
and bent on exercising some private malice
against a person who happened to be a trav
eler, assaults him, the corporation must not
only make full compensation for all the in
jury, under the most liberal rules, but may
be punished for an act they have used every
endeavor within the reach of human power
to prevent. One committed by another,
against their wishes, interest, and positive
commands; and it is to be such a punish
ment as will "serve as a warning and exam
ple to others."
If we were punishing the actor himself, we
should consider the probable effect of a given
punishment upon him; but when, for his of
fense, we punish another, how can we form
any idea of the influence of a punishment he
cannot feel. The master may discharge him
from his employment, and he thus feel the
punishment another suffers indirectly, and to
that extent. It will be perceived, however,
that this is the extent for all classes, kinds,
and degrees of offense. It is the only chan
nel through which he can be made to feel it.
But suppose it were otherwise. is the punish
ment which is inflicted upon the innocent
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party any the less keen, unjust, and onerous?
is that in any degree affected by the man
ner in which the offender receives the intelli
gence of its infliction upon another? Again;
how shall the corporation avoid the constant
recurrence of penalties for the offenses of
others? Can they, when they select another
servant, exercise any more care or be more
watchful over him? Can they change the
passions of men? What is their fault if they
have exercised all the care, wisdom, and pru
dence with which men are invested? \Iust
they be punished for not being omnipotent?
If the idea and design of punishment is to
restrain the offender and make the punish
ment serve as a warning to others, how can
it better be done than by making it personal;
inflicting it upon the offender? How can its
influence upon others be made more restrain
ing than by the reflection that they must per
sonaily suffer the same punishment if they
t-ffend? Is the reflection that others will suf
fer it, more potent with that class of individ- 1
unis? Has the observation of men led to
this conclusion? And if it has, have all the
principles of reason, right, and justice yield
ed to it and made it right?
If the punishment, thus inflicted, is to serve
,
as a warning to others, who must take warn
ing? Evidently the innocent as well as guilty.
The innocent are to be the greatest suffer
crs by reason of the offense, and punished
alone directly. It is to serve as a warning
to all innocent persons, that they may be pun
ished for the offenses of others, after having
fully compensated the injury done.
One other consideration I barely suggest.
The liability in this case is based upon a con
tract; purely so. No liability could, under
the proof, arise by the rules of law applica
ble to master and servant. Had the plaintiff
been a stranger to the defendants, and had no
claims upon them, except such as each citizen
owes to the other, no liability of any kind
would have attached to these defendants for
the willful trespass of their servant. Not
only would they be saved punishment, but
compensation even. Now it being a case
where no liability would attach, but for the
contract, and the liability which does attach
being for breach of contract, the rule in this
case is not only punishing one for the act of
another, but it is doing this in an action ox
contractu, for this declaration must be con
strued to be such to meet,the law of the opin
ion.
Ail consideration of the matter tends to
show the fundamental error in holding an in
nocent party liable to punishment. In all
these acts, done by the command of the
principal (whether the authority appears by
direct command or by fair implication from
the proceedings of the party charged), there
is propriety in punishing if the act be wrong
and an infraction of the moral code;' but
in those cases where the act is unauthor
ized, and the principal is‘ in nowise con
nected with the animus of the ‘actor, and
becomes liable to compensate upon grounds
other than that the act was done by his
connnand, it appears to me that all punish-
ment inflicted, or rather all suffering impos
ed under the name of punishment, is flag
rant injustice; it is not punisinnent, for it
has not its necessary antecedent, wrong: both
reason and authority are opposed to it, and
no case can be found, where the question has
been presented and discussed, in which such
doctrines are not denounced as unsound and
unjust. In addition to the.cases which i
have cited, there is the pregnant fact that
no case can be found in Massachusetts or
New York where it has ,ever had any sanc
tion, even in the inferior courts; and no case
can be found, that I am aware of, where any
party hassought to establish any such rule
by an appeal to the superior courts or courts
of last resort in those states. Yet these
states are a net-work of railroads, an" ques
tions of liability are constantly arising and.
being settled by the courts of those states.
It appears to me the fact has some sign‘fi
cance.
The rule established in this case is so im
portant, and fraught with such results under
the ordinary modes of administering law.
that I have felt impelled to enter my dissent
at length, and regret that the pressure of
other duties has prevented me from giving
a more extended examination of the authori
ties, and the compression of them and my
own views into a narrower compass.
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WPIEELER & WILSON MANUF‘G CO. et'
. al. v. BOYCE.
(13 Pac. 609, 36 Kan. 350.)
Supreme Court of Kansas. April 8, 1887.
Error from Shawnee county.
Waters & Ensminger, for plaintiffs in er
ror. G. N. Elliott, for defendant in error.
JOHNSTON, J. This is a proceeding to
reverse a judgment rendered in an action
for false imprisonment, brought by Jacob F.
Boyce against the Wheeler &. Wilson .\lanu
facturing Company, C. S. Baker, and J. W.
Hughes. Hughes was dismissed from the
action, and the judgment went only against
the plaintiffs in error. The facts upon which
the case was disposed of are substantially
these: The Wheeler & Wilson Manufactur
ing Company, a corporation organized for
the manufacture and sale of sewing-ma
chines, was engaged in business at Topeka,
Kansas, and C. S. Baker was its general
agent at that place. The company had sold
a sewing-machine to Mary Hatfield, who
subsequently married Jacob iv‘. Boyce, the
defendant in error. She paid a part of the
purchase money, and signed a contract, in
substance that the title to the machine
should remain in the company until the bal
ance of the purchase money was paid. In
November, 1881, the company directed its
general agent to bring an action of replevin
against Mary Boyce to recover the machine,
claiming that there was a balance due there
on, a claim which she denied. An action
of replevin was begun before a justice of
the peace, and a writ was issued and placed
in the hands of Constable Hughes, who re
ported that he had made search for the ma
chine, and was unable to obtain possession
of it. C. S. Baker, the agent of the com
pany. then directed Hughes to make and file
an aflidavit before the justice of the peace,
alleging that Mary Boyce and her husband,
Jacob F. Boyce, were in possession of the
machine, and had refused to deliver it to
him, and thus obtain a warrant for their ar
rest. This was done, and the justice issued
a warrant to the constable commanding him
to arrest Boyce and his wife, and commit
them to the Shawnee county jail, there to
remain until they should deliver the ma
chine. Under this warrant, Jacob F. Boyce
was arrested and placed in jail without be
ing taken before the justice, and without
any examination, hearing, or trial. The con
stable informed the general agent of the
company that he had arrested Boyce, and
placed him in the county jail as requested,
and Baker replied: “Now, I guess he. will
give up the machine." The replevin action
resulted in a judgment in favor of Mary
Boyce. Jacob F. Boyce was held in the
county jail for 10 days, and was never
taken before any court or otficer for exam
ination or trial, and was finally discharged
at the instance of the plaintiffs in error, and
he became sick in consequence of his con
finement. He at once instituted this action,
and the jury awarded him damages in the
sum of $1.000, and the verdict was approved
by the trial court.
The plaintiffs in error complain chiefly of the
rulings of the court in' the matter of charging
the jury. The jury were instructed that. if the
evidence justified it, they could find c’xgmp_lag'
damages or smart-money against the defend
ants. Kfter the jury had been out some
time, and had practically agreed upon their
verdict, the court recalled them, and advis
ed them that he was in error in giving the
instruction that they might in their discre
tion assess exemplary damages, and with
drew it from the jury, telling them that in
their deliberati n th should not consider
the instruction r wn. Objection was
made to the wi hdrawai of the instruction,
and an application of plaintiffs in error for
leave to address the jury after the :nodifica
tion had.been made was denied, and this
ruling is assigned as error. This decision
affords the plaintiffs in error no ground for
complaint. The action of the court was fa
vorable rather than prejudicial to their in
terests. The instruction given was predi
cated upon suiiiclent facts, was warranted
under the law, and the defendant in error
alone Ihad reason to complain of its .with
drawal. It is a well-established principle of
jurisprudence that corporations may be_“h_el;l
liable for torts involving a wron n n
tiW'shFh as false imprisonment; and\e§
Tinplary damages _may be recovered agilili§_Q/
them for the wrongful acts of their serx-0
ants and agents done in the course of thit
e1n‘ploytrren‘t,11i"aTi‘ct'ises and to the Mme ex‘
tent that natural persons committing like
wrongs would be held liable. In such cases
the mafiice and fraud of the authorized
agents are lmputabie to the corporations for
which they acted. This principle is too well
settled to require argument, and the authori
ties sustaining it are numerous and well
nigh unanimous. Railroad Co. v. Slusser,
19 Ohio St. 157; Railroad Co. v. Dunn, 19
Ohio St. 162; Goddard v. Railway. 57 Me.
202; Railroad Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 213;
Railroad Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489; Rail
road Co. v. Bailey, 40 Miss. 395; Railroad
Co.v v. Blocher. 27 Md. J7: Hopkins v. Rail
road Co., 36 N. H. 9; Railroad Co. v. Ham
mer, 72 Ill. 353; Reed v. Bank. 130 .\lass.
443; Fenton v. Machine Co., 9 Phila. 189;
Goodspeed v. Bank, 22 Conn. .130; Boogher
v. Association, 75 Mo. 319; “,heless v. Bank,
1 Baxt. 469; Jordan v. Railroad Co., 7-!
Ala. 85; Williams v. Insurance Co., 57 Miss.
759; Vance v. Railway Co0 32 N. J. Law.
334; Cooley, Torts, 119: 3 Suth. Dam. 270.
and cases cited; 2 Wait, Act. & Def. 447,
and cases cited. The same doctrine has
been fully recognized on several occasions by
this court. Railroad Co. v. Rice, 10 Kan.
-i37; Railway Co. v. Weaver, -16 Kan. -L36:
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Railway Co. v. Kcssler, 18 Kan. 523; Ball
way Co. v. Little, 19 Kan. 269; News Co. v.
Wilmarth, 33 Kan. 510, 6 Pac. 786. The
withdrawal of the instruction, although er
roneous, was beneficial to the plaintiffs in er
ror, and there can be no reversal unless the
erroneous ruling is injurious to the party
, complaining.
It is next contended that the company can
not be held liable for the wrongful acts of
Baker and the constable, and an instruction
is challenged which holds that, if the agent
of the company caused and procured the ille
gal arrest and detention of the defendant in
error as charged, the company and its agents
were both liable. Baker was the managing
agent of the company; his authority was
general, and the constable acted wholly un
der his direction and sanction. He had not
only authority to sell machines, and collect’
the money due for the same, but it is con
ceded that he had authority to institute le
gal proceedings to recover possession of the
machines conditionally sold, and for which
payment had not been made in accordance
with the terms of sale. The arrest and de
tention of Boyce was incidental to the re
plevin action, and was made, as alleged, to
compel the delivery of the machine under a
provision of the Justices‘ Code relating to
repievin, which provides that where the de
fendants, or any other persons, knowingly
conceal the property rcplevied, or, having the
control thereof, refuse to deliver the same
to the oflicer, they may be committed until
they disclose where the property is, or de
liver the same to the oflicer. Comp. Laws
1879, c. 81, § 69. He had full authority to
represent the company, and whatever was:
done by him was done for the benefit of
the]company, and for the accomplishment of its
purpose. His act, although wrongful, was in
the line of his employment, was done in the
execution of the authority conferred upon
him, and must be regarded as the act of the
company. To make the corporation respon
sible, it is not necessary, as plaintiffs in er
ror contend, that the principal should have
directly authorized the particular wrongful
act of the agent, or should have subsequently
ratified it. Judge Story, in treating of the
liability of principals for the acts of their
agents, says that “the principal is held liable
to third persons in a civil suit for the frauds,
deceits, concealments, misrepresentations,
tortsi negligences, and other maifeasances or
misfeasances and omissions of duty of his
agent in the course of his employment, al
though the principal did not authorize or jus
tify or participate in, or, indeed, know of
such misconduct. or even if he forbade or
disapproved of them," and to sustain this he
cites numerous authorities. “In all such
cases," he says, “the rule applies, respondeat
superior, and it is founded upon public policy
and convenience, for in no other way could
there be any safety to third persons in their
dealings, either directly with the principal,
LAW nam.—4
or indirectly with him through the instru
mentaiity of agents." Story, Ag. §'-£52.
They complain, further, of an instruction
in which the court stated that the warrant
under which Boyce was taken and held in
custody was illegal and void, and insufficient
in law to justify his arrest and imprison
ment. The warrant, as we have seen, was
issued upon an aflidavit charging Boyce with
having control of the property replevied,'and
of refusing to deliver it to the ofiicer who
had the writ. There was no process issued
except the warrant, and it commanded that
he be committed at once to the county jail
until he should deliver the property to the
officer. No notice was given to him that the
charge stated in the aflidavit had been made
against him, nor was an opportunity given
him to refute it. The order of commitment
was not based upon any examination, hear
ing, or trial, but was arbitrarily made, in
the absence of Boyce, upon ex parte state
ment. The plaintiffs in error attempt to jus
tify this action, though not seriously, we
think, under section 69 of the Justices‘ Code,
already referred to, which reads as follows:
“Whenever it shall be made to appear, to the
satisfaction of the justice, by the aflidavit
of the plaintiff or otherwise, that the defend
ant, or any other person, knowingly conceals
the property sought to be recovered, or, hav
ing control thereof, refuses to deliver the
same to the ofllcer, the justice may commit
such defendant or other person until he or
they disciose where such property is, or de
liver the same to the oiiicer." The proceed
ing authorized by this statute is virtually one
for the punishment of contempt.
a party is to be brought before the justice
of the peace upon a notice or by attachment,
or what the initial proceeding shall be, is not
expressly provided. The section quoted does
provide what punishment hall finally be vis
ited upon a party; but this punishment is
not to be administered until the guilt of the
party is “made to appear to the satisfaction
of the justice." This language implies that
there is to be a hearing and an adjudication
of the charge upon its merits. When 8. con
tempt is committed in facie curiae, the pun
ishment is generally summary, and no ini
tial proceeding is required; but, when it is
not committed in the view of the court, the
initial proceedings are necessary, and the
party must have notice and opportunity to
defend. The most common initial process
is a rule or order to show cause why an at
iachment or warrant for contempt should not
issue, of which service should be made; and,
in a proceeding to punish for criminal con
tempt, personal notice of the accusation is
indispensable. Whatever procedure may be
adopted, it is certain that a party cannot be
condemned without notice; and a final judg
ment rendered, as was done in this case,
without a hearing or an opportunity to do
fend, is void. Rap. Contempt, § 96. While
the language of the statute is not very ex
Whether/'
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plicit, it does not require the interpretation
contended for, and, if it did, it would neces
sarily be held void.
The final error assigned is that the dam
ages awarded are excessive. This assign
ment is as groundless as those already con
sidered. The case is an aggravated one, and
the conduct of the plaintiffs in error exhibit
ed a wanton and reckless disregard of the
rights of the defendant in error. He was
not a party to the replevin action, and the
testimony is that the machine in controversy
was purchased long before he was married
to the plaintiff in that action, and that he
had no interest in or control over it. He was
thrust into jail, without warning or trial,
when there was no civil or criminal suit
pending against him, and kept there for 10
days with 17 or 18 prisoners who were ei
ther charged with or convicted of crimes.
The sewing-machine sought to be recovered
from his wife had been paid for, and belong
ed absolutely to her; and plaintiffs in error,
with knowledge of this fact, undertook to
compel the payment of money not due, or
the recovery of property which they did not
own, by the arrest and incarceration of the
defendant in error, without cause, and in a
manner that was clearly illegal. Apart from
the logs of time and interruption to his Ensi
ness, as well as .tfihe“hnmii.iat.io.n.andJ.n”Qigni
“lEy‘su'ffered by him by being thrust into jail
upon a false charge, itappears that .t.hQ.(_!(_)_lk
flnement resulted in.-l1is“s.i.cl§I_1.eSs;1.8-Ilfl when
we consider the malicious and oppressixe.
conduct of the plaintiffs‘ in error, and.that
the case is one whlcliciills for the infliction
of exeinpiaryflor piinlTfi"§ ‘damages, we can
only conclude tli5‘t'the1rerdict of $1,000 in
favor of the defendant was fully justifled,
if not too small. We can say without hesita
tlon that an award of a larger amount would
not have been disturbed on the ground that
\it was excessive.
,
It follows that the assignments of error
must be overruled, and the judgment of the
district court affirmed.
All the justices concurring.
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LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. BALLARD.
(3 S. W. 530, 85 Ky. 30?.)
Court of Appeals of Kentucky. March 5, 1887.
Appeal from circuit court, Marlon county.
Wm. Lindsay and Rountree & Lisle, for
appellant. Hill & Rives, for appellee.
HOLT, J. The appellee, Lou. E. Ballard,
after purchasing a proper ticket, took pas
sage from one intermediate station to an
other, upon a passenger train of the Louisville
8
:. Nashville Railroad. It failed to stop at
the platform at her place of destination, which
was a flag station. It was a down grade at
that point, and there is some evidence tend
ing to show that the car brakes did not op
erate well, in consequence of which the train
'ran some 50 or 60 yards beyond the platform,
where it was stopped, and the station then
announced by the proper person, but the
appellee did not get off the train. Upon the
other hand. there is testimony tending to show
that this stop was not made, and that no
etfort was made to stop the train, until it
was done at the request of the appellee, at
a point between her destination and the next
station. The weight of the evidence shows
that the conductor then informed her that
she could either go on to the next station, or
he would stop the train and she could get ofl!
there; and that, upon his so telling her the
second time, he did stop it. and she got off
at that point, which was a lonely place, and
about a mile beyond her station.
She says that the conductor “seemed very
impatient, and his tone was rather rough
for a gentleman;" that he did not assist her
in getting off with her baggage, which con
sisted of a valise and bundle; and that, as
she jumped from the lower step of the plat
form to the ground, he stood upon the plat
forID, while a brakeman of the train, who
was standing by, looked at her and “gt.inned."
Upon the other hand, there is evidence to
the effect that the conductor did assist her
out of the car, and was altogether kind and
polite in his manner. There was no request
upon her part that the train should be back
ed to her station, but this should have been
done, under the circumstances. The appel
lee was compelled to walk back to her sta
tion, and from thence, three-quarters of a
mile, to her home, in consequence of which
she was confined to her bed the most of the
time for three or four days, and unable to
teach her school for a week. The jury in
this action by her for damages returned a
verdict for $3,000.
Manlfestly it cannot be sustained upon the
ground that it did not include exemplary
damages, and was compensatory only, for a
breach of the con for transportation. If
upheld, it must be. the ground that she
was entitled to ex ry damages, and that
this question was submitted to the jury by
proper instructions. They were told: “If
the jury believe from the evidence that the
defendant,s agents or employes, or any of
them, in charge of defendant,s train, carried
the plaintiff beyond the station for which
she had purchased a ticket, and refused to
put her off? at her station, and were in‘Qcorous
or insulting, either in words, tone, or man
ner, they should find for the plaintiff, and
award her damages in their discretion, not
exceeding five thousand dollars, the amount
claimed in the petition."
A corporation can act only through nat
ural persons. It of necessity commits its
business absolutely to their charge. They
are, however. selected by it. In the case of
a railroad, the safety and comfort of pas
sengers is necessarily committed to them.
They act for it. Its entire power, pro hac
vice, is vested in them. and as to passengers
in transitu they should be considered as the
corporation itself. It is therefore as respon
sible for their acts in the conduct of the train,
and the treatment of the passengers, as the
ofllcers of the train would be for theIDsBIvt‘.~‘,
if they were the owners of it. Public inter
ests require this rule. They also demand
that the corporation should be and it is lia
ble for exemplary damages in case of an
injury to a passenger resulting from a viola
tion of duty by one of its employtis in the
conduct of the train, if it be accompanied by
oppression, fraud, malice, insult, or other will
ful misconduct, evincing a reckless disregard
of consequences. Dawson v. Louisville & N.
R. Co., 6 Ky. Law Rep. 668.
As to female passengers the rule goes
still farther. Their contract of passage em
braces an implied stipulation that the cor
poration will protect them against general
obscenity, immodest conduct, or wanton ap
proach. Com. v. Power, 7 Metc. (Mass) 596;
Craker v. Railway Co., 36 Wis. 657; Nieto
v. Clark, 1 Cliff. 145, Fed. Gas. No. 10,262;
Chamberlain v. Chandler, 3 Mason, 242, Fed.
Gas. No. 2,575.
It was improper, however, to instruct the
jury, as was in effect done in this instance,
that “indecorous" conduct alone is suflicient
to authorize exemplary damages. The term
is too broad. It may embrace conduct which
would not authorize their infliction. It is
true that the peculiar element which, enter
ing into the commission of wrongful acts,
justifies the imposition of such damages, can
not be so definitely defined, perhaps, as to
meet every case that may arise. It has been
said that they are allowable where the wrong
ful act has been accompanied with “circum
stances of aggravation," (Chiles v. Drake, 2
Metc. [Ky.] 146;) or if a trespass be "commit
ted in a high-handed and threatening man
ner," (Jennings v. Maddox, 8 B. \Ion. 430;)
or where the tort is “accompanied by oppres
sion, fraud, malice, or negligence so great as
to raise a presumption of malice," (Parker v.
Jenkins, 3 Bush, 587;) or, as was said in
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Dawson v. Railroad Co., supra, where the
wrongful act is accompanied by “insult, indig
nity, oppression, or inhumanity."
It would, however, be extending the rule
unwarrantably to hold that they could be
imposed provided the conduct was merely
“indecorous." This. as defined by Webster,
and as commonly understood, means impolite,
or a violation of good manners or proper
breeding. It is broad enough to cover the
slightest departure from the most polished
politeness to conduct which is vulgar and
insulting. It does not necessarily; or, indeed,
generally, involve an insult. The latter as
sumes superiority, and offends the self-re
spect of the person to whom it is offered,
while the former excites pity or contempt for
the one guilty of it. A word or act may be
both indecorous and insulting, but yet it
often lacks the essential elements of an in
suit.
In. the case now under consideration the
jury may have believed it was indecorous in
the conductor not to stop the train at the
platform, or not to carry her valise for her
when she was leaving the train. or to let
her get off between stations, although she
chose to do so rather than suffer inconveni
ence by being carried to the next one, or in
merely telling her ‘that she could walk back
to her station; yet none of these things
amounted to “insult, indignity, oppression, or
inhumanity."
The lower court properly refused the re
quest as made for special ffndings. The in
ter1-ogatories offered merely required the jury
to say what amount they found as compensato
ry, and what sum as exemplary damages. They
involved mixed questions of law and of fact.
Upon a retrial the question of limiting the
finding to compensatory damages should be
presented to the jury under proper instruc
tions. and the difference between them and
those which are exemplary dciined.
The evidence as to the conduct of the brake
man was competent. It is true that it was
not specifically complained of in the petition,
but only that of the conductor. The brake
man was, however, one of the agents of the
railroad company in the management of the
train upon which the appellee was a passen
ger. It is not necessary that a petition should
enumerate speciiically that this or that per
son connected with the management of the
train was guilty of improper conduct in order .
to authorize the admission of evidence as to
this or that particular party. It is sufflcient
to aver the breach of duty upon the part oi?
those in control of the train. Besides, in this
instance, the conduct of the brakeman com
plained of was in the immediate presence of
the conductor, and occurred at the time of
the other alleged acts of which the appellee
complains. We do not mean to say whether
he was guilty of improper conduct or not.
but it was a part of the res gestae, and there
fore admissible. Any circumstances attending
the commission of 0. trespass or a wrong, al
though not set forth in the declaration, may
be given in evidence, with a view of aflEect
ing the question of damages, save where
they within themselves constitute an inde
pendent cause of action. Sedg. Dam. side p.
538, note 3.
For the reason indicated, the judgment be
low is reversed, and cause remanded for a
new trial and further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
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SOUTHERN KANSAS R. CO. v. RICE.
(16 Pac. 817, 38 Kan. 398.)
Supreme Court of Kansas. Feb. 11, 1888.
Error to district court, Johnson county; J.
P. Hindman, Judge.
Action brought by Benjamin Rice against
the Southern Kansas Railroad Company on
October 31, 1885, to recover as damages the
sum of $1,000 for being unlawfully assaulted
and ejected from a passenger car by the con
ductor thereof while returning from Kansas
City, Missouri, to Olathe, in this state; the
plaintiff at the time having a ticket to ride as
a passenger in the car. Subsequently the rail
road company filed an answer containing a
general denial. Trial had at the March term,
1886. The jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff, and assessed his damages at $117.
46, and also made the following special find
ings of facts: “(1) Did the conductor act
willfully, and in a grossly negligent manner,
in putting the defendant off the train? An
swer. He willfully put him off the train.
(2) Did the conductor act with a reckless dis
regard of the plaintiffs rights? A. Yes. (3)
Did the plaintiff state to the conductorthat he
had purchased his ticket the day before, and
could the conductor have easily ascertained
that fact from the passengers who were ac
quainted with plaintiff ! A. In this case he
could. (4) How much do you allow piaintiff
as exemplary damages? A. £571.75." “First.
How much do you allow plaintiff for pe
cuniary loss? A. $.71. Second. Was plain
tiff injured in person by the conductor? A.
No. Third. How much do you allow plain
tiff for injury to his person? A. Nothing.
Fourth. Did plaintiff loe any time by reason,
of defendant,s conductor refusing to honor
his ticket, and. if so, how much? A. No.
Fifth. How much do you allow plaintiff for
loss of time? A. Nothing. Sixth. How much
do you allow plaintiff for inconvenience in
going from his seat to the platform and back
again? A. Nothing. Seventh. Was plaintiff’
treated in an insulting or brutal manner by
the conductor? And, if so, state fully how.
A. An insulting manner. Eighth. How much,
if anything, do you allow plaintiff for injury
to his feelings? A. $10.00. Ninth. How
much, if anything, do you allow plaintiff for
expenses, attorney,s fees, or time in prosecut
ing this case? A. $35.( ." The defendant
filed a motion to set aside the verdict of the
jury, and for a new trial, which was over
ruled. Subsequently, judgment was entered
upon the verdict. The railroad company ex
cepted, and brings the case here.
Geo. R. Peck, A. A. Hurd, and Robert Dun
lap, for plaintiff in error. John ’1‘. Little
and Samuel T. Seaton, for defendant in error.
HORTON, C. J. (after stating the facts as
above). On October 29, 1885, Benjamin Rice,
a colored man, purchased of the ticket agent
of the Southern Kansas Railroad Company
at Olathe, in this state, for 50 cents, 0. lim
ited railroad ticket to Kansas City, Missouri,
and return, good for three days; the date of
issue being stamped on the back. On that
day he was carried as a passenger by the
railroad company upon one of its passenger
trains from Olathe to Kansas City. The
“going coupon" of the ticket was torn off,
and taken up by the conductor of the train.
On the next day, October 30th, Rice, desiring
to return to Olathe, boarded one of the pas
senger trains of the company, which left
Kansas City about 10 o‘clock p. m., and,
when the conductor called upon him for his
‘fare, presented the “return coupon" of the
ticket, which he had purchased the day be
fore. The conductor took it to the light,
and, after examining it, handed it back to
Rice, saying it was not good, and informed
him that he could not honor it. Rice insisted
that the ticket was good, and said to the con
ductor that he had purchased the ticket the
day before, and that he (the conductor) had
carried him upon the ticket to Kansas City
on that day. Another passenger also stated
to the conductor, at the time, that he had
seen Rice purchase the ticket on the 29th.
The conductor replied that he could not honor
the ticket, and subsequently took hold of
.Rice,s coat-collar, and led him out of the car.
Rice had no money to pay any extra fare;
and when he was ofl! the car, or about to get
off,a friend gave him 75 cents, which he gave
to the conductor, who returned him 5 cents,
punched a receipt for his fare, and permitted.
him to ride to Olathe.
On the part of Rice, it is contended that the
ticket he presented showed plainly on its
back that it was stamped at Olathe on the
29th of October; that he told the conductor
that he did not have any money to pay any
more fare; that he was quietly in his seat
as a passenger when ordered by the conduct
or to leave the train; that he did not make
any forcible resistance to the orders of the
conductor; but that the conductor took him
out of the car, and off upon the steps of the
platform. On the part of the railroad com
pany, it is claimed that the ticket had been
folded up and creased at the date; that the
conductor took it to the light, and examined
it carefully; that the date was obliterated;
that the ticket looked so old and worn that
the conductor believed it had expired; that
he informed Rice that the ticket was not
good, and that he could not ride upon it, but
would have to pay fare; that, when the train
reached Holliday, the conductor inquired of
Rice what he was going to do; that Rice
then refused to pay fare or get ofl! the train;
that the conductor then took hold of Rice,s
coat-collar, and led him to the platform of
the station, or to the last step of the car;
that then a friend told Rice to come back,
and he would give him money to pay his
fare; and the conductor permitted Rice to
take his seat and ride to his destination;
that, when Rice was informed that he would
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which tended to limit the anmnt, of dam
‘ but directed the jury, among other things, as
have to pay his fare or leave the car, it was
his duty to do one or the other; that he
should have paid his fare, and relied upon
his remedy to recover it back; that, if he
could not do thi, he should have quietly
left the train, and not provoked or made nec
essary an assault; that therefore he should
have recovered only 71 cents, that amount be
ing the sum assessed by the jury for his pe
cuniary loss.
The railroad company asked instructions
ages that Rice was entitled to recover to_the
exact fare paid by him, with interest thereon.
The court refused to give these instructions,
follows: “I instruct you that if you find the
plaintiff presented to the conductor for his
passage a limited ticket, good only for three
days from the date of its sale; and that the
conductor, from the mutilated and worn con
dition of the ticket, was unable to read the
date on the ticket, and honestly believed that
the ticket was an old one. and not good;
and for this reason, and without any unnec
essary force or indignity to the plaintiff. re
quired him to pay his fare or get off, and i
did, upon refusal and failure to pay fare. re
move said piaintiii? without any unnecessary
force, and without injury to his person, to
the platform of the car, or to the platform or
ground at a regular station; and then plain
tiff paid his fare, and continued his journey
on the same train, and without delay,—then,
if you find as a fact that the ticket presented
‘by plaintiff was a good and valid ticket, and
that the conductor had no right to collect
this fare from the plaintiff, you must find a
verdict for the piaintiff, and the mea.sure of
his damages would be the amount of fare
paid by him, with interest at seven per cent.
per annum from October 30th, 1885, and ac
tual compensation for the injury and outrage,
if any, suffered by plaintifli from the alleged
assault." We perceive no error in this in
struction. Inactions for the recovery of dam
ages for the wrongful expulsion of a passen
ger fl.oina train, the passenger may recover
for his time. inconvenience, the necessary ex
penses to which he is subjected, and if treat
ed with violence, or in an insulting manner,
for the injuries to his person and feelings.
If the ex l i be malicious, oL“ti1.1;o_t1gh
negiigeiicglhich is gr(Y1s_and wanton. then
exemplary damages may be award\5d.'
4“There is“a special duty on the carrier-'t_o
protect its passengers, not only against the
violence and insults of strangers and co-pas
sengers, but, a fortiori, against the vio
lence and insums own servants; and
that for a breach of that duty he ought to
be compelled to make the amplest reparation.
The law wisely and justly holds him to a i
strict and rigorous accountability. We would
not relax in the slightest degree this strict
accountability. We know that upon it, in no
small degree, depends the safety and com
fort of passengers." Railway Co. v. Wcaver,
16 Kan. 456; Railway Co. v. Kessier, 18
Kan. 523. We fully concede that no one has
a right to resort to force to compel the per
formance of a contract made with him by
another; and a passenger about to be wrong
fully expelled from a railroad train need not
require force to be exerted to secure his
rights, or increase his damages. For any
breach of contract or gross negligence on the
part of the conductor, or the other empioyes
of a railroad company, redress must be
sought in the courts, rather than by the
strong arm of the person who thinks himself
about to be deprived of his rights. A pas
senger should not be permitted to invite a
wrong, and then complain of it. Hail v.
Railroad Co., 15 Fed. 57; Townsend v. Rail
road Co., 56 N. Y. 301; Bradshaw v. Railroad
Co., 135 Mass. 409; Railroad Co. v. Connell,
112 Ill. 296; Car Co. v. Reed, 75 Ill. 125; 3
Wood, By. Law, § 364. Of course, a party
upon a train may resist when, under the cir
cumstances, resistance is necessary for the
protection of his life, or to prevent probable
serious injury; nor can a party be lawfully
ejected from a train while in motion, so that
his being put off would subject him to great
peril. In this case Rice made no unreason
able resistance. He did not resort to force
or violence. Having a good ticket, and be
ing entitled to ride, he refused to pay fare
or get off the train. The conductor had no
difliculty in leading him off, and about all
that Rice did was merely to assert his lawful
right to ride upon the train. Where a pas
senger with a clear right and a clean ticket
is entitled to ride on that trip and train,
and is wrongfully ejected without forcible
resistance upon his part. the jury are, and
ought to be, allowed great latitude in assess
ing damages. They shouid award liberal
damages in full compensation for the injuries
received. The quiet and peaceabie behavior
of a passenger is to his advantage, rather
than to his detriment.
Complaint is also made of other instruc
tions of the court regarding the measure of
damages. Among other things, the court
said to the jury that if “the assault was
malicious, and without cause or_provo9ation,
o.r_ was.acc.6t_npanie.d hyacts of gross insult,
outrage, or oppression, you may award:f.he
plainiiffexemplary or vindictive damages."
Kiso;"tIiafTn esthnating damages they miEit
take into consideration the indignity, insult,
and injury to plaintiff,s feelings by being
publicly expelled." Further, that, if they
found “there was on the part of the conduct
or either malice, gross negligence, or oppres
sion, they would not be confined in fixing
damages to the actual damages received, but
were justified in giving exemplary danulges.,r
It is said that these instructions were mis
leading and erroneous, because there was no
evidence whatever to show that the con
ductor acted with malice or gross negligence.
Upon the evidence of Rice, corroborated by
McCulioch, another passenger, who said that
i
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he saw Rice purchase the ticket on October
29th, there was evidence before the jury up
on which to found these instructions. Huf
ford v. Railroad Co. (Mich.) 31 N. W. 544.
The forcible expulsion of Rice from the car
where he was rightfully seated was such a
wrong as is inevitably accompanied with
more or less outrage and insult. There was
no excuse for the act of expulsion, except the
honest mistake or the gross negligence of
the conductor. If that mistakg_ wa§._<'1ue‘_to
such reckless indifference to the rights of a
pasSl§fig’t§r__()n_.the_o.I~.tlie'“cobductor as .
“est§bTished gross negl_i_gencé.,‘amoii'ntin5’“to
‘Wa'n‘f'onness, andthe jury so found, tiey
Ynight fi'ii(I_”exem'piary damages. Railroad Co.
fi.*K€§§Yer, supra;‘Railroad C6. v. Rice, 10
Kan. 426. Whether the conductor was gross
ly negligent, amounting to wantonness, or
actuated by malice, were matters before the
jury, for their determination upon the evi
deuce. Under the authority of Titus v. Cor
kins, 21 Kan. 722, Rice was entitled to re
cover the expenses incurred by him in the
litigation, if entitled to exemplary damages.
Hall v. Railroad Co., 15 Fed. ‘J5—97. The
amount of the verdict in this case was only
$117.46; therefore the damages are not so ex
cessive as to indicate passion or prejudice on
the part of the jury. The other matters sub
mitted are immaterial.
The judgment of the district court will be
aflirmed.
All the justices concurring.
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LOUISVILLE, N. A. & C. RY. CO. v.
WOLFE.
(27 N. E. 606, 128 Ind. 34?.)
Supreme Court of Indiana. May 23, 1891.
Appeal from circuit court, Harrison county;
W. T. Zenor, Judge.
C. L. Jewett, H. E. Jewett, E. C. Field, D.
J. Wile, and S. O. Pickens, for appellant. A.
Dowling, for appellee.
OLDS, C. J. This is an action by the ap
pellee against the appellant for being wrong
fully expelled from the appellant,s train by
its servants, with force and violence, under
humiliating circumstances. Issues were join
ed on the complaint by a general denial and
answers in justiflcation,—one alleging the
non-payment of fare, and the other non-pay
ment of fare, and the use of profane and in
decent language, and that he was guilty of
disorderly conduct. The appellee replied in
denial to the answers in justification. There
was a trial by jury, and a verdict in favor of
the appellee for $1,500 damages. The jury
also returned answers to special interrogato
ries. Appellant moved for judgment on the
interrogatories and answers, also for a new
trial, and to modify the Judgment; all of
which motions were overruled, and judgment
rendered on the verdict. Appellant,s counsel
discuss three propositions: First, that appel
lee, by his conduct and language, forfeited
Mhis right to be carried as a passenger, and
appellant had the lawful right to eject. him
from the train; second, that the damages are
excessive; and, third, that the court erred
in the instruction given in relation to dam
ages. The jury by their answers to inter
rogatories find that appellee, on August 29,
1 7, purchased a ticket at New Albany for
passage on appellant,s train from New Al
bany to .Mitchell, Ind., and on said day he
took passage on appellant,s n.ain for Mitchell,
and, on demand of the conductor, surrender
ed his ticket. That the conductor demanded
fare or a ticket twice befoIe stopping the
train to put appellee off, and the train was
stopped not at a regular station or stopping
plaee to put him off. That the train was
stopped before any effort was made to eject
appellee, and before he was put off the train
he said to the conductor: “If you say I did
not give you a ticket, you are a God damned
lying son of a bitch." That the words were
spoken in a loud voice, and there were ladies
in the car at the time. That when the train
men
undgyrtook
to put the appellee off the train
he resis
ed,.hand
struggled, and attemptou to
hold onto .\e seats in the car, and while so
resisting he was injured about the arms and
hands, and this was all the physical injuries
he received. It is insisted that these facts
entitled the appellant to a judgment, not
withstanding the general verdict, on the the
ory that the appellee, by the use of the pro
fane and improper language in a loud tone in
the presence of the lady passengers, forfeited
his right to be carried as a passenger, and
the conductor had the right to stop the train
and put him off. It is assumed in the argu
ment that this finding of fact shows the ap
pellee to have used this improper language
before the train was stopped for the purpose
of putting him off, but this assumption is not
warranted by the finding. The finding is that
he used this language “just before he was
put off of defendant,s train." We do not
think it presents the proposition discussed by
counsel, viz., that if a passenger delivers to
a conductor a ticket or pays his fare, and.
afterwards the conductor calls upon him to
again pay his fare, and disputes the first
payment, and a dispute arises, in which the
conductor demands fare, and the passenger
refuses to pay it on the ground that he has
once paid, but in his refusal he becomes
boisterous, and is guilty of unbecoming con
duct, or the use of vulgar, obscene, and pro
fane language. he forfeits his right to be car
ried further, notwithstanding he has paid his
fare; and the conductor may stop the train,
and expel him without liability. For aught
that appears in the finding in this case, the
appellee may have conducted himself in a
perfectly civil and gentlemanly manner until
the train was stopped,and the employes of the
appellant had taken hold of him, and a strug
gle ensued, and the appellee taken from his
seat; and that it was.just as he was about
to be finally ejected from .he car when he
used the language. If such were the facts,——
and they may have been, for aught that ap
pears from the finding,—it would present a
very different case than if the language was
used in the first instance; for in such a case
as we have put it would be clear that the
language used had nothing to do with the
ejectuieut from the train. it would be clear
ly apparent, under such a state of facts, that
he would have been ejected without regard
to the use of the language; but, conceding
that the language was used before the train
was stopped, it does not appear that he was
ejected on account of the vile language used.
It is undoubtedly true that a passenger, by
a breach of decorum, either by his acts or
his language, may forfeit his right to be car
ried as a passenger, and may be expelled
from the train, notwithstanding he has paid
his fare; and this may be true even if he be
led to such breach by reason of an insult of
fered him by an employfa of the company. A
wanton insult or false accusation often causes
a sudden outburst of temper, and the use of
language which one in an instant after re
grets, and feels the mortiiication more keenly
than do those in whose presence it is uttered.
One who utters language in a heat of pas
slon, caused by a sudden and wanton insult
and unexpected charge against his truthful
ness and honesty, must be dealt with
more leniently than if the language is used
deliberately, without provocation, or after
reasonable time for second thought, and op
portunity to bridle and control his passion.
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The fact that a false and slanderous charge
is made in the heat of passion may be proven
in mitigation of damages. If a conductor,
after having received a ticket for fare from
a passenger, should return to him, and falsely
deny having collected his fare or received
a ticket, and demand pay again, and it is
refused, and the conductor should abandon
any further effort to collect again the fare
or refrain from making any threats of put
ting him off the train, and the passenger, aft
er having reasonable time to control himself,
should persist in the use of profane or inde-
cent language, to the annoyance of other pas
sengers, he would no doubt violate his right
to be carried; at least, if the unearned fare
was tendered back to him; but the company
camtot justify the act of the conductor in‘
expelling a passenger who has paid his fare
on account of his having, in the heat of pas
sion, when he was falsely charged with the.
failure to pay, used improper language, such
as was used in this case, in response to such
false charge, even though it was heard by
other passengers; the wrong committed by
the passenger was provoked by the conductor.
It does not lie in the mouth of the appellant
to say: ‘"13-ue, you paid your fare. You had
the right to be carried. But when the con
ductor falsely charged you, in the presence
of the other passengers, with not having paid
your fare, and demanded that you again pay
fare or he would stop the train and put you
off, you became angry; you used improper
language to the conductor in the presence of
lady passengers." If the theory contended
for by the appellant be the true one, then it
would be an inducement for the employee of
railroad companies, under such circumstan
ces, to wantonly and purposely address the
passenger in such a manner as to provoke
him to the use of bad language or bad con
duct as affording an excuse, in case he refus
ed to pay a second time, to eject him from
the train. The damages sued for accrue on
account of an injury on thepart of the em
ploye of the appellant to the appellee. The
offense committed by the appellee is against
the other passengers. He was provoked to
the commission of it by the act of the em
ploye of the appellant in falsely accusing
him, in the presence of the other passengers,
of not having paid his fare. Certainly the
company ought not to defend against the un
lawful act of their agent on account of such
unlawful act having provoked a breach of
decorum, or even a breach of the peace, on
the part of the appeliee. It is true the lan
guage used was unjustifiable, and was an in
sult to those in whose presence it was utter
ed; but it is evidently the fact that this
breach of decorum was provoked and caused
by an insult offered by the conductor to the
appellee in the presence of the passengers;
and we see no just reason why, under such
circumstances, it should operate as a defense
to appellee’s right of action, and bar him
from a recovery.
It is next contended that the verdict is ex
cessive, for the reason that the jury find
that all the physical injuries inflicted were
caused by the appeilee resisting, and that
he cannot recover for the injury caused by
his resistance. There is nothing to show
that the jury did include any damages for
the injury occurring by reason of appellee,s
resistance; but, the appellee being lawfully
in the car, and having paid his fare, he had
the right to be carried, and had the right to
make reasonable resistance, as he did by
holding onto the seats; and he was forced.
loose and taken from the car; and for such
damages as he sustained on account of such
removal from the car the appellant is liable.
English v. Canal Co., 66 N. Y. 454; Railroad
Co. v. Rice, 38 Kan. $8, 16 Pac. 817; Rail
way Co. v. Acres, 108 Ind. 548, 9 N. E. 453;
Railroad Co. v. Hoidridge, 118 Ind. 281, 20
N. E. 837.
Some objection is made to the giving of the
seventh instruction, and the refusal to give
instruction 7 asked by appellant. We have
examined these instructions, and think there
is no available error in the instruction given.
It is evident the jury was not misled by any
technical error in the language used, even if
it is erroneous. The instruction relates to
the right to give exemplary damages, and
there was some evidence which, if true, au
thorized the assessment of exemplary dam
ages. Railroad Co. v. Rogers, 38 Ind. 116.
When the offense is not punishable by the
criminal law, and malice or oppression wtlgh
in the controversy, exemplary or vindictive
damages may be assessed. What we have
said as to the other alleged errors disposes
of the question presented by the instruction
refused.
It is further contended that a new trial
should have been granted by reason of acci
dent and surprise on account of an absent
witness. There is no diligence shown. no ap
plication for a continuance, and the evidence
is merely cumulative. There is no error in
the record.
appellant.
Judgment aflirmed, at costs of‘
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STEVENSON v. SMITH et al.
(28 Cal. 103.)
Supreme Court of California. April, 1865.
Appeal from district court, Second judicial
district, Tehama county. .
The facts are stated in the opinion of the
Court.
George Cadwalader, for appellant.
Long, for respondents.
W. S.
SAWYER, J. This is an action to recover
a mare and colt eized by the defendant
(sheriff of Tehama county) under an attach
ment, and damages for their detention.
Plaintiff recovered the property. Plaintiff
moved for a new trial on the ground that cer
tain special damages, claimed to have been
proved, were not found for him. The mo
tion was denied, and the plaintiff appeals
'
from the order denying a new trial.
The appellant claims that the evidence
shows that the animals were placed by de
fendants in fields where the pasturage was
poor, and that in consequence of this act
they lost iieh and depreciated in value to the
extent of five hundred dollars. Also that the
mare was a valuable brood mare, taken to
Tehama county for the purpose of being bred
to a particular horse, and that by reason of
the taking and detention by defendants the
breeding season was lost, whereby a further
damage was shown to have been sustained
to the amount of live hundred dollars, and
that the court should upon the evidence have
found these items of damage for plaintiff.
On examination of the pleadings, we find
no averments in the complaint that would an
thorize the recovery of the items claimed.
These damages are special, and the facts out
of which they arise must be averred, or they
cannot be recovered.
Mr. Chitty says: “Damages are either gen
eral or special. General damages are such as
the law implies, or presumes to have accrued
from the wrong complained of. Special dams
ages are such as really took place, and are
not implied by law. and are either sup_er
added to g‘eneral damages arising from an
act injurious in itself,—as when some partic
ular damage arises from the uttering of
slanderous words actionable in themselves,—
or are such as arise from an act indifferent,
and not actionable in itself, but only injuri
ous in its consequences," etc. 1 Chit. Pl. 395.
Again: “It does not appear necessary to
state the former description of the damages
in the declaration. because presumptions of
law are not in general to he pleaded or aver
red as facts, etc. "‘ ' ' But when the law
does not necessarily imply that the plaintiff
sustained the damages by the act complained
of. it is essential to the validity of the dec
laration that the resulting damage should be
,
shown with particularity. ' ' ' And
whenever the damages sustained have not
necessarily accrued from the act complained
of, and consequently are not implied by law,
then, in order to prevent surprise on the de
fendant, which might otherwise ensue at the
trial, the plaintiff must in general state the
particular damage which he has sustained, or
he will not be permitted to give evidence o
it. Thus in an action of trespass and false
imprisonment, where the plaintiff offered to
give in evidence that during the imprison
ment he was stinted in his allowance of food.
he was not permitted to do so, because the
fact was not, as it should have been, stated
in the declaration; and in a similar action it
was held that the plaintiff could not give ev
1 idencc of his health being injured, unless spe
T cially stated. So in trespass ‘for taking a
horse,‘ nothing can be given in evidence
'which is not expressed in the declaration,
and if money was paid over in order to re
gain possession, such payment should be al
leged as special damages." Id. 390,.
The complaint in this case only alleges the
ownership of the animals, the value, the
wrongful taking and detention, the demand,
and that plaintiff “has sustained damages by
reason of such wrongful taking and detention
of said chattels and property in the sum of
one thousand dollars.“
From these facts alone the law does not
imply either of the items of damages claimed
to have been proved. The iirst item is not
even consequential upon any of the facts al
leged, but results from other acts of defend
ants while the animals were in his posses
sion. And the second item of damages
would not necessarily r. suit from a mere tak
ing and detention. These damages depend
upon an extraordinary value of the animal
for a particular purpose, and upon the spe
cial use to which she was capable of being
applied. The facts out of which these items
of special damages arise must be alleged in
‘the complaint, or they cannot be recovered.
They are notaileged, and are, therefore, not
embraced within the issues to be tried. For
this reason, if for no other, the plaintiff is
not entitled to judgment for such items of
damages. There was, then, no.error in not
finding for plaintiff on these points.
The only other point made by appellant is.
that the court erred in not giving plaintifl.’
costs. There is no doubt in our minds that
the plaintiff was entitled to costs. But this
error in no way affects the finding, and is not
a ground for new trial. The error cannot,
therefore, be corrected on appeal from an or
der denying a new trial. The proper mode
of reviewing and correcting this error is on
appeal from the judgment, but no such ap
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WAB..KSH WESTERN RY. CO. v. FRIED
MAN.
(30 N. E. 353, 34 N. E. 1111, and 146 Ill. 583.)
Supreme Court of Illinois. March 24, 1892.
Appeal from appellate court, First district.
Action by Oscar J. Friedman against the
Wabash Western Railway Company to recov
er damages for personal injuries. Plaintiff
obtained judgment, which was aflirmed by
the appellate court. Defendant appeals. Re
versed.‘
George B. Burnett (Black & Fitzgerald, of
counsel), for appellant. Page, Eliel & Rosen
thal (J. W. Duncan, of counsel), for appellee.
CRAIG, J. This was an action brought by
Oscar J. Friedman against the Wabash West
ern Railway Company to recover damages
for a personal injury received on the 1st day
of May, 1888, while plaintiff was a passenger
on the defendant,s line of road, running from
Moberly, .\Io., to Ottumwa, Iowa. The fol
lowing map shows .the line of defendant,s
road. The accident which resulted in the in
jury complained of occurred in the state of
Missouri, between Kirksville and Glenwood




Distance from Centrslia to Moberly, 24 miles.
Distance from Moberly to Ottumwa t31 miles.
Distance from Kirksvilie to Glenwood Junction
25 miles.
The declaration contained five counts, but
they are all substantially alike. In the second
count, it is averred that defendant was on
May 1, 1888, operating a railroad from Klrks
ville, Mo., to Gienwood Junction, Mo0 and
operating trains for the conveyance of pas
sengers for reward; “and the said plaintiff,
at said Kirksville, then became and was a
passenger in a certain train of the said de
fendant on the said railroad, to be carried,
and was accordingly then being carried, in
the said train, from Kirksville to said Glen
wood Junction," for reward, etc.; that it
became and was the duty of the said defend
ant to properly and safely construct and
maintain the track and road-bed of said rail
way, but the defendant so negligently con
structed and maintained the same that the
same were not then safe for the use of pas
sengers on defendant’s trains, “and the rails
of said track of said ralhoad were‘ then and
there in bad repair and condition, and a cer
tain rail in the said track had become broken
by reason of the said negligence of the said
defendant, and thereby a certain car then be
ing in the said train, and of a sort commonly
called ’sleeping-cars,‘ was then and there
thrown with great force and violence from
. audcff thesaid track;"and plaintifl!,heingthen
and there asleep and in the exercise of due
care0 was thrown from the berth in said car,
in hich he was sleeping, with great force
and violence, across the car, and into the op
posite berth, "by means whereof, then and
there, the spine and spinal column, including
the spinal cord, of the said plaintiff. became
and were greatly bruised, hurt, and injured,
and the said plaintiff suffered and incurred
an injury of the kind known as ‘concussion
of the spine,’ " wherelw he incurred expendi
tures, in endeavoring to be healed, amounting
to $5,000, and became sick, lame, etc.,‘ “from
thence hitherto," suffering great pain and be
ing prevented from attending to his business,
and thereby losing profits, etc. In the con
clusion of the declaration the plaintiff claimed
damages amounting to $50,000. The defend
ant pleaded the general issue, and on a trial
before a jury the plaintifl! recovered $30,000.
and the judgment, on appeal to the appellate
court, was afiirmed. v
it will be observed that in each count of
the declaration the plaintiff, in stating where
the relation of passenger and common carrier
commenced, and where such relation existed
between the plaintiff and the defendant.
averred as follows: “And the said plaintiff.
at said Kirksville, then became and was a
passenger on a certain train of the said de
fendant on the said railroad, to be carried,
and was accordingly then being carried, in
the said train, from Kirksville to said Glen
wood Junction," for reward, etc. No evidence
was introduced on the trial that the plain
tiff became a passenger at Kirksville for
Glenwood Junction; but the plaintiff testified
that he took the sleeper at Moberly to go in
Ottumwa, and that he had a ticket which
read, from Moberly to Ottumwa, which he
had purchased at Moberly in the fall of 1867'
The testimony offered for the purpose of
proving the averment of the declaration was
objected to on the ground of a variance be
tween the evidence and the declaration; but
the court overruled the objection, and allow
ed the evidence to be introduced. Upon the
question of variance the defendant asked
the court to instruct the jury as follows:
60 GENERAL AND SPECIAL DAMAGES.
“The averment in plaintiff,s declaration that
he became a passenger in the train of defend
ant at Kirksville, Mo., to be carried from
said Kirksvilie to Glenwood Junction, is
material, and must be proved as alleged;
and if the jury believe from the evidence
that said plaintiff did not at the time in ques
tion become a passenger in said train of de
fendant at said Kirksville, to be carried to
said Glenwood Junction, then the jury will .
find for defendant, regardless of all other
‘
questions in the case." But the court refused
to give the instruction as prayed, but quali
fied it by adding as follows, to-wit: “But if
it appear from the evidence that plaintiff was
a passenger on the train of the defendant
between the points mentioned, traveling from
a point south of said Kirksville to a point
beyond Glenwood Junction, then the aver
ment in the plaintit’f’s declaration is sufli
ciently made out." It may be said that the
question involved is a technical one, and
hence not entitled to that consideration which
a court should give to a question which
goes to the merits of an action. The plaintiff
had the right, when the question was raised,
to amend his declaration, and thus obviate
the difliculty; but he saw proper to take
another course, and he occupies no position
now to complain. should the rules of law
that control in such cases be strictly en
forced against him. But, while the ques
tion involved may be regarded somewhat
technical, still it will be remembered that
the plaintiff is seeking to recover a large
sum of money, and the defendant has the
right to demand and insist that the grounds
upon which the plaintiff claims a right of
recovery should be clearly and concisely
stated, and that the case made on the declara
tion should be proven as laid. If a plaintiff
may allege in his declaration one ground of
recovery, and on the trial prove another, a
ldefendant never could be prepared for trial.
'One great object of a declaration is to notify
ithe defendant of the nature and character
\of the plaintiffs demand. so that he may be
able to prepare for a defense; but if one
groundof action may be alleged, and another
proven, a declaration would be a delusion,
and, instead of affording a defendant notice
of what he was called upon to meet, it would
be a deception. Here the plaintiff claimed
that the relation of passenger and common
carrier existed between him and the defend
ant, and that the defendant owed him a duty
growing out of that relation. In speaking of
a declaration in such a case Chltty on
Pleading says: “When the plaintiff,s right
consists in an obligation on the defendant to
observe some particular duty, the declaration
must state the nature of such duty, which
we have seen may be founded either upon a
contract between the parties or on the obli
gation of law arising out of the defendant,s
particular character or situation, and the de
fendant must prove such duty as laid; and
a variance will, as in actions on contract, be
fatal." Chit. Pl. 382. The same author also
says: “In an action on the case founded on
an express or implied contract, as against an
attorney, agent, carrier, innkeeper, or other
bailee, for negligence, etc., the declaration
must correctly state the contract or the par
ticular duty or consideration from which the
liability results. and on which it is founded;
and a variance in the description of a con
tract, though in an action ex delicto, may be
fatal, as in an action ex contractu. The dec
laration in such case usually begins with a
statement of the particular profession or
situation of the defendant and his retainer,
and consequent duty or liability. The decla
ration will be defective if it does not show
that by express contract or by implication
of law, in respect to the defendant,s particu
lar character or situation, etc., stated by the
plaintiff, the defendant was bound to do or
omit the act in reference to which he is
charged." Chit. Pl. p. 38-}.
It may, however, be said that the state
ment in the declarationof the point from
which and to which the plaintiff was be
ing carried was mere inducement, and need
not be proved as laid. Upon a question of
this character, Chitty on Pleading (page 292)
says: “In general, however, every allega
tion in an inducement which is material, and
not impertinent and foreign to the cause,
and which, consequently, cannot be rejected
as urplusage, must be proved as alleged,
and a variance would be fatal; and conse
quently great attention to the facts is neces
sary in framing the inducement, and care
must be taken not to insert any unnecessary
allegation." If, therefore, the allegation is
to be regarded as inducement, it was neces
sary to prove it as alleged. And at page 3.5
the author further says: “It is also a rule
that if a necessary inducement of the plain
tiff,s right, etc., even in actions for torts, re-
late to and describe and be founded on a
matter of contract. it is necessary to be
strictly correct in stating uch contract; it
being matter of description. Thus, even in
case against a carrier, if the termini of the
journey which was to be undertaken be mis
stated, the variance will be fatal Here the
allegation in the inducement relates to mat
ter of description." Harris v. Rayner, 8
Pick. 541, isa case in point. The action was
brought to recover for an injury sustained
by the oversetting of a stage-coach. The
plaintiff alleged in his declaration that he
paid defendants, for his passage in their
stage from Albany to Boston, $10. the usual
fee for said passage, and defendants, in con
sideration thereof, undertook and promised
carefully to transport plaintiff in said pass
age from Albany to Boston. In support of
the declar . ., "mintiff proved that he was
in a stag com Worcester to Boston,
and that‘ he arrived at Boston the
coach n . . c by the carelessness of the
driver, . .as thereby injured. It was
held t r .-vidence did not prove the
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.carry him from one point to the other.
.contract set out in the declaration, and in
passing upon this point the court said: “We
think there was no sufllclent proof at the
trial of the contract as alleged in the declara
tion. The declaration alleges a contract on
the part of the defendants to transport the
plaintiff from Albany to Boston. The proof
was that the plaintiff rode in defendants‘
stage from Worcester to Boston; and. al
though this is part of the route from Albany
to Boston, yet it is part, also, of many other
lines of travel. So that the contract as al
leged remains without proof." In Tucker
v. Cracklin, 2 Starkie, 385, and in Railroad
& Banking Co. v. Tucker, 79 Ga. 128, 4 S. E.
5, actions were brought against carriers for
the loss of goods; and in each case it was
held that a variance between the proof and
allegation as to the termini of the carriage
was fatal. In Phillips, Ev. (volume 3, p.
268,) the author says: “The plaintiff 'will be
nonsuited if the termini of the journey are
not correctly set forth." In Railroad Co. v.
Sutton, 53 Ill. 398, the point was made that
an averment in the declaration of defend
a.nt’s undertaking to convey the plaintiff
from West Urbano. to Tolono is not sustained
by proof of an undertaking to convey from
Champaign City to Tolono. In disposing of
the question of variance, it is said: “It
would appear from the testimony that West
Urbana and Champaign City are one and the
same place; consequently, there was no vari
once." The averment in plaintiff’s declara
tion that he became and was a passenger at
Klrksville, to be carried to Glenwood Junc
tion, for reward, was, in effect, a statement
that he took the defendant,s train at Kirks
ville for Glenwood Junction, and that he had
paid or was ready to pay his fare from one
point to the other when called upon, where
upon there was an implied contract on
the part of the railway company to safely
We
think it plain that the averment in plaintiff’s
declaration was not sustained by proof that
he became a passenger at .\ioberly for Ot
tumwa. It may be true that plaintiff stat
.ed more in his declaration than he might
have stated; that he might have relied upon
an allegation that he was a passenger upon
defendant,s cars, being carried for reward,
without stating definitely the termini of his
journey on defendant,s line of road. But,
having gone into detail in his allegation, the
law requires him to prove them as laid.
What is said in Bell v. Senneff, 83 Ill. 125,
is in point here: “As a general rule a party
is required to prove the averments of his
pleadings as he makes them. He may aver
more than is required; but, as a general
rule, he must prove them, although unneces
sarily made." In Derragon v. Rutland, 58
Vt. 128, 3 Atl. 332, it was held that every
averment which the pleadings make material
as a descriptive part of the cause of action
must be proved as alleged; and any vari
.ance which destroys the legal identity of
the matter or thing averred with the matter
or thing proved is fatal. In State v. Copp,
15 N. ‘H. 212, it is said: “It is a most gen
eral rule that no allegation which is descrip
tive of the identity of that which is legally
essential to the claim or charge can be re
jected." See, also, 1 Phillips, Ev. pp. 709.
710; Steph. Pl. p. 124, appendix. Here the
plaintiff was bound to allege that he was a
passenger on defendant,s train of cars for
reward. This was material, and the further
averment that he became a passenger at
Kirksville for Glenwood Junction was descrip
tive of the identity of that which was legally
essential. It could not be rejected or disreL
garded. In conclusion, we think it plain,
under the authorities, that there was a vari
ance between the proof and the declaration;
and the court erred in the admission of the
evidence, and in the modification of defend
ant,s instruction.
On the trial the plaintiff was permitted,
against the objection of the defendant, to
introduce evidence tending to prove that
the plaintiff at the time of the injury was
receiving a compensation for his services
as a traveling salesman of $3,000 per annum.
The declaration contained no allegation of
any special contract or engagement of the
plaintiff with any person under which he
might earn money for his services. In Rail
way Co. v. Klauber, 9 Ill. App. 613, in dis
cussing a question of this character it is
said: “Neither of these allegations points
to any damages growing out of or depending
upon the peculiar circumstances or business
of the defendant. In Tomlinson v. Derby,
43 Conn. 562, the plaintiff was injured by
means of a defective highway, and his allega
tion was that he was thereby ‘prevented from
transacting his ordinary business;’ and it
was held that, under such allegation, he
could not show that he was earning $100 a
month in carting and sawing timber. So,
in Taylor v. Munroe, 43 Conn. 36, under a
similar allegation, it was held that the plain
tiff could not show that she was a button
maker, and what wages she earned in that
business. In City of Chicago v. O,Brennan,
65 Ill. 160, the plaintiff brought suit for an
injury caused by the falling of a portion of
the brick and plastering in the common coun
cil chamber in the city. The allegation in
the declaration was that ‘the plaintiff, who
was pursuing his occupation as journalist,’
was injured, etc., ‘and thereby the plaintiff,
as lawyer, lecturer, and journalist, became
and was sick, sore, and incapacitated from
attending to his business, and so continued
for a long time, to-wit, for two months; and,
as regards plaintiffs profession as a lecturer,
he has been almost wholly, ever since, dis
abled from pursuing it.’ It was held that
under these allegations the plaintiff could
not give in evidence the fact of a particular
engagement to lecture in Virginia. and the
probable gains thereof. The court say: ‘In
order to subserve the ends of good pleading,
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which are to apprise the opposite party of
the nature of the claim, and prevent surprise,
it was necessary that these special damages,
and the facts on which they were based,
should have been set out in the declaration.’ "
Baldwin v. Railroad Corp. 4 Gray, 333. City
of Bloomington v. Chamberlain, 104 Ill. 21".’,
is also a case in point. There the admitted
evidence was held not to be erroneous, but
the ruling was placed on the express ground
that the evidence was not as to the loss of
profits of a particular engagement. Had the
evidence gone to that extent, as is the case
here, it is plainly laid down that the evidence
would have been erroneous, as held in City
of Chicago v. O‘Brennan, 65 ill. 160. This
is apparent from what is said in the opinion
of the court on page 27 . We think the rule
established in the cases cited is the correct
one, and the court erred in the admission of
the evidence. It cannot be said that the
error was a harmless one, as the evidence
was of a character calculated to produce on
the minds of the jury an impression that the
plaintiff, on account of his capacity to earn
a large salary before the injury, which he
had lost by the accident, and hence should
recover large damages.
It may, however, be said that the error
was cured by an instruction given by the
court as follows: “The court permitted the
testimony of what plaintiff was earning at
the time of the injury charged. This testi
mony was admitted for no other purpose
than to show plaintiffs capacity to earn
‘money. and must not be considered in any
respect as a measure of damages.“ It is not
entirely clear what the instruction means.
While the court directed the jury that the
evidence was not to be considered as a meas
ure of damage the court failed to point out
what use they should make of the evidence.
The court ruled, when the evidence was
offered. that it was competent for the con
sideration of the jury. That ruling was
never changed. The evidence was allowed
to remain with the jury for their considera
tion, and it could have no other effect than
to swell the damages. Had the court, when
it was ascertained that an error had been
committed in admitting it, excluded the evi
dence entirely from the consideration of the
jury, the error would in a great measure
have been removed; but that course was not
pursued. The instruction did not, in our
judgment, cure the error. For the errors
indicated the judgment of the appellate and
circuit courts will be reversed, and the cause
remanded.
(Oct. 23, 1893.)
MAGRIJDER, .T., (dissenting.) It seems to
me that the petition for rehearing in this
case has demonstrated beyond question the
right of the appellee to a rehearing. First,
the declaration is suflicient as a declaration
upon the common-law liability of the carrier;
second, the declaration alleges that the plain
tiff “was hindered and prevented from trans
acting and attending to his business and
affairs, and lost and was deprived of divers
great gains, profits, and compensations,
which he might and otherwise would have
made and acquired." This was a sufficient
allegation of special damage to justify the
admission of evidence that plaintiff at the
time of the injury was receiving a compensa
tion for his services as a traveling salesman
of $3,000 per annum, under the decision made
in City of Bloomington v. Chamberlain, 104
Ill. 268. In the latter case the allegation in
the first count of the declaration was that
“plaintiff was hindered from transacting her
business and affairs and deprived of large
gains and profits, which she otherwise would
have earned," and, in the second count, “that
she had been rendered unable to earn or make
for herself a living, and had been depriv
ed of large gains and profits which she other
wise would have earned." Under these al
legations the plaintifl! was there permitted
to testify that she had taught school at
$50 per month. If the law is a science of
precedents, no instance can be found where
a precedent so exactly fits a subsequent state
of facts as the Chamberlain Case fits the
facts disclosed by the record in the case at
bar upon the second point here designated.
BAILEY, C. J., and BAKER. J., concur.
U‘!WIPRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE DAMAGES.
NATIONAL COPPER CO. v. MINNESOTA fendant at the defendant,s fifth level occurred
MIN. C0. about the year 1859.
. “In Hay, 1880, the plaintiff resumed mining
(23 N. W. 781, 57 Mich. 83.)
Supreme Court of Michigan. June 3, 1885.
Error to Ontonagon.
T. L. Chndbourne, for appellant. Chandler,
Grant & Gray and G. V. N. Lothrop, for ap
pellee.
COOLEY, C. J. This is an action of tres
pass. The following is a statement of the
case, as made for the plaintiff, for the argu
ment in this court:
“The plaintiff and defendant are corpora
tions, which for 25 years and more have been
engaged in copper mining in Ontonagon coun
ty. Their‘ mines adjoin each other. Each
owns ‘the land in fee on which its mine is situ
ated. The plaintlff, in carrying on its mining
operations, left a wall of rock, from 15 to 18
feet thick, next to the boundary line of de
fendant,s mine. This was left as a barrier
and protection to its mine against water or
other encroachments from the Minnesota. The
Minnesota left no such barrier; it not only
worked up to the boundary line, but broke
through into defendant’s mine. About the
year 1866 the plaintiff, at about 40 feet above
its fourth level, and from 20 to 25 feet from the
bmmdary line, drilled a hole, of the ordinary
size, about one and one-half inches in diameter,
and when the blast was fired it blew through
into the opening which had been previously
made by the defendant into the plaintlffs ter
ritory. The driil-hole was left through from
two to two and one-half feet of solid rock.
Capt. Chynoweth, then the agent of plaintiff,
examined this hole and the surroundings, and
immediately gave orders to cease work there.
This was done as a further protection against
the defendant. No work was done at this
point after that until the winter of 1883—1.
The plaintiff had no knowledge of any fur
ther trespass at this point until February, 1884,
under the circumstances related hereafter. The
pump of the defendant was stopped in 1870,,
and that of the plaintiff in 1871 or 1872. Plain
tiffs mine fllled up to the adit level in about
five years. Since 1870 the defendant has
worked its mine more or less upon tribute, and
so did the plaintiff, until May, 1880, when it
resumed work. In order to avoid liability for
the trespass committed by it at the plaintiffs
fourth level. (being the defendant’s fifth level,)
the defendant sought to show, and did show,
another hole at the first level, between the two
mines. A continuation of the inquiry showed
that this hole also was about 20 feet from the
boundary line, on the plaintiffs side, and that
defendant had here trespassed 20 feet upon
plaintiffs land. We do not think that the his
tory of mining upon Lake Superior will dis
close another instance of such reckless disre
gard of the rights of an adjoining mine-owner.
This encroachment and trespass by the de
operations and commenced to pump the water
from its mine. The six-inch pump, formerly
used by the mine, and which had always been
adequate to keep the mine unwatered, proved
wholly inadequate, and it was compelled to get;
a 12-inch pump, and even this was not suflicieut
in the spring; and in 1882 the water gained
on them 120 feet, and in 1883, 222 feet, with
the pump working night and day. Capt. Par
nell, the agent of the plaintiff,s mine, was
thoroughly acquainted with it, having worked
in the mine years before; he soon became con
vinced that the bulk of the water came from
the defendant,s mine. He found that the wa
ter came from the fourth level. He cleaned
out the level, and, on reaching the point where
the drill-hole had been made years before, he
found that the rock had been all blasted away
from the .\Iiune§sota side, and that the water
was rushing through an opening from 20 to 25
feet high and 12 feet wide. When discovered
there was a volume of water seven feet wide
flowing from the Minnesota into the National.
When the defendant made its second encroach
ment at this point does not clearly appear;
according to the defendant’s witness Spargo it
was in 1871 or 1872. This witness was an
employe of the defendant, and one of its tribu
ters. He says he saw the hole from the Min
nesota side, and it was then six to eight feet
high, and from four to five feet wide. Wil
liam George, a witness for defendant. last saw
the hole in 1870 or 1871. It was then about a
foot in diameter. The witness was then work
ing for the defendant as tributer and captain.
Thomas James was in charge of the mine.
He admits that the defendant’s tributers were
then mining there. This same Capt. James
has been in charge of the defendant,s mine as
agent ever since.
“It was not denied in the court below, and
we presume will not be in this court, that the
defendant committed these several acts of tres
pass. But, in proof of the fact, we refer to
the admission of the agent Harris, the evidence
that the track of a tram-road, sollars, and a
system of timbering were found constructed
from the fifth level of defendant’s mine into
this opening, and the testimony of plaintiff,s
witnesse already referred to. Furthermore,
it is beyond dispute that the defendant know
ingly and willfully committed these acts of
trespass, and broke down the barrier which
the plaintiff had so carefully left to protect its
mine for all future time, and against all possi
ble dangers.
“About 1870 the defendant concluded to
abandon regular mining, stopped its pumps.
and commenced what is known among miners
as robbing the mine. It placed its tributers
at work at the bottom of the mine, took out
all the copper ground that could be found, took
out the supports of the roof of the mine, and
allowed it to settle or cave in. This was all
done under the direction of the defendant,s
v!
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agent, James. The deiendant’s mine is situ
ated upon a hill or mountain side. The result
was that the surface of the ground became de
pressed, and openings were made in it. De
fendant,s agent, James, testlfied to openings of
this character on the surface of the Minnesota,
amounting in all to over 500 feet in length;
some were 3 or 4 feet wide. Into these open
ings the water from rains and melting snow
ran into the defendant,s mine, and from thence
flowed into the plaintilT’s mine, through the
opening at its fourth level. But for these open
ings the water would have run down the hill
side. As one of defendant,s own witnesses ex
pressed it, ‘There has been a general falling
away of the bluff.‘ There were no such open
ings on the surface of the National. In fact,
we everywhere find the plaintiff conductmg its
mining operations with due regard to the
rights of adjoining owners; while we find
the defendant conducting its operations in
the most reckless disregard of such rights."
The above is a suflicient statement of the
facts for a discussion of the principal question
in the case, viz: Is the piaintiffs right of ac
tion barred by the statute of limitations?
The count in the declaration on which the
parties went to trial alleged that the defend
ant, on March 15, 1882, and on divers days
and times between that day and the com
mencement of suit, with force and arms broke
down the partition wall between the mine of
the plaintiff and the mine of the defendant,
and let the water from its said mine into the
mine of the plaintiff, and then and there filled
the mine of the plaintiff with water, greatly
damaging its timbering, workings, walls, and
machinery, hindered and prevented the plain
tiff from carrying on and transacting its law
ful and necessary affairs and business, caused
the plaintiff great damage and expense in re
moving water from its mine. etc.
The defendant pleaded the general issue,
with notice that the statute of limitations
would be relied upon. The plaintiff recovered
a large judgment.
1. The time limited for the commencement
of suit for trespass upon lands in this state is
two years from the time the right of action
accrues. How. St. § 8714. This action was
commenced in May, 1884, and it is not claimed
that damages for the original trespass can be
recovered in it. The contention of the plain
tiff may be succinctly stated as follows: (1)
Had the plaintiff instituted suit within two
years from the original trespass. the recovery
would.have been limited to such damages as
were the direct and immediate result of the
trespass. The subsequent fiowage of water
through the opening was not the direct, imme
diate, or necessary result of breaking down the
barriers; therefore no damages could have
been recovered therefor in an action so brought.
(2) Two trespasses may be the result of one
act. In other words, one trespass may cause
., another, and he who commits the wrongful
act in such a case will be responsible for both
trespasses. (3) In this case no action accrued
for the flowage of water into the plaintiff,s
mine until the flowage actually took place, but
when the fiowage occurred as a result of de
fendant’s wrongful act it was a trespass, and
if it continued from day to day there was a
continuous trespass for which repeated actions
mignt be maintained.
Upon these positions the plaintiff plants its
case, and unless they are sound in law the re
covery cannot be supported. All right of re
covery for the original trespass, which consist
ed in breaking through into the plaintiff,s urine,
was long since barred, and it is not claimed
that there was, from the time of the first
wrong, a continuous trespass which can give a ,
right of action now. The merely leaving an
opening between the two mines is not the
wrong for which suit is brought, but it is the
flowing of water through the opening which is
complained of as a new trespass; the original
wrongful act of the defendant in breaking
through being the cause, and the injurious con
sequence when it happened, connecting itself
with the cause to complete the right of action.
In support of its contention that the case
before us may be regarded as one of con
tinuous trespass from the first, several au
thorities are cited for the plaintiff, which
may be briefly noticed. Among them is
Holmes v. Wilson, 10 Adol. & E. 503. It ap
peared in that case that a turnpike company
had built buttresses on the plaintiff,s land for
the support of its road. The act was a tres
pass, and the plaintiff recovered damages
therefor; but this. it was held, did not pre
clude its maintaining a subsequent action for
the continuance of the buttresses where they
had been wrongfully placed. ’l‘he ground of
the decision was that in the first suit dam
ages could be recovered only for the con
tinuance of the trespass to the time of its
institution. There could be no legal pre
sumption that the turnpike company would
persist in its wrongful conduct, and conse
quently, prospective damages, which would
Konly be recoverable on the ground of such
pe1sistent wrong-doing, would not have been
within the compass of the first recovery..
‘The cases of Bowyer v. Cook, 4 C. B. 236;
Thompson v. Gibson. 7 Mees. & W. 456;
Russell v. Brown, 63 Me. 203; and Powers
v. Council Bluffs, 45 Iowa, 652, are all de
cided upon the same principle. Cumberland,
etc., Co. v. Hitchings, (35 Me. 140, was one of
the wrongful filling up of a canal by a tres
passer. it was held that the trespasser was
under legal obligation to remove what he
had unlawfully placed on the plaintiffs prem
ises, and that, so long as he suffered the
obstruction to remain, he was guilty of a‘
continuous trespass from day to day.
In Adams v. Railroad Co., 18 Minn. 260
(Gil. 236,) and Troy v. Railroad Co., 23 N.
H. 83, railroad companies which, by tres
pass, had entered upon the lands of indi
viduals and constructed and begun the oper
ation of railroads. were held liable as tres
passers from day to day so long as the oper
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ation of the road was continued. The prin
ciple of decision in all these cases is clear
and not open to question. In each of them
there was an original wrong, but there was
also a persistency in the wrong from day to
day; the plaintiffs possession was continu
ally invaded, and his right to the exclusive
occupation and enjoyment of his freehold
continually encroached upon and limited.
Each day, therefore, the plaintiff suffered a
new wrong, but no single suit could be made
to embrace prospective damages, for the rea
son that future persistency in the wrong
could not legally be assumed.
To make these cases applicable, it is nec
essary that it should appear that the action
of the defendant has been continuously
wrongful from the first. Whether it can be
so regarded will be considered further on.
The plaintiff, however, does not. as we have
seen, rely exclusively upon this view. Its
case is likened by counsel to that of a farmer,
whose fences are thrown down by a tres
passer; the cattle of the trespasser on a
subsequent day entering through the open
ing. In such a case it is said there are two
trespasses: the one consisting in throwing
down the fences, and the other in the entry
of the cattle: and the right of action for the
latter would accrue at the time the entry was
actually made. The plaintiff also cites and
relies upon a number of cases in which the
act of the party which furnishes the ground
of complaint antedates the injurious conse
quence, as the original trespass in this case
antedated the flowing from which the plain
tiff has suffered damage.
One of these cases is Bank of Hartford Co.
v. Waterman, 26 Conn. 324. In that case
action was brought against a sheriff for a
false return to a writ of attachment. The
falsity consisted in a misdescription of the
land attached. When suit was brought, the
period of limitation, if it was to be com
puted from the time the return was made,
had already run; but under the statute the
plaintiff was entitled to bring suit only aft
er he had taken out execution and had a re
turn made upon it, which would show a
necessity for a resort to the attached lands.
It was only after such a return of execution
that the plaintiff would suffer even nominal
damage from the ofllcial misfeasance; and
it was therefore a necessary consequence
that the time of limitation must be comput
ed from that time, and not from the time of
the false return.
Another case is that of McGuire v. Grant,
25 N. J. Law, 356, which is to be referred to
the same principle. The defendant removed
the lateral support to the0plaintiff’s land by
an excavation, made within his own bound
_aries. Injury subsequently resulted to the
plaintiff in consequence. The statute of lim
itations was held to run from the time the
damage occurred; the excavation not being
of itself a tort until damage resulted. The
case of Bonomi v. Backhousc, El. Bl. & El.
LAw DAM.—5
622, was like the last in principle, and was
decided in the same way.
v
The plaintiff also, in this connection, likens
its case to that of one who, in consequence
of a ditch dug upon his neighbor’s land, has
water collected and thrown upon his prem
ises to his injury. It is not the act of dig
ging the ditch that sets the time of limita
tion to running in such a case, but it is the
happening of the injurious consequence.
The case supposed, however, is not a case of
trespass. The act of digging the ditch was
not in itself a wrongful act. The owner of
land is at liberty to dig as many ditches as
he pleases on his own land, and he becomes
a wrong-doer only when, by means of them,
he causes injury to another. If he floods his
neighbor,s land the case is one of nuisance,
and every successive instance of flooding is
a new injury. But here, as in the case of a
continuous trespass, prospective damages
cannot be taken into account, because it
must be presumed that wrongful conduct
will be abandoned rather than persisted in,
and that the party will either fill up his
ditches or in some proper way guard against
the recurrence of injury. Battishill v. Reed,
18 C. B. 696. Cases of flooding lands by
.dams or other obstructions to running water
are cases of this description. Baldwin v.
Calkins, 10 Wend. 169; Mersereau v. Pear
sall, 19 N. Y. 108; Plate v. Railroad Co., 37
N. Y. 472. So are cases of diverting water, to
the flow of which upon his premises the plain
tiff is entitled. Langford v. Owsley, 2 Bibb,
215. So are cases of the wrongful occupation
of a public street, whereby the access of
the plaintiff to his premises is obstructed.
Carl v. Railroad Co., 46 \‘\'is. 625; S. C. 1 N.
W. 295. Other cases cited for the plaintiff,
and resting on the same principle, are They
er v. Brooks, 17 Ohio, 489; Blunt v. McCor
mick, 3 Denio, 283; Winchester v. Stevens
Point, 58 Wis. 350, 17 N. W. 3, 547; Union
Trust Co. v. Guppy, 26 Kan. 75-i; Spilman v.
Navigation Co., 74 N. C. 675; Loweth v.
Smith, 12 Mees. & W. 582.
The case of Whitehouse v. Fellowes, 10 O.
B. (N. S.) 765, was one of nuisance. A turn
pike company made a covered drain with
gratings at intervals and catchpits. In con
sequence of the insuiiiciency of the catch
pits, or of their not being kept in proper con
dition, the plaintiffs colliery was flooded
every time there was a heavy shower. In
an action for this flooding it was held that
every damage was a new injury and gave a
new right of action. The ruling sustained
the position taken for the plaintiff in the
case, which was thus succinctly stated by
counsel arguendo: “The distinction which
pervades the cases is this: Where the plain
tiff complains of a trespass, the statute runs
from the time when the act of trespass was
committed, except in the case of a continuing
trespass. But where the cause of action is
not in itself a trespass’ as an act done upon
a man’s own land, and the cause of action is
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the consequential injury to the plaintiff,
there the period of limitation runs from the
time the damage is sustained."
The case before us was one of admitted
trespass, from which immediate damage re
sulted. Had suit been brought at that time,
all the natural and probable damage to re
sult from the wrongful act would have been
taken into account, and the plaintiff would
have recovered for it. [_But there was no
continuous trespass from that time on. The
defendant had built no structure on the
plaintiffs premises, was occupying no part
of them with anything it had placed there,
and was in no way interrupting the plain
tiff,s occupation or enjoyment. All it had
left there was a hole in the wall. But there
is no analogy between leaving a hole in a
wall on another’s premises and leaving
houses or other obstructions there to in
cumber or hinder his occupation; the phys
ical hindrances are a continuance of the
original wrongful force, but the hole is only
the consequence of a wrongful force which
ceased to operate the moment it was made.
If, therefore, the plaintiff had brought suit
more than two years after the original tres
pass, and before the flooding of its mine by
water flowing through the opening had be
gun, and if the statute of limitations had
been pleaded, there could have been no re
covery. The action for the original wrong
would then have been barred, and there had
been no repetition of the injury in the mean
time to give a new cause of action. The
more continuance of the opening in the wall
could not be a continuous damage. Lloyd
v. Wigney, 6 Bing. 489.
The right of action, if any, for which the
plaintiff can complain, must therefore arise
from the flowing itself as a wrongful act;
there being no longer any action for the orig
inal breaking, and no continuous acts of
wrong from that time until the flowing be
gan.
plaintiff; but damage alone does not give a
right of action; there must be a concurrence
of wrong and damage. The wrong, then,
must he found in leaving the opening uncles
ed and permitting the water to flow through.
It must therefore rest upon an obligation on
the part of the defendant either to close the
opening, because persons for whose acts it
was responsible had made it, or to restrain
water which had collected on its own prem
ises from flowing upon the premises of the
plaintiff to its injury. The latter seems to be
the ground upon which the Plaintiff chiefly re
lies for a recovery.
In the argument made for the plaintiff in
this court stress is laid upon the fact that the
damage which has actually resulted from the
flooding could not have been anticipated at
the time of the original trespass, and there
ore could not then have been recovered for.
This consideration, it is urged, ought to be
decisive. But, while we agree that it is to be
considered in the case for what it is worth, it
The flowage caused a damage to the .
is by no means necessarily conclusive) The
plaintiff must fix some distinct wrong upon
the defendant within the period of statutory
limitation, or the action must fail; and there
is no such wrong in this case unless the fail
ure to prevent the. flowing constitutes one.
The original act of wrong is no more in ques
tion now, after having been barred by the
statute, than it would have been if damages
had been recovered or settled for amicably;
nor do we see that it can be important in a
case like the present, where the wrong must
be found in the injurious flowing, whether
there was or was not a wrong originally. If
there was, it stands altogether apart from the
wrong now sued for, with an interval be
tween them, when no legal wrong could have
been complained of. The mere fact that.an
opening was made by the defendant between
the two mines, would not of itself have been
a trespass unless the defendant invaded the
plaintiffs premises in making it. Each party
had a right to mine on its own side to the
boundary, (Wilson v. Waddeli, L. R. 2 App.
Cas. 95;) and if the plaintiff had first done so,
the defendant might have done the same at
the same point, and in that way have made
an opening rightfully. The difference be
tween the case supposed and this, is that here
the defendant was found to have gone beyond
the boundary and committed a trespass. But
suppose the defendant had then made com
pensation for the trespass, so far as it was
then damaging; how would the case have
‘
differed from the present? The opening would
1 remain, made by the defendant, through
which, if the water was allowed to collect in
his mine, it must eventually pass; and if he
was under obligation to keep it within the
bounds of his own premises, he would be lia
ble for allowing it to pass; otherwise not.
‘ The fact that compensation was not actually
made for the breaking away of the plaintiifs
barrier is immaterial when the statute has
run, as has been already explained.
The case of Clegg v. Dearden, 1‘2 Q. B. 576,
is not unlike in its facts the case before us.
In that case, also, there had been a wrongful
breaking through from one mine to another,
and an injurious flowage of water through
the opening. The facts were found by special
verdict, and Lord Denman, in pronouncing
judgment, said: “The gist of the action, as
stated in the declaration, is the keeping open
and unfilled up of an aperture and excava
tion made by the defendant into the plain
tiffs’ mine. By the custom the defendant was
entitled to excavate up to the boundary of’
his mine without leaving any barrier; and
the cause of action, therefore, is the not fill
ing up of the excavation made by him on the
plaintiffs’ side of the boundary and within
their mine. It is not, as in the case of Holmes
v. Wilson, 10 Adol. & E. 503, a continuing of
something wrongfully placed by the defend
ant upon the premises of the plaintiff. Nor
is it a continuing of something placed upon
the land of a third person to the nuisance of
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the plaintiff, as in the case of Thompson v.
Gibson, 7 .\lces. & W. 456. There is a legal
obligation to discontinue a trespass or remove
a nuisance; but no such obligation upon a
trespasser to replace what he has pulled
down or destroyed upon the land of another,
though he is liable in an action of trespass to
compensate in damages for the loss sustained.
The defendant having made an excavation
and aperture in the plaintiffs’ land was liable
to an action of trespass; but no cause of ac
tion arises from his omitting to re-enter the
plaintiffs‘ land and fill up the excavation.
Such an omission is neither the continuation
of a trespass nor of a nuisance; nor is it the
breach of any legal duty. It was, however,
contended on the part of the plaintiffs, that,
admitting this to be so, there nevertheless
was a legal obligation or duty upon the de
fendant to take means to prevent the water
from flowing from his mine into that of the
plaintiffs through the aperture he had made ;"
but “the plaintifl!s have not alleged any such
duty or obligation in their declaration, nor is
their action founded upon the breach of any
such duty, if it exists, but upon the omission
to fill up the aperture made by them in the
plaintiffs’ mine. It appears to us that the
defendant, upon the facts found by the jury,
is entitled to have the verdict entered for
him upon the plea of not guilty."
If this case was rightly decided, it should
rule the one before us. It has been followed
by the supreme court of Ohio in Williams v.
Coal Co., 37 Ohio St. 583, in a case which also
closely resembles this upon its facts, and is
not distinguishable in principle. It seems to
us that these cases are sound in law as well
as conclusive. The only wrongful act with
which the defendant is chargeable, was com
mitted so long before the bringing of suit that
action for it was barred. Had suit been
brought in due time, recovery might have
been had for all damages which could then
have been anticipated as the natural and
probable result of the wrongful act. If the
particular damages which have been suffered
could not then have been anticipated, it is be
cause it could not then be known that the de
fendant would cease mining operations and
the plaintiff would not. There could be no
flowing from one mine into the other while
both were worked; and had the plaintiff
ceased operations and the defendant contin
ued to work, the defendant would have suf
fered the damage instead of‘ the plaintiff.
But neither party was under obligation to
keep its mine pumped out for the benefit of
its neighbor. Either was at liberty to discon
tinue its operations and abandon its mine
whenever its interest should seem to require
it. And had the plaintiff brought an action
within two years from the time of trespass,
its recovery would necessarily have been had
with this undoubted right of abandonment in
view. But a jury could not have awarded
damages for any exercise of a right, and
they could not, therefore, have given dam
ages for a possible injury to flow from such
an abandonment. This is on the plain prin
ciple that the mere exercise of a right cannot
be a legal wrong to another, and if damage
shall happen, it is damnum absqne injuria.
This view of the case is conclusive; but
there is another that is equally so. The
wrong to the plaintiff consisted in breaking
down the wall which had been left by it in its
operations. If any damage might possibly
result from this which was not then so far
probable that a jury could have taken it into
account in awarding damages, the plaintiff
was not without redress. It would have been
entitled in a suit then brought to recover the
cost of restoring the barrier which had been
taken away; and if it had done so, and made
the restoration, the damage now complained
of could not have happened. It thus appears
that complete redress could have been had in
a suit brought at that time; and, that being
the case, ‘he plaintifl! is not entitled to recov
er now for an injury for which an award of
means of prevention was within the right of
action which was suffered to become barred)
The right which then existed, being a right to
recover for all the injury which had then been
suffered, including the loss of the dividing
barrier, it would not have been competent for
the plaintiff, had suit then been brought, to
leave the loss of the barrier out of account,
awaiting possible special damages to flow
therefrom as a ground for a new suit. The
wrong which had then been committed was
indivisible; and the bar of the statute must
be as broad as the remedy was which it ex
tinguishes.
The judgment must be set aside and a new
trial ordered.
The other justices concurred.
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JOSEPH SCHLITZ BREWING CO. v.
COMPTON.
(32 N. E. 693. 142 Ill. 511.)
Supreme Court of Illinois. Nov. 2, 1892.
Appeal from appellate court, Third dis
trict.
Action on the case by Sophie Compton
against the Joseph Schlitz Brewing Com
pany. Plaintiff obtained judgment, which
was affirmed by the appellate court. De
fendant appeals. Reversed.
The other facts fully appear in the follow
ing statement by MAGRUDICR, J.:
This is an action on the case, begun on
April 17, 1890, in the circuit court of San
gamon county, by the appellee against the
appellant company. In the trial court the
verdict and judgment were in favor of the
plaintiff, which judgment has been aflirmed
by the appellate court. The declaration
consists of two counts. The first count al
leges that plaintiff was possessed of certain
premises in Springfield, in which she and
her family resided, and that the defendant,
to wit, on April 20, 1885, wrongfully erected
a certain building near said premises in so
careless, negligent, and improper a manner
that on said day and afterwards, “and be-
fore the commencement of this suit," large
quantities of rain water flowed upon,
against, and into said premises and the
walls, roofs, ceilings, beams, papering,
floors, stairs, doors, cellar, basement, and
other parts thereof, and weakened, injured,
and damaged the same, by reason whereof
said messuage and premises became and
are damp and less fit for habitation. The
second count alleges that plaintiff was the
possessor, occupier, and owner of saidm.es
suage and premises, in which she‘and her
family dwelt, and the defendant, to wit, on
said day, caused quantities of water to run
into, against, and upon the same, and the
walls, roofs, floors, cellars, etc., thereof, and
thereby greatly weakened injured, wetted,
and damaged the same. By reason where
of said premises became and were and are
damp, incommodious, and less fit for habi
tation. The plea was not guilty. The
proof tends to show that plaintiff’s building
' is a two-story brick building, with a cellar
underneath, the front room on the first floor
being used as a butcher,s shop, and the rest
of the building being used as a dwelling;
that her building was erected several years
before that of the defendant; that defend
ant,s building is on the lot west of plain
tiff,s lot, and is about 60 feet long, having
an oflice in front and a beer-bottling estab
lishment in the rear, and has one roof,
which slants towards plaintiff,s property;
that there are three windows on the west
side of plaintiff,s house, besides the three
cellar windows; that her wall is a little
over two feet from the west line of her lot;
that when it rains the water flows against
her west wall, and some of it into her win
dows and cellarfrom the roof of defend
ant,s building; that the cave trough is so
far below the cave that the water runs over
it into the windows, etc.
Palmer & Schutt, for appellant. Patton
& Hamilton, for appellee.
MAGRUDER, J. (after stating the facts).
Proof was introduced of damage done to
plaintifl!,s property after the commencement
of the suit by reason of rain storms then
occurring. The defendant.asked, and the
court refused to give, the following instruc
tion: “The court instructs the jury that the
suit now being tried was commenced in the
month of April, 1890, and that they are not
to take into consideration the question as to
whether or not any damage has accrued to
plaintiff,s property since the commencement
of this suit." The question presented is
whether plaintilI wasentitled to recover
only such damages as accrued before and
up to the beginning of her suit, leaving sub
sequent damages to be sued for in subse
quent suits, or whether she was entitled to
estimate and recover in one action all dam
ages resulting both before and after the
commencement of this suit. The rule orig
inally obtaining at common law was, that
in personal actions damages could be recov
ered only up to the time of the commence
ment of the action. 3 Com. Dig. tit. “Dam
ages," D. The rule subsequently prevail
ing in such actions is that damages accru
ing after the commencement of the suit may
be recovered, if they are the natural and
necessary result of the act complained of,
and where they do not themselves consti
tute a new cause of action. Wood’s Mayne,
Dam. § 103; Birchard v. Booth, 4 Wis. 6"‘;
Slater v. Rink, 18 Ill. 527; Fetter v. Beale,
1 Salk. 11; Howell v. Goodrich, 69 Ill. 556.
In actions of trespass to the realty, it is said
that damages may be recovered up to the
time of the verdict, (Com. Dig. 363, tit.
"Damages," D;) and the reason why, in
such cases, all the damages may he recov
ered in a single action, is that the trespass
is the cause of action, and the injury result
ing is merely the measure of damages. 5
Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 16, case cited in
note 2. But in the case of nuisances or re
peated trespasses recovery can ordinarily
be had only up to the commencement of the
suit, because every continuance or 1,epe1i_
tion of the nuisance gives rise to a new
cause of action, and the plaintiff may bring
successive actions as long as the nuisance
lasts. McConnel v. Kibbe, 29 Ill. 483, and
33 Ill. 175; Railroad Co. v. Moflitt, 75 UL
524; Railroad Co. v. Schaffer, 124 Ill. 112, 16
N. E. 239. The cause of action, in case my
an ordinary nuisance, is not so much the
act of the defendant as the injurious conse-
quences resulting from his act, and hence
the cause of action does not arise until such
consequences occur; nor can the damages
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be estimated beyond the date of bringing
the first suit. 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p.
17, and cases in notes. It has been held,
however, that where permanent structures
are erected, resulting in injury to adjacent
realty, all damages may be recovered in a
single suit. Id. p. 20, and cases in note.
But there is much confusion among the
authorities which attempt to distinguish be
tween cases where successive actions lie
and those in which only one action may be
maintained. T confusion seems to arise
from the
differtt
views entertained in re
gard to the circ mstances under which the
Injury suffered by the plaintiff from the act
of the defendant shall be regarded as a per
manent injury. “The chief difficulty in this
subject concerns acts which result in what
effects a permanent change in the plaintiffs
land, and is at the same time a nuisance or
trespass." Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) § 94. Some
cases hold it to be unreasonable to assume
that a nuisance or illegal act will continue
forever, and therefore refuse to give entire
damages as for a permanent injury, but al
low such damages for the continuation of
the wrong as accrue up to the date of the
bringing of the suit Other cases take the
ground that the entire controversy should
be settled in a single suit, and that damages
should be allowed for the whole injury,
past and prospective, if such injury be prov
en with reasonable certainty to be penna
nent in its character. Id. § 94. We think,
upon the whole, that the more correct view
is presented in the former class of cases. 1
Suth. Dam. 199-202; 3 Suth. Dam. 369-399;
1 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) ~§§ 91-94; Uline v.
Railroad Co., 101 N. Y. 98, 4 N. E. 536;
Duryw. v. Mayor, 26 Hun, 120; Blunt v. Mc
Cormick, 3 Denio, 283; Cooke v. England,
92 Am. Dec. 630, notes; Reed v. State, 108
N. Y. 407, 15 N. E. 735; Hargreaves v. Kim
berly, 26 W. Va. 787; Ottenot v. Railroad
Co., 119 N. ‘Y. 603, 23 N. E. 169; Cobb v.
Smith, 38 Wis. 21; Canal Co. v. Wright, 21
N. J. Law, 469; Wells v. Northampton Co.,
151 Mass. 46, 2'5 N. E. 724; Barrick v. Schif
ferdecker, 123 N. Y. 52, 25 N. E. 365; Silsby
.\1anufg Co. v. State, 104 N. Y. 562, 11 N.
E. 264; Aldworth v. City of Lynn, 153 .\Iass.
53, 26 N. E. 229; Town of Troy v. Railroad
Co., 23 N. H. 83; Cooper v. Randall, 59 Ill.
317; Railroad Co. v. Hoag, 90 ill. 339. We
do not wish to be understood, however, as
holding that the rule laid down in the sec
ond class of cases is not applicable under
some circumstances, as in the case of per
manent injury caused by lawful public
structures, properly constructed and perma
nent in their character. In Uline v. Rail
road Co., supra, a railroad company raised
the grade of the street in front of the plain
tiff’s lots so as to pour the water therefrom
down over the sidewalk into the basement
of her houses, flooding the same with water,
and rendering them damp. unhealthy, etc.,
and injuring the rental value, etc. In dis
cussing the question of the damages to
which the plaintiff was entitled the court
say: “The question, however, still remains,
what damages? All her damages upon the
assumption that the nuisance was to be per
manent, or only such damages as she sus
tained up to the commencement of the ac
tion? ' * ‘ There has never been in this
state before this case the least doubt ex
pressed in any judicial decision ' ' '
that the plaintiff, in such a case, is entitled
to recover only up to the commencement of
the action. That such is the rule is as well
settled here as any rule of law can be by re-
peated and uniform decisions of all the
courts, and it is the prevailing doctrine else
where." Then follows an exhaustive re
view of the authorities, which sustain the
conclusion of the court as above announced.
In Duryea v. Mayor, supra, the action was
brought to recover damages occasioned by
the wrongful acts of one who had dischar
ged water and sewerage upon the land of
another, and it was held that no recovery
could be had for damages occasioned by the
discharge of the water and sewage upon the
land after the commencement of the action.
In Blunt v. McCormick, supra, the action
was brought by a tenant to recover dam
ages against his landlord because of the lat
ter,s erection of buildings adjoining the de
mised premises, which shut out the light
from the tenant,s windows and doors; and
it was held that damages could only be re-
covered for the time which had elaped
when the suit was commenced, and not for
the whole term. In Hargreaves v. Kimber
ly, supra, the action was case to recover
damages for causing surface water to flow
on plaintiff,s lot, and for injury to his trees
by the use of coke ovens near said lot, and
for injury thereby to his health and com
fort; and it was held to be error to permit
8. witness to answer the following question:
“What will be the future damage to the
property from the acts of the defendant?"
the court saying: “In all those cases where
the cause of the injury is in its nature per
manent, and a recovery for such injury
would confer a license on the defendant to
continue the cause, the entire damage may
be recovered in a single action; but where
the cause of the injury is in the nature of a
nuisance, and not permanent in its charac
ter, but of such a character that it may be
supposed that the defendant would remove
it rather than suffer at once the entire dam
age which it may inflict if permanent, then
the entire damage cannot be recovered in a
single action; but actions may be maintain
ed from time to time as long as the cause
of the injury continues." In Wells v.
Northampton Co., supra, where 9. railroad
company maintained a culvert under its em
bankment, which injured land by dischar
ging water on it, it was held that the case
fell within the ordinary rule applicable to
continuing nuisances and continuing tres
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passes. Reference was made to Uline v.
Railroad Co., supra, and the following lan
guage was used by the court: “If the de
fendants act was wrongful at the outset,
as the jury have found, we see no way in
which the continuance of its structure in its
wrongful form could become rightful as
against the plaintiff, unless by release or
grant by prescription or by the payment of
damages. If originally wrongful, it has not
become rightful merely by being built in an
enduring manner." In Aldworth v. City of
Lynn, supra, where the action was for dam
ages sustained by a landowner through the
improper erection and maintenance of a
dam and reservoir by the city of Lynn on
adjoining land, the supreme court of Massa
chusetts say: “The plaintiff excepted to the
ruling that she was entitled to recover dam
ages only to the date of her writ, and con
tended that the dam and pond were perma
nent, and that she was entitled to damages
for a permanent injury to her property.
Au erection unlawfully maintained on one’s
own land, to the detriment of the land of a
neighbor, is a continuing nuisance, for the
maintenance of which an action may be
brought at any time, and damages recovered
up to the time of bringing the suit. ' ' "‘
That it is of a permanent character, or that
it has been continued for any length of time
less than what is necessary to acquire a
prescriptive right, does not make it lawful,
nor deprive the adjacent landowner of his
right to recover damages. Nor can the ad
jacent landowner, in such a case, who sues
for damage to his property, compel the de
fendant to pay damages for the future.
The defendant may prefer to change his use
of his property so far as to make his con
duct lawful. In the present case we cannot
say that the defendant may not repair or re
construct its dam and reservoir in such a
way as to prevent percolation with much
less expenditure than would be required to
pay damages for a permanent injury to the
plaintiffs land."
In the case at bar the defendant did not
erect the house upon plaintiff,s land, but up
on its own land. It does not appear that
such change might not be made in the roof.
or in the manner of discharging the water
from the roof. as to avoid the injury com
plained of. The first count of the declara
tion, by its express terms, limits the recov
ery for damages arising from the negligent
and improper construction of defendant,s
building to such injuries as were inflicted
“before the commencement of the suit."
The second count was framed in such a
way as to authorize a recovery of damages
for the flow of water upon plaintiff,s prem
ises from some other cause than the wrong
ful construction of defendant,s building;
and accordingly plaintiff’s evidence tends to
show that the eave trough. designed to car
ry off the water from the roof, was so
placed as to fall of the purpose for which it
was intended. It cannot be said that the
cave trough was a structure vof such a per
manent character that it might not be chau
ged, nor can it be aid that the defendant
would not remove the cause of the injury
rather than submit to a recovery of entire
damages for a permanent injury, or suffer
repeated recoveries during the continuance
of the injury. The facts in the record tend
to show a continuing nuisance, as the same
is defined in Aldworth v. City of Lynn, su
pra. There is a legal’ obli tion to remove
a nuisance; and the “law ti
ll not presume
the continuance of the wr g, nor allow a
license to continue a wrong, or a transfer of
title, to result from the recovery of dam
ages for prospective misconduct." 1 Suth.
Dam. 199, and notes. The question now un
der consideration has been before this court
in Cooper v. Randall, supra. The action
was for damages to plaintiff,s premises,
caused by constructing and operating a
flouting mill on a lot near said premises,
whereby chaff, dust, dirt, etc., were thrown
from the mill into plaintifi?’s house. It was
there held that the trial court committed no
error in refusing to permit the plaintiff to
prove that the dust thrown upon his prem
ises by the mill after the suit was com
menced had seriously impaired the value of
the property, and prevented the renting of
the house; and we there said: “When sub
sequent damages are produced by subse
quent acts, then the damages should be
strictly confined to those sustained before
suit brought." It is true that the operation
of the mill, causing the dust to fly, was the
act of the defendant; but it cannot be said
that it was not the continuing act of the
present appellant to allow the roof or the
eave trough to remain in such a condition
as to send the water against appellee’s
house upon the occurrence of a rain storm.
Nor is appellant,s house or cave trough any
more permanent than was the mill in the
Cooper Case. In Railroad Co. v. Hoag_ su
pra, a railroad company had turned its
waste water from a tank upon the prem
ises of the plaintiff, where it spread and
froze, and a recovery was allowed for dam
ages suffered after the commencement of
the suit; but it there appeared that the ice.
which caused the damage, was upon plain
tiff,s premises before the beginning of the
suit,0and the damage caused resulted from
the melting of the ice after the suit was
brought. It was there said: “The injury
sustained by appellee between the com
mencement of the suit and the trial was not
from any wrongful act done by appellant
during that time, but followed from acts
done before the suit was commenced."
Here, the water, which caused the injury,
was not upon plaintifi?,s premises, either in
a congealed or liquid state, before the be
ginning of the suit, but flowed thereon as
the result of rain storms which occurred
after the suit was commenced. We think
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the correct rule upon this subject is stated
as follows: “If a private structure or other
work on land is the cause of a nuisance or
other tort to the plaintiff, the law cannot re
gard it as permanent, no matter with what
intention it was built; and da.nages can
therefore be recovered only to the date of
the action." 1 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) § 93.
It follows from the foregoing observations
that it was error to allow the plaintiff to in
troduce proof of damage to her property
caused by rain storms occurring after the
commencement of her suit, and that the in
struction asked by the defendant upon that
subject, as the same is above set forth,
should have been given. The judgments of
the appellate and circuit courts are revers
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HADLEY et al. v. BAXENDALE et al.
(9 EXCEL 341.)
Court of Excheqp_e_.r. Hilary Term. Feb. 23,
1854.
At the trial before CRO.\II-‘TON, J., at the
last Gloucester assizes it appeared that the
plaintiffs carried on an extensive business as
millers at Gloucester; and that on the 11th
of May their mill was stopped by a breakage
..of the crank shaft, by which the mill was
‘,
worked. The steam engine was manufactur
ed by Messrs. Joyce & Co., the engineers, at
Greenwich, and it became necessary to send
the shaft as a pattern for a new one to Green
wich. The fracture was discovered on the
12th, and on the 13th the plaintiffs sent one
of their servants to the ofllce of the defend
ants, who are the well-known carriers trad
ing under the name ‘of Pickford & Co., for the
purpose of having the shaft carried to Green
wich. The plaintiffs’ servant told the clerk
that the mill was stopped, and that the shaft
must be sent immediately; and in answer to
the inquiry when the shaft would be taken
the answer was that if it was sent up by
twelve o,clock a t day it would be delivered
at Greenwich on the following day. On the
following day the shaft was taken by the de
fendants, before nobn, for the purpose of be
ing conveyed to Greenwich, and the sum of
£2 4s. was paid for its carriage for the whole
distance. At the same time the defendants’
clerk was told that a special entry, if requir
ed, should be made, to hasten its delivery.
The delivery of the shaft at Greenwich was
delayed by some neglect, and the conse
quence was that the plaintiffs did not receive
the new shaft for several days after they
would otherwise have done, and the work
ing of their mill was thereby delayed. and
they thereby lost the profits they would oth
er\'ise have received.
On the part of the defendants it was object
ed that these damages were too remote, and
that the defendants were not liable with re
spect to them. The learned judge left the
case generally to the jury, who found a ver
dict with £25 damages beyond the amount
paid into court.
Keating & Dowdesweli, showed cause.
Whateley, Willes & Phipson, in support of
the rule.
The judgment of the court was now deliv
ered by
ALDERSON, B. We think that thereought
to be a new trial in this case; but in so do
ing we deem it to be expedient and necessary
to state explicitly the rule which the judge,
at the next trial, ought, in our opinion, to di
rect the jury to be governed by when they
estimate the damages.
it is, indeed, of the last importance that
we should do this; for, if the jury are left
without any definite rule to guide them, it
will, in such cases as these, manifestly lead
to the greatest injustice. The courts have
done this on several occasions; and in Blake
v. Railway Co., 21 L. J. Q. B. 237, the court
granted a new trial on this very ground, that
the rule had not been definitely laid down to
the jury by the learned judge at nisi prius.
“There are certain established rules," this
court says, in Alder v. Keighley, 15 Mees. &
W. 117, “according to which the jury ought
to find." And the court in that case adds:
“And here there is clear rule that tin
amount which w0l . been received if
the contract had lJ( is the measure of
damages if the con ' broken." Now,
we think the proper ru n such a case as the
present is this: Where two parties have"?
made a contract which one of them has bro- I
ken, the damages which the other party
ought to receive in respect of such breach of
contract should be such as may fairly and“
reasonably be considered either arising nat- /8
urally,—i. e., according to the usual course of
things, from such breach of contract itself,—
or suen as may reasonably be supposed to
have been in the contemplation of both par
ties at the time they made the contract, as
the probable result of the breach of it. Now,
if the special circumstances under which the
contract was actually made were communi
cated by the plaintiffs to the defendants,
and thus known to both parties, the damages
resulting from the breach of such a con
tract, which they would reasonably contem
plate, would be the amount of injury which
would ordinarily follow from a breach of con
tract under these special circumstances so
known and communicated. But, on the other
hand, if these special circumstances were
wholly unknown to the party breaking the
contract, he, at the most, could only be sup
posed to have had in his contemplation the
amount of injury which would arise gener
ally, and in the great multitude of cases not
affected by any specialcircumstances, from
such a breach of contract. For, had the spe-'
cial circumstances been known, the parties
might have specially provided for the breach
of contract by special terms as to the dam
ages in that case; and of this advantage it
would be very unjust to deprive them. Now,
the above principles are those by which we
think the jury ought to be guided in esti
mating the damages arising out of any breach
of contract. It is said that other cases, such
as breaches of contract in the nonpayment of
money, or in the not making a good title to
land, are to be treated as exceptions from
this, and as governed by a conventional rule.
But as, in such cases, both parties must be
supposed to be cognizant of that well-known
rule, these cases may, we think, be more
properly classed under the rule above enunci
ated as to cases under known special circum
stances, because there both parties may rea
sonably be presumed to contemplate the esti
mation of the amount of damages according
to the conventional rule. Now. in the pres
ent_case, if we are to apply the principles
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above laid down, we find that the only cir
cumstances here communicated by the plain
tiffs 1o the defendants at the time the con
tract was made were that the article to be
carried was the broken shaft of a mill. and
that the plaintiffs were the miilers of that
mill. But how do these circumstances show
reasonably that the profits of the mill must
be stopped by an unreasonable delay in the
delivery of the broken shaft by the carrier
to the third person? Suppose the plaintiffs
had another shaft in their possession, put up
or putting up at the time. and that they only
wished to send back the broken shaft to the
engineer who made it, it is clear that this
would be quite consistent with the above cir
cumstances, and yet the unreasonable delay
in the delivery would have no effect upon the
intermediate profits of the mill. Or, again,
suppose that, at the time of the delivery to
the carrier, the machinery of the mill had
been in other respects defective, then, also,
the same results would follow. Here it is
true that the shaft was actually sent back to
serve as a model for a new one, and that the
want of a new one was the only cause of the
stoppage of the mill, and that the loss of of
its really arose from not sending down he
new shaft in proper time, and that this arose
:3,
from the delay in delivering the broken one
to serve as a model. But it is obvious that
in the great multitude of cases of miliers
sending ofl! broken shafts to third persons by
a carrier under ordinary circumstances, such
consequences would not, in all probability,
have occurred; and these special circum
stances were here nevcr communicated by the
plaintiffs to the defendants. It follows,
therefore, that the loss of pt:ofltsQ1ere-canPgt
reasonably be considered such a consequence
of the breach of contract as could have been
fairly and reasonably contemplated by both
the parties when they made this contract.
For such loss would neither have flowed nat
urally from the breach of this contract in the
great multitude of such cases occurring un
der ordinary circumstances, nor were the spe-
ciai circumstances, which, perhaps, would
have made it a reasonable and natural conse
quence of such breach of contract, communi
cated to or known by the defendants. The
judge ought, therefore, to have told the jury
that upon the facts then before them they
ought not to take the loss of profits into con
sideration at all in estimating the damages.
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GRIFFIN v. COL"ER et al.
(16 N. 1,. 489.)
Court of Appeals of New York, March Term,
1858.
Action to recover the purchase price of an
engine. Defendants sought to recoup dam
ages for delay in delivery of the vengine.
There was a judgment for plaintiii’, from
which defendants appealed.
John C. Churchill, forappellants.
for respondent.
D. Coats,
SELDEN, J. The only point made by the
appellants is that in estimating their dam
ages on account of the plaintiffs failure to
furnish the engine by the time specified in
the contract, they should have been allowed
what the proof showed they might have
earned by the use of such engine, together
with their other machinery, during the time
lost by the delay. This claim was objected
to, and rejected upon the trial as coming
within the rule which precludes the allow
ance of profits, by way of damages, for the
breach of an executory contract.
To determine whether this rule was cor
rectly applied by the referee, it is necessary
to recur to the reason upon which it is
founded. It is not a primary rule, but is a
mere deduction from that more general and
fundamental rule which requires that the
damages claimed should in all cases be
shown. by clear and satisfactory evidence,
to have been actually sustained. It is a
wcll-established rule of the common law
that the damages to be recovered for a
breach of contract must be shown with cer
tainty, and not left to speculation or conjec
ture;
are excluded from the estimate of dam%l,,§;s
in such cases, and not because there is any
thing in their nature which should per se
prevent their allowance. Profits which
would certainly have been realized but for
' the defendnnt’s default are recoverable; those
which are speculative or contingent are not.
Hence, in an action for the breach of a
contract to transport goods, the difference
between the price. at the point where the
goods are and that to which they were to
be transported, is taken as the measure of
damages; and in an action against a vendor
for not delivering the chattels sold, the ven
dee is allowed the market price upon the
day fixed for the delivery. Although this,
in both cases, amounts to an allowance of
profits. yet, as those profits do not depend
upon any contingency, their recovery is per
mitted. It is regarded as certain that the
goods would have been worth the estab
lished market price at the place and on the
day when and where they should have been
delivered'
On the other hand, in cases of illegal cap
ture, or of the insurance of goods lost at sea,
there can be no recovery for the probable
loss of profits at the port of destination. The
and it is under this rule that pullI!
J c
principal reason for the difference between
these cases and that of the failure to trans
port goods upon land is, that in the latter
case the time when the goods should have
been delivered, and consequently that when
the market price is to be taken, can be as
certained with reasonable certainty; while
in the iormer the fluctuation of the mar
kets and the contingencies affecting the
length of the voyage render every calcula
tion of profits speculative and unsafe.
There is also an additional rcason,, viz.
the difficulty of obtaining reliable evidence
as to the state of the markets in foreign
ports; that these are the true reasons is
shown by the language of Mr. Justice Story
in the case of The Lively, 1 Gail. 315, Fed.
Cas. No. 8,403, which was a case of illegal
capture. He says: “Independent, however,
of all authority, I am satisfied upon principle
that an allowance of damages, upon the basis
of a calculation of profits, is inadmissible.
The rule would be in the highest degree un
favorable to the interests of the community.
The subject would be involved in utter un
certainty. The calculation would proceed
upon contingencies, and would require a
knowledge of foreign markets to an exact
ness in point of time and value which would
sometimes present embarrassing obstacles.
Much would depend upon the length of the
voyage and the season of the arrival; much
upon the vigilance and activity of the master,
and much upon the momeutary demand.
After all, it would be a calculation upon
conjectures and not upon facts."
Similar language is used in thecases of The
Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. 546, and La Amis
tad de lines. 5 \Vheat. 385. Indeed, it is
Qt4.‘jar that whenever profits are rejected as
an item of damages it is because they are
subject to too many contingencies and are
too dependent upon the fluctuations of mar
kets and the chances of business to consti
tute a safe criterion for an estimate of dam
ages. This is to be inferred from the cases
in our own courts. The decision in the
case of Blanchard v. Ely, 21 Wend. 342,
must have proceeded upon this ground, and
can, as I apprehend, be supported upon no
other. It is true that Judge Cowen, in giv
ing his opinion, quotes from Pothier the fol
lowing rule of the civil law, viz.: “In gen
eral, the parties are deemed to have con
templated only the damages and injury
which the creditor might suffer from the
non-performance of the obligations in re-
spect to the particular thing which is the
object of it, and not such as may have been
accidentally occasioned thereby in respect to
his own (other) affairs." But this rule had
no application to the case then before the
court. It applies only to cases where, by
reason of special circumstances having no
necessary connection with the contract
broken, damages are sustained which would
not ordinarily or naturally flow from such
breach: as where a party is prevented by
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the breach of one contract from availing
himself of some other collateral and inde
pendent contract entered into with other par
ties, or from performing some act in rela
tion to his own business not necessarily
connected with the agreement. An instance
of the latter kind is where a canon of the
church, by rmson of the non-delivery of a
horse pursuant to agreement, was prevented
from arriving at his residence in time to col
lect his tithes.
In such cases the damages sustained are
disallowed, not because they are uncertain,
nor because they are merely consequential
or remote, but because they cannot be fairly
considered as having been within the con
templation of the parties at the time of
entering into the contract. Hence the objec
tion is removed, if it is shown that the con
tract was entered into for the express pur
pose of enabling the party to fulfill his col
lateral agreement, or perform the act sup
posed. Sedg. Dam. c. 3.
In Blanchard v. Ely the damages claimed
consisted ‘in the loss of the use of the very
article which the plaintiff had agreed to
construct; and were, therefore, in the plain
est sense, the direct and proximate result of
the breach alleged. Moreover, that use was
contemplated by the parties in entering into
the contract, and constituted the object for
which the steamboat was built. It is clear,
therefore, that the rule of Pothier had noth
ing to do with the case. Those damages
must then have been disallowed, because
they consisted of profits depending, not. as
in the case of a contract to transport goods,
upon a mere question of market value, but
upon the fluctuations of travel and of trade,
and many other contingencies. The cita
tion, by Cowen, J ., of the maritime cases to
which I have referred, tends to confirm this
view. This case, therefore, is a direct au
thority in support of the doctrine that when
ever the profits claimed depend upon cpn
tingencies of the character referred to, they
are not recoverable.
The case of Masterton v. Mayor, etc., of
Brooklyn, 7 Hill, 61, decides nothing in op
position to this doctrine. It simply goes to
support the other branch of the rule, viz.,
that profits are allowed where they do not
depend upon the chances of trade, but upon
the market value of goods, the price of labor,
the cost of transportation, and other ques
tions of the like nature. which can be ren
dered reasonably certain by evidence.
From these authorities and principles it is
, clear that the defendants were not entitled
to measure their dam..ages by estimating what
they might have earned by the use of the
engine and their other machinery had the
contract been complied with. Nearly every
element entering into such a computation
would have been of that uncertain character
which has uniformly prevented a recovery
for speculative profits.
But it by no means follows that no allow
ance could be made to the defendants for
the loss of the use of their machinery. it is
an error to suppose that “the law does not
aim at complete compensation for the in
jury sustained," but “seeks rather to divide
than satisfy the loss." Sedg. Dam. c. 3. Th?’
broad, general rule in such cases is, that
the party injured is entitled to recover all
his damages, including gains prevented as
well as losses sustained; and this rule is
subject to but two conditions. The dam
ages must be such as may fairly be sup
posed to have entered into the contempla
tion of the parties when they made the con
tract; that is, must be such as might natu
rally be expected to follow its violation; and
they must be certain, both in their nature
and in respect to the cause from which they)proceed.
The familiar rules on the subject are all
subordinate to these. For instance: That
the damages must flow directly and natur
ally from the breach of contract, is a mere
mode of expressing the first; and that they
must be not the remote but proximate con
sequence of such breach, and must not be
speculative or contingent, are different modi
fications of the last.
These two conditions are entirely separate
and independent, and to blend them tends
to confusion; thus the damages claimed may
be the ordinary and natural, and even nec
essary result of the breach, and yet, if in
their nature uncertain, they must be re
jected; as in the case of Blanchard v. Ely,
where the loss of the trips was the direct
and necessary consequence of the pla.intiffs
failure to perform. So they may be definite
and certain, and clearly consequent upon the
breach of contract, and yet if such as would
not naturally flow from such breach, but,
for some special circumstances, collateral to
the contract itself or foreign to its apparent
object, they cannot be recovered; as in the
case of the loss by the clergyman of hi
tithes by reason of the failure to delivery
the horse.
Cases not unfrequently occur in which
both these conditions are fulfilled; where it
is certain that some loss has been sustained
or damage incurred, and that such loss or
damage is the direct. immediate and natural
consequence of the breach of contract, but
where the amount of the damages may be
estimated in a variety of ways. In all such
cases the law, in strict conformity to the
principles already advanced, uniformly
adopts that mode of estimating the damages
which is most definite and certain. The
case of l’‘reeman v. Clute, 3 Barb. 424, is a
case of this class, and affords an apt illus
tration of the rule. That case was identical
in many of its features with the present.
The contract there was to construct a steam
engine to be used in the process of manu
facturing oil, and damages were claimed for
delay in furnishing it. It was insisted in
that case, as in this, that the damages were
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to be estimated by ascertaining the amount
of business which could have been done by
the use of the engine, and the profits that
would have thence accrued. This claim was
rejected by .\ir. Justice Harris, before whom
the cause was tried, upon the precise ground
taken here. But he, nevertheless, held that
compensation was to be allowed for the “loss
of the use of the plaintitfs mill and other
machinery." He did not, it is true, specify
in terms the mode in which the value of
such use was to be estimated; but as he had
previously rejected the probable profits of
the business as the measure of such value,
no other appropriate data would seem to
have remained but the fair rent or hire of
the mill and machinery; and such I have no
doubt was the meaning of the judge. Thus
understood, the decision in that case, and
the reasoning upon which it was based, were,
I think, entirely accurate.
Had the defendants in the case of Blan
chard v. Ely, supra, taken the ground that
they were entitled to recoup, not the uncer
tain and contingent profits of the trips lost,
but such sum as they could have realized by
chartering the boat for those trips, I think
their claim must have been sustained. The
loss of the trips, which had certainly oc
curred, was not only the direct but the im
mediate and necessary result. oi.’ the breach
of the plaintiffs‘ contract.
The rent of a mill or other similar prop
erty, the price which should be paid for the
charter of a steamboat, or the use of ma
chinery, etc., are not only susceptible of
more exact and definite proof, but, in a ma
jority of cases would, I think, he found to
be a more accurate measure of the damages
actually sustained in the class of cases re-
ferred to, considering the contingencies and
hazards attending the prosecution of most
kinds of business, than any estimate of an
ticipated profits; just as the ordinary rate
of interest is, upon the whole, a more accu
rate measure of the damages sustained in
consequence of the non-payment of a debt
than any speculative profit which the credit
or might expect to realize from the use of
the money. It is no answer to this to say
that, in estimating what would be the fair
rent of a mill, we must take into considera
tion all the risks of the business in which it
is to be used. Rents are graduated accord
ing to the value of the property and to an
average of profits arrived at by very ex
tended observation; and so accurate are the-
results of experience in this respect that
rents are rendered nearly if not quite as cer
tain as the market value of commodities at
a particular time and place.
The proper rule for estimating this por
tion of the damages in the present case was,
to ascertain what would have been a fair
price to pay for the use of the engine and
machinery, in view of all the hazards and
chances of the business; and this is the rule‘
which I understand the referee to have
adopted. There is no error in the other al
lowances made by the referee. The judg
ment should, therefore, be afirmed.
Judgment aflirmed.
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BOOTH v. SPUYTEN DUYVIL ROLLING
MILL CO.
(00 N. Y. 48’)
Court of Appeals of New York. 1875.
Action against the Spuyten Duyvii Rolling
Mill Company for breach of a contract to
make and deliver by a certain date a quan
tity of steel caps for rails. At the time of
making the contract, defendant was inform
ed that the caps were to be used in making
rails to fill a contract which plaintiff had
made with the New York Central Railroad
Company, but defendant was not informed
as to what price plaintiff was to receive for
the rails. Both parties knew that the caps
could not be procured elsewhere in time to
flil the sub.contract. The caps alone had no
market value. Defendant,s mill was burned
before the time for furnishing the caps had
expired, and they were never furnished.
There was a judgment for piaintiff, from
which defendant appealed.
CHURCH, C.\J. The point made, that the
destruction of the mill by fire was an excuse
for the non-performance of the contract by
the defendant, is not‘ tenable. In the first
place it does not appear nor is it found as a
fact, that the burning of the mill prevented
such performance. The contract was made
December 27th, and the steel caps were to
be delivered on the 1st of April thereafter.
The mill burned on the 10th of March; and
the proper construction of the finding is, that
the defendant was prevented after that time
from completing the contract, but there was
ample time prior to that event to have man
ufactured the caps. A party cannot post
pone the performance of such a contract to
the last moment and then interpose an acci
dent to excuse it. The defendant took the
responsibility of the delay. But the case is
not within the principle decided in Dexter v.
Norton, 47 N. Y. 62, and the authorities upon
which it was based. That principle applies
when it is apparent that the parties contem
plated the continued existence of a particular
person or thing which is the subject of the
I
contract, as in the ease of the Musical Hall ‘
destroyed by fire (Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 Best
& S. ‘$26); in the case of an apprentice who
became permanently ill (Boast v. Frith, L.
R. 4 C. P. 1); and of a woman who, from
iliness, was unable to perform as a pianist
(‘Robinson v. Davison, L. it. 6 Exch. 269).
In these and analogous cases a condition is
implied that the person or thing shall con
tinue to exist. In Dexter v. Norton, supra,
this principle was applied to relieve a party
from damages for a failure to deliver prop
erty which was burned without his fault,
but it has no application to a case of this
character. There was no physical or natural
impossibility, inherent in ‘the nature of the
thing to be performed, upon which a condi
tion that the mill should continue can be
predicated. The article was to be manu
factured and delivered, and whether by that
particular machinery or in that mill would
not be deemed material. True, the contract
specifies the mill as the place, but it neces
sarily has no importance, except as designat
ing the place of delivery. For aught that ap
pears, other machinery couid have been sub
stituted. The defendant agreed to furnish a
certain manufactured article by a specified
day, and it cannot be excused by an acci
dent, even if it prevented performance. If
it sought protection against such a contin
gency it should have been provided for in
the contract. Harmony v. Bingham, 12 N.
Y. 99; Tompkins v. Dudley. 25 N. Y. 272;
School Dist. v. Dauchy, % Conn. 530. This
case belongs to a class clearly distinguishable
from those before referred to.
The more important question relates to the
proper rule of damages. The referee finds,
that prior to the contract with the defendant,
the plaintiff had contracted with the New
York Central Railroad Company to sell and
deliver to it by the 1st of June, four hundred
tons of rails to be composed of an iron found
ation and steel caps, for the invention of
which the plaintiff had obtained a,patent;
and that when the contract was made with
the defendant he informed it that he wanted
the caps to perform the contract; that if they
had been delivered by the 1st of April the
; plaintiff could have performed his contract;
. and he finds, also, facts showing that the
plaintiff would have realized the amount of
profits for which the recovery was ordered.
The damages for which a party may re
cover for a breach of contract are such as
ordinarily and naturally flow from the non
performance. They must be proximate and
certain, or capable of certain ascertainment,
\‘ and not remote, speculative or contingent.
L\
It is presumed that the parties contemplate
the usual and natural consequences of a
breach when the contract is made; and if
the contract is made with reference to spe-
cial circumstances, fixing or affecting the
amount of damages, such special circum
stances are. regarded within the contempla
tion of the parties, and damages may be as
. sessed accordingly. Forabreaeh of an exec
. utory contract to sell and deliver personal
property the measure of damages is, ordina
rily, the dlfference between the contfact-price
and the market-value of the article at the
time and place of delivery; but if the contract
is made to enable the plaintiff to perform a
‘ sub-contract, the terms of which the defend
ant knows, he may be held liable for the
difference between the sub-contract-price and
the principal contract-price, and this is upon
the ground that the parties have impiledly
I fixed the measure of damages themselves, or
rather made the contract upon the basis of a
fixed rule by which they may be assessed.
The authorities cited on both sides recognize
these general rules. Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.
Y. 489; Borries v. Hutchinson, 114 E. C. L.
445; Horner v. Railroad Co., L_ R. 7 C. P.
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587; Hadley v. Baxendale, 26 Law & Eq.
398; Stockwell v. Phelps, 3-! N. Y. 364;
.\Iessmore v. Lead Co., 40 N. Y. 422; Ran
dall v. Raper, 96 E. C. L. 82; Parks v. Tool
Co., 54 N. Y. 586; Gary v. Iron Works Co.,
L. R. 3 Q. B. 181; Smeed v. Foord, 1 El. &
El. (502; British Col. Co. v. Nettleship, L. R.
3 C. P. 499; Horner v. Railroad Co., L. R.
8 Exch. 131. The difllcuity is in properly ap
plying general rules to the facts of each par
ticular case. Here it is found in substance
that the contract was made to enable the
plaintiff to perform his contract with the rail
road company, and that this was known to
the defendant. It is insisted however that as
the price which the railroad company was to
pay the plaintiff for the rails was not com
municated to the defendant it cannot be said
that it made the contract with reference to
such price. It is expressly found that there
was no market-price for the steel caps, and
it does not appear that there was any market
price for the completed rail. The presump
tion is, from the facts proved, that there was
not. It was a new article, and the contract
was made to bring it into use. The result of
theable and elaborate argument of the learn
ed counsel for the defendant is, that in such
a case, that is when, although the contract
is made with reference to and to enable the
plaintiff to perform a sub-contract, yet if
the terms of the sub-contract, as to price,
are unknown to the vendor, and there is no
market-price for the article, the latter,1s not
liable for any damages, or what is the same
thing. for only nominal damages. 1 have
examined all the authorities referred to, and
I do not find any which countenances such
a position, and there is no reason for exempt
ing a vendor from all damages in such a
case. It is not because the vendee has not
suffered loss, as he has lost the profits of his
sub-contract; it is not because such profits
are uncertain, as they are fixed and definite,
and capable of being ascertained with cer
tainty; it is not because the parties did not
contract with reference to the sub.contract,
when it appears that the contract was made
for the purpose of enabling the vendee to
perform it. If the article is one which has
a market-price, although the sub-contract is
contemplated, there is some reason for only
imputiug to the vendor the contemplation of
a subcontract at that price, and that he
should not be held for extravagant or ex
ceptional damages provided for in the sub
contract. But the mere circumstance that
the vendor does not know the precise price
specified in the contract will not exonerate
him entirely. He cannot in any case know
the precise market-price at the time for per
formance. Knowledge of the amount of dam
ages is impracticable. and is not requisite.
It is only requisite that the parties should
have such a knowledge of special circum
stances, affecting the question of damages.
as that it may be fairly inferred that they
contemplated a particular rule or standard
for estimating them, and entered into the
contract upon that basis. In Hadley v. Bax
endale. 9 Exch. 341, which is a leading case
on the subject in the English com,ts, the
court after speaking of the general rule, says:
“If the special circumstances under which the
contract was actually made were communi
cated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and
thus known to both parties, the damages re
sulting from the breach of such a contract.
which they would reasonably contemplate,
would he the amount of injury which would
ordinarily follow from a breach of the con
tract under the special circumstances, so
known and communicated."
This case has been frequently referred to,
and the rule as laid down somewhat criti
cised; but the criticism is conffned to the
character of the notice, or communication of
the special circumstances. Some of the
judges, in commenting upon it, have held
that a bare notice of special consequences
which might result from a breach of the con
tract, unless under such circumstances as to
imply that it formed the basis of the agree
ment, would not be sufllcient. I concur with
the views expressed in these cases; and I
do not think the court in Hadley v. Baxen
dale, intended to lay down any different doc
trine. See authorities before cited. Upon the
point involved here, whether the defendant
is exempted from the payment of any dam
ages when there is no market-price, and the
price in the sub4contract is not known, there
is no conflict of authority that I have been
able to discover. In the first place, there is
considerable reason for the position that
where the vendor is distinctly informed that
the purchase is made to enable the vendee
to fulfill a sub-contract, and knows that there
is no market.price for the article, he as
sumes the risk of being bound by the price
named in the sub-contract, whatever that
may be, but it is unnecessary to go to that
extent. It is suflicient to hold, what appears
to me to be clearly just, that he is bound
by the price, unless it is shown that such
price is extravagant, or of an unusual and
exceptional character. The presumption is,
that the price at which the property was sold
was its fair value, and that is to be taken as
the market-price for the purpose of adjusting
the damages in the particular case. This
presumption arises here. The profits were
not unreasonable, certainly not extravagant.
About fifteen per cent was allowed for profits,
including the use of the patent. and no evi
dence was offered, or claim made. that the
price was not the fair value of the article.
We must assume that it was, and hence
within the contemplation of the parties. The
case of Borries v. Hutchinson, 114 E. O. L.
443, is quite analogous to this. The article.
caustic soda, was purchased to be sold to a
foreign correspondent, which the defendant
knew. There were several items of damage
claimed. The profits on the sub-contract
were conceded, and the money paid into court,
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but the court held, in passing judgment, that
the plaintiff was entitled to recover such
profits. Eric, C. J., said: “Here the ven
dor had notice that the vendee was buying
the caustic soda, an article not ordinarily
procurable in the market, for the purpose of
..esale to a sub-vendee, on the continent. he
made the contract, therefore, with the knowl
edge that the buyers were buying for the
purpose of fulfilling a contract which they
had made with a merchant abroad."
The case of Elbidger v. Armstrong, L. R.
:1 Q. B. 473, also illustrates the rule. That
was a contract for the purchase of six hun
dred and sixty-six sets of wheels and axles,
which the plaintiff designed to use in the
manufacture of wagons; and which he had
contracted to sell and deliver to a Russian
company by a certain day, or forfeit two 1
roubles a day. The defendant was informed
of‘ the contract, but not of the amount of
penalties. Some delay occurred in the de
livery, in consequence of which the plaintiff
had to pay £100 in penalties, and the action
was brought to recover that sum. There was .
no market in which the goods could be ob
tained, and the same point was made there v
as here, that the plaintiff was only entitled
to nominal damages; but the court says:
“When from the nature of the article, there
is no market in which it can be obtained,
this rule (the difference between the contract
and market value) is not applicable, but it
would be very unjust if, in such cases, the
damages must be nominal."
It is true that the court held that the plain
tifl! could not recover the penalties as a mat
ter of right, mainly upon the ground that
such a consequence was not, from the nature
and yet the judgment, directing the amount
of the penalties paid. was allowed to stand,
as being a sum which the jury might reason
ably flnd. Cary v. Iron Works Co., L. R. 3
Q. B. 181, decided that when the article pur
chased was designed by the purchaser for a
peculiar and exceptional purpose unknown to
the seller, the latter was nevertheless liable
for the damages which would have been in
curred if used for the purpose which the
seller supposed it would be used for.
The case of Horner v. Railway Co., L. R.
S C. P. 134, is not in conflict with the posi
tion of the plaintiff. In that case the article
had a well-known market-value. The sub
' of the notice, contemplated by the parties; .
i
contract was at an unusual and extravagant
price, of which the defendant was not in
formed. Besides, the defendant was a car
rier, and it was seriously doubted by some
of the judges whether the same rule would
apply to a carrier as to a vendor. The ques
tion in all these cases is, what was the con
tract? and a carrier who is bound to take
property offered at current rates would not,
perhaps, be brought within the principle by
a notice of ulterior consequences, unless such
responsibility was sought to be imposed as
a condition, and he have an opportunity to
refuse the goods; or unless a special contract
at increased rates was shown. The decision
was placed upon the ground that the excep
tional price was not within the contempla
tion of the parties. The authorities in this
state support the doctrine of liability in a
case like this. The cases of Griflin v. Coiver
and Messmore v. Lead Co., supra, especially
the latter, decide the same principle. The
defendant in that case was informed of the
price of the sub-contract, but the decision
was not put upon that ground. This case
presents all the elements which have been
recognized for the application of the rule of
liability. The plaintiff contracted with the
defendant expressly to enable him to perform
his contract with the railroad company, which
the defendant knew. The goods could not
have been obtained elsewhere in time; and
in consequence of the failure of the defend
ant to perform his contract, the plaintiff
lost the benefit of his sub-contract. It is not
claimed that the price at which the com
pleted rails were agreed to be sold was ex
travagant or above their value; and as there
was no market-price for the article, the fact
that the defendant was not informed of the
precise price in the sub-contract does not af
fect its liability. Nor does the fact that the
defendant,s contract does not embrace the
entire article resold, relieve it from the con
sequences of non-performance. It was a
material portion of the rail, without
which it could not be made; and solely by
reason of the failure of the defendant, the
plaintiff failed to perform hi contract, and
thereby lost the amount for which he has
recovered. We concur with the opinion oi.’
the referee and court below, in their views.
holding the defendant liable. The judgment
must be aflirmed. All concur.
Judgment affirmed.
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\ he seeks to recover.
MATHER v. AMERICAN EXP. C0.
(138 Mass. 55.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Hampshire. Nov. 1, 1884.
Action against the American Express Com
pany for breach of a contract to transport a
package containing an architect,s plans for a
house. There was a finding for plaintiff, and
defendant excepted.
J. C. Hammond, for plaintiff. D. W.
Bond, for defendant.
FIELD, J. It is not denied that the de
fendant is liable in damages for the reason
able cost of the new plans, and for other ex
penses, if there were any reasonably incurred
in procuring the new plans; but it is denied
that the defendant is liable in damages for
the delay in constructing the house occasion
ed by the loss of the plans, It is assumed
that the plans had no market value, and
were only useful to the plaintiff. The rule
of damages then is their value to the plain
tiff. As new plans could not be bought in
the market ready made, some time necessar
ily must be consumed in making them, and
the plaintiff contends that the value of the
plans for immediate use, or for use at the
time he would have received them from Bos
ton. if the defendant had duly performed its
contract, is their value to him, and that this
value is made up of the cost of procuring the
new plans and the damages occasioned by
the delay. Whatever he calls it, it is dam
ages for the delay in constructing the house,
caused by the loss of the original plans, that
It does not appear that
the defendant had notice of the contents of
the package at the time it was delivered for
transportation, or any notice or knowledge
that the plaintiff needed the plans for the
construction of a house which he had begun
to build. The damages caused by the delay
are not such as usually and naturally arise
solely from a breach of the contract of the
defendant to carry the package safely to its
destination, nor were they within the rea
sonable contemplation of both parties to this
contract, as likely to arise from such a
breach. The fact that the plans had a spe-
clai value to the plaintlff, and could not be
purchased, does not touch the question of in
cluding in the damages the injury to the
piaintifli occasioned by reason of other con
tracts which he had made, and of work which
he had undertaken in expectation of having
the plans for use immediately, or after the
usual delay involved in sending the plans to
Boston, and in having them traced and re
turned to him. Damages for such injury are
not given unless the circumstances are such
as to show that the defendant ought fairly to
be held to have assumed a liability therefor
when it made the contract.
We think that Hadley v. Baxendale, 9
Exch. 341, which ha been cited with ap
proval by this court, governs this case.
The case of Green v. Railroad Co., 193
Mass. 221, on which the plaintifii relies, was
an action to recover the value of an “oil
painting, the portrait of the plaintlffs father."
The opinion attempts to lay down a rule for
determining the value of such a painting
when the plaintiff had no other portrait of
his father, and when, so far as appears, it
had no market value; but the opinion does
not discuss any question of damages not in
volved in determining the value of the por
trait to the plaintiff. The plaintiff in that
case made no claim for damages occasioned
a loss of a profitable use of the portrait.
Exceptions sustained.
‘R
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ABBOTT et al. v. HAPGOOD et al.
(22 N. E. 907, 150 Mass. 248.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
VVorcester. Nov. 29, 1889.
Report from superior court, Worcester
county; TIAMMOND, Judge.
. This is an action brought to recover damages
for breach of contracts made by the defendants
to furnish the Penn Match Company, Limited,
of Philadelphia, certain machines used in the
manufacture of matches, and certain match
splints for themanufacture of matches. The
said contracts are the same which were be
fore the supreme judicial court in the case of
Match Co. v. liapgood, 141 Mass. 145, 7 N.
E. Rep. 22. The plaintiffs in this writ are
described as “Francis R. Abbott, Charles
Kee, and Wm. B. Kempton, all of Philadel
phia, in the state of l’ennsylvania. as they
are copartners and associated together in
busine..:s under the firm name and style of the
‘ Penn Match Company, Limited.’ " Theda
fendants did not call attention at the trial to
the specific fact that they made any point in
defense that the use in the writ of the pres
ent tense of the verb in “as they are co-part
ners" described this firm as it existed at the
date of the writ, viz.. May 12, 1888. It had
in fact appeared in the plaintiffs’ testimony
that Kempton had been in the business only
a year or two, and was not connected with it
at all when this suit was brought. It being
agreed that the questions raised by the de
murrer might be raised at the trial with the
other questions, the following evidence ma
terial to the questions raised by the report
was put in: The plaintiffs Abbott and Kee,
with one William Brown. entered into acou
tract under the act of assembly of Pennsyl
vama approved June 2. 1874. Brown died
about January 13, 1882, and the affairs of
that concern were wound up, and a reh.ase
from the administrator of Brown,s estate was
given February 7, 1882. The defendants had
sold match splints to said concern, and had
received a letter dated January 23, 1882,
signed “PENN Mxrcu Co., Ll.\llTl£D, Fuss
cis R. Annorr, Tr.’" orderingone each of de
fendants‘ “setting" and “rolling-off" ma
chines, and at the time of t1§e contracts sued
on were making said machines.
middle of February, 1882, the plaintiff hemp
tonagreed verbally to join them in forming
a company, under the said statute of Penn
sylvania, of the same name as the former, to
prosecute the same business of manufactur
ing matches’ in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs
together agreed that they would organize
said company under said statute, and would
build a factory forlhe purpose of such manu
factory, provided they could get the machin
ery, such as is mentioned in the contracts
sued on. Thereupon, for the purpose of car
rying out said agreement, and in the name of
.and for the benefit of the projected company,
the plaintiffs applied to the def‘.ndants, who
made the contracts in question, the plain
LA\\’ DA3l.—6
About the ,
tiffs made known to the defendants that th(
projected company would proceed with its
organization, and would cause a factory to
be built for it only in case they could make a
contract with the defendants to furnish the
machines. The plaintiffs told the defendants
they would like them to give a written con
tract for the machines already ordered,-that
is, one rolling-off machine and one setting
machine,—and also attach to it an additional
order for four more setting machines and
one rolling-off machine. After some conver
sation, the defendants signed and delivered
the contracts sued on. After the contracts
were made, the plaintiffs gave up the idea of
‘building the factory jointly. and Abbott and
Kempton proceeded to build the factory ior
the use of the firm, with the arrangement
that it should be verbally leased to the Penn
Match Company, Limited, for the purpose of
transacting its business, to-wit, the match
business the plaintiffs had agreed to go into.
The factory was completed about July 15,
1882, and the Penn Match Company paid
rent from that time. On October 3, 1882,
the plaintiffs made an agreement to carry out
the arrangement entered into in February,
1882, and no business was done until after
July 15th, when the factory was finished, ex
cept that the plaintiffs made some match
boxes, with a view preparatory to this com
pany (the Penn Match Company) being or
ganized, and so as to have them on hand.
The records required by the statutes of Penn
sylvania, as to limited partnerships. were
duly made. Evidence was offered that in
May, 1882, the defendants, after some letters
stating that the machines would soon he
made. refused to perform said contracts. The
plaintiffs offered evidence of damage to them,
as individuals, independent of their memlwr
ship of their association. They likewise of
fered evidence of expenses incurred and dam
ages sutTered by the association in conse
quence of the defendants’ refusal to deliver
the machines and the match splints. The
defendants put in the judgment for the de
fendants, which was rendered on the demur
rer after the decision of the supreme judicial
comt in Match (,o. v. Hapgood. 141 Mass.
. 146’ 7 N. E. Rep. 22.
The defendants asked the court to rule:
(1) There is no evidence to warrant a verdict
for the plaintilfs. (2) The contracts are in
terms with the Penn Match Company. Lim
ited, and that company was not organized at
the time of the contracts,and there never was
any contract which would bind that company,
and the plaintiffs cannot recover. (3) The
judgment in the case of Penn Match Com
pany, Limited, v. Hapgood and another is a
a bar to this action. (4) If. after the death
of Brown, the present plaintiffs agreed to
gether to form a limited partnership, under
the statute of Pennsylvania, which has been
put into the case, for the manufacture of
matches, under the name of the “Penn Mat:h
Company, Limited," and with the pn:'p0sti
and to the end of doing so, and in the name
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of and for the benefit of the projected limited
I
partnership procured these contracts, the
aforesaid judgment is a bar to recovery in I
this case. The court declined to rule as re
quested by the defendants, and ruled that the
association, by the agreement of October 3, i
1882, is so far different from the orgauiv.a- l
tion of the plaintiffs, as general partners,
that in this case no damages suffered by
the association can be assessed, and the
only damages which can be recovered are ‘
such as the plaintiffs themselves have suf
fered independently of their membership of
the association. The plaintiffs objected and
excepted to this ruling, so far as it limit
ed damages. The court overruled the de-,
fendants‘ demurrer, and they appealed; the
ruling being that the p!aintjfi’s could recover
such damages as they suffered independently 1
of the association formed under the statute, ‘
by reason of the non-performance of the con- '
tracts. A verdict was directed for the plain- l
tiffs, with the understanding that the case
should be reported, and the same is now re
ported, for the determination of the supreme
judicial court. If the rulings are correct, the
parties agree that the case shall be sent to an
assessor to assess the damages. If the de-
!murrer should have been sustained, or if, up
on the evidence, a verdict should have been
Iordered ior the defendants, the verdict is to 3
be set aside, and judgment for the defendants
entered; unless the ground for orderiugjudg-
Iment is such that it could have been cured
by amendment, if it had been pointed out at
the trial, in which case the court shall enter
such judgment or order as shall seem just.
1f the plaintiffs are entitled to recover such
damages as were suffered by the association
organized under the agreement of October 3,
1862, the verdict is to be set aside, and a new
trial ordered.
W. S. B. Hopkins, for plaintiffs. F. P.
Goulding, for defendants.
\
KNOWLTON. J. According to the terms
of the repmtin this case, if the demurrer
should have been sustained, on grounds which
could have been removed by amendment, the
plaintiffs are to be permitted toamend. The
defendants have made no point upon the
use of the present tense instead of the past I‘
tense in the allegation in the writ as to the ‘
partnership of the plaintiffs, and, if that is
material, it may be corrected by amend
ment. ln each count of the declaration,
after alleging that there was a valuable1
consideration for the defendants‘ contract,
the plaintiffs aver that the contract was
reduced to writing, and set out as the
contract a writing which shows no consider
ation nor mutuahty, but merely an undertak
ing on one side. ,1‘o state the contract truly,
they should set out in each count their own
agreement which constituted the considera
tion for the agreement made by the defend
ants. The substantive grounds of defense
rest upon the rulings, and refusals to rule, in
regard to the effect of the evidence. There
was an attempt to recover under the con
tracts now before us, bya suit brought in the
name of the Penn Match Company, Limited,
against these defendants. In that case the
plaintiff was alleged to be a corporation, and.
the hearing and decision were upon a demur
rer which admitted that allegation to be true.
If we assume that the limited partnership
organized under thelaws ofl’enns.vlvania was 1
so far an entity, separate from the persons
who were members of it, that itcould sue.and
be sued in this commonwealth as a corpor
ation can, it is quite clear that it was not a
party to the contracts declared on. Match
Co. v. llapgood, 141 Mass. 145, 7 N. E.
Rep. 22. if a contract is made in the
‘ name and for the benefit of a projected
corporation, the corporation, after its
organization, cannot become a party to
the contract, even by adoption or ratifi
cation of it. Keiner v. Baxter, L. lt. 2
C. P. 174; Gunn v. Insurance Co., 12 U. B.
(N. S.) 694; Melhado v. Railway Co., L. R. 9
C. P. 503; In re Engineering Co., L. It. 16
Ch. Div. 125. Upon the facts reported in
the present case, the defendants, as well as
the plaintiffs, must have understood that the
limited partnership was only projected, and
that the plaintiffs. acting jointly as individ
uals, or as general partners, constituted the
only party who could contract with the (le
fendants in the manner proposed. It is evi
dent that both parties intended to enter into
binding contracts. As recitedin the report,
for the purpose of carrying out their agree
ment to form a limited partnership, “audio
the name of and for the benefit of the project- .
ed company, the plaintiffs applied to the de
fendants who made the contracts in question,
and the plaintiffs made known to the defend
‘
ants that the projected company would pro
ceed with its organization and would cause
a factory to be built for it, only in case they
could make a contract with the defendants
to furnish the machines."
We are of opinion, in view of the facts
‘
known to both parties, that the plaintiffs
must be deemed to have been jointly con
tracting in the only way in which they could 4
lawfully contract, and that they assumed the
name “Penn Match Company, Limited," as )
that in which they chose to do business, in
reference to the projected limited partnership,
until their organization should be completed,
and they should turn over the business tofhe
new company, which would be colnposed of
themselves in anew relation. This seems to
be warranted by the language of the repo
and entirely consistent with their porn .
Imade known to the defendants, and in t
way only can effect be given to their ac
The judgment in the former suit is no I.at
‘ .
this action, for that suit was brou ht b
different plaintiff. €
On the subject of damages, the rel rt d
not sufficiently state the evidence t ena
us fully to determine the rights of the part
As we understand the rule laid down by '.1
presiding justice, that “ the only dama
A _ ‘ ” J‘--A
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which can be recovered are such as the plain
tiffs themselves have suffered independently
oftlieir membership of the association," we
are of opinion that it is too narrow. In the
view which we take of the agreement, the
plaintiffs contracted for articles to be deliv
ered to themselves. They informed the de
fendants that they had agreed to organize a
limited partnership, of which they were to
be the sole members, and that they made the
contracts to enable them profitably to carry
on business in their new organization. By
reason of the defendants’ breach of contract,
the plaintiffs were unable to turn over to the
new company the property which they should
have rr ccived for that purpose, and they have
been unable to establish that company, and
start it in its work under such favorable au
spices, and with such an equipment for the
transaction of a profitable business, as if the
defendants had performed their contracts.
The only damages for which thedefendauts are
liable to any one must be recovered in this
action, and, inasmuch as the machines could
not be procured in the market, we are of
opinion that the parties must be presumed to
have contracted in reference to the declared
purpose for which they were to be furnished,
and that that purpose may be consi:leOQe.l in
assessing the damages. Machine Co. v. Ry
der, 139 Mass. 366; Manning v. Fitch, 138
Mass. 273; Townsend v. Wharf Co., 117 Mass.
501; Somers v. Wright’ 115 Mass. 292; Cory
v. Iron-Works, L. 1t. 3 Q. B. 181; Portman
v. Middleton, 4 C. B. (N. S.) 322; Mcllose v.
Fulmer, 73 a. St. 365.
We do no intimate that the plaintiffs are
to receive any damages as members of the
limited partnership, but only that the dam
ages which they sufiered, it any, by reason
of the defendants‘ preventing them from suc
cessfully establishing and fitting out a busi
ness to be conducted by them as a limited
partnership. may be recovered. The mere
fact that they arranged to conduct their busi
ness by a limited partnership, under the stat
ute of l’ennsylvania, does not deprive them
of the rights which they then had in the busi
ness, nor of the advantages which properly
belonged to it. The value of the articles con
tracted for may be estimated in reference to
their intended use in the business for which
the defendants were to furnish them. The
plaintiffs are to have leave to amend their
writ and declaration as they shall be advised,
and the case is to stand for trial. So ordered.
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L- BROWNELL et al. v. CHAPMAN.
(51 N. W. 249, 84 Iowa, 504.)
Feb. 2, 1892.
Appeal from superior court of Council
Bluffs; J. E. F. Mt.Gee. Judge.
Action on a contract. in substance as.fol
lows: “April 12th, 1889. D. Clipman, Esq.,
Council Bluffs, Iowa—Dear Sir: We will
furnish you one of our Scotch marine boil
ers, 54 dia., 84 long, made of 60,000 T. S.
marine steel shells. 5-16; ' ' ' all the
above delivered and set up, (you to do all
wood-work,)--for the sum of ten hundred
and twenty-three dollars, ($1,023.00) We
will allow you three hundred and sixty dol
lars ($360.00) for your two engines. boiler,
heater, and inspirater, wheels, shafting, and
couplings. Hoping to receive your order, we
are, yours truly, Brownell & Co. P. S. We
guaranty to deliver above in thirty days from
April 13th. It is understood you are to have
90 days’ option on sale of engine and boiler
you have." “Accepted. D. Chapman." This
action is to recover the balance of the con
tract price, after deducting the $360 for the
defendant,s engines, etc. There was a fail
ure to deliver the boilers, etc., on the part‘
of the plaintiffs for some 18 days after the
time specified in the contract: and the de
fendant presents a counter-claim because of
the failure and for defective workmanship
in putting in the boilers. A reply put in is
sue certain allegations of the counter-claim.
and a trial by jury. resulting in a verdict
and judgment for the defendant for $31.25.
The plaintiffs appeal.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Isaac Adams, for appellants. D. B. Daily.
Emmet Finley, and Ambrose Burke, for up
pellee.
GRANGER, J. 1. Lake Manana is a
small lake in the vicinity of Council Bluffs,
in Pottawattamie county, and is a summer
and pleasure resort. Boats are used on
the lake for the accommodation of visitors,
and among them was one known as the "hi.
it‘. Rohrer," belonging to the defendant. The
boat was operated on the lake in the season
of 1888, and the boilers and machinery con
tracted for. as known to the parties, were_ to
refit the boat for use in the season of 1889.
A breach of the contract on the part of
plaintiff by a failure to deliver within the
time is not questioned, and the important
question on this appeal is as to the proper
.measnre of damage. The superior court‘ ad
,mitted evidence to show, and instructed the
jury on the theory. that the measure of dam
;age was the rental value of the boat
during
tthe time the defendant was deprived of its
{use
in consequence of the breach. The ap
pcllants‘ thought is that the measure of dam
age is the “interest of the capital invested in
the boat." This latter rule has something
of support in authority. but it is far out
weighed by the number of cases and the rea
soning supporting the rule adopted by the
court. In considering the question we must
keep in view the rule, universally recog
nized, that the damage for breach of con
tract must be limited to such as would nat
urally come within the contemplation of the
parties at the time the contract was made.
The plaintiii, when it agreed to. furnish and
set the boilers, knew they were to be used
in operating the boat; that a breach on its
part would deprive the plaintiff of its use;
and it would naturally contemplate the value
of such use as the injury that would he sus
tained; and such is, as a matter of fact, the 5
actual damage. The appellants cite a num-
'
ber of cases, but all ‘except two, we think,
support the rule adopted by the court.
Brown v. Foster, 51 Pa. St. 165, is a case
quite similar to this. Repairs to a boat by
putting in machinery were to be completed
by October 1st. The work was not done un
til December 15th. The trial court gave, as
the rule of damage, “that the measure in
such a case is the ordinary hire of such a
boat for the time in question. for the time
plaintlff was in default." The complaint in
that case of the rule as given was by the de
fendant, who was seeking damage, and the
court said his complaint was without reason.
The case cited is not authority for the ap
pellants‘ position. ln Mining Syndicate v.
Fraser, 130 U. S. 611, 9 Sup. Ct. 665, the in- f
terest on the investment in a mill that had 3
been delayed because of defective machinery
was allowed as the measure of damage, but’ .
only in case the jury found there was no
evidence of the rental value of the mill. The
case clearly recognizes the rule as to rental
value as a‘ correct one. In Griffin v. Colver,
16 N. Y. 489, is the following syllabus, hav
ing full support in the opinion: “Upon a
breach of a contract to deliver at a certain
day a steam-engine built and purchased for
the purpose of driving a planing.mill and
other definite machinery. the ordinary rent
or hire which could have been obtained for
the use of the machinery whose operation
was suspended for want of the steam-engine
may be regarded as damages." In Nye v.
Alcohol Works, 51 Iowa, 120, 50 N. W. 988,
this general principle has support argumen
tatlvely, but another rule, because of distin
guishing facts, is sustained. The cases of
Allis v. McLean, 48 Mich. 4%. 12 N. W. 640.
and Taylor v. Maguire, 12 Mo. 313, are not
in harmony with this view, but they are
clearly overborne by the weight of the other
cases and the current of authority. The lat
ter case cites. as decisive of the point,
Blanchard v. Ely, 21 Wend. 312. In Griflin
v. Colver, supra, the Blanchard Case is com
mented upon and explained, and. in effect,
it is divested of the authority claimed for it
v
in the Missouri case.
But it is said that the boat _i
n question had
no established rental value. By this i
t is
meant that the boat had never been rented.
But it will not do to say that because an ar
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ticle has never been rented it has no rental
value, any more than it would to say that
because .an article had never been sold it
has no market value. We should assume
that an article suitable and adapted for use
at a time and place has both a market and
rental value, at least until the contrary ap
pears. In Jemmison v. Gray, 29 Iowa, 537,
this court approved an instruction that “the
fact, if proven, that 12,213 ties could not
have been purchased for immediate delivery
in the market at the places where said ties
were to be delivered on the 1st day of Oc
tober, 1869, would not, of itself, establish
the fact that there was not a market price
for such ties at such time and place." The
holding affords a strong presumption in favor
of a market price. A like presumption
would prevail in favor of an article having a
value for hire at a time and place where such
articles are in demand for use. The testi
mony shows that boats varying in size were
rented on the lake during the season, both
by the day and for trips. This boat had per
haps twice the carrying capacity of any other
boat on the lake, and in that respect formed
an exception; but the rental value of boats
depended on their size and adaptation for
use, and it was competent for persons hav
ing knowledge of the business and prices
paid for other boats to give an opinion as to,
the rental value of such a boat as the one in
question. It is contended that the method
of ascertaining the rental value involves the
uncertainties and facts on which profits are
excluded as a rule of damage; but we think
not. It is true that rental values are general
ly fixed from a calculation of the profits to
be derived from the use, but the rental is a
fixed, definite value, agreed to be paid, and
the bailee assumes the uncertainties as to
the profits.
The appellants say: “For an analogous
case to the one at bar, in there being an at
tempt to prove a rental value to property
when the facts showed that the property in
question had no rental value, the court is
referred to Coal Co. v. Foster, 59 Pa. St. 365."
The case, as we we read it, is without a
bearing on the question. The defendant
agreed to furnish for the coal company an
engine of a particular size and make. There
was no other engine of the kind that the
company could use. There was a delay in
the delivery, and the company was compell
ed to transport its coal by horse-power, as it
had before done. The trial court gave the
rule “that the measure of damage for the de
lay was the ordinary hire of a locomotive
during the period of \deiay." The reviewing
court gave the rule as the difference between
the cost of transporting the coal by horse and
by locomotive power, but placed its ruling‘
on the fact that the parties knew there was
no other engine to be operated on the track
of the company, and could not have had such
damage in view in making the contract. it
will be seen that the cases are different. if
in the case at bar the defendant,s boat had
been operated at an additional cost by do
ing the same amount of work during the
delay, it would be reasonable to say the dam
age to him was the difference in the cost.
But his is an entire loss of use, and the value
of such use is the damage, where it is proxi
mate, and not speculative or uncertain.i A part of the counter-claim is for loss
of time by men kept in readiness by defend
ant to do the part of the work belonging to
him in adjusting the boilers and machinery,
as provided by the contract. On this branch
of the case the court gave the following in
struction: “(5) If you find from the evi
dence, and under the third and fourth in
structions, that there was a contract, as set
out, between plaintiffs and defendant, and
that plaintiffs were in default in carrying
out said contract; and if you find that, by
reason of such default, defendant was dam
aged; and if you further find that defendant
was in readiness to carry out his part of
said contract at the time specified therein;
and that at the time he was in readiness to
run and operate his boat; and that the boat
was necessarily idle during the period of
plaintiffs’ default, by reason of such default,
—then the defendant would be entitled to
recover the ordinary and reasonable rental
value of said boat during the time of said
default, and such reasonable and necessary
amount (if there be any such amount) as he
may have been required to pay to any men
that he may have employed during said en
forced idleness for the purpose of running
said boat, if he had any such men in his
employ who remained in his employ and idle
by reason of such default; and if you find
that the defendant had placed himself in
readiness to work upon said boat himself
at the time specified in the contract for the
furnishing of said machinery, and that he
necessarily remained idle during the time of
such default, if any, of the plaintiffs, and
used ordinary diligence to find other employ
ment for that time, ybu will then further
find the fair and reasonable value of his
services during the period of such default
as part of the damage, if any, which defend
ant sustained." Complaint is made of the
instruction, as stating an erroneous rule of
damages, but we discover no error.. If, be
cause of the breach, the defendant lost his
or the time of his empioyes, for such time
and expense he should be reimbursed. The
rule is recognized in Mining Syndicate v.
Fraser, supra. ‘The instruction fairly pro
tccts the rights of the plaintiffs. A number
of other questions are argued, all of which
we have examined, and find no prejudicial
error. It would serve no good purpose to
extend the opinion to present them. The
judgment is affirmed.
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MASTERTON ET AL. v. MAYOR, ETC.,
OF CITY OF BROOKLYN.
(7 Hill, 61.)
Supreme Court of New York.
18-i5.
This was an action of covenant commenc
ed in 184t), and tried at the New York cir
cuit in June, 1843, before Kent, C. J. The
case was this: January 26, 1836, a cove
nant was entered into between the defendaihts
and the plaintiffs, by which the latter agreed
at their own risk, costs and charges, to
furnish, cut, fit, and deliver (properly and
sufliciently prepared for setting), at the site
Jan. Term,
of the city hall in the city of Brooklyn, all ,
the marble that might be required for build
ing the said city hall, according to certain
plans and specifications then exhibited and
signed by the respective parties, and in
conformity with such drawings, molds and
patterns as should from time to time be fur
nished by the superintendent or architect of
be of the same quality as that used for the
‘
ornamental and best work on the new custom
house in the city of New York, and of the
best kind of sound white marble from Kain
& Morgan,s quarry, in Eastchester, free from
‘
spaits, cracks, and blemishes, and wrought
in the best manner of workmanship, and
tooled and rubbed, etc., as should be ordered
by the superintendent. It was further
agreed by the plaintifl!s that they would pro
ceed forthwith to the execution of the work
with all diligence and with a sufiicieut force;
and that they would commence the delivery
of the marble as soon after the opening of
navigation in the spring as might be re
quired, and continue delivering the same in
such order and at such times and as fast as
the superintendent should direct. They also
agreed that the marble thus delivered should
be subject to inspection and rejection by the
superintendent, and remain at the risk of the
plaintiffs until the superintendent inspected
and accepted it. And the defendants, in
consideration of the above stipulations,
agreed to pay the plaintiffs the sum of $271,
600, at the times and in the manner follow
ing, viz. the sum of $10,000 when the base
ment of the said city hall was halt up; the
sum of $15,000 when the whole of the base-
ment was up; the sum of $20,000 when the
first story was half up; the sum of $20,000
when the whole of the first story was up;
the sum of $20,000 when the second story
was half up; the sum of $20,000 when the
whole of the second story was up; the sum
of $20'000 when one-half of the cornice of
the superstructure was up; the sum of $20,
000 when the whole of the cornice was up;
the sum of $50,001) when the columns and
capitals were up; the sum of $2-3,000 when
the entablature was complete; the further
sum of $20000 when the interior work was
done; and the remainder when the building
was, finished. The declaration alleged a
breach of this covenant in 1837, and claimed
various items of special damage.
March 7, 1836, the plaintiffs entered into a
covenant with Kain & Morgan. This cove
nant, after referring to the one entered into
with the defendants, and reciting a part of
the same, provided that Kain & Morgan
should furnish from their quarry, in East
chester, all the marble required for erecting.
completing and finishing the city hall in the
‘ city of Brooklyn, in such blocks, pieces and
proportions, and in such condition for work
ing, as is usual and customary; and deliver
the same to the plaintiffs, free of all ex
pense, on a wharf in the city of Brooklyn,
etc.; the blocks to be delivered so that there
should be suflicient time to work and lit the
same for the said superstructure, and equal
in quality to that used for the superstructure
and interior above the basement of the new
custom house in the city of New York, etc.
‘ The remainder of the covenant was as fol
' lows:
the said city hall; all of the said marble to ‘
"And the said parties of the first
part (the plaintiffs), in consideration, etc.,
i do hereby covenant and agree to pay the
said parties of the second part (Kain & Mor
gan) in the aggregate the sum of $112,395,
which amount shall be paid in different
sums, from time to time, out of the sum of
$271,600 to be paid by the said mayor, etc.
(the defendants), to the said parties of the
first part, as the same from time to time
may be paid to them, ctc.; that is to say:
The said parties of the first part shall and
will make payment to the said parties of the
second part at the same times that they,
the said parties of the first part, receive
their payments from the mayor, etc. (the de-
fendants). And the several payments thus
to be made to the said parties of the second
part shall bear the same proportion, respec
tively, to the whole amount they are to re
ceive from the said parties of the first part as
the corresponding payment to the said parties
of the first part by the mayor, etc., bear to
the whole amount they are to receive under
their contract from the said mayor, etc.
And it is expressly understood and mutually
covenanted and agreed that in no event shall
the parties of the second part look to the
said parties of the first part, or hold them.
responsible for any payments, until the said
parties of the first part are first placed in
sufficient funds by the mayor, etc. (the de
fendants). to enable them to make such pay
ment according to the herein last before
mentioned provisions," etc.
The covenant with Kain & Morgan was
read in evidence by the plaintiffs, subject to
the right of the defendants to raise such ob
jections to its admissibility, during the prog
ress of the cause. as they might think prop
er. The plaintiffs also proved that they
commenced the delivery of the ma.rble in
pursuance of the covenant between them and
the defendants, and continued so to do until
July, 1837, when the defendants suspended
operations upon the building for want of
i
DIRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES—IN CONTRACT.
funds, and refused to receive any more ma
terials of the plaintiffs, though the latter
were ready and _offered to perform. The
entire quantity of marble necessary to ful
fill the contract on the part of the plaintiffs,
according to the estimates made at the trial,
was 88,819 feet. At the time the work was
,suspended, the plaintiffs had delivered 14,
779 feet, for which they were paid the con
tract price. The plaintiffs then had on
hand. at Kain & Morgan,s quarry, about
3.308 feet, which was suitably fitted and pre
pared for delivery. A witness swore that
this was not of much value for other build
ings. and would not probably bring over
two shillings per foot. Other ‘witnesses
swore that, had the work progressed with
ordinary diligence, it would have taken
about live years to complete the contract on
the part of the plaintiffs. Considerable testi
mony was given tending to show the cost
of marble in the quarry, and the expense of
raising, dressing, and transporting it to the
place of delivery. And the plaintiffs offered
.to show “what would be the difference be
tween the cost to-them of the marble in the
' contract, and the price that was to be paid
for it by the contract," which evidence was
objected to, but the circuit judge admitted
it, and the defendants excepted. The wit
nesses answered that in 1836 the difference
would be about 20 per cent.; in 1837, from
25 to 30 per cent.; in 1838, about 25 per cent.;
in 1839, from 25 to 30 per cent.; and in
1840, from 30 to 40 per cent. The witnesses
also testified that the ordinary profit calcu
lated upon by master stone cutters was from
10 to 20 per cent., and that 15 per cent. was
a fair living profit. All this testimony was
objected to, but the circuit judge admitted
it, and the defendants again excepted.
When the plaintiffs rested, the defendants
moved that all the testimony in relation to
the contract of Kain & Morgan with the
plaintiffs, and the contract itself, be exclud
ed from the consideration of the jury as ir
relevant, but the circuit judge overruled the
motion, and the defendants excepted.
The circuit judge charged the jury, among
other things, that they were to allow the
plaintiffs as much as the performance of the
contract would have benefited them; that
the plaintiffs were entitled to recover for the
unfinished marble not accepted, subject to
a deduction of what should be deemed its
fair market value; that the jury should con
fine the damages to the loss of the plaintiffs;
but that the benefit or profits which they
would have received from the actual per
formance constituted such loss. The cir
cuit judge also charged as follows: “The
defendants ought to be allowed what the
jury should think just as to interest on the
outlays of the plaintiffs; also what the jury
might think just for the risk of transporta
tion, and the reasonable value of the marble
unaccepted and unquarried. As to damages
on the rough marble to be delivered by Kain
.‘ .’,IT\ 1*‘;_.
v
& Morgan, it appears by the contract with
the defendants that the plaintiffs were ob
liged to procure it from this quarry. The
plaintiffs‘ contract with Kain .& Morgan. if
made in good faith, was entered into as a
reasonable part of the performance by the
plaintiffs of their own contract; and if the
defendants, by stopping the work, obliged
the plaintiffs to break their contract with
Kain & Morgan, then the damages on the
latter ought to be allowed to the plaintiffs,
who would be responsible to Kain & Mor
gan for the same. The jury, in respect to
this contract, are to give the difference be
tween the contract price and what it would
cost Kain & Morgan to deliver the article,
deducting the value of it to them, and mak
ing all proper allowances as in the case of
the principal contract. In fixing the dam
ages to be allowed the plaintiffs, the jury are
to take things as they were at the time the
work was suspended, and not allow for any
increased benefits they would have received
from the subsequent fall of wages or subse
quent circumstances." etc.
The defendants excepted to the charge,
and requested the circuit judge to instruct
the jury, among other things; that no dam
ages should be allowed on account of any sup
posed profits which the plaintiffs might have
made out of the unfinished work; and that
the damages allowed should be confined to
the actual loss which the plaintiffs had sus
tained. The judge refused to charge fur
ther, and the defendants excepted. The jury
found a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for
$72,099, and the defendants now moved for
a new trial on a bill of exceptions.
D. Lord and C. O‘Conor, for plaintiffs.
F. Butler and G. Wood, for defendants.
B.
NELSON, C. J. The damages for the
marble on hand, ready to be delivered, were
not a matter in dispute on the argument.
The true measure of allowance in respect to
that item was conceded to be the difference
between the contract price and the market
value of the article at the place of delivery.
This loss the plaintiffs had actually sustain
ed, regard being bad to their rights as ac- .
qulred under contract.
The contest arises out of the claim for dam
ages in respect to the remainder of the mar
ble which the plaintiffs had agreed to furnish,
but which they were prevented from furnish
ing by the suspension of the work in July,
1837. This portion was not ready to be de
livered at the time the defendants broke up
the contract, but the plaintiffs were then
willing and offered to perform in all things
on their part, and the case assumes that they
were possessed of sufficient means and abil
ity to have done so.
The plaintiffs insist that the gains they
would have realized, over and above all ox
penses. in case they had been allowed to per
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constitute a part of the loss and damage oc
casioned by the breach; and they were ac
cordingly permitted in the course of the trial
to give evidence tending to show what
amount of gains they would have realized if
the contract had been carried into execu
tion.
On the other hand, the defendants say that
this claim exceeds the measure of damages
allowed by the common law for the breach
of an executory contract. They insist that it
is simply a claim for the profits anticipated
from a supposed good bargain, and that these
are too uncertain, speculative, and remote to
form the basis of a recovery.
It is not to be denied that there are profits
or gains derivable from a contract which are
uniformly rejected as too contingent and
speculative in their nature, and too dependent
upon the fluctuation of markets and the
chances of business, to enter into a safe or
reasonable estimate of damages. Thus any
supposed successful operation the party
might have made, if he had not been prevent
ed from realizing the proceeds of the con
tract at the time stipulated, is a considera
tion not to be taken into the estimate. Be
sides the uncertain and contingent issue of
such an operation in itself considered, it has
no legal or necessary connection with the
stipulations between the parties, and cannot,
therefore, be presumed to have entered into
their consideration at the time of contracting.
It has accordingly been held that the loss of
any speculation or enterprise in which a par
ty may have embarked, relying on the pro
ceeds to be derived from the fulfillment of
an existing contract, constitutes no part of
the damages to be recovered in case of
breach. So a good bargain made by a ven
dor, in anticipation of the price of the article
sold, or an advantageous contract of resale
made by a vendee, confiding in the vendor,s
promise to deliver the article, are considera
tions always excluded as too remote and con
tingent to affect the question of damages.
(‘lare v. Maynard, 6 Adoi. & E. 519, and Cox
v. Walker, i‘n the note to that case; Walker
v' Moore, 10 Barn. & .C
. 416; Gary v. Gru
man, 4 Hill, 627, 628; Chit. Cont. 458, 870.
The civil law is in accordance with this
rule. “In general," says Pothier, "the par
ties are deemed to have contemplated only
the damages and interest which the creditor
might suffer from the nonperformance of the
obligation, in respect to the particular thing
which is the object of it, and not such as may
have been incidentally occasioned thereby in
respect to his other affairs. The debtor is
therefore not answerable for these, but only
for such as are suffered with respect to the
thing which is the object of the obligation,
"Dalnni et interesse ipsam rem non habitam."





When the books and cases speak of the
profits anticipated from a good bargain as
matters L0o remote and uncertain to be taken
into the account in ascertaining the true
measure of damages, they usually have refer
ence to dependent and collateral engage-
ments entered into on the faith and in ex
pectation of the performance of the principal
contract. The performance or non-perform
ance of the latter may and often does exert a
material influence upon the collateral enter
prises of the party; and the same may be
said as to his general affairs and business
transactions. But the influence is altogether
too remote and subtile to be reached by legal
proof or judicial investigation. And besides,
the consequences,‘when injurious, are as oft
en, perhaps, attributable to the indiscretion
and fault of the party himself as to the con
duct of the delinquent contractor. His condi
tion, in respect to the measure of damages,
ought not to be worse for having failed in
his engagement to a person whose affairs
were embarrassed than if it had been made
with one in prosperous or afiluent circum
stances. Dom. bk. 3, tit. 5, § 2
,
art. 4.
But profits or advantages which are the di
rect and immediate fruits of the contract en
tered into between the parties stand upon a
different footing. These are part and parcel
of the contract itself, entering into and con
stituting a portion of its very elements; some
thing stipulated for, the right to the enjoy
ment of which is just as clear and plain as to
the fulfillment of any other stipulation. They
are presimied to have been taken into consid
eration and deliberated upon before the con
tract was made and formed; perhaps the
only inducement to the arrangement. The
parties may, indeed, have entertained difl!er
ent opinions concerning the advantages of the
bargain, each supposing and believing that he
had the best of it; but this is mere matter
of judgment going to the formation of the
contract, for which each has shown himself
willing to take the responsibility, and must,
therefore; abide the hazard.
Such being the relative position of the con
tracting parties, it is diflienlt to comprehend
why, in case one party has deprived the oth
er of the gains or profits of the contract by
refusing to perform it, this loss should not
constitute a proper item in estimating the
damages. To separate it from the general
los would seem to be doing violence to the
intention and understanding of the parties,
and severing the contract itself.
The civil law writers plainly include the
loss of profits, in cases like the present, with
in the damages to which the complaining
party is entitled. They hold that he is to be
indemnified for “the loss which the non-per
formance of the obligation has occasioned
him, and for the gain of which it has depriv





, arts. 6, 12. And upon looking into
the common-law authorities bearing upon the
question, especially the later ones, they will
he found to come nearly, if not quite, up to
the rule of the civil law.
In Boorman v. l\,ash, 9 Barn. & G. 1-45, it
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appeared that the defendant contracted in
November for a quantity of oil, one.half to
be delivered to him in February following,
and the rest in March; but he refused to re
ceive any part of it. And the court held that
the plaintiff was entitled to the difference
between the contract price and that which
might have been obtained in market on the
days when the contract ought to have been
completed. See .\i’Lean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722.
The case of Leigh v. Paterson, S Taunt. 540,
was one in which the vendor was sued for
not delivering goods December 31st, accord
ing to his contract. It appeared that in the
month of October preceding he had apprised
the vendee that the goods would not be deliv
cred. at which time the market value was
considerably less than December 31st. The,
court held that the veudee had a right to re
gard the contract as subsisting until Decem
ber 31st, if he chose and recover the differ
ence between the contract price, and the mar
ket value on that day. See, also, Gainsford
v. Carroll, 2 Barn. & C. 624.
The above are cases, it will be seen, in
which the profits of a good bargain were re
garded as a legitimate item of damages, and
constituted almost the only ground of recov
ery. And it appears to me that we have only
to apply the principle of these cases to the
one in hand, in order to determine the meas
ure of damages which must govern it. The
contract here is for the delivery of marble,
.wrought in a paticular manner, so as to be
fitted for use in the erection of a certain build
ing. The plaintiffs‘ claim is substantially
one for not accepting goods bargained and
sold; as much so as if the subject.matter of
the contract had been bricks. rough stone, or
any other article of commerce used in the
process of building. The only difliculty or
embarrassment in applying the general rule
grows out of the fact that the article in ques
tion does not appear to have any well-ascer
tained market value. But this cannot change
the principles which must govern, but only
the mode of ascertaining the actual value of
the article, or rather the cost to the party pro
ducing it. Where the article has no market
value, an investigation into the constituent
elements of the cost to the party who has
contracted to furnish it becomes necessary;
and that, compared with the contract price,
will afford the measure of damages. The
jury will be able to settle this upon evidence
of the outlays, trouble, risk, etc., which enter
into and make up the cost of the article in
the condition required by the contract at the
place of delivery. If the cost equals or ex
ceeds the contract price, the recovery will of
course be nominal, but, if the contract price
exceeds the cost, the difference will constitute
the measure of damages.
It hhs been argued that inasmuch as the
furnishing of the marble would have run
through a period of five years,—of which
about one year and a half only had expired at
the time of the suspension,-the benefits
which the party might have realized from the
execution of the contract must necessarily
be speculative and conjectural; the court and
jury having no certain data upon which to
make the estimate. If it were necessary to
make the estimate upon any such basis, the
argument would be decisive of the presentl
claim. But, in my judgment, no such neces-1
sity exists. Where the contract, as in thist
case, is broken before the arrival of the time!
for full performance, and the opposite party
elects to consider it in that light, the market
price on the day of the breach is to govern
in the assessment of damages. In other
words, the damages are to be settled and as
certained according to the existing state of
the market at the time the cause of action
arose. and not at the time fixed for full per
formance. The basis upon which to esti
mate the damages, therefore. is just as fixed
and easily ascertained in cases like the pre
ent, as in actions predicated upon a failure to
perform at the day.
It will be seen that we have laid altogether
out of view the subcontract of Kain & Mor
gan. and all others that may have been en
terc:l into by the plaintiffs as preparatory
and subsidiary to the fulfillment of the prin
cipal one with the defendants. Indeed, I am an
able to comprehend how these can be taken in
to the account, or become the subject-matter of
consideration at all, in settling the amount of
damages to be recovered for a breach of the
principal contract. The defendants had no‘
control over or participation in the making
of the subcontracts, and are certainly not to},
be compelled to assume them if dmprovident
ly entered into. On the other hand, if they
were made so as to secure great advantages
to the plaintiffs’ surely the defendants are.‘
not entitled to the gains which might be re
alized from them. In any aspect, therefore,
these subcontracts present a most unfit as
well as unsatisfactory basis upon which to
estimate the real damages and loss occasion
ed by the defamt of the defendants. The
idea of assuming that the plaintiffs were nec
essarily compelled to break all their subcon
tracts as a consequence of the breach of the
principal one. and that the damages to which
they may be thus subjected ought to enter
into the estimate of the amount recoverable
against the defendants, is too hypothetical
and remote to lead to any safe or equitable
result. And yet the fact that these subcon
tracts must ordinarily be entered into prepar
atory to the fulfillment of the principal one,
shows the injustice of restricting the dam
ages, in cases like the present, to compensa
tion for the work actually done, and the item
of materials on hand. We should thus throw
the whole loss and damage that would or
might arise out of contracts for further mate
rials, etc., entirely upon the party not in
fault.
If there was a market value of the article
in this case, the question would be a simple
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will be obligQd to go into an inquiry as to
the actual cost of furnishing the article at
the place of delivery; and the court and jury
should see that in estimating this amount it
be made upon a substantial basis, and not
be left to rest upon the loose and specula
tive opinions of witnesses. The constituent
elements of the cost should be ascertained
from sound and reliable sources; from prac
tical men, having experience in the particu
lar department of labor to which the con
tract relates. It is a very easy matter to
figure out large profits upon paper; but it
will be found that these, in a great majority
of the cases, become seriously reduced when
subjected to the contingencies and hazards in
cident to actual periormance. A jury should
scrutinize with care and watchfuinessany spec
ulative or conjectural account of the cost of
furnishing the article that would result in a
very unequal bargain between the parties, by
which the gains and benefits. or, in other
words, the measure of damages against the
defendants, are unreasonably enhanced.
They should not overlook the risks and con
tingencies which are almost inseparable from
the execution of contracts like the one in
question, and which increase the expense in
dependently of the outlays in labor and cap
ital. .
Those views, it will be seen, when con
trasted with the law as expounded and ap
plied by the circuit judge, necessarily lead to
the granting of a new trial.
BE.-.\lli)SLEY, J. The circuit judge clearly
erred in that part of his charge to the jury
which related to the contract of the plaintiffs
with Kain & Morgan. No damages are al
lowable on account of this contract, nor am I
able to see how it can be regarded as rele
vant evidence upon any disputed point con
nected with the amount for which the de
fendants are liable.
The main question in the case arises out of
the claim of the plaintiffs in respect to that
portion of their contract with the defendants
which remained wholly unexecuted in July,
1337. 1 think the plaintiffs are entitled to
recover the amount they would have realized
as prolits had they been allowed fully to
execute their contract. The defendants are
not to gain by their wrongful act, nor is that
to deprive the plaintiffs of the advantages
they had secured by the contract, and which
would have resulted to them from its per
forlnunce. The jury must, therefore, ascer
tain what it would probably have cost them
to complete the contract, over and above the
matermls on hand, including the value of the
marble required, the labor of quarrying and
preparinglt for use, the expense of transpor
tation, superintendence, and insurance against
all hazards, together with every other ex
pense incident to the fulfillment of the under
taking. The aggregate of these expenditures
is to be deducted from the amount which
would be payable for the performance of this
part of the contract, according to the prices
therein stipulated, and the balance will be
the damages which the jury should allow for
the item under consideration.
Remote and contingent damages, depending
on the result of successive schemes or in
vestments, are never allowed for the violation
of any contract. .But proiits to be earned
and made by the faithful execution of a fair
contract are not of this description. A right
to damages equivalent to such profits results
directly and immediately from the act of the
party who prevents the contract from being
performed.
Where a vendor has agreed to sell and de
liver personal property at a particular day,
and fails to perform his contract, the vendee
may recover in damages the difference be
tween the contract price and the market value
of the property at the time when it should
have been delivered. Chit. Cont. (3th Am.
Ed.) 445; Dey v. Dox, 9 Wend. 129; Gains
ford v. Carroll, 2 Barn. & C. 624; Shepherd
v. Hampton, 3 Wheat. 200; Quarles v. George,
23 Pick. 400; Shaw v. Nudd, 8 Pick. 9; 2
Phil. Ev. 104. So, if a person who has
agreed to purchase goods at a certain price
refuses to receive them, he must pay the dif
ference between their market value and the
enhanced price which he contracted to pay.
2 Starkie, Ev. (7th Am. Ed.) 1201; Boorman
v. Nash, 9 Barn. & C. 145.
These principles are strictly applicable to
the present case. In reason and justice there v
can be no difference between the damages
which should be recovered for the breach of
an ordinary agreement to buy or sell goods
and one to procure building materials, fit
them for use, and deliver them in a finished
state, at a stipulated price. In neither case
should the wrongdoer be allowed to profit by
his wrongful act. The party who is ready
to perform is entitled to a full indemnity for
the loss of his contract. He should not be
made to uffer by the delinquency of the
other party, but ought to recover precisely
what he would have made by performance.
This is as sound in morals as it is in law.
Shannon v. Comstock, 21 Wend. 461; Miller
v. Mariner,s Church, 7 Greenl. 51; Shaw v.
Nudd, 8 Pick. 13; Swift v. Barnes, 16 Pick.
196; Royaiton v. Turnpike Co., 14 Vt. 311.
The plaintiffs were not bound to wait till
the period had elapsed for the complete per
formance of the agreement, nor to make suc
cessive offers of performance, in order to re
cover all their damages. They .might re
gard the contract as broken up, so far as to
absolve them from making further efforts to
perform and give them a right to recover full
damages as for a total breach. I am not pre
pared to say that the plaintiffs might not
have brought successive suits on this cove
nant, had they from time to time made im
peated offers to perform on their part. which
were refused by the defendants, but this the
plaiutiffs were not bound to do.
There can be no erious difllculty in as
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sessing damages according to the principles
which have been stated. The contract was
made in 1836; and, according to the testi
mony, about five years would have been a
reasonable time for its execution. That time I
. mate is required to ascertain what wouldhas gone by. The expense of executing the
contract must necessarily depend upon the ‘V
prices of labor and materials. If prices fluc
tuated during the period in question, that
may be shown by testimony.
there is no need of resorting to conjecture,
for all the data necessary to form a correct
estimate of the entire expenses of executing
the contract can now be furnished by wit
nesses.
If the cause had been brought to trial be
fore the time for completing the contract ex
pired, it would have been impracticable to
make an accurate assessment of the dam
ages. This is no reason, however, why the
injured party should not have his damages,
‘although the difliculty in making a just as
sessment in such a case has been deemed a
suflicient ground for decreeing specific per
formance. Adderly v. Dixon, 1 Sim. & S.
607, and cases there cited. In Royaltou v.
Turnpike Co., 1i Vt. 311, 324, an action was
brought on a contract which had about twelve
years to run. And the court held, in grant
ing a new trial, that the rule of damages
"should have been to give the plaintiffs the
difference between what they were to pay
the defendants, and the probable expense of
performing the contract; and thus assess the
entire damages for the remaining twelve
.\‘ears." No rule which will be absolutely
certain to do justice between the parties can
.be laid down for such a case. Some time
must be taken arbitrarily at which prices are
to be ascertained and estimated; and the
In this respect .
day of the breach of the contract. or of the
commencement of the suit. should perhaps be
adopted under such circumstances. But we
need not, in the present case, express any
opinion on that point. No conjectural esti
have been the expense of a complete execu
tion of this contract; but the state of the
market in respect to prices is now susceptible
of explicit and intelligible pfoof. And where
that is so, it seems to me unsuitable to adopt
an arbitrary period, especially as the esti
mate of damages must, in any .event, be
somewhat conjeetural.
I think the defendants are entitled to a new
trial, and that the damages should be assess
ed upon the principles stated.
BRONSON, J. As the marble had no mar
ket value, the question of profits involves an
inquiry into the cost of the rough material in
the quarry, and the expense of raising, dress
ing, and transporting it to the place of deliv
ery. There may have been fluctuations in
the prices of labor and materials between the
day of the breach and the time when the con
tract wss to have been fully performed; and
this makes the question on which my breth
ren are not agreed. I concur in opinion with
the chief justice, that such fluctuations in
prices should not be taken into the account
in ascertaining the amount of damages, but
that the court and jury should be governed
entirely by the state of things which existed
at the time the contract was broken. This
is the most plain and simple rule; it will
best preserve the analogies of the law; and
will be as likely a any other to do substan
tial justice to both parties.
New trial granted.
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‘ with the terms of the contract; that the
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SHER.\IA.\‘ CENTER TOWN CO. v. LEO1\,- I
ARD.
(26 Pac. 71?. 46 Kan. 354.)
May 9, 1891.
Error from district court,
county; Lotus K. PRATT, Judge.
Hardy & Sterling, for plaintiff in error.
Bngley & Andrews, ior defendant in error.
.lOHNS’l‘(lN. J. Thomas Y’.l,,eona rd re
cov,ered a _iudgment; for $600 against the
Sherman (‘enter Town Company as dam
age for .the breach oi a contract. Leon- .
nrd owned a hotel in Ita.-sca,and Sherman 0
Center, which was three miles away, was
'
a candidate ior county-seat of Sherman .
county. The town company, desiring to ‘
increase the population and influence of
Sherman Center and strengthen its can
didacy, held out inducements to the citi
zens of the surrounding towns to remove
their buildings and establish themselves
in business in Sherman Center, and unite
in an efiort to make that town the coun
ty-seut oi the county. Accordingly they
entered into an agreement with Leonard
by which Leonard was to join them in
building up the town, and remove his
hotel from Itasca, in consideration oi
which the company was to convey to
him certain lots in Sherman Center. and
provide at its own expense men and ma
chinery to remove the hotel, and place it
over a cellar oi equal size. and on a ioun
dation of a similar kind, as it was then
resting upon in Itasca. The plaintiff ai
lege‘Lthat the company had failed and re
fused to remove the hotel in accordance
Supreme Court of Kansas.
Sherman
other buildings which were then situated
in Itasca have been removed to Sherman
Center, and the town of Itasca has be- ‘
come depopulated, and the business of i
hotel keeping oi no value; and that the
hotel now stands alone, with no town
nearer toit than Sherman Center. which is
n‘early three miles distant. He further al
leged that it was a large and well-iur
nished hotel, and that the cost oi its con
struction and the furniture contained
therein was about $4,500. It is alleged
that the cost of removal would be about
the sum oi $500, and that he suffered dam- .
ages by the refusal oi the company to
comply with the contract in the sum oi
$1.200. He thereiore asked judgment ior
$2,000. The company by its answer de
nies the execution oi the contract, or that
it is authorized by its charter to enterin
to the contract alleged tohave been made.
There are several errors assigned by the
company, but only one of them requires
attention. it appears that the company
has conveyed the lots to Leonard. as stip
ulated in the contract, but.the hotel has
not been removed, and, according to
plaintiffs testimony. the non-removal is
owing to the reiusaloi the company to
furnish the men and machineryior that
purpose, although frequent demands have
been made upon them. In the course of
the trial the plaintiff testified that, by
reason oi the removal oi the people and
their buildings from other towns. Sher
man Center became a flourishing place oi
several hundred people, where he could
have profitably carried on the hotel busi
ness, but that the town oi Itasca was
practically abandoned, so that he is with
out business, and simply remains at the
hotel to protect the goods and furniture
therein. In order to prove the extent oi
his iniury, the following question was
asked and allowed by the court over the
objection oi the defendant: “State, as
near as you can, what would have been'
your profits. or what your damages was,
in other words, by reason of the non-iul
fillment oi this contract,—not moving
your hotel and establishing your business
at Sherman Center." Another question
which was allowed, over objection, was:
“State what the damage was by reason
oi them not moving your hotel to Sher
man Center, as they agreed to,in money.”
He answered that the loss or profits
would have been $l-50 a month, and that I
the total damage sustained by reason of
not having the hotel located at Sherman
Center, besides the cost oi moving the
building. was from $1,200 to $1,500, and
that it would cost about $800 to move the
building. The questions asked were ob
jectionable, and the testimony given was
inadmissible, upon two grounds: First, .
the questions were objectionable because
they did not call for specific facts, but
permitted the witness to state a mere
opinion. giving in the lump the amount of
damages thought to be sustained. ltis
the function of the court orjury trying
the case to determine from evidence prop
, erly presented what the amount oi dam
ages sustained is. and, whiieit might be
very convenient for the plaintiff to per
1 mit him and his witnesses to give the
damages suffered in a lump, it would be a
very unsafe practice to allow them to
state the amount of damages supposed to'
be sustained, without regard to the facts
or knowledge upon which their opinions
were based. It is well settled that the
practice is not permissible. Roberts v.
Commissioners, 21 Kan. 248; Railroad Co.
v. Kuhu,38 Kan. 675, l7 Pac. Rep. 322;
Town (1o. v. MorrisI 39 Kan. 377. 18 Pac.
Ilep. 230; Railway Co. v. .\'eiman, 45 -Knn..
93$. 2.i Put‘. 2!.
ive
the contract are too remote, uncertain,
and speculative to be recoverable. Who
can tell what the future gains of the hotel
business would have been in Sherman
Center. if he had moved there‘! His past
profits in Itasca were not shown, and
there is no testimony of the gains of oth
ers estabiished in the same business at
Sherman Center. How, then, does Leon
ard know that the protits would have
been $150 per month? The gains to be
derived from the business depended upon
many contimzencies other than the mere
removal of his hotel to that place. The,
growth oi the town; the location of the
county-seat there or at another town
near by; the immigration and travel;
the competition in the hotel business; the
price of provisions and the cost ofhelp:
the general reputation of the house; and
the popularity oi the landlord with the
traveling public and the people oi that
comm unity,—are suggested as some of the
considerations that would affect the an
ticipated benefits. Where the breach of a
,l‘iu.u.uu'-in, lne prosptci
profits that he lost by the breach of
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contract results in the loss oi definite
profits, which are nscertainable, and were
within the con Lempiation oi the contract
in;r parties. they may generally be recov
ered: but the prospective profits do not
furnish the correct measure of damages in
the present case. Aside from the remote,
conjectnrai. and speculative character of
the anticipated benefi ts, it cannot be said
that the loss oi them is the direct and un
:\ roidable consequence of the breach.
The plaintifi could not sit idle an indefi
__ nite length oi time. and safely count on the
recovery of $150 per month as damages.
if there was a breach oi the contract. it
was his duty. upon learning of it, to at
once remove the building. or employ oth
ers to do so. and charge the cost of the re
moval to the town company. The law
requires that the injured party shall do
whatever be reasonably can, and improve
. all rc:1.~4onable opportunities to lessen
the injury. From the testimony it ap
pears that Leonard could have procured
others to move the hotel: and in such a
- case the ordinary measure oi damages is
the cost oi removal, and the reasonable
expenses of avoiding the consequence ot
the defendant,s wrong. Railway Co. v.
Mihiman. 17 Kan. 224; Loker v. Damon.
17 Pick. 284: l Sedg. Dam. 16-3, and cases
cited. Counsel ior plaintiff in error say
that no more than the cost of removal
was allowed by the court: but the ad
mission ol the objectionable evidence,
against the opposition oi the plaintiff in
error, would indicate that the court
adopted an incorrect measure of damages,
and did not limit the recovery to the ex
pense oi the removal. The liability of the
plaintiff in error ior any loss is not con
ceded. It is shown in the testimony that
soon after the time ior the removal of the
building the people of Sherman (‘enter
abandoned the attempt to obtain the
county-scat. and all or nearly all of them
moved to another place. It is claimed
by plainfifiin error that Leonard objected
to the removal o! his building until the
question oi the location of the county.scat
was settled. He testified at the trial that
he did not intend to move the building
to Sherman Center’ and that he would
not move the building at all. until the
county-scat was permanently located. If
the non-removal oi the building was due
to the fault of Leonard, he is not entitled
to recover anything. This is a disputed
question of fact, which must be settled on
another trial. For the error oi the court
in admitting testimony the judgment of
the court below will be reversed. and
cause remanded ior anew trial. All the
justices concurring.
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’1‘HO.\lAS, BADGLEY & W. .\IANUF,G CO.
v. WABASH, ST. L. & P. RY. CO.
(22 N. W. 827, 62 Wis. 642.)
Supreme Court of Wisconsin. March 31, 1885.
Appeal from circuit court, Milwaukee coun
ty.
Chapin, Dey & Friend, for appellant' Van
Dyke &. Van Dyke, for respondent.
COLE, C. J. On the tenth of November,
1882, the plaintiff, as consignee, caused to be
delivered to the defendant, a common car
rier. at St. Louis, a pipe-machine, circular
shaft, box of dies, and wrenches accompany
‘ing. and being a part of the pipe-machine,
to be transported over its road and connect
ing lines to Milwaukee. The machine and
its attachments were badly broken and de
stroyed while in the custody of the defend
ant through the negligence of its servants.
The machine was a patented one’ and the
right to make and sell it was vested in the
manufacturer at St. Louis, of whom it was
purchased by the plaintiff. The machine
was devised for cutting pipe and making
nipples, and was ordered by the plaintiff to
be used in its business in Milwaukee, of
fitting pipe and manufacturing brass goods,
etc. The plaintiff sues to recover damages
for the loss of the machine, and the loss of
its use in its business while another was be
ing procured. The case was tried by a jury.
which found a special verdict. The plaintiff
had judgment for the value of the machine,
which wa proven to be $275, and for the loss
of its use for 85 days, at the rate of $1.50 per
day, and interest thereon from the com
mencement of the action.
The questfiins presented on the appeal are
as to the proper rule of damages. There
was evidence which tended to show that the
machine, though badly broken and some of
its parts destroyed, might have been repair
ed by the patentee at St. Louis, who was
the manufacturer. The plaintiff refused to
accept the machine at Milwaukee, but left;
it in the possession of the carrier, and or
dcred a new machine of the manufacturer.
One question arlsinglin the record is wheth
er it was the duty of the plaintiff, under the
circumstances, to have received the machine
in its damaged condition, and to have made
proper and reasonable exertions to have it
r(4l4tllrP(i. so as to render the loss to the car
rier as light as posible. There is a class of
cases which decide that it is not only the
moral but the legal duty of a party who
seeks redress for another,s wrong, to make
use of his opportunities of lessening the dam
age caused by the other’s default. If it had
been within the power of the plaintiff to
have supplied the broken parts of the ma
chine, or to have repaired ‘it with reason
able labor and expense. it might have beem its
duty to have done so within this rule of law.
4 But the jury found that the machine when
delivered was useless; that the cost and ex
pense to the plaintiff to repair it would have
amounted to the price of a new machine.
This finding is criticised by the counsel for
the defendant, but we are not inclined to dis
turb it.
As we have said, the machine was a pat
ented one; its parts were not kept for sale
in the open market; and there was evidence
that it would cost any one but the manu
facturer more to make the patterns for the
castings than the price of a new machine.
The plaintiff, therefore, could not have had
the machine repaired in Milwaukee at any
saving to the carrier. But it is said it might
have returned the machine to the manufac
turer in St. Louis, who testified that it could
have been repaired for $75. True, the manu
facturer, in answer to this hypothetical ques
tion, namely, “Supposing the bottom part of
the machine was broken in two pieces, the
attachments consisting of a box of dies
broken open and contents scattered in the
car, oil-cup on the machine burst, skids on
which machine and attachments were origi
nally placed broken, legs on standard of ma
chine broken, and rods connected with them
bent, what was the damage, in your estima
tion, to the machine?"—the witness said the
question was a diflicult one to answer, but
added, as we understand him, that if the
damages supposed included all that was
done to the machine, and none of the parts
were missing. and no other injury was done
to it, then it would cost about $75 to repair
it. But the witness subsequently modified
his statements upon this point by saying that
with the fragments of the machine which
he received from the defendant, it would
cost not less than $2.30 to repair it. It ap
peared that some of the most expensive parts
were mising, and in the state of the proof
the jury might well find, as they did, that
the cost and expense to the plaintiff at the
time to have the machine repaired by the
manufacturer, and the broken parts replac
ed, would be as much as the price of a new
machine. It is very clear that the machine
in its damaged condition was of no value to
the plaintiff. It was not a case of a partial
_but of a total loss, so far as plaintiff was
concerned. The general rule of damages for
the loss of goods by a carrier, where it is
liable for such loss, is the value of the goods
at the destination to which it undertook to
carry them, with interest on such value from
the time when the goods should have been
delivered. Nudd r. Webs, 11 Wis. 408; 2
Sedg. Dam. 94, note b; Hutch. Carr. ii 769.
The plaintiff did not claim to recover more
for the machine than it had paid for it at
St. Louis, to-wit, $275. It appeared that it
had paid the freight, $3.85. which of course
'
should be added to the recovery. So our con
clusion upon this branch of the case is that
the court below was right in allowing the
plaintiff to recover upon the verdict the cost
of the machine. There was a stipulation in
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the bill of lading that in case of loss or dam
age to goods during transportation, whereby
the defendant incurred a responsibility, that
then it should only be liable for the value of
the property computed at the place and time
of shipment. This was precisely the extent
of the recovery on this item of damages.
The next question is, was the plaintiff en
‘
titled to recover for the loss of the use of
the machine while another was being pro
cured to supply the place of the one destroy
ed? This question, upon the circumstances
of this case, e think must be answered in
the negative. Fl
u
the first place, it is to be ob
served that there is no allegation in the com
plaint, and no proof was give on the part of
the plaintiff, which tended to show that the
defendant had notice of the use to which the
machine was to he put, or even knew that the
plaintiff intended to use it in its business.
On the contrary, the agent of the defendant
who made the contract of shipment says he
had no notice of the purpose for which the
machinery was to be used. He said he was
applied to by the manufacturer in St. Louis
about this particular shipment, and gave
pecial rates, less than the regular tariff, on
representation made by the manufacturer
that the goods were not liable to injury, and
that he wanted to introduce the machine,
which was a new one, through the west, and
wished the assistance of the witness in do
ing so. This is all the knowledge the de
fendant had about the property, or the use
to which it was to be put. it is said the
fact that the consignee in the bill of lading
was a manufacturing company was sufficient
notice that the machine was intended to be
used by it in its business. We do not think
so. The defendant certainly had no notice
of the business in which the plaintiff was
engaged, and did not know that this ma
chine had been procured for fitting pipe and
making nipples. Should we presume—as we
have no right to do—that the defendant had
knowledge of plaintiff,s business, surely we
could not presume that this machine was
ordered by it for immediate use.
This being the state of the evidence, on
what ground can the plaintiff claim dam
ages for loss in the use of the machine? The
president of the plaintiff testified that his
company was doing business of steam-fitting
and selling pipe at wholesale, and in the fall
of 1882 he was told he would need a ma
chine to cut the pipe. This was the reason
for buying the machine. He says: “We
were. besides, doing some steam-fitting our
selves. and. of course, we have to cut pipe
all the time to get special lengths, and in
stead of using men we paid a man to do it
with the machine. The machine would do
the work of one man." This is really all
there is in the case to base a claim for loss
in the use of the machine upon. The de
fendant did not know what the machine was
designed for; did not know the use to which
it was to be put; did not even know the
plaintiff would use it; and, of course, did
not know that the plaintiff would sustain
any special damage if the property failed to
be delivered promptly, in good order. From
the nature of ‘the subject it is difficult to
state an inflexible rule of damages which
will apply to all contracts. This court has
often referred to, and has practically acted
upon, the rule laid down in the leading case
of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341. In
that case the plaintiffs, who were owners of
a flour-mill, sent a broken iron shaft to an
oflice of the defendant, a common carrier, to
be conveyed to the consignee, to have a new
shaft made. The defendant’s clerk was told
that plaintiffs mill was stopped, and that
the broken shaft must be delivered immedi
ately to the consignee, but it was delayed
for an unreasonable time. In consequence
of the delay the plaintiffs did not receive the
new shaft for some days after the time they
ought to have received it, and they were
unable to work their mill for want of the
new shaft, and thereby incurred a loss of
profits. The court held that under the cir
cumstances such loss could not be recovered .
in an action against the common carrier,
because the special circumstances were nev
er communicated to it by the plaintiffs. Al
derson, B., in giving the decision, states the
rule of damages as follows:
“Where two parties have made a contract,
which one of them has broken, the damages
which the other party ought to receive in re
spect of such breach of contract should be
such as may fairly and reasonably be con
sidered either arising naturally. i. e., ac
cording to the usual course of things, from
such breach of contract itself, or such as
may reasonably be supposed to have been in
the contemplation of. both parties, at the
time they made the contract, as the prob
able result of the breach of it. Now, if the
special circumstances under which the con
tract was actually made were communicated
by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus
known to both parties, the damages result
ing from the breach of such acontract, which
they would reasonably contemplate, would
be the amount of injury which would ordi
narily follow from the breach of contract
under these special circumstances so known
and communicated. But, on the other hand,
if these special circumstances were wholly
unknown to the party breaking the contract,
he, at the most, could only be supposed to
have had in his contemplation the amount
of injury which would arise generally. and,
in the great multitude of cases, not affected
by any special circumstances from such a
breach of contract."
This rule has been sometimes criticised,
and it has been said that, generally, when
parties enter into a contract, they do not
contemplate its breach or the probable result
of a breach, and that the rule might be more
accurately expressed. See Pailes, C. B0 in
Hamilton v. McGill, 12 1r. Law, 202. But,
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without refining on the rule, its application
.to the question we are considering is ob
vious and decisive; for here the defendant
was not informed by the plaintiff that the
machine was one which it needed for use in
its business of cutting and fitting pipe, and
that it was procured for that purpose. If
one desires to trace the judicial discussion
of the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, he will
find a most excellent and accurate analysis
.of the English and American decisions in
note a, 1 Sedg. Dam. (7th Ed.) top p. 218.
Also see note 2 to section 772, Hutch. Carr.
1). 597.
In Brayton v. Chase, 3 Wis 456, which
was an action by the vendee against the
vendor for failure to deliver a reaper which
the plaintiff purchased to harvest his crops,
the plaintiff sought to prove that he suffered
great loss and damage in his crops, and in
the extra expense of hiring hands, by rea
son of the non-fulfillment of the contract to
deliver. ‘The evidence was excluded, and
this court aliirmed the ruling, holding that
such damages did not result naturally and
directly from the injury complained of. It
may be doubtful whether this decision is
entirely consistent with Richardson v. Chyno
weth, 26 Wis. 656; Smeed v. Foord, 1 El. 8;
El. 602; Gee v. Railway Co. 6 Hurl. & N.
211; Collard v. Railway Co. 7 Hurl. & N. 79;
Eibiriger A("tien-Gesellschafft v. Armstrong,
L. R. 9 Q. B. 473; Wils0n v. Railway Co. 9 .
vC. B, (N. S.) 632; Griflin v. Colver, 16 N. Y.
490; Vicksburg & M. it. Go. v. Ragsdnle, 46
Miss. -i58;.and cases of that class. For. as
we understand the Brayton Case. the vendor
knew that the reaper was wanted for the
purpose of harvesting the plaintiffs crop
that season. If it were not delivered in time
for that purpose the parties might well be
presumed to have known that the vendee
would be put to additional expense in secur
‘ing his crops_ But still the case is fully sup
ported by British Columbia Saw.mill Co. v.
l\,ettleshipI L. R. 3 C. P. 499. In this tree
“the plaintiffs delivered to the defendant,s
servants, on a quay at Glasgow. for ship
ment on board the defendants vessel, which
lay along.side, several cases containing ma
chinery, which was intended for the crec
tion of a saw-mill at Vancouver,s island.
The master gave a bill of lading for them,
describing the cases as containing “merchan
dise." The defendant knew generally of
what the shipment consisted. On the ar
rival of the vessel at her destination, one of
the cases, which contained machinery with
out which the mill could not be erected,
could not be found on board, and ‘the plain
tiffs were obliged to send to England to re
place the lost article. Held, that the defend
ant was liable for the loss of the machinery,
as delivery to the defendant,s servants along
side the vessel was equivalent to a delivery
on board. Held, also, that the measure of
damages for the breach of the contract was
the cost of replacing the lost articles in Van
couver,s island, with interest at 5 per cent.
upon the amount until judgment, by way of
compensation for the delay."
But we deem it unnecessary to pursue this
discussion further. The case of Brown v.
Railway Co. 54 Wis. 342, S. C. 11 N. W. 356.
911, i referred to by plaintiff,s counsel to
sustain the claim for damages for loss of the
use of the machine; but that was a case for
a personal injury and has no application to
this case. We have already said that the
jury found that the machine was so dam
aged, while in the custody of the defendant
as carrier, as to be entirely useless to the
plaintiff. The plaintifl! is therefore entitled
to recover the value of the machine, found
to be $275, including the freight paid by
plaintiff of $3.85, and interest on this amount
from November 22, 1882, the time the prop
erty reached its destination.
BY THE COURT. The judgment of the
circuit court is reversed, and the cause is
retuanded,'with directions to enter judgment
on the verdict in accordance with this opin
ion.
,4 -_---0._.-\
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Q BRIGHAM et ttl. v. CARLISLE.
(78 Ala. 243.)
Supreme Court of Alabama. Dec. Term, 1884.
Appeal from circuit court, Lee county;
Henry D. Clayton, Judge.
Action against Brigham & Co. for breach
of a contract employing plaintiff as a trav
I eling salesman to sell goods on commission.
There was a judgment for plaintiff, from
which defendants appealed.
J. M. Chilton, for appellants. W. H.
Barnes, contra. .
CLOPTON, J. It may be conceded that
at common law a defendant can insist upon
.the benefit of the statute of fraud by plea
of the general issue. Under our statute,
which provides that “in all suits where the
defendant relies on a denial of the cause of
action as set forth by the plaintiff he may
plead the general issue, and in all other
cases the defendant must briefly plead spe
cially the matter of defense." The statute of
frauds must he pleaded, or it will be consid
ered as waived. Bitch v. Thornton, (35 Ala.
309; Petty v. Dill, 53 Ala. 641. No plea of the
statute of frauds having been interposed, the
validity of the contract, because not in writ
ing, cannot be raised by a charge.
If the statute had been pleaded, the con
tract, as set out in the bill of exceptions,
does not come within its inhibition. it was
made in September, 1881, and, as testiiied
by the plaintiff, was to commence on the
1st of October, and continue at least eight
months, and longer if mutually desirable at
the end of that time. By its terms it was
capable of performance within a year. The
statute applies to contracts which, by ex
press stipulation, are not to be performed
within one year from the making thereof,
and not to contracts which by their terms are
determinate within that period, but may be
continued longer at the option of the parties.
Heflin v. Milton. 69 Ala. 354.
The third charge requested by the defend
ants based their right to abandon the con
tract on the naked fact, unexplained, that the
plaintiff did not commence the performance
of the contract until January 1, 1882. The
violation of a contract by one of the parties,
or when he is unable to perform the acts or
services stipulated, may be suflicient to au
thorize the other party to abandon it. Sick
ness of the plaintiff for a protracted period,
such as would probably have disabled him
from making sales during the appropriate
season, as contemplated and intended by
the contract, might perhaps have authorized
the defendants to abandon the contract; but
there was no implied condition that the
plaintiff would continue in health. Its
abandonment in such case is at the election
of the defendants; and they will be held to
have -waived their right to renounce the con
tract when. after the delay has terminated,
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they regard and treat it as continuing and
in force. Stewart v. Cross, 66 Ala. 22 The
charge requested by the defendants ignored
the material facts: the detention of the
plaintiff by sickness in New York until near
the end of November; the letter of the de
fendants of December 12th, in reply to one
from the plaintiff, in which they stated
samples would be furnished him during the
week, and cautioning him as to the credit of
certain firms, and samples having been ac
tually sent to him late in December; which
facts there was evidence tending to prove.
Whilst a party has the right to require an
instruction as to the legal effect of the evi
dence, when, conceding all adverse infer
ences from the conflicting evidence, the un
disputed facts establish a legal conclusion
in his favor, a charge is properly refused
which asserts a legal proposition, based
on certain specified facts, but ignores other
facts, which there is evidence tending to
prove, showing the incorrectness of the le
gal conclusion asserted in the charge.
The burden of proof is on the party having
the afiirmative of the particular issue. Pleas
of payment and set-off were filed by defend
ants, and the onus of establishing their
truth was on them. The legal effect of the
second charge requested by the defendants
is to instruct the jury, if they found the evi
dence in equilibrium on any or all the issues
presented, which includes the issues of pay
ment and set-off, to find ior the defendants.
Being calculated to mislead, it was properly/
refused.
The material Question is the measure of
damages. The primary purpose of awarding ,
damages is actual compensation to the party
injured, whether by a tort or by breach of a
contract; though there are exceptional cases
in which exemplary or punitive damages are
allowed. Owing to the ever-occurring difl!er
ences in the circumstances, and in the spe- ,
clal conditions of the contracting parties, it
has been found difficult, if not impossible,
to lay down general and definite rules as to
the measure of damages, applicable to all
cases of a class. From a mlsconstruction of
expressions of eminent jurists, not sufll
ciently guarded for general use, but adapted
to the case in hand, the applications of rules
commonly recognized have been as wtrious
as the cases. \The proposition that.all dam
ages are recoverable which are in the con
templation of the parties, is not strictly cor
rect.
must be the natural and proximate results
of the wrong complained of, and must not
be merely speculative or conjectural. These
must concur, though founded on different
principles, and are distinct and independ
ent of each other. The law presumes that
a party foresees tile natural and proximate‘
results of a breach of his contract or tort.
and hence these are presumed to be in his
legal contemplation. For such damages. as
a general rule, the party at fault is liable.
§The primary rules are, the damages
’
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'. recoverable.
But there are damages' which are in the
contemplation of the parties at the time of
making the contract, and are the natural and
proximate results of itsbreach which are not
The parties must necessarily
contemplate the loss of profits as the direct
and necessary consequence of the breach of
a contract, and yet all profits are not with
in the scope of recoverable damages. There
are numerous cases, however, in which prof
its constitute, not only an element, but the
measure, of damage. While the line of de
marcation is often dim and shadowy, the
distinctive features consist in the nature
and character of the profits. When they
orm an elemental constituent of the con
ract, their loss the natural result of its
breach, and the amount can be estimated
with reasonable certainty,—such certainty as
satisfies the mind of a prudent and impa.rtial
person.—they are allowed. The requisite to
their allowance is some standard, as regular
market values, or other established data, by
reference to which the amount may he sat
isfactorily ascertained. Illustrations of prof
its recoverable are found in cases of sales
of personal property at a fixed price, evic
tions of tenants by landlords, articles of part
nership, and many commercial contracts.
On the other hand, “mere speculative prof
its, such as might be conjectured would be
the probable result of an adventure, defeated
by the breach of a contract, the gains from
which are entirely conjectural, and with re
spect to which no means exist of ascertain
ing even approximately the probable results,
cannot, under any circumstances, be brought
\ within the range of recoverable damages."
1 Suth. Dam. 141. Profits speculative, con
jectural or remote are not, generally, regarded
as an element in estimating the damages. In
Pollock v. Gantt, 69 Ala. 373, it is said:
“What are termed ’speculative damages,—
that is, possible, or even probable, gains, that
it is claimed would have been realized but
for the tortlous act or breach of contract
charged against a defendant—are too remote,
and cannot be recovered." The same rule has
been repeatedly asserted by this court. Cul
ver v. Hill, 68 Ala. 66; Higgins v. Mansfield,
62 Ala. 26"; Burton v. Holley, 29 Ala. 318;
White v. Miller, 71 N. Y. 118; French v.
Ramge, 2 Neb. 254; 2 Smith, Lead. Gas. 574;
Olmstead v. Burke, 25 Ill. 86. The two fol
lowing cases may serve to illustrate the dif
ference between profits recoverable and not
recoverable. In Insurance Co. v. Noxson,
84 Ind. 347, an insurance agent, who had
been discharged without cause before the
expiration of his contract, was allowed to
include in his recovery the probable value of
renewals on policies previously obtained by
him, upon which future premiums would, in
the usual course of business, be received by
the company, on the ground that the amount
of compensation due on such renewals can
be ascertained with requisite certainty by
the use of actuary’s life tables and compari
sons, and that the basis of the right to dam
ages existed, and was not to be built in the
future. In Lewis v. Insurance Co., 61 Mo.
534, which is cited with approval in the
other case, the same rule as to the probable
value of renewals was held; but it was also
held that an estimate of the probable earn
ings of the agent thereafter, derived from
proof of the amount of his collections and
commissions before the breach of the con
tract, in the absence of other proof, is too
speculative to be admissible.
Profits are not excluded from recovery be
cause they are profits; but, when excluded.
it is on the ground that there are no criteria
by which to estimate the amount with the
certainty on which the adjudications of
courts and the findings of juries should be
based. The amount is not susceptible of
proof. In 3 Suth. Dam. 157, the author dis
criminatingly observes: “When it is ad
visedly said that profits are uncertain and
speculative, and cannot be recovered, when
there is an alleged loss of them, it is not
meant that profits are not recoverable mere
ly because they are such, nor because prof
its are necessarily speculative, contingent.
and too uncertain to be proved; but they are
rejected when they are so; and it is probable
that the inquiry for them has been generally
proposed when it must end in fruitless un
certainty; and therefore it is more a general
truth than a general principle that a loss of
profits is no ground on which damages can
be given." When not allowed because specu
lative, contingent, and uncertain, their ex
clusion is founded by some on the ground of‘
remoteness, and by others on the presump
tion that they are not in the legal contempla
tion of the parties.
The plaintiff, by the contract, undertook
the business of traveling salesman for the
defendants. The amount of his commissions
depended, not merely on the number and
amounts of sales he might make, but also on
the proportional quantity of the two classes
of goods sold, his commissions being differ
ent on each. The number and amounts of
sales depended on many contingencies,—the
state of trade, the demand for such goods,
their suitableness to the different markets,
the fluctuations of business, the skill, energy,
and industry with which he prosecuted the
business, the time employed in effecting dif
ferent sales, and upon the acceptance of his
sales by the defendants. There are no cri
teria, no established data, by reference to
which the profits are capable of any estiniate.
They are purely speculative and conjectural.
Besides, the evidence is the mere opinion
and conjecture of the plaintiff, without giv
ing any facts on which it was based. The
bare statement, uncorroborated by any facts,
and without a basis, that “the reasonable‘
sales would have been fifteen thousand doi
lars, and that the net profits on that amount
of sales would have been four hundred and
fifty dollars," is too conjectural to be ad
missible. \Vashburn v. Hubbard, 10 Lans. ii.
Reversed and remanqted.
- ‘
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ALLISON v. “ER.
(11 Mici. v12.)
Supreme Court of Michigan. Oct. 20, 1863.
Error to circuit court, Wayne county.
C. 1. Walker, for plaintiff in error. Jerome
& Swift and A. B. \Iaynat-d, for defendant
in error.
CI-IRISTIANCY, J. When this cause was
formerly before us (Chandler v. Allison, 10
Mich. 400), one of the questions involved
was whether Allison, the plaintiff, was
rightfully in possession of the store at the
time the trespass was committed, or wheth
er his right of possession was dependent up
on Chandler’s election to rebuild, and ceased
when that election was made; and one of
the grounds upon which the judgment in
that case was reversed was the rejection of
evidence tending to show that Allison,s
right of possession was thus qualified. But
as the case now appears before us upon ex
ceptions taken on the new trial, the finding
of the jury, whether right 0! wrong,—no ex
ception having been taken to the evidence
or the charge upon this point,—requires us
to treat this question, so far as we are now
to consider the case, as settled in favor of
the plaintiff; and the defendant must be
considered as a trespasser, entering upon
the premises and tearing down the store
while in the rightful possession of the plain
tiff, under a lease for a term which would
not expire till the 1st day of May following.
The only question presented by the pres
ent bill of exceptions, and not already dis
posed of by our former decision, is the ques
tion of damages; and in this action of tres
pass (as parties are under no necessity of
protecting themselves by contract a;:ains
trespasses) the question of damages is to be
treated in all respects as it would have been
had the trespass been committed by a party
between whom and the plaintiff the relation
of landlord and tenant did not exist, except
so far as the good faith of the defendant,
and the absence of malice on his part,
might preclude the plaintifl‘ from the recov
ery of damages of a punitory and exem
plary character, beyond the amount which
would compensate the actual loss. Upon
this point (the question of exemplary dam
ages) we think the court below was right in
instructing the jury that, if they should
tind the defendant, in tearing down the
store. acted in good faith, and under an
honest bclicf that he had a legal right to do
so, then the plaintiff could only recover his
actual damages. This qualification of the
right of a jury to give punitory or exempla
ry damages in actions of trespass is, we
think, in accordance with the principle up
on which such damages are sometimes al
lowed to be given. But whether the rulings
of the court upon the admission of evidence,
and in the charge to the jury, did not lay
down too narrow a rule for the estimation
of actual damages, is the main question for
our consideration.
While in many cases the rule of damages
is plain and easy of application, there are
many others in which, from the nature of
the subject-matter, and the peculiar circum
stances, it is very diiiicu1t—and in some
cases impossible—to lay down any definite,
flxed rule of law by which the damages ac
tually sustained can be estimated with a
reasonable degree of accuracy, or even a
probable approximation to justice; and the
injury must be left wholly, or in great part,
unredressed, or the question must be left to
the good sense of the jury upon all the facts
and circumstances of the case, aided by
such advice and instruction from the court
as the peculiar facts and circumstances of
the case may seem to require. But the
strong inclination of the courts to adminis
ter legal redress upon fixed and certain
rules has sometimes led to the adoption of
such rules in cases to which they could not
be consistently or justly applied. Hence
there is, perhaps, no branch of the law upon
which there is a greater conflict of judicial
decisions, and none in which so many mere
ly arbitrary rules have been adopted. We
have carefully examined all the cases cited
in the very elaborate briefs of the respective
counsel, and the most approved elementary
treatises upon the subject, and, without at
tempting here to compare and analyze them
(which would require a treatise), we are
compelled to say that the line of mere au
thority upon questions of damages like that
here presented, if any such line can be
traced through the conflict of hostile deci
sions, is too confused and tortuous to guide
us to a safe or satisfactory result, without
\,esort to the principles of natural justice
and sound policy which underlie these ques
'ons, and which have sometimes been over
ooked, or obscured by artificial distinctions
and arbitrary rules.
The principle of compensation for the loss
or injury sustained is, we think, that which,
lies at the basis of the whole question ofi
damages in most actions at common law,i
whether of contract or tort. We do not
here speak of those actions in which puni
tory or exemplary damages may be given,
nor of those whose principal object is the
establishment of a right, where merely nom
inal damages are proper. But, with these
exceptions, the only just theory of an action
for damages, and its primary object, would
seem to be that the damages to be recover
ed should compensate the loss or injury sus
tained. We concur entirely with the court
of appeals in New York in Griffin v. Colver,
10 N. Y. 492, in repudiating the doctrine
adopted by Mr. Sedgwick from Domat
(Sedgw. Dam. 3, 37, 38, etc.), that “the law
aims not at the satisfaction, but the divi
sion of the loss.“ Such, it is true, is often
the result of an action, but never the object
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of the law. The law may, and often does,
tail of doing complete justice, from the im- '
perfection of its means of ascertaining
truth, and tracing and apportioning elIects
to their various causes; but it is not liable
to the reproach of doing positive injustice
by design.
corrupt its administration, by fostering a
disregard of the just rights of parties. In
actions upon contract, especially, and those
nominally in tort, but substantially upon
contract, courts have thought it generally
safer, upon the whole, to adopt certain def
inite rules for the government of the jury
by which the damages could be estimated,
at the risk of falling somewhat short of the
actual damages, by rejecting such as could
not be estimated by a fixed rule, than to
leave the whole matter entirely at large
with the jury, without any rule to govern
their discretion, or to detect or correct er
rors or corruption in the verdict. In such
cases, therefore, there has been a strong in
(.lination to seize upon such elements of cer
tainty as the case might happen to present,
and as might approximate co\npensation,
and to frame thereon rules of law for the
measurement of damages, though \i
t might
be evident that further damages must have
been suffered, which however, could only be
estimated as matter of opinion, and must
therefore be excluded under the rules thus
adopted. And it is not to be denied that this
course of decision has sometimes been ex-‘
tended to actions purely of tort.
But whatever plausibility there may be in
the theory of Mr. Sedgwick when applied to
actions upon contract,—a plausibility which
arises from mistaking the result for the ob
ject.—the injustice of such a principle, when
applied to cases of actual, positive tort, like
that here in question, would be so gross as
to shock all sense of justice.
It has been frequently said that the rule of
damages, where there is no fraud, willful neg
ligence, malice, oppression, etc., is the same in
actions of tort as in those upon contract. But
though the J.emark is doubtless true in its ap
plication to those cases of tort where. from the
nature of the case, elements of certainty exist,
by which ubstantial compensation may be
readily estimated, and other cases which are
but nominally in tort, we do not think it can
be accepted as a principle of universal applica
tion; nor, in our opinion, can it be justly ap
plied to any case of actual, aggressive tort,
where, from the nature and circumstances of
the case itself, no such elements of certainty
are found to exist, or none which will apply
substantially to the whole case; nor to any
case where the rule applicable to breaches of
contract would exclude a material portion of
the damages the injured party may have suf
fered, though the amount of the latter may not
be capable of accurate calculation by any fixed
and definite rule.
There are some important considerations
Such a doctrine would tend not i
only to make the law itself odious, but to’
which tend to limit damages in an action upon
contract, which have no application to those
purely of tort. Contracts are made only by
the mutual consent of the rewective parties;
and each party, for a consideration, thereby
consents that the other shall have certain
rights as against him, which he would not oth
erwise possess. In entering into the contract
the parties are supposed to understand its le
gal effect, and, consequently, the limitations
which the law, for the sake of certainty, has
fixed for the recovery of damages for its
breach. If not ‘satisfied with the risk which
these rules impose, the parties may decline to
enter into the contract, or may fix their own
rule of damages when, in their nature, the
amount must be uncertain. Hence, when suit
is brought upon such contract, and it is found
that the entire damages actually sustained can
not be recovered without a violation of such
rules, the deficiency is a loss, the risk of which
the party voluntarily assumed on entering into
the contract, for the chance of benefit or ad
vantage which the contract would have given
him in case of performance. His position is
one in which he has voluntarily contributed to
place himself, and in which, but for his own
consent, he could not have been placed by the
wrongful act of the opposite party alone.
Again, in the majority of cases upon con
tract, there is little difliculty, from the nature
of the subject, in finding a rule by which sub
stantial compensation may be readily estimat
ed; and it is only in those cases where this
cannot be done, and where, from the nature of
the stipulation, or the subject-matter, the ac
tual damages resulting from ‘a breach, are
more or less uncertain in their nature, or difll
cult to be shown with accuracy by the evi
dence, under any definite rule, that there can
be any great failure of justice by adhering to
such rule as will most nearly approximate the
deshed result. And it is precisely in these
classes of cases that the parties have it in their
power to protect themselves against any loss
to arise from such uncertainty, ‘by estimating
their own damages in the contract itself, and
providing for themselves the rules by which
the amount shall be measured, in case of a
breach; and if they neglect this, they may be
presumed to have assented to such damages as
may be measured by the rules which the law,
for the sake of certainty, has adopted.
Again, in analogy to the rule that contracts
should be construed as understood and as
sented to by the parties,—if not as a part of
that rule,—damages which are the natural,
and, under the circumstances, the direct and
necessary result of the breach, are often very
properly rejected, because they cannot fairly
be considered as having been within the con
templation of the respective parties at the time
of entering into the contract.
None of these several considerations have
any bearing in an action purely of tort. The
injured party has consented to enter into no
relation with the wrongdoer by which any haz
ard of loss should be incurred; nor has he re
I
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ceived any consideration. or chance of benefit
or advantage. for the assumption of such haz
ard; nor has the wrongdoer given any consid
eration, nor assumed any risk, in consequence
of any act or cdnsent of his. The injured par
ty has had no opportunity to protect himself
by (ontract against any uncertainty in the es
timate of damages; no act of his has contrib
uted to the injury; he has yielded nothing by
consent; and, least of all, has he consented
that the wrongdoer might take or injure his
property or deprive him of his rights, for such
sum as, by the strict rules which the law has
established for the measurement of damages
in actions upon contract, he may be able to
show, with certainty. he has sustained by such
taking or injury. Especially would it be un
just to presume such consent, and to hold him
to the recovery of such damages only as may
be masmved with certainty by fixed and defl
nite rules, when the case is one which, from
its very nature, affords no elements of cer
tainty by which the loss he has actually suf
fered can be shown with accuracy by any evi
dence of which the case is susceptible. Is he
to blame because the case happens to be one
of this character? He has had no choice, no
selection. The nature of the case is such that
the wrongdoer has chosen to make it, and upon
every principle of justice he is the party who
should be made to sustain all the risk of loss
which may arise from the uncertainty pertain
ing to the nature of the case, and the difliculty
of accurately estimating the results of his own
wrongful act. Upon what principle of right
can courts of justice assume, not simply to
divide this risk, which would be thus far un
just. but to relieve the wrongdoer from it en
tirely, and throw the whole upon the innocent
and injured party? Must not such a comse of
decision tend to encourage trespasses, and op
erate as an inducement for parties to right
themselves by violence, in cases like the pres
ent?
Since. from the nature of the case, the dam
ages cannot be estimated with certainty, and
there is a risk of giving by one course of trial
‘less, and by the other more than a fair com
pensation,—to say nothing of justice,—does not
sound policy require that the risk should be
thrown upon the wrongdoer instead of the in
jtrred party? However this question may be
answered, we cannot resist the conclusion that‘
1
it is better to run a slight risk of giving some
what more than actual compensation. than to
adopt a rule which. under the circumstances of
the case, will, in all reasonable probability,
preclude the injured party from the recovery
of a large proportion of the damages he has
actually sustained from the injury, though the
amount thus excluded cannot be estimated
with accuracy by a fixed and certain rule.
Certainty is doubtless very desirable in esti
mating damages in all cases; and where, from
the nature and circumstances1 of the case, a
rule can be discovered by which adequate com- '
pensation can be accurately measured. the rule
should be applied in actions of tort, as well as
in those upon contract. Such is quite gener
ally the case in trespass and trover for the
taking or conversion of personal property, if
the property [as it generally is) be such as can
be readily obtained in the market and has a
market value. But shall the injured party in
an action of tort, which may happen to furnish
no element of certainty, be allowed to recover
no damages (or merely nominal) because he
cannot show the exact amount with certainty,
though he is ready to show, to the satisfaction
of the jury, that he has sul'i"ered large damages
by the injury? Certainty, it is true, would
thus be attained; but it would be the certain
ty of injustice. And, though a rule of cer
tainty may be found which will measure a por
tion, and only a portion, of the damages, and
exclude a very material portion, which it can
be rendered morally certain the injured party
has sustained, though its exact amount cannot
be measured by a fixed rule; here to apply
any such rule to the whole case. is to misapply
it; and so far as it excludes all damages
which cannot be measured by it pcrpetrates
positive injustice under the pretense of admin
istering justice.
The law does not require impossibillties,
and cannot, therefore, require a higher de
gree of certainty than the nature of the
case admits. And we can see no good reason
for requiring any higher degree of certainty
in respect to the amount of damages than
in respect to any other branch of the cause.
Juries are allowed to act upon probable and
inferential, as well as direct and positive
proof. And when. from the nature of the case.,
the amount of the damages cannot be esti
mated with certainty, or only a part of them
can be so estimated, we can see no objection
to placing before the jury all the' facts and
circumstances of the case, having any tend
ency to show damages, or their probable
amount;v so as to enable them to make the
inost intelligible and probable estimate which
the nature of the case will permit. This
should, of course, be done with such instruc
ltions and advice from the court as the cir
'cumstances of the case may require. and as
“nay tend to ‘prevent the allowance of such
as may be merely possible, or too remote or
fanciful in their character to be safely con
sidered as the result of the injury.
In the adoption of this course it will sel
dom happen that the court, hearing the evi
dence, will not thereby possess the means of
forming a satisfactory judgment whether
the damages are unreasonable or exorbitant;
and, if satisfied they are so, the court have
always the power to set aside the verdict
and grant a new trial. .
The justice of the principles we have en
deavored to explain will, we think, he suffi
ciently manifest in their application to the
present case. The evidence strongly tended
to show an ouster of the plaintiff for the
balance of the term by the defendant,s art.
This term was the property of the plaintiff:
v
and, as proprietor. he was entitled to all the
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benefits he could derive from it. He could
not by law be compelled to sell it for such
sum as it might be worth to others; and.
when tortiously taken from him against his
will, he cannot justly be limited to such sum
—or the difference between the rent he was
paying and the fair rental value of the prem
ises—if the premises were of much greater
and peculiar value to him, on account of the
business he had established in the store, and i
the resort of customers to that particular
place, or the good will of the place, in his
trade or business. His right to the full en
joyment of the use of the premises, in any
manner not forbidden by the lease, was as
clear as that to sell or dispose of it, and
was as much his property as the term itself,
and entitled to the same protection from the
laws. He had used the premises as a jewel
ry store, and place of business for the re
pairing of watches, making gold pens, etc.
This business must be broken up by the
ouster, unless the plaintiff could obtain an
other fit place for it; and if the only place
he could obtain was less fitted and less valu
able to him for that purpose, then such busi
ness would be injured to the extent of this 1
difference; and this would be the natural, di’
rect, and immediate consequence of the injury.
To confine the plainiiff to the difference be-
‘
V tween the rent. paid and the fair rental value
of the premises to others for the balance of
the term would be but a mockery of justice.
To test this, suppose the plaintiff is actually
paying that full rental value, and has estab
lished a business upon the premises, the clear
gains or profits of which have been an aver
age of one thousand dollars per year, and he
'
is ousted from the premises, and this busi
ness entirely broken up for the balance of the
term, can he be allowed to recover nothing but
six cents damages for his loss? To ask such
a question is to answer it. The rule which
would confine the plaintiff to the difference
between such rental value and the stipulated
rent can rest only upon the assumption that
the plaintiff might (as in case of personal
property) go at once into the market and ob
tain another building equally well fitted for
the business, and that for the same rent;
and to justify such a rule of damages this
assumption must be taken as a conclusive
presumption of law. However such a pre
sumption might be likely to accord with the
fact in the city of New York, in most west
ern clties and towns it would be so obviously
contrary to the common experience of the
facts as to make the injustice of the rule
gross and palpable. But we need not further
discuss this point, as a denial of any such
presumption was clearly involved in our
former decision.
The plaintiff in this case did hire another
store. “the best he could obtain, but not
ncarly so good for his business"; “his cus
tomers did not come to the new store, and
there was not so much of a thoroughfare by
lt,—not one-quarter of the travel; and he
i
4
relied much upon chance custom, especially
in the watch-reparing and other mechanical
business." This injury to the plaintiff,s busi
ness was as clearly a part of his damages as
the loss of the term itself. This point, also,
was decided in the former case, and we there
further held that the declaration was suifi
cient to admit the proof of this species of
loss.
Now, if the plaintiff is to be allowed to
recover for this injury to his businms, it
would seem to follow, as a necessary con
sequence, that the value of that business be-
fore the injury, as well as after‘, not only
might. but should be shown, as an indis
pensable means of showing the amount of
loss from the injury. If the business were a
losing one to the plaintiff before, his loss
from its being broken up or diminished (if
anything) would certainly be less than if it
were a profitable one. It is not the amount
of business done, but the gain or profit aris
ing from it, which constitutes its value.
But it is insisted that loss of profits con
stitutes no proper ground or element of dam
ages. lf there be any such rule of law it is
certainly not a universal, and can hardly be
called a general, rule. Decisions, it is true,
may be found which seem to take it for
granted that the rule is universal. But there
are numerous cases. even for breach of con
tract, in which profits have been properly
held to constitute not only an element, but
a measure (and sometimes the only measure),
of damages, as in Masterton v. Mayor, 7 Hill,
61; Railroad Co. v. Howard, 13 How. 344.
And in actions for breach of contract in not
delivering goods (as wheat or other articles)
having a marketable value, as well as in
most actions of trespass or trover for the
taking or conversion of such property,—where
ever the difference between the contract
price, or the market value at the time of
taking or conversion, and the higher market
value at any subsequent period, is held to
constitute the damages-in all such cases
this diffcrence of price is but another name
for profits, and is yet very properly held to
be a measure of damages. There is nothing'
therefore, in the nature of profits, as such,
which prevents their allowance as damages.
But in many, and perhaps the majority, of
cases upon contract in which the question
has arisen, they have been held to,be too
remote or dependent upon too many contin
gencies to be calculated with reasonable cer
tainty, or to have been within the contempla
tion of the parties at the time of entering in
to the contract.
But there are also cases for breach of con
tract where, though the profits were in their
nature somewhat uncertain and contingent
(and in most of them quite as much so as
in the present case). they were yet held to
constitute. not strictly a measure. but an
element of damages proper for the considera
tion of a jury to enable them to form a judg
ment or probable estimate of the damages;
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as in .\Ic.\‘eill v. Reid, 9 Bing. 68; Bagley
v. Smith, 10 N. Y. 459; Gale v. Leckle, 2
Starkie, 107; Ward v. Smith, 11 Price, 19;
Driggs v. Dwight, 17 Wend. 71.
Passenger v. Thorburn, 35 Barb. 17.
in Waters v. Towers, 20 Eng. Law & Eq.
410, the jury were allowed to take into con
sideration the profits which might have been
made upon a collateral contract, though void
by the statute of frauds (and see .\IcNeiil
v. Reid, supra), while by the American au
thorities profits of this description have been
almost uniformly rejected. But whatever
may be the rule in actions upon contract,
we think a more liberal rule in regard to
damages for profits lost should prevail in
actions purely of tort (excepting perhaps the
action of trover). Not that they should be
allowed in all cases without distinction, for
‘there are some cases where they might, in
their nature, be too entirely remote, specula
tive, or contingent to form any reliable basis
for a probable opinion. And perhaps the
decisions which have excluded the anticipat
ed profits of a voyage broken up by illegal
capture or collision may be properly justified
upon this ground. Upon this, however, we
express no opinion. But generally, in an ac
tion purely of tort, where the amount of
profits lost by the injury can be shown with
reasonable certainty, we think they are not
only admissible in evidence, but that they
constitute, thus far, a safe‘ measure of dam
ages; as when they are but another name
for the use of a mill (for example), as in
White v. Moseley, 8 Pick. 356; or for the useI of any other property where the value or
profit of the use can be made to appear with
reasonable certainty by the light of past
experience, as might often be done where
such profits had been for a considerable
time uniform at the same season of the year,
and there are no circumstances tending to
show a probable diminution, had the injury
not occurred. And possibly the same view,
subject to the like qualifications, might have
been taken of the profits of the plaintiff,s
business had it been confined to the me
cbanical trade of repairing watches and mak
ing gold pens, particularly if done purely as
a cash business. ‘But this business seems
to have been carried on with that of the
sale of jewelry./He kept a jewelry store,
and the _proiits‘ of so much of his business as
may be regarded as mercantile business
are dependent upon many more contingen
cies, and therefore more uncertain, especially
if sales are made upon credit. Past profits,
therefore, could not safely be taken as the
exact measure of future profits; but all the
various contingencies by which such profits
would probably be affected should be taken
into consideration by the jury, and allowed
such weight as they, in the exercise of good
sense and sound discretion, should think
them entitled to. Past profits in such cases,
where the business has been continued for




nl .. ‘ l aid to the jury in arriving at a fair
p. '. ! =e estimate of the future profits, had
t|e ...;iness still continued without inter
r ' .n
Accordingly such past profits have been
allowed for this purpose, both in actions ex
contractu and ex delicto, though more fre
quently in the latter, where from the nature
of the case no element of greater certainty
1 appeared, and the actual damages must be
more or less a matter of opinion; and where,
as in the present case, though somewhat in
conclusive, it was the best evidence the
nature of the case admitted. See Wilkes v.
Hungerford, 2 Bing. N. C. 281; Ingram v.
Lawson, 6 Bing. N. C. 212; Lacour v. Mayor,
4 Duer, 406; and the following in actions
upon contract: Driggs v. Dwight, 17 Wend.
71; Baglcy v. Smith, 10 N. Y. 489.
But it is urged by the counsel for the de
fendant that damages for the loss of profits
ought not to be allowed, because they could
not have been within the contemplation of
the defendant. Whether, as matter of fact,
this is likely to have been true, we do not
deem it important to inquire. It is wholly
immaterial whether the defendant, in com. .
mitting the trespass, actually contemplated
this or any other species of damage to the
plaintiff. This is a consideration which is
confined entirely to cases of contracts, whe .e
te question is, what was the extent f
obligation, in this respect, which both parti .
understood to be created by the contract
But where a party commits a trespass h
must be held to contemplate all the damage
which may legitimately follow from his il
legal act And where a party, though acting
in good faith, yet knowing his right to be
disputed by a party in possession, instead of
resorting to a judicial trial of his right, as
sumes to take the law into his own lnimis,
and by violence to seize the property or right
in dispute, he must be held thereby to as
sume, on the one hand, the risk of being
able to show, when the other party brings
him into court, that the property or right
was his, or that his act was legal; or, on
the other, of paying all the damages the
injured party may have suffered from the
injury; and, if those damages are in their
nature uncertain, then such as, from all the
circumstances, or the best light the nature of
the case affords, a jury, ‘in the exercise of
good sense and sound discretion, may find to
be a full compensation.
We are therefore entirely satisfied that all
the questions put to the witness Allison
touched the nature, ‘extent, and profits of the
business before and after the trespass were
competent, and improperly overruled; and
that the charge of the court, so far as it ex
cluded all consideration of the good will of
the place, its peculiar value to the plaintifl,
and his probable profits, was erroneous.
The judgment must be reversed, with costs
to the plaintiff, and a new trial granted.
The other justices concurred.
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SCHUMAKER v. ST. PAUL & D. R. CO.
(48 N. W. 559, 46 Minn. 39.)
Supreme Court of Minnesota. April 8, 1891.
Appeal from district court, Ramsey
county; KlI:LL\', Judge.
Wm. H. Bliss, ior appellant. Eruin &
Wellington, ior respondent.
COLLINS, J. To plaintiff,s complaint
herein the defendant corporation inter
posed a demurrer, upon the ground that
it failed to state facts sufflcient to consti
tutea cause of action. Upon the argu
ment of this appeal defendant contended
that its negligence in the premises was in
sufficiently pleaded; that the injury com
plained oi, provided the same could be said
to have been the result of defendant’s act.
was not proximate, but w as too remote a
consequence to be chargeable to it; and.
further, that from the allegations of the
complaint it was manifest that plaintiff
himself was guilty of contributory negli
gence. Very little need be said on any of
these points,ior none are well taken. The
complaint contains much that is superflu
ous, but in respect to negligence it avers the
defendant’s duty to have been to furnish
transportation to plaintiff, a car-repairer
in its employ, from the wrecked caboose,
which he had been sent out to repair by
the foreman, back to St. Paul, when he
had completed his work, and that it
wrongfully, unlawfully, and negligentl
failed and omitted so to do, or to furnish
plaintiff with transportation to anyother
place where shelter or food could be ob
tained, and that by reason ofsuch negligent
failure and omission plaintiff was com
pelled to and did walk to the village of
White Bear,a distance of nine miles,in the
night-time, in extremely cold and danger
ous weather, that being the nearest point
at which the necessary shelter and food
could be had; that placing reliance upon de
fendant,s periormance of its duty towards
plaintiff when he had completed his work,
by furnishing transportation back to St.
Paul from the place on its line of road
where he had been taken to repair the ca
boose, plaintiff was wholly unprepared
with means for properly sheltering or
clothing himself. It was also averred
that the facts and circumstances with ref
erence to the location of the caboose, the
inclemency of the weather, the distance to
shelter or iood, and that plaintiff, by rea
son of his reliance upon being transported
back to St. Paul when through with his
work. had not provided himself with
proper clothing ior such weather, were
then well known to the defendant. The
negligence of the defendant might have
been specified with greater certainty, but
from an inspection of the pleading it ap
pears that defendant is charged with hav
ing unnecessarily and unreasonably placed
its servant, the piaintiff.in serious danger,
from which injury resulted, by carelessly
and negligently omitting to perform‘ a
duty immediately connected with his
work. on the periormance of which he had
a right to and did rely. With full knowl
edge of the sit ttlon as to weather and
the iocaiity,cm quently of the danger to
be apprehended, it neglected and aban
doned the plaintiff under circumstances
which he alleges resulted in personal in
jury to him. It had no more right to un
necessarily and unreasonably leave him in
a dangerous place, to expose him to an
unnecessary and unreasonable risk from
the elements, by failing to furnish trans
portation frOm the place where he had
been put at work, when that work was
completed, it being its duty so to do. ac
cording to the complaint, than it had to
unnecessarily and unreasonably expose /
him to risks and dangers while he was at
work,—such risks and dangers as were
discoverable by the use of ordinary pre
caution aud diligence. The defendant
should have been reasonably diligent, and
could not, without incurring liability, de
sert the plaintiff in the manner and under
the circumstances set iorth in the com
plaint.
’i‘he important question in this case,
however, is whether, from the complaint.
it appears that defendant is liable ior the
injuries which resulted from plaintiff,s ef
forts to obtain shelter and iood on the
occasion referred to; the iormer, as be
fore stated. arguing that, as alleged. they’
are too remote, and are not the proxi
mate results of its act. it is averred that,
by reason of the unavoidable exposure of
the plaintiff, he was made sick, contracted
rheumatism, has ever since suffered great
pain and agony, and has been permanent
ly injured. It must not be forgotten that
thegn’tvamen of the action.is the negligence
and carelessnessof the defendantin leaving
plaintiff at a place where hecould not pro
cure either shelteror iood. it is an action
in tort, and not ior a breach of contract.
It is the negligence of the defendant
wh~is complained of, and not the breach 0contract to return the plaintiff to St. Paul
when he had periormed his labor. it was,
of course, essential that the plaintiff,s re-
lation with the defendant be made to
appear, for, unless he was a servant to
whom the defendant owed a duty. there
could arise no liability by reason of its neg
lect to perform that duty. The relation
‘of master and servant first having been
shown to exist, the law fixes the duty of
the iormertowards the latter,and a viola
lon of this duty is a wrong, not a breach
f the contract. This, then,is an action in
,
which the wrong-doer is liable iorthe nat- I
ural and probable consequences of its neg
ligent act or omission; the general rules
which limit the damages in actions of
of tort being, in many respects, different
from those in actions on contracts. The
injury must be the direct result of the mis
conduct attributed. and the general rule
in respect to damages is that whoever
commits a trespass or other wrongful act
is liable ior all the direct injury resulting
therefrom, although such resulting injury
could‘ not have been contemplated as a
probable result of the act done. 1 Stalg.
Dam. 130, note, and cases cited; Clifford v.
Railroad Co., ii Colo. 333. 12 Pac. Re ). 2lii,
a case much like this. He who co 0mlts
a trespass must be held to contemplate
all the damages which may legitimately
flow from his illegal act, whether he,’
may have ioreseen them or not; and,l
so far as it is plainly traceable, he must











The damages cannot be considered too
remote ii, according to the usual ex
perience oi mankind, injurious results
ought to have been apprehended. It is not
necessary that the injury in the precise
orm in which it, in fact, resulted. should
have been foreseen. It is enough that it
9 now appears to have been a natural and‘ probable consequence. Hill v. Winsor. li8
Mass. 231. The question is whether the
negligent act complained of—leaving the
plaintifi‘ in the open country in the night
time, in extremely cold and dangerous
weather, a long distance from shelter or
food—was the direct cause of the injuries
mentioned in the complaint, or whether it
was a remote cause, for which an action
will not lie,and it must be taken ior grant
ed that thewnlk oi nine miles and incident
exposure brought about the alleged sick
ness, pain, and disability. There was no
intervening independent cause of the in
jury, for all of the acts done by the plain
tiff. nis eiiort to seek protection from the
inclement and dangerous weather, were
legitimate, and compelled by de!endant’s
failure to reconvey him to the city. Had
he remained at the caboose, and lost his
hands, or his feet, or perhaps his life, by
freezing. no doubt could exist of the de
fendant,s liability. It must not be permit
ted to escape the consequences of its
wrong because the injuries were received
in an eiiort to avoid the threatened dan
ger, or because they differ in form or seri
ousness from those which might have re
sulted had the plaintiff made no such ci
fort. An eiiicient, adequate cause being
iound for the lnjuri t€lve(1 by plaintiff.
it must be consid’s
the true cause,
other, not cident to it, but in
mdent of it, is shown to have inter
ened betweenit and the result. This is
substance of very clear statements of
law found in Kellogg v. Railway Co.,
I
\\’is.223. and in RaiiwayCo. v. Kellog.‘-.'. 94
U. S. 469. And upon the point now under
consideration we fail to distinguish be
tween the case at bar and Brown v. Rail
way (,o.,54 Wis. 342,11 N. W. Rep.-256,911,
an action brought to recover ior like dam
ages said to have been caused by directing
passengers to alight from a train at a
place about three miles distant from their
destination. At all events, the question
as to what was the proximate cause oi a
piaintiff’s injuries is usually one to be de
termined by a jury. As was said in Rail-
way Co. v. Kellogg. supra. the true rule"
is that what is the proximate cause oi an
)4injury is ordinarily one ior a jury. It is
not a question of science or legal knowl
edge. it is to be determined as a fact, in
view of the circumstances attending it.
Finally, the defendant insists that plain
tiff was guilty of contributory negligence,
because, from the complaint,“ appears
that he was wholly unprepared with
clothing suiiiclent ior the occasion. and
because he left the shelter of the caboose
when he undertook his journey upon loot
to the village of White Bear. The plain
tifi. undoubtedly, went prepared with such
clothing as he would ordinarily and nut
urally need ior the occasion, had the de
fendant pcriormed its alleged duty, and
this was all that was required oi him.
He Was not obliged to anticipate the de
fendant,s negligence or omission, and pre
pare ior it, nor does it follow that, be
cause there was a caboose at the place
where he worked, it afforded him ade
quate and proper shelter for the night.
If this was the fact. it can quite properly
be shown asa defense upon the trial of
the case. But the complaint negatives
such a conclusion. Order aiiirmed.
.\ilTCi:lELL.J., did not participate in
king and filing of this decision.
//
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YOSBURG v. PUTXEY.
(50 N. W. 403. 80 Wis. 523.)
Suprcum Court of Wisconsin. Nov. 17, 1891.
Appeal from circuit court, Waukesha
county; A. Scorr SLOA:\, Judge. Re
versed.
Action by Andrew Vosburg against
George Putaey ior personal .injuries.
From a judgment ior plaintiff, defendant
appeals.
’1‘he other facts fullv a
lowing statement by LY
The action was brought to recover dam
ages ior an assault and battery, alleged to
have been committed by the defendant up
on the plaintiff on February :30. 1859. The
answer is a general denial. At the date of
the alleged assault the plaintiff was a
little more than 14 years of age, and the
defendant a little less than 12 years of
age. The injury complained of was caused
by a kick inflicted by defendant upon the
leg of the plaintiff, a little below the knee.
’1‘hetransaction occurred in aschool-room
in Waukesha, during school hours, both
parties being pupils in the school. A
former trial of the cause resulted in a ver
dict and judgment for the plaintiff ior
$2,800. The defendant appealed from such
judgment to this court, and the same was
reversed ior error, and a new trial aw'nrd
ed. 78 \\,is. 84, 47 N. W. Rep. 99. The case
has been again tried in the circuit court,
and the trial resulted inn verdict ior plain
tiff ior $2,500. The facts of the case, as
they appeared on both trials, are suffi
ciently stated in the opinion by Mr. Jus
tice \')n’ro.\, on the iormer appeal.and re
quire no repetition. On the last trial the
jury iound a special verdict, as follows:
“(ll Had the plaintiff during the month
of January, 1889, received an injury jus_‘.
above the knee, which became inflamed,
and produced pus? Answer. Yes. (2)
Had such injury on the 20th day of Feb
ruary, lh‘S9, nearly healed at the point of
the iniury? A. Yes. (3) Was the plain
tiff, before said 20th of February, lame, as
the result of such injury? A. No. (4)
Had the tibia in the plainti-ffs right leg
become inflamed or diseased to some ex
tent beiore he received the blow or kick
from the defendant? A. No. (5) What
was the exciting ca use of the injury to the.
plaintiff,s leg? A. Kick. (6) Did the dc
fendant, in touching the plaintiff with
his ioot, intend to do him any harm? A.
No. (7) At what sum do you assess the
dama,c;es of the plaintiff? A. Twenty-five
hundred dollars.” The defendant moved
forjudgment in his favor on the verdict,
and also for a new trial. The plaintiff
moved ior judgment on the verdict in his
favor. Themotionsofdefendantwereover
ruled, and that of the plaintiff granted.
Thereupon judgment ior plaintiff, for
$2.-300 damages and costs ofsuit. was duly
entered. The defendant appeals from the
judgment.
’1‘. W. Hahzht (J.V. Quarles,of counsel),
for appellant, to sustain the proposition
that where there is no evil intent there can
be no recovery, cited: 2 Greenl. Ev. §§ 82
85: 2 Add. Torts,§ 790; Conley, Torts, p,




Christopherson v. Bare, 11 Q. B. 473; Holl
man v. Eppers, 41 Win. 251: i\’".‘ll v. l.ull,
49 Wis. 405, 5 N. W. Rep. 874; Or mdnll v.
Transportation (.‘o..l6 Fed. Re|'.7.3; Brown
v. Kendall, 6 Cash. 292.
Ryan & Merton, ior respondent.
LYON, J. (after stating the facts). Sev- ’
eral errors are assigned, only three of
which will be considered.
1. Thejury having found that the de
fendant, in touching the plaintiff with his
ioot, did not intend to do him any harm, I
counsel ior defendant maintain that the
plaintiff has no cause ofaction, and thatde
fendant’s motion ior judgment on the spe
cial ‘verdict should have been granted.
In support of this proposition counsel
quote from 2 Greenl. Ev. § 83, the rule
that “the intention to do harm is of the
essence of an assault." Such is the rule.
no doubt, in actions or prosecutions ior
mere assaults. But this is an action to
recover damages ior an alleged assault
and battery. In such case the rule is cor- .
rectly stated, in many of the authorities
cited by counsel, that plaintiff must show
either that the intention was unlawful, or
that the defendant is in fault. If the in
tended act is unlawful, the intention to
commit it must necessarily be unlawful.
Hence, as applied to this case. if the kick
ing of the plaintiff by the defendant was
an unlawful act, the intention of defend
ant to kick him was also unlawful. Had/
the parties been upon the play-grounds
. of the school, engaged in the usual boy
ish sports, the defe
malice. wantonne
intending no harm
is being free from
negligence, and
daintiff in
did, we should hesitate to hold 11%the defendant unlawful. or that he coul ‘
be held liable in this action. Some con
sideration is due to the implied license of
the play-grounds. But it appears that
the injury was inflicted in the school.after
it had been called to order by the teacher,
and after the regular exercises of .the
school had commenced. Under these cir
cumstances, noimplied license to do tb
act complained of existed. and such ac
was a violation of the order and decorum
of the school, and necessarily unlawful.
Hence we are of the opinion that, under
the evidence and verdict, the action may
be sustained.
II. The plaintiff testified. as a witness in
his own behalf. as to the circumstances of
thealleged injuryinfiictad upon him by the
defendant. and also in regard to the wound
he received in January,near thesame knee,
mentioned in the special verdict. The de
fendant claimed that such wound was the
,
proximate cause of the injury to plaintiff,s
leg, in that it produced a diseased condi
tion of the bone, which disease was in act
ive progress when he received the kick,
and that such kick did nothing more than
to change the location, and perhaps some
what hasten the progress, of the disease.
The testimony of Dr. Bacon. a witness ior
plaintiff, (who was plaintiffs attending
physician,) elicited on cross-exa mination,
tends to some extent to establish such
claim. Dr. Bacon first saw the injured leg
on February 25th, and Dr. Phlller, also
one of plaintiff,s witnesses, first so w it
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March 8th. lir. Philler was called as a
witness after the examination of the plain
tiff and Dr. Baron. On his direct examina
tion he testified as follows: “I heard the
testimony ofAndrew Vosburgin regard to
how he received the kick, February 20th.
from his playmate. I heard read the tee
timony of Miss More, and heard where he
said he received this kick on that day."
(Miss More had already testified that she
was the teacher of the school. and saw de
fendant standing in the aisle by his seat,
and kicking across the aisle, hitting the
plaintiff.) The iollowing question was
then propounded to Dr. Philler: “After
hearing that testimony, and what you
know of the case of the boy, seeing it on
the 8th day of March, what, in your opin
ion, was the exciting cause that produced
the inflammation that you saw in that
boy,s leg on that day?" An objection to
this question was overruled, and the wit
ness answered: “The exciting cause was
the injury received at that day by the kick
on the shin-bone. “ It will he observed
that the above question to Dr. Pniller
calls for his opinion as a medical expert,
ba:=ed in part upon the testimony of the
plaintiff. as to what was the proximate
Cause of the injury to plaintiffs leg. The
plaintiff testified to two u ounds upon his
leg. either of which might have been such
proximate cause. Without taking both
of these wounds into consideration, the
expert could give no intelligent or reliable
opinion as to which of them caused thein
jury complained of; yet. in the hypothet
ical question propounded to him, one of
these probable causes was excluded from
the consideration of the witness, and he
was required to give his opinion upon an
1 .lr,ripet-fect and insuflicienthypothesls,—one
which excluded from his consideration a
material fact essential to an intelligent
.opinion. A consideration by the witness
of the wound received by the plaintiff in
January being thus prevented, the wit
ness had but one fact upon which to base
his opinion, to-wit. the fact that defend
ant kicked plaintiff on the shin-bone.
Based, as it necessarily was, on that fact
alone, the opinion of Dr. Philler that the
kick caused the injury was inevitable.
when. had the proper hypothesis been
submitted to him, his oninion might have
been different. The answer of Dr. Philler
to the hypothetical question put to him
may have had, probably did have. a con
trolling influence with the jury, ior they
found by their verdict that his opinion
was correct. Surely there can be no rule
of evidence which will tolerate a hypothet
ical question to an expert, calling ior his
opinion in a matter vital to the case,
which excludes from his consideration facts
already proved by a witness upon whose
testimony such hypothetical question is
based, when a consideration of such facts
by the expert is absolutely essential to en
able him to iorm an intelligent opinion
concerning such matter. The objection to
the question put to Dr. Philler should
have been sustained. The error in permit
ting the witness to answer the question
is material, and necessarily fatal to the
judgment.
III. Certain questions were proposed on
behalf of defendant to be submitted to
the jury, iounded upon the theory that
only such damages could be recovered as
the defendant might reasonably be sup
posed to ha vc'eontempinted as likely to
result from his kicking the plaintiff. The
court refused to submit such questions to
the jury. The ruling was correct. The
rule of damages in actions ior torts was
held in .Brown v. Railway Co., 54 Wis. 342,
11 N. W. Rep. 356, 911, to be that the wrong
doer is liable for all injuries resultim_r di
rectly from the wrongful act, whether they
could or could not have been ioreseen by
him. The chief justice and the writer of
this opinion dissented from the judgment
in that case,ehiefly because we were of the
opinion that the complaint stated a cause
of action ex contractu, and not ex delicto,
and hence that a different rule of damages
—the rule here contended for— was ap
plicable. We did not question that the
rule in actions for tort was correctly
stated. That case rules this on the ques
tion of damages. The remaining errors
assigned are upon the rulings of the court
on objections to testimony. These rul
ings are not very likely to be repeated on
another trial, and are not of sufficient im
portance to require a review of them on
this appeal. The judgment of the circuit
court must be reversed, and the cause will
be remanded ior a new trial.
108 DlltEC,i‘ AND CONSEQUENTIAL D..\\i.1\Gi£S—IN TORT.
30
BALTIMORE CITY PASSENGER BY. C0. , caused, as it was alleged, by the negligence
v. KEMP et ux.
(61 Md. 619.) .
Court of Appeals of Maryland. July 3, 188-i.
Bernard Carter and Arthur W. Machen, for
the motion.
ALVI.ZY, C. J. There has been a motion
made in this case for reargument, based‘
largely upon authorities that were not
brought to the attention of the court on the
former hearing; and hence we depart from
the general practice of disposing of such mo
tions without the formal assignment of rea
sons for the action of the court thereon.
Upon the question whether the jury should
have been allowed to infer, upon the evi
dence before them, that the cancer was the
result of the injury received by plaintiff, the
defendant cites and relies upon the case of
Jewell v. Railway Co., 55 N. H. Si, a case not
referred to on the former argument. But the
facts of that case are so entirely different
from those of the case before us that the '
analogy between the two cases is but slight.
in the first place, the party whose negligence
caused the injury in that case was not, ac
cording to the decision of the court, the
servant or employee of the defendant, and
therefore the defendant was not liable for his
acts. In the second place, there was a con
siderable length of time intervening between
the time of the accident and the death of the
party, the latter in the meantime being en
gaged in hard work, and subjected to much
exposure; and all the circumstances of the
case rendered it exceedingly doubtful wheth
er there could be any connection between the
injury received by a blow on the right should
er, and a cancer that was found to exist, by
post mortem examination, in the left lung of
the party a year and .a half after the injury
received. And the physicians all testified
that in their opinion neither the last sickness
of the 'party nor the cancer was in any way
attributable to the injury previously receiv
ed. The court, moreover, considered and de
termined the case upon the weight of evi
denct.. as upon motion for a new trial, and
not as upon a demurrer to the legal suifi
ciency of the evidence to be submitted to the
jury as in the case before us. The other
cases cited upon this question have only a re
mote or indirect bearing, and we do not per
ceive that they are at all in conflict with the
opinion that has been delivered in this case.
Since the opinion in this case was delivered,
50 .\iich. has been published, and that volume
contains the case of Beauchamp v. Saginaw
Min. Co0 at page 163 (15 N. W. 65). In that
case, a boy, while passing on a highway, was
injured by being struck on the side of his
head by a stone from a blast fired by the
mining company, and, having died some five
or six months thereat’tcr.
brought to recover damages for his death,
an action wasv
of the defendant. Among other defenses, it
was alleged, and evidence was given to show,
that death was not caused by the injury, but
by a specific or typical pneumonia, and the
case was sought to be taken from the jury
upon the ground that pneumonia, and not the
injury received from the stone, was the di
rect and proximate cause of the death. The
physician who attended the boy in his sick
ness testified that he died of pneumonia,
though he had been very seriously injured,
and was paralyzed on one side, and the
chances of recovery were against him. The
doctor said in his testimony: “I am unpre
pared to say what caused pneumonia in this
case. In my opinion, it was a specific or
typical pneumonia. The relation between it
and the injured head was not close." it was
contended, however, for the plaintiff, that
owing to the broken and shattered condition
of the boy’s system, caused by the injury re
ceived, and his increased susceptibility to
cold, pneumonia was superinduced and de
veloped as a natural result of the injury; and
that question was submitted to the jury upon
the evidence, and they found for the plaintiff.
The case was taken to the supreme court of
Michigan, and the error assigned was the
submission of the question to and allowing
the jury to conclude as to whether pneumonia
did in fact result from, and was a conse
quence of, the injury received by the boy.
The supreme court afiirmed the ruling of the
court below, and held that, "if the injury re
ceived and sickness following concurred in
and contributed to the attack of pneumonia,
the defendant must be held responsible there
for." And so in this case, if the injury re
ceived by .Mrs. Kemp, by the negligence of
the defendant, superinduced and contributed
to the production or development of cancer.
the defendant is responsible therefor; and
the cancer is not to be treated as an inde
pendent cause of injury or suffering, any
more than pneumonia, resulting from an in
jury that rendered the system susceptible of
and liable to the attack, as a natural conse
quence of such injury is to be regarded as an
independent cause of death. In both cases
the original injury was the prime cause that
opened the way to and set other causes in
motion which led to the fatal results. And
the wrong‘loer' cannot be allowed to appor
tion the mcasure of his responsibility to the
initial cause. \Vhether the direct casual con
nections exist, is a question, in all cases, for
the jury, upon the facts in proof.
There is another ground upon which rear
gument of the case is asked, and that is with
respect to the nature of the action, and for
what nature and extent of injury dmnages
may be allowed to be recovered therein.
. The defendant insists that while the form of
action is as for a tort, yet the real ground of
~/
the right to recover in this case is simply for \
breach of the contract to carry safely, and to
put the party down safely. And, that being
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fare is charged.
so, according to the contention, it is insisted I tween him and the company, but by reason
that to entitle the plaintiff to damages by
reason of a breach of the contract the injury
for which compensation is asked should be
shown to be such that it may fairly be takenJ to have been contemplated by the parties as
the possible result of the breach of the con
tract; and that in this case, no such conse
quence as the production of cancer in the
plaintiff could have been anticipated as the
probable result of the negligent act of the
defendant. But to this proposition we can
n t agree, and in our opinion it is not sup
rted by authority.
A common carrier of passengers, who ac
cepts a party to be carried, owes to that par
ty a duty to be careful, irrespective of con
tract; and the gravamen of an action like
the present is the negligence of the defend
ant. The right to maintain the action does
not depend upon contract, but the action is
founded upo the common-law duty to carry
safely; and the negligent violation of that
.\ duty to the damage of the plaintiff is a
to
r?
or wrong which gives rise to the right 0
action. Bretherton v. Wood, 3 Brod. & B.
5-i. If this were not so, the passenger would
occupy a more unfavorable position in refer
ence to the extent of his right to recover for
injuries than a stranger; for the latter, for
any negligent injury or .wrong committed,
can only sue as for a tort, and the measure
of the recovery is not only for the actual suf
fering endured, but for all aggravation that
may attend the commission of the wrong;
whereas in the case of a passenger, if the
contention of the defendant be supported, for
the same character of injury, the right of re
covery would be more restricted. The prin
ciple of these actions against common carriers
of passengers is well illustrated by the case
of aservant whose fare has been paid by the
master, or the case of a child for whom no
In both of the cases me
tioned, though there is no contract as be
tween the carrier and the servant, or as be
tween the carrier and the child, yet both
servant and the child are passengers, and for
any personal injuries snffered by them
through the negligence of the carrier it is
clear they could sue and recover; but they
could only sue as for a tort. The authorities
would seem to be clear upon the subject, and
leave no room for doubt or question.
\:In the case
of Marshall v. Railroad Co., 1
. B. 655, in discussing the ground of action
against a common carrier, Jervis, O. J., said:
“But upon what principle does the action lie
at the suit of the servant for his personal suf
fering? Not by reason of any contract he
of a duty implied by law to carry him safe
ly." And in the same case .\ir. Justice Wil
liams said: “The case was, I think, put upon
the right footing by .\Ir. Hill, when he said
that the question turned upon the inquiry
whether it was necessary to show a contract
between the plaintiff and the railroad com
pany. His proposition was that this declara
tion could only be sustained by proof of a
contract to carry the plaintiff and his luggage
for hire and reward to be paid by the piaintift
and that the traverse of that part of the dec
laration involves a traverse of the payment by
the plaintiff. I am of opinion that there is no
oundation for that proposition. It seems to
e that the whole current of authorities, be
ginning with Govett v. Radnidge, 3 East, 62,
and ending with Pozzi v. Shipton, 8 Adoi. &
E. 9433, establishes that an actionpf this sort
is, in substance, not an action of contract,
but an action of tort against the company as
carrier." And in the subsequent case of Aus
tin v. Railroad Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. 442, Mr.
Justice Blackburn, now Lord Blackburn, in
delivering his judgment in that case, said:
“I think that what was said in the case of
Marshall v. Railroad Co., 11 C. B. 655, was
quite correct. It was there laid down that
the right whicha passenger by railway has
to be carried safely does not depend on his
having made a contract, but that the fact of
his being a passenger casts a duty on the
company to carry him safely." And to the
same effect, and with full approval of the au
thorities just cited, arc the cases of Foulkes
v. Railroad Co., 4 C. P. Div. 267, 30 Eng. R.
536, and the same case on appeal, 5 C. P. Div.
157, 30 Eng. R. 740; and Fleming v. Railway
Co., 4 Q. B. Div. 81. The case of Bretherton
v. Wood, 3 Brod. & B. 54, is a direct authority
it the question.
A passenger may, without doubt, declare for
a breach of contract where there is one; but
it is at his election to proceed as for a tort
where there has been personal injury suffer
ed by the negligence or wrongful act of the
carrier, or the agents of the company; and
in such action the plaintiff is entitled to re
cover according to the principles pertaining
to that class of actions, as distinguished from
actions on contract. And this is the settled
doctrine and practice in this state. Stockton
v. Frey, 4 Gill, 406; Railroad Co. v. Blocher,
27 Md. 277, 287; Turnpike Co. v. Boone, 455
Md. 344; Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. 181.
The motion for reargumeut must be over
ruled.
STONE, J., dissented.
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"5! WESTERN RAILWAY OF ALABAMA v.
MUTCH.
(11 South. 894;‘9,i, Ala. 19-i.)
Supreme Court of Alabama. Dec. 1, 1892.
Appeal from circuit court, Lee county; J.
M. Carmichael, Judge.
Action by George Mutch, administrator of
James Thomas Mutch, against the Western
Railway of Alabama, to recover for the al
leged negligent killing of his intestate by de
fendant. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant
appeals. Reversed.
After the rendition of the judgment for
plaintiff, defendant moved the court for a
new trial on the following grounds: (1) Be
cause the jury found contrary to the evidence;
(2) because the evidence did not authorize a
verdict against the defendant; (3) because
Mr. Augustus Barnes, one of plaintiff,s at
torneys, in his argument to the jury, in
speaking of defendant,s employes who were
_ witnesses in this case. said "that he would
not say, as a north Alabama attorney had
said, that they ‘testified with halters around
their necks;’ but he would say that they tes
tified with a conscious regard to their posi
tion." The court overruled the motion for a
new trial, and the defendant duly excepted.
On this appeal, prosecuted by the defendant,
there are many assignments of error, in
which were included the overruling of de
fendant,s motions for a new trial, but under
the opinion it is deemed unnecessary to notice
them in detail.
Geo. P. Harrison and R. F. Ligon, Jr., for
appellant. A. & R. B. Barnes, W. J. Samford,
and J. M. Chilton, for appellee.
STO.\‘E, C. J. The plaintiff, George .\Iutch,
was a resident of Opelika. His son, James
Mutt.ll. was 9t/_, years old, well grown and de
veloped for his age, and, in intelligence and
brightness, was above the average of boys
of his age. He went at large without being
attended by a nurse or protector, and was at
tending school. The Western Railway of Ala
bama runs through Opelika, and has a sta
tion and depot in that city or town. There
was an ordinance of force_ in Opelika which
made it unlawful to run a train of cars with
in the corporate limits at a higher rate of
speed than four miles an hour, and imposing
a penalty for its violation. A freight train
of the railroad was coming into Opeiika on
an afternoon in \Iarch, t889. It had box
cars. and attached to the side of one of them
was a ladder, placed there to enable brake
men to reach the top of the car. The little
boy, James. having placed himself at the side
of the track. attempted to seize the ladder as
it passed him, that he might climb up on it,
\and thus enjoy a ride. He did succeed in
catching a round of the ladder, but. in at
tempting to ascend, he missed his footing, fell
under the train, and was o injured and
crushed that he died of the wounds. Up to
this point there is no conflict or uncertainty
in the testimony. The present suit was
brought against the railroad, and seeks to re
cover damages from it for this alleged negli
gent killing of plaintiff,s intestate. The neg
ligence charged (and there is no other pre
tended, or attempted to be shown) is that the,‘
train was being moved at a greater rate of
speed than four miles an hour. Some of
plaintiff,s witnesses testified that it was mov
ing at the rate of six or seven miles an hour.
On the other hand, defendant,s witnesses
placed the speed, some as low as three, and
none above four, miles an hour. This was
not the first time intestate had attempted to
spring on moving trains. and he had been
more than once cautioned against such at
tempns. Assuming that the speed of the
train was in excess of four miles an hour.
was there a causal connection between such
breach of duty on the part of the railroad
company and the injury done to plaintiff,s
intestate?
Persons who perpetrate torts are, as a rule.
responsible, and only responsible, for the
proximate consequences of the wrongs they
commit. In other words, unless the tort be
the proximate cause of the injury complained
of. there is ab legal accountability. In that
able and valuable work, 16 Am. & Eng. Enc.
Law, 436. is this language: “A ‘proximate
cause’ may be defined as that cause which in ‘
natural and continuous sequence. unhmken
by any efficient intervening cause. producing
the result complained of, and without which
that result would not have occurred; and it
is laid down in many cases, and by leading
text writers, that, in order to warrant a find
ing that negllgence, or an act not amounting
‘to wanton wrong, is the proximate cause of
an injury, it must appear that the injury was
the natural and probable co.nsequence of the
negligence or wrongful act, and that it was
such as might or ought to have been foreseen,
in the light of the attending circumstances."
On page 431 of the same volume it is said:
“To constitute actionable negligence. there
must be not only a causal connection between
the negligence complained of and the injury
suffered, but the connection must be by a
natural and unbroken sequence, without in
tervening efiicient causes; so that, but for
the negligence of the defendant, the injury
would not have occurred. It must not only
be a cause, but it must be the proximate
that is, the direct and immediate, eflicient
cause of the injury." That philosophic law
writer Dr. Wharton, (Law of Negligence, §
75.) expresses the principle as follows: “If
the consequence flows from any particular
negligence, according to ordinary natural se
quence, without the intervention of any hu
man agency, then such sequence, whether
foreseen as probable, or unforeseen, is im
putable to the negligence." Quoting from
Chief Baron Pollock with apparent approval,
he (in section 78) says: “I entertain consid
erable doubt whether a person who has been
guilty of neg igence is responsible for all the
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consequences which may under any circum
stances arise, and in respect of mischief
which could by no possibility have been fore
seen, and which no reasonable person could
have anticipated. I am inclined to consider
the rule of law to be this: That a person is
expected to anticipate and guard against all
reasonable consequences, but that he is not 1
by the law of England expected to anticipate
and guard against that which no reasonable
‘
man would expect to occur." In the same
section he quotes approvingly the following
language from Lord Campbell: “If the
wrong and the legal damage are not known
by common experience to be usually in se
quence, and the damage does not, according
to the ordinary course of events, follow from
the wrong, the wrong and the damage are
not sufliciently conjoined or concatenated, as
cause and effect, to support an action." In
Shearman & Rediield’s Law of Negligence
(section 26) the principle is thus stated: “The
proximate cause of an event must be under
stood to be that which. in a natural and con
tinuous sequence, unbroken by any new
cause, produces that event, and without
which that event would not have occurred."
The authorities from which we have quoted
are everywhere regarded as standard. What
they assert is but the condensation of the ut
terances of a very great number of the high
est judicial tribunals, wherever the principles‘
of the common law prevail. See 16 Am. &
Eng. Enc. Law, 428. 429; Railway Co. v.
Kellogg. 94 U. S. 469; Herring v. Skaggs, 62
Ala. 180; Daughtery v. Telegraph Co., 75 Ala.
168. Lynch v. .\,urdin, 1 Q. B. (N. S.) 29, 41
E. C. L. 422. is the strongest of the cases re
lied on in support of the present action. The
injury in that case occurred in a city. The
headnote contains a summation of the facts
as follows: “Defendant (a cart man) negli
gently left his horse and cart unattended in
the street. Plaintiff, a child seven years old,
got upon the cart in play. Another child in
cautionsly led the horse on, and plaintiff was
thereby thrown down, and hurt." It was held
that the action was maintainable for the re
covery of damages, “and that it was properly
left to the jury whether defendant,s conduct
was negligent, and the negligence caused the
injury." In delivering his opinion, Lord
Denman used the following language: “If I
am guilty of negligence in leaving anything
dangerous in a place where I know it to be ex
tremeiy probable that some other person will
unjustifiably set it in motion, to the injury of a
third, and if that injury should be so brought
about, I presume that the sufferer might have
redress by action against both or either of
the two, but unquestionably against the first.
‘ * ' Can the plaintiff, then. consistently
with the authorities, maintain his action,
having been at least equally in fault? The
answer is that. supposing that fact ascertain
ed by the jury, but to this extent: that he
merely indulged the natural instinct of a
child in amusing himself with the empty cart
and deserted horse, then we think that the
defendant cannot be permitted to avail him
self of that fact. The most blamable care-
lessness of his servant having tempted the
child, he ought not to reproach the child with
yielding to that temptation." Reading the
case of Lynch v. Nurdin in the light shed up
on it by Lord Denman’s reasoning, no one
can fail to note the marked difference between
that case and the one we have in hand. The
argument by which the learned lord chief
justice supported the judgment he announced
has no application to the present one. That
case was manifestly decided on the well
recognized principle that if one leave danger
ous machinery, or any other thing of similar
nature, unattended, and in an exposed place,
and another be injured thereby, an action on
the case may be maintained for such injury,
unless plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence. Clark v. Chambers, 3 Q. B. Div.
27; Kunz v. City of Troy (N. Y. App.) 10 N.
E. 442; Stout v. Railroad Co., 2 Dill. 294,
Fed. Gas. No. 13,504; Beach, Contrib. Neg.
§§ 140, 206. Infants of tender years, and
wanting in discretion, are no
the disabling effects of contributory negli
gence. In the opinion of the court in the case
of Lynch v. Nurdin the causal connection be
tween the negligence and the injury was so
direct and patent that the driver, exercising
ordinary care and prudence, should have an
ticipated and guarded against it. The impli
cation from Lord Denman’s language is very
strong that he regarded the cart man’s con
duct as grossly negligent. Contributory nog
ligence is no defense to injuries which result
from gross negligence. But the principle de
clared in Lynch v. l\‘urdin was, if not mate
rially shaken, at least shown to be inapplica
ble to a case like the present one, in the two
later English cases of Hughes v. Macfle, 2
Hurl. & C. 744, and Mangau v. Attertou. L. R.
1 Exch. 239. See, also, McAlpin v. Powell.
70 N. Y. 126; Wendell v. Railroad Co., 91 N.
Y. 420; Railroad Co. v. Bell, 81 Ill. 76. The
case of Messenger v. Dennie, 137 Mass. 197,
is a strong authority against the right to
maintain the present. action. Another case
relied on in support of the present action is
Railroad Co. v. Gladmon, 15 Wall. 401. That
case is wholly unlike the present one, and
rests on a different principle. The negli
gence of defendant,s agent was manifest, and
the injury was the natural consequence of
the negligence. Had the driver been looking
ahead, as he should have been, he would
have seen the child,s danger, and could and
would have stopped his car before his horses
did the injury. The causal connection in
that case was complete, because the injury
resulted so naturally from the driver’s inat
tention that the law‘regards it as the proba
ble consequence of his negligence. None of
the cases cited support the contention of ap
pellee.
The ordinance of Opelika, restricting the
speed of trains within the corporate limits to
nable to .
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illustrate our views:
four miles an hour, had one purpose,—onc pol
icy. Opelika is a town probably of four or
more thousand inhabitants. The railroad
antedated the town, and caused its location
there. It runs centrally through the busi
ness portions of the place. In such condi
tions, men pursuing business avocations, as
well as idiers and curiosity seekers, will con
gregate about the depot and track of the rail
road, and will be constantly crossing, if not
standing on, the track. They do both.
Knowing this habit of men, most towns
located on railroads have ordinances requir
ing trains passing through them to move at a
low rate of speed. Why? Not because they
apprehend that reckless persons will at
tempt to board the train while in motion.
The wildest conjecture would scarcely take
in an adventure so fraught with peril. The
policy was to enable persons who might be
standing on the track, or whose business pur
suits required them to cmss it, to get ofli the
track, and thus escape the danger of a col
lision. The ordinance had no other aim.
We hold as matter of law that there was
no proof whatever in this case tending to
show a causal connection between the negli
gence charged and the injury suffered. To
Let us suppose that
the negligence charged against the railroad
company had been, not the too rapid move
ment of the train, but some imperfection, de
cay, or derangement of the ascending ladder
which caused plaintiff’s intestate to fall and
lose his life. Would any one contend the
railroad company would be liable for such
accident? And is there a difference in prin
ciple between the case supposed and the one
we have in hand? Charge No. 21, the gen
eral eharge in favor of the defendant, ought
to have been given. The great English com
mentator said, “Law is the perfection of hu
man reason." This, in a sense, is true. It
is the expression of the combined wisdom of
the legislative body. It is the creature, how
ever, of human thought, and nothing human
is perfect. Nor is it true that legislative
policy is unchanging. Conditions change,
and the law which should adapt itself to hu
man wants must change with them. Still,
while the law stands on the statute book, it
should be obeyed and conformed to as tl rule
of action. if we cut loose from its restraints,
we expose ourselves to the tempests of hu
man passion and human prejudice, and, like
a ship at sea without rudder or compass, will
surely be dashed on some of the many
shoals which are found all along the voyage
of life. .
Trial by jury is a bulwark of American, as
it has long been of English, freedom. It
wisely divides the responsibility of determi
native adjudication, of punitive administra
tion, between the judge, trained in the wis
dom and intricacies of the law, and 12 men
chosen from the common walks of nonprofes
sional life; chosen for their sound judgment
and stern impartiality. The one declares the
rules of law applicable to the issue or issues
formed, in the light of the testimony ad
duced; the other weighs the testimony, de-
termines what facts it proves, and. molded
by the law as declared by the court, renders
its verdict. In the jury box, and under the
oath the jurors have solemnly sworn on the
holy evangelists of Almighty God, there is
no room for friendship, partiality, or preju
dice; no permissible discrimination between
friends and enemies, between the rich and
the poor, between corporations and natural
persons. The ancients painted the Goddess
of Justice as blindfolded, and jurors must
‘be blind to the personal consequences of
the verdicts they render. 1f the testimo
ny convinces their judgments of the exist
ence of certain facts, they must. be blind to
the consequences which result from those
facts. A wish that it were otherwise fur
nishes no excuse for deciding against their
convictions. Justice thus administered com
mands the approbation of heaven and earth
alike; and a verdict thus rendered meets all
the requirements of the jurors oath, in the
fullest sense of the word,—a true expression
of the convictions ffxed on the minds of the
jury by the testimony. Independent of the
legal question considered above, and which
we have declared to be determinative of this
case, the verdict of the jury was so palpa
bly against the evidence that a new trial
ought to have been granted on that account.
Reversed and remanded.
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CHA‘..HBERLAIN v. orrr or osrntosn.
(54 N. W. 618, 84 \Vis. 289.)
Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Feb. 21, 1893.
Appeal from circuit court, Winnebago
county; George W. Burnell, Judge.
Action by Anna Chamberlain against the
city of Oshkosh to recover for personal in
juries caused by defendant,s alleged negli
gence. From a judgment for plaintiff, and
an order denying a new trial, defendant ap
peals. Reversed.
H. I. Weed, for appellant.
Finch & Barber, for respondent.
For an ordinary, general, and transient
slipperiness, due to the ordinary action of
the elements only, and capable of being
removed by such ordinary action of the ele
ments, there is no liability, but for a local,
unusual, and permanent sllpperiness, caused
by a defect in the street, and which the ordi
nary action of the elements would not re
move, the city is liable. Cook v. City of
Milwaukee, 24 Wis. ..70, 27 Wis. 191; Per
kins 7. City of Fond du Lac, 34 Wis. 435;
Hill v. City of Fond du Lac, 56 Wis. 242, 14
N. W. Rep. 25; Stilling v. Town of Thorp.
54 VVis. 528, 11 N. W. Rep. 906; Grossenbach
v. City of Milwaukee, 65 Wis. 31, 26 N. W.
Rep. 182; Paulson v. Town of Pelican, 79
Wis. 445, 48 N. W. Rep. 715; McDonald v.
City of Ashland, 78 Wis. 251, 47 N. W. Rep.
434; Cromarty v. City of Boston, 127 Mass.
329; Taylor v. City of Yonkers, 105 N. Y.
202, 11 N. E. Rep. 642; Todd v. City of Troy,
61 N. Y. 506; Pomfrey v. Village of Sara
toga Springs, 104 N. Y. 450, 11 N. E. Rep.
. 43; Kinney v. City of Troy, 108 N. Y. 567,
15 N. E. Rep. 728; Kenney v. City of Cohoes,
(N. Y. App.) 3 N. E. Rep. 189; Spellman v.
Inhabitants of Chicopee, 131 Mass. 443;
.Keith.v. City of Brockton, 136 Mass. 119;
Cloughessey v. City of Waterbury, 51 Conn.
405; Congdon v. City of Norwich, 37 Conn.
414; Burr v. Town of Plymouth, 48 Conn.
460; Landolt v. City of Norwich, 37 Con!0
615; Dooley v. City of Meriden, 44 Conn. 117;
Hubbard v. City of Concord, 35 N. H. 52;
Darling v. Town of Westmoreland, 52 N. H.
401; Clark v. City of Chicago, 4 Biss. 486;
Mosey v. City of Troy, 61 Barb. 580; Mayor,
etc., v. Marriott, 9 Md. 160; City of Provi
dence v. Clapp, 17 How. 161; Evans v. City
of Utica, 69 N. Y. 166; Darling v. Mayor.
etc., 18 Hun, 340; Evers v. Bridge Co., Id.
144; Blakeley v. City of Troy, Id. 167; Thomas
v. Mayor, etc., 28 Hun, 110. In all these
cases the test of liability is whether the
city is responsible for the slipperiness, either
in its formation by a structural defect in
the sidewalk, or by allowing it to remain
too long after it is formed. Smooth and
level as may be dangerous as well as rough
ice, and the question simply is, was any
negligence of the city the cause of its forma
tion or retention? The following cases are
a direct authority on this point: Cromarty
LAw DAM.-—8
v. City of Boston, 127 .\Iass. 320; Spellman
v. Inhabitants of Chicopee, 131 Mass. 443:
Cloughessey v. City of Waterbury, 51 Conn.
405; Paulson v. Town of Pelican, 79 Wis. 445,
48 N. W. Rep. 715. If the condition is artifi
cial, instead of natural, and is caused by the
negligence of the city, the city is liable.
The case of Spellman v. Inhabitants of Chic
opee, supra, is almost identical in the facts
with the case at bar.
ORTON. J. This action is to recover dama
ges for a personal injury to the plaintiff, oc
casioned by the wnnt of repair and defective '
condition of a walk in Merritt street, in the
city of Oshkosh. The defect is thus describ al
in the complaint: "The said street, known as
‘Merritt Street,‘ at a certain place in s id
street to wit, on the south side of said Merritt
street, on the southeast corner thereof where
said Merritt street intersects with Ford stnet
of said city, was, (on the 21st day of Febru
ary, 1SS9,) and for a period of four weeks or
more had been, unsafe, insufllcient, defective.
and badly out of repair, in this, to wit, that at
the point of junction between the stone cross
ing on the south side of said Merritt street,
where said Merritt street intersects with
Ford street, and the sidewalk on the south
side of said Merritt street, where said stone
crossing ends, the authoriths of the city of
Oshkosh, to wit, this defendant, negligently
permitted a large hole to exist within the
usual line and course of travel over said stone
crossing and sidewalk. and neglig tly per
mitted and allowed said hole to exis anl re
main without placing any guard over or
around the same, and negligently allowcd.
said hole to become filled with water, and to
become frozen over with a large surface of
smooth ice, and negligently failed to place
anyprotection, guard, or cover over or around
said surface of ice, ard failed to take any pre
caution to prevent or w.:rn ii aveiers ov. r said
crossing or sidewalk from walking upon and
over said surface of ice. That persons trav
eling over and upon said crossing and side
walk were compelled to walk upon and over
said surface of ice, and that the aforesaid
city authorities, to wit, the defendant, neg
ligently failed to provide a safe and suillcient
crossing or passage over or around said large
surface of smooth ice." The p‘.a'ntift"s in
jury, and the manner of it, are substantially
described as follows: The plaintiff, while
traveling upon said Merritt stnet and over
the said stone cros.-ing, “did by necessity and
in tfie ordinary course of travel, walk'upon
and over said large surface of ice, and with
out any fault on her part she fell upon said
surface of ice with gre It iorce," and received
great bodily injuries therefrom. After the
plaintifl! was sworn as a witmss in her own
behalf, the defendant city interposed a de
murrer ore tenus. on ‘.1t8 ground that the com
plaint did not state a cause of action, and the
objection to any evidence under it was over
ruled, and emep.ion taken. The plaintiff tes
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tiihd that when she came to that point "her
feet came from under her, and she came
down on her back. She did not notice any
barriers or guards around this place, or any
ashes upon the sidewalk where she slipped."
According to the evidence, thedcpression in
the street, where the water had accumulated
which made the ice on which the plaintiff
slipped down and was injured, was made by
the junction of a sidewalk coming down
Ford street with the stone cross walk over
Merritt street. It would seem that the slight
difference of the grade of the two streets
made the depression. ’l.‘he slopé of the plank
sidewalk down to its junction with the stone
cross walk was only four inches, and the de
pression in the stone cross walk where the ice
accumulated was from an inch to an inch an].
a half. The plank walk was over the gutter
on Merritt street. This defect, if any, ap
pears to have been in the plan of the work
and its construction. At the t.onclu4ion of the
testimony the defendant,s motion for a non
suit was overruled. The jury found a special
verdict “that the cross walk was in a defect
ive and dangerous condition," and “that such
condition caused the plaintiffs injury," and
assessed her damages at $1,100. it will be
observed that the complaint does not charge
that the plaintiff,s injury was causcd by a
hole or depression in the cross walk, but that
it was caused wholly by the smooth surface
of the ice at that place, and such was the
e\‘idmce. The plaintiff slipped and ft; ii on the
smooth surface of the ice. The ice was the
proximate cause of the injury. The depres
sion in the walk where the ice formed, if a
dcfect, and a cause of the injury in any sense.
was a remote, and not the proximate, cause
of the injury. But at this time there was 1a)
hole. or even depression, at that place. It
was filled up by the ice. It is too plain for
argument that the cause of the plaintiffs
injury, both by the complaint and testimony,
was the smooth surface of the ice on the cross
walk. The special verdict is careful not to
state the defect or dangerous condition. It
will be observed, also, that the negligence
of the city consists “in failing to provide a
safe crossing or passage over and around said
large surface of smooth ice. and allowed and
permitted said crossing to remain in such in
suflicient, unsafe, and defective condition for
a period of four weeks, and failed to take any
precaution to prevent or warn travelers over
said crossing or sidewalk from walking upon
and over said surface of ice." The existence
and continuance of said ice for four weeks
was the presumptive notice to the city of the
defect complained of. The plaintiff does not
complain of being injured by the hole or de
pression, but by the “large surface of smooth
ice." The depression was the cause of the
water accumulating there, and the water,
combined with a low temperature, caused the
ice to form which injured the piaintiff. The
depression was a remote cause or cause of
causes. The proximate or direct cause was
the ice, and this must be the cause of action. I.
"Causa proxima. non remota, spectatur,"—the
proximate, and not the remote, cause, must be
considered. The cause nearest in order of
causation, which is adequate to produce the
result, is the direct cause. In law, only the
direct cause is considered. These are fa
miliar maxims.
cause which leads to, and is instrumental in
producing, the result." 3 Amer. & Eng. Enc.
Law, 45; State v. Railroad Co., 52 N. H. 528.
In this case the hole or depression is not the
cause of the injury for which an action may
be brought. It is too remote. There is a di
rect cause of the injury, and that is the ice on
which she slipped down, and that is the only
one which can be considered. The defect in
the street or walk is the ice, and the negli
gence of the city consists in allowing it to re
main. This was dangerous to the traveling
public, and the cause of the plaintiff,s injury
in the law and by the complaint and testi
mony. This ice was smooth and level, and
accumulated through the sole agency of the
elements and in the order of nature. No argu
ment, speculation, or casuistry can make this
case any different from this. The main and
important question which first presents itself
;
on the demurrer to the complaint, and again
‘
on the motion for a nonsuit, is, is such a con
dition of the walk an actionable defect? This
question is settled by this court in the nega- ’
tive in many cases, after a very full examina
tion of the authorities elsewhere, which we
need not cite. "When the walk is slippery be
cause of the smooth surface of the snow and
ice which had accumulated upon it," such a
defect is not actionable. Cook v. City of Mil
waukee, 24 Wis. 270, 27 Wis. 191. In ,
Perkins v. City of Fond du Lac, 34 Wis.
435, “the walk was entirely covered with
packed snow and ice, and the whole sur
face of the walk was very smooth and
slippery." It was held that such a con
dition of the walk did not alone constitute
an actionable defect; and so in Grosseubach v.
City of Milwaukee, 65 Wis. 31, 26 N. W. Rep(
182. This holding is most reasonable. Such ti
defect in a walk or street is common and V
natural everywhere in the winter season, and
such actions would be numberiess, unreasona
ble, and oppressive. The municipalities are
powerless to prevent or remove such a com
mon and natural condition. The authorities
cited by the learned counsel of the respondent
are not applicable to this case. They are
cases where other defects combine with
the ice to cause the injury. Such defects
must be present with the ice, and they to
gether constitute a cause of action; as
where the ice is formed on a steep de
clivity or descending grade, or there is some
other condition of the walk, which, to
gether with the ice. makes the walk danger
ous, as in Grossenbach v. City of Milwaukee
and Perkins v. City of Fond du Lac,
supra, and other cases in this court. But
here the hole or depression does not com
I
"The proximate cause is the //
/
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blue with the ice, and is not present produced the result, and was not the direct,
with it. There is no hole at the time, efficient, or adequate cause, which alone is ac
‘_ as it is filled with ice, and the surface tionabie. The court should have sustained
is made level as ice can be anywhere. the demurrer ore tenus, or, failing in that,
The plaintlff was not injured by stepping into ought to have ordered a nonsuit on the evi
the hole, but by slipping on the ice. But I dence. The judgment of the circuit court is
I/ have said enough of this. The hole was only reversed. and the cause is remanded for athe remote cause, or cause of causes, which new trial.
DIRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES—IN TORT.
3 3
116
BLYTHE et al. v. DE.\",ER & R. G. RY. CO.
(25 Pac. 702, 15 Colo. 333.)
Supreme Court of Colorado. Jan. 10, 1891.
Commissioners‘ decision. Error to dis
trict court, Arapahoe county.
Plaintiffs in error brought suit against
the defendant as a common carrier ior
the loss of a package of merchandise con
. sisting of gold and silver watches, watch
cases and movements, of the alleged value
of $726.95, delivered to defendant at Ala
mosa by one J. B. Moomaw. to be carried
as an express package, directed to and to
be delivered to plaintiffs at Denver. The
package was not valued, and was accept
ed and receipted ior as an ordinary pack
age at a nominal valuation of $50, upon
which charges of 65 cents were paid in ad
vance ior its transportation. The de
fendant, after denying the material alle
gations of the complaint, admitted the
receipt oi the package, the payment of the
money for its transportation, the execu
tion and delivery of its receipt ior the
same, and specially alleged as defenses:
1"1,rst, that the car in which such package
was being transported was blown from
the track by a furious wind, and the car
and contents destroyed by fire, and that .
theloss was by inevitable accident and
“the act of God;" second, that the ship
per frauduenfly concealed the value of the
package, and it was received as being only
of the value oi $50; that it was placed in
the body oi the car, where ordinary pack
ages were usually carried; that defend
ant had a fire-proof safe in the car, and
had the shipper given the true value, and
paid transportation ior such value, the
goods would have been placed in the safe,
and would not have been lost; that. by
the terms of the receipt given, defendant
wasexempted from any liability exceeding
$50. A replication was filed putting in
issue the special matters pleaded in de
fense, and averring negligence in not so
curing the package in the safe, and in not
making proper efforts to save the prop
erty at the time of the disaster. The case
was tried to a jury. resulting in a verdict
for the defendant, and judgment upon the
verdict.
Lucius P. Marsh, ior plaintiffs in error.
Wulcott & Valle, for defendant in error.
REED, C., (after stating the facts as
above.) It is concederhthat the wrecking
of a portion of the train, such portion con
sisting of one engine and four cars, one
being the express-car in which the goods
were being carried, was by “the act of
God, " and inevitable. it is also conceded
in argument that havinga coal fire burning
in a stove, and a lighted lamp in the com
partment, as testified to, was not negli
gence on the part of the carrier. Counsel
for plaintiffs in error in reply say: “In the
brief of defendant in error, counsel have
assumed ior us a claim which we havenot
made, and they then proceed to demolish
such assumed claim. They assume ior
us that we claim there was negligence in
carrying in the car a stove with fire in it.' * " There was negligence,—we may
call it by that name,—but such negli
gencc was in not making the
efiorts to save the
had been incurred. We make no claim
that there was negligence in carrying a
stove in the car." By these concessions,
two important questions are eliminated,
and the issues are narrowed, the only
questions remaining being: First. Was
“ the act of God " the proximate and direct
cause of the loss sustained, so as to ex
requisite
onerate the carrier from liability, or was v
it the remote cause, and the fire against
which the carrier is supposed to be an in
surer the proximate and direct cause?
Second. After the wrecking and overturn
ing of the train by “the act oi God," was
the carrier guilty of negligence in falling
to protect and secure the goods in the
burning car?
Great ability and research have been ex
pended in attempting to arrive at and de
termine upon some general definition of
the terms “proximate " and “remote_
causes and establish a rule and a line of
demarkation between the two. Such ef
iorts appear to have been but partially
successful. Both have received various
definitions, though differently worded,
amounting to practically the same thing.
But, in almost every instance where they
have been attempted to be applied, their
applicability seems to have been deter
mined by the peculiar circumstances of the
case underconsideration. Wcbsterdcfines
“proximate cause," “that which imme
rliately precedes and produces the effect,
as distinguishd from the remote, mediate,
or predisposing cause. " And. Diet. Law:
“The nearest, the immediate, the direct
cause; the eflicient cause; the cause that
sets another or other causes in operation,
or dominant cause. " But with these defi
nitions in view, when two causes unite
to produce the loss, the question still re
mains, which was the proximate cause?
In Insurance Co. v. Tweed, 7 Wall. 52, the
late lamented Mr. Justice MILLER said:
“ We have had cited to us a general review
of the doctrine of proximate and remote
causes, as it has arisen (1 been décided
in the courts in a great- ,ariety of cases.
It would be an unprofitable labor to en
ter into an examination of these cases. If
we could deduce from them the best pos
sible expression of the rule. it would re
main after all to decide each case largely
upon the special facts belonging to it, and
often upon the very nicest discrimina
tions." In Howard Fire Ins. Co. v. Nor
wlch & N. Y. Transp. Co., 12 Wall. 199, in
delivering the opinion of the court, Mr.
Justice SraoNo said:
that cause which set the other in motion,
and gave to it its efficiency to do harm
at the time of the disaster, must rank as
predominant. " In Railroad Co. v. Kellogg,
94 U. S. 475, it is said: “The inquiry must
thereiore always be whether there was any
intermedia te cause disconnected from the
primary fault, and self-operating, which
produced the injury. " In Insurance Co. v.
Boon, 95 U. S. 130, it is said: “The prox
imate cause is the efficient cause; the one
that necessarily sets the other causes in
operation. The causes that are merely
incidental or instruments of a superior or
controlling agency are not the proximate
causes and the responsible ones, though
goods after the peril '
“ And certainly, .
DIRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES-—IN TORT. 117
they may be nearer in time to the result.
It is only when the causes are independ-.
ent of each other that the nearest is, of
course, to be charged with the disaster.”
Leaving out of consideration, as we
must, by concession of counsel, all ques
tion of negligence in regard to the burning
fire in the stove, a lighted kerosene lamp,
and regarding each of them as securely
protected against damage as prudence
would require. and applying the rules
above laid down, it becomes apparent
that the overturning and wrecking of the
car by the violence of the wind was the
proximate, direct’ and efficient cause of‘
the loss, and the fire following, if not in
stantaneously, immediately after, with
out negligence or any wrongful act oi the
carrier intervening to produce it, must be
regarded as resulting and incidental. It is
ably contended in argument, and many
supposed authorities in support of the po
sition are cited, that the negligence of the
carrier in failing to use proper exertion to
save the contents oi the car, after it was
overturned, rendered the defendant liable
ior the loss. ll‘, by proper diligence and
attention the goods couhi have been res
cued, a failure to secure them would have
flxed the liability of the carrier. There
can be no doubt of the correctness of this
conclusion.‘ The questions. what was the
proximate cause oi the loss, and of negli
gence. were questions of tact to be deter
mined by the jury from the evidence, un
der proper instructions from the court.
There was not muchconflict of testim,:my.
In Railroad Co. v. Kellogg, supra, it is
said: “In the nature of things, there is in
every transaction a succession of events,
more or less dependent upon those preced
ing, and it is the province of thejury to
. look at this succession O! events or iacts,
and ascertain whether they are naturally
and probably connected with each other
by a continuous sequence, or are dissev
ered by new and independent agencies;
and this must be determined in view of
the circumstances existing at the time."
The jury iound as a fact that the “ act of
God " was the proximate cause. and also ‘
found as a fact that there was no negli
gence. Viewed in the light oi all the evi
dence, and of attendant circumstances,
the finding of the jury was fully warrant
ed. The iorce of the gale was such as to
blow the cars from the track over the em
bankment. It was shown to be almost
impossible ior men to stand or walk, and
they were compelled to prostrate them
selves under the lee oi the track or bank
to escape its fury. The air was so full of
dust and flying material that scarcely any
thing could be seen. The car contained
inflammable material, and the fire suc
ceeded the overturning almost instantane
ously. The messenger escaped with great
difiiculty, and not without injury from
the flames. The position of the car was
such that all movable goods must have
been hurled into the corner of the top of
the car. From the iorce of the wind, and
combustible material of the car, it is ob
vious that the destruction oi the car and
contents was inevitable in a very brief
space of time, and that any attempt to
rescue the goods would have been an
availing.
Considerable criticism is directed to the
instructions oi the court. Some of those
criticised, and upon which errors are as
signed. are in regard to negligence in the
use of the store and lamp. As counsel
concedes in his final argument that there
was no negligence in that respect, a re
view oi them becomes unnecessary. Con
siderable attention is given to the eighth
instruction. in which the learned judge
charged: " Where one is pursuing a lawful
avocation, in a lawful manner, and some
thing occurs which no human skill or pre
caution could ioresee or prevent, and as a
consequence the accident takes nlace. this
iscalled ‘inevitable accident’ or the ‘act of
God.’ " The objection urged is more techni
cal than substantial. Whileitis, possibly,
not technically correct, and while there is
a legal distinction between “inevitable ac
cident" and the “act of God," we can see
nothing in it to the prejudice of the plain
tiff, or that could have misled the jury.
Tile immediate resulting cause producing
the loss was the fire, which might proper
ly he termed an “inevitable accident"
growing out of the iormer disaster; while
the direct cause oi the agency that worked
the destruction was the “act of God,"
putting the resulting agent at work. We
think the charge, taken as a whole, was B.
fair and impartial statement of the law,
and should be sustained. We advise that
the judgment be afiirmed.
. RICHMOND and BISSELL, Cf.‘.., concurmug.
PER CURIAM. For the reasons stated
in the ioregoing opinion the judgment of
the court below is aflirmed.
ELLIOTT, J., having tried this cause
below, did not participate in this decision.
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HAVERLY v. STATE LINE & S. R. CO.
(19 Atl. 1013, 135 Pa. 50.)
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. May 19, 1890.
Appeal from court of common pleas, Brad
ford county.
Action by Leroy Haverly against the State
Line At Sullivan Railroad Company for dam
age caused by fire. The testimony showed
that on May 11. 1880, about 4 or 5 o’clock P.
M. a train of defendant’s passed over its road,
and near the tract of land where plaintiff was
lumbering; that soon afterwards smoke was
seen issuing from a stump in the line of the
defendant,s right of way; that one of plain
tiffs agents was sent to put out this fire,
who, returning, reported he had done so;
that no further smoke was seen in or around
the stump until about 10 o,clock A. M. of the
following day, when the plaintiff himself
sent a servant, who, finding the stump on
fire. poured water thereon until he supposed
it was entirely extinguished, and he re
mained there half or three-quarters of an
hour, until he satisfied himself that no fire
remained; that about noon of the same day,
the wind coming up and blowing lively, a
fire broke out on said tract in the vicinity of
said stump, which could not, on account of
the wind, be controlled by the plaintiff or his
agents, and destroyed a quantity of logs in
which the plaintiff had an interest. Plaintiff
obtained judgment. Defendant appeals.
Edward Overton, John F. Sanderson, and
Rodney A. Mercur, for appellant. H. N.
Williams, I. MCP]t€7,S0fl, E. J. Angle, and
R. H. Williams, for appellee.
MITCHELL, J. The test by which the line
is to be drawn between proximate and re
mote cause, in reference to liability for the
consequences of negligence, has been firmly
established by the three cases of Railroad Co.
v. Kerr, 62 Pa. St. 353; Railroad Co. v. Hope,
80 Pa. St. 373; and Hoag v. Railroad Co., 85
Pa. St. 293. It is most elaborately expressed
by Chief Justice AGNEw in Railroad Co. v.
Hope, in the iollowing language: “The jury
must determine’ therefore, whether the facts
constitute a continuous succession of events.
so linked together that they become a natural
whole, or whether the chain of events is so
broken that they become independent, and
the final result cannot be said to be the nat
ural and probable consequence of the pri
mary cause,—the negligence of the defend
And the rule is again put somewhat
more tersely by the present chief justice in
‘ Hoag v. Railroad Co., as follows: “The in
jury must be the natural and probable conse
quence of the negligence,—such a conse
quence as * * * might and ought to
have been foreseen by the wrong-doer as
likely to flow from his act." The three lead
ing cases above referred to, though frequent
ly cited on opposite sides of the same argu
ment, are not at all in conflict in principle.
The different results which were reached in
them depended not on any different view of
I
l
the law, but of the facts. and on the applica
tion of the familiar doctrine that, where a
plain inference is to be drawn from undis
puted facts. the court will decide it as a
matter of law. In Railroad Co. v. Kerr the
negligence had been held by the court below
to be the proximate cause of the plaintiffs
loss. This court held that it was remote, and
did not award a new centre, but said that it
would do so if plaintiff should desire it upon
grounds shown. The question was then
new; an 1, from what was said about the
centre, the court itself does not seem to have
been entirely clear that it should be decided
as matter of law. It may be doubted wheth
er, on the same facts, the court would not
now send it to a jury. Certainly no subse
quent case has assumed to decide where the
facts were so near the line. Hoag v. Railroad
Co. was a much clearer case, and so were
Railway Co. v. Taylor, 104 Pa. St. 306;
West Mahonoy Tp. v. Watson, 116 Pa. St.
344, 9 Atl. Rep. 430; Railway Co. v. Trich,
117 Pa. St. 890, 11 Atl. Rep. 627; and the
other cases where the court has pronounced
the negligence to be remote as matter of law.
But, whatever the result of the views taken
of the facts in these cases, the principles of
decision are the same in all.
In the present case the learned judge left
the question of proximate or remote cause to .
the jury, in substantial conformity with the
doctrine of Railroad Co. v. Hope. Appellant,
however. claims that the succession of events .
was so broken as to bring the case under
Hoag v. Railroad Co., and require the judge
to direct the jury in its favor. The break in
the chain of events was merely a gap in the
time. Had the fire extended from the stump
to plaintiff’s lumber without interval, on the ,
same afternoon, this case would have been ex
actly parallel with Railroad Co. v. Hope. But
the fact that the fire smouldered awhile in
the stump, and’ after it was supposedto have
been extinguished, broke out again the next
day, while it makes the conclusion less
obvious that the damage was done by the
same fire. does not interpose any new cause,
or enable the court to say as matter of law .
that the casual connection was broken. The (
sequence from the original fire to the burn
ing of plaintiffs logs was interrupted by two
apparent cessations of the fire, but the jury
have found that the cessations were only ap
parent, leaving intervals of time in the vis
ible progress of the fire, but making no
real break at all in the actual connection.
In Railroad Co. v. Kerr, (page 366,) it is said
by Tnomrson, C. .I., that the rule “is not to
be controlled by time or distance, but by the
succession of events;" and in Hoag v. Rail
road Co., TRUNKEY, P. J., in charging the
jury, had quoted the foregoing, and added:
“ Whether the fire communicated to the plain
tiff's property within a few minutes, or after
the lapse of hours, from the negligent set,
may be immaterial." It is said in this case
that the agents of plaintiff on the ground did
not anticipate a further spread of the fire aft
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er the interval of time, and therefore it can
not be assumed that the defendant should
have anticipated it. But the agents of plain
tiff did not expect it because they thought the
fire had been put out, not because they did
not see the danger of its spreading while it
was burning; and this was the danger that
appellant was bound to contemplate, to-wit,
the natural and probable consequence of the
original act, not the effect of the supposed
extinguishment subsequently. The pauses
in the progress of the fire, therefore, and the
lapse of time, while matter for the considera
tion of the jury in determining the continuity
of effect, do not of themselves make such a
change as requires the court to say that they
break the connection.
But it is argued that it was not until the
next morning after the fire started in the
stump, and during the time when it was ap
parently extinguished, that the wind rose,
and became a new cause of the spread of the
fire to plaintilfs lumber. This, however,
was, like the point already considered, de
pendent on the circumstances. In Railroad
Co. v. Hope, one of the facts was a strong
wind which carried the fire, and so, also, it
was in Railroad Co. v. Lacey. 89 Pa. St. 458,
and in Railroad Co. v. McKeen, 90 Pa. St.
129; and in this last case, Tmmxsy, J., says
the jury “could also determine whether dry
weather and high winds in the spring-time
are extraordinary, and whether, under these
conditions, * * * the injury was within
the probable foresight of him whose negli
gence ran through from the beginning to the
end." No doubta hurricane or a gale maybe
such as to be plainly out of the usual course 1
of nature, and therefore to be pronounced by
the court as the intervention of a new cause.
Such a wind would be like the flood in Mor
rison v. Davis, 20 Pa. St. 171. But the or
dinary danger of wind helping a fire to spread
is one of the things to be naturally anticipated.
The lapse of time before the wind rose, in this
case, was therefore not clearly a new cause
to be so pronounced by the court, but a cir
cumstance to be considered, with the others,
by the jury. On this branch of the case,
generally, the injury was not more remote
from the alleged cause than in Railroad Co. v.
Hope. supra. llailr’oad Co. v. Lacey, 89 Pa. St.
458, and Railroad Co. v. McKeen, 90 Pa. St.
129, and not so much so as in Fairbanks v.
Kerr, 70 Pa. St. 86, and Railroad Co. v. Keigh
ron, 74 Pa. St. 316, in all of which the ques
tion was held to have been properly submitted
to the jury.
There remains only the question of con
tributory negligence, and we do not flnd any
evidence that would have justified taking
this from the jury. If plaintiff had not
known of the fire in the stump’ he would,
have had no duty in regard to it; but, know
ing of it, he was bound to take all reasonable
and practicable measures to prevent its
spreading to his lumber. He was not an
insurer. The measure of his duty in this
regard was reasonable care and diligence.
and whether he used these was fairly and ac
curately submitted to the jury. That they
iound against the defendant’s view was no
fault of their instruction as to the law. Judg
ment aflirmed.
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LEWIS v. FLINT & P. M. RY. C0.
(19 N. W. 744, 54 Mich. 55.)
Supreme Court of Michigan. June 11, 1884.
Error to Wayne. Plaintiff brings error.
Blodget & Patchin and G. I. Walker, for
appellant W. L. Webber and 0. F‘. Wis
ner, for appellee.
COOLEY, C. J. Action to recover dam
ages for a personal injury. The facts as
they appeared on the trial were as follows:
The plaintiff resides in the township of
Huron, a few miles east of Belden station,
on the road of defendant. He was at
Wayne station on the evening of January
12, 1883, awaiting the train which was to go
south past Belden in the night. The train
left Wayne at 3:05 in the morning of the
13th, and he procured his ticket and took
passage for Belden, where the train was
due at 3:30. The night was dark, cold. and
wet. The train stopped when “Belden"
was called, and plaintiff got off. Belden
was only a flag station for this train, and
there was no one in charge of the station
house, and no light there. When plalntiff
got off the train he was told by the brake
man or conductor that they had run by the
station about two car lengths, and he re
plied that if that was all, it was no matter,
as he had to go that way. An east and
west highway crosses the railroad about 24
rods south of the station-house, which the
plaintiff would take in going to his home.
If he‘ was two car lengths beyond the sta
tion-house, he would still be north of the
highway; and, supposing that to be the
case, he followed the track along south, in
preference to going back to the station
house,‘from which a passage east of the
track would have led him to the highway.
The piaintiff knew the place well, and knew
that on the track he must cross an open
cattle-guard to reach the highway. He had
crossed this before, and sometimes found a
plank laid over it Passing on he soon came
to trees which he knew were some distance
south of the highway, and he then knew the
information given him as to where he was
when he alighted from the train was erro
neous. He turned about to retrace his
steps, and followed the track in the direc
tion of the highway. This he did carefully.
because it was very dark, and he knew
there was an open cattle-guard on the south
side of the highway, as well as on the north
side. He was looking for this cattle-guard
constantly and carefully. There were burn
ing kiins near to the track on his right, and
the smoke from these affected his eyes, but
he saw a switch light, which he knew was
near the crossing, but which at the time
was too dim to aid him. He continued to
approach the cattle-guard carefully, intend
ing, if there was a timber or plank over it, to
cross upon that; and if not, then to pass
down into it and climb out. In the dim
light he saw what he believed to be the cat
tle-guard, which seemed to be several paces
off, but at the very next step one foot slip
pod, and as he attempted to save himself by
springing upon the other, the other foot
caught, and he was precipitated into the
cattle-guard, and he received an injury of a
very serious and permanent nature. He
was for a time senseless, but then succeed
ed in drawing himself out by his elbows,—
not being able to use his lower limbs,—and
with great difficulty he reached a neighbor
ing tavern, where he was cared for.
On the trial a claim was made on the part
of the defense that the plaintiff was negli
gent in following the railroad track back to
the cattle-guard, and in attempting to cross
it, when he might have left the track to the
right and passed along the field until he
came to the highway; and evidence was
given to show that he would have encoun
tered no impediments. But, in such a night
as this was, it is not clear that the field
would have afforded a safer passage than
the highway, and his failure to take it
would at most only raise a question of neg
ligence on his part which would necessarily
go to the jury. Railroad Co. v. Van Stein
burg, 17 .\lich. 118; Billings v. Breinig, 45
Mich. 72, 7 N. W. 722; Railroad Co. v. Mil
ler. 46 Mich. 537, 9 N. W. 841; Marcott v.
Railroad Co., 47 Mick. 7, 10 N. W. 3. In
this case the court took the case from the
jury, and directed a verdict for the defend
ant. This direction is understood to have
been given on the ground that the injury
which the plaintiff suffered was not proxi
mate to the wrong attributable to the de
fendant, and for that reason would not sup
port an action.
ant consisted in carrying the plaintiff past
the station, and then giving him erroneous
information as to where he was.
jury suffered was not a proximate conse
quence of this wrong, the instruction of the
court was right; otherwise, not. The diffi
culty here is in determining what is and
what is not a proximate consequence in con
templation of law.
For the plaintiff, the cases are cited in
which it has been held that one whose neg
ligence causes a tire by, the spreading of
which the property of another is destroyed,
is liable for the damages, though the prop
erty for which the compensation was claim
ed was only reached by the fire after it had
passed through intervening fields or build
ings. Kellogg v. Railroad Co., 26 Wis. 223;
Fent v. Railroad Co., 59 Ill. 349; Wiley v.
Railroad Co., 44 N. J. Law, 248; Railroad Co.
v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469. But these cases,
we think, are not analogous to the one be
fore us. The negligent fire was the direct
and sole cause of the injury in each in
stance, and there was no intervening cause
whatever. The cases are in harmony with
Hoyt v. Jeffers, 30 Mich. 181. The case of
Pennsylvania Co. v. Hoagland, 78 Ind. 203,
I
The wrong of the defend- .
If the in- .
DIRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES—IN TORT. 121
seems, at first view, to be more in point.
The action in that case was brought by a
woman, who, in consequence of misinforma
tion on the part of the person in charge
of a railroad train, left the car in the night
time at the wrong stopping place, and wan
dered about for an hour or more before
she could ffnd shelter, taking cold from ex
posure. But here, as in the other cases cit
ed, there was no cause intervening the
wrong complained of and the resulting m
jury, and the question of proximate cause
does not appear to have been raised in the
case. Smith y. Packet Co., 86 N. Y. 408, is
also relied upon, but it is unlike this in the
important particular that the intervening
cause, which, after the first wrong on the
part of the defendant, operated to bring in
jury to the plaintiff, was a neglect of proper
care, which the court held was due from the
defendant to the plaintiff under the circum
stances, so that all the injury received was a
proximate result of the defendant,s neglect
of duty.
The case of Brown v. Chicago, etc., R. Co.,
54 Wis. 3-Q, 11 N. W. 356, more nearly re
sembles the present case than any other to
which our attention has been called by coun
sel for the plaintiff. The facts, as stated in
the prevailing opinion, are the following:
The plaintiffs, with their child, 7 years old,
were being carried on defendant,s cars, with
Mauston for their destination. and when they
arrived at a station three miles east of Maus
ton they left the train, under the direction of
the brakeman, who told them they were at
\Iauston. It was in the night; it was cloudy
and wet; there was a freight train standing
on a side track where they were put off the
train; there was no platform, and no lights
visible, except on the freight train. Plain
tiffs soon ascertained they were not at Maus
ton, but did not know where they were.
They did not see the station-house, though
there was one, hidden from their view by
the freight train. Tney supposed they were
at a place two miles east, where the train
sometimes stopped, but where there was no
station-house. They started west on the
track towards Mauston, expecting to find a
house where they might stop, but did not find
one until they came to a bridge, within a
mile of Manston, and then they thought it
easier to go on to that place than to seek
shelter at the house, which was a considera
ble distance from the track. Mrs. Brown
was pregnant at the time, and when she ar
rived at Mauston was quite exhausted. She
had, during the night, severe pains, which
continued from time to time, and were fol
lowed by flowing, and at length by a miscar
riage, inflammation, and serious iliness.
The plaintiffs claimed that the miscarriage
and subsequent sickness were all caused by
the walk Mrs. Brown was compelled to take
to get from the place where they were left
by the train to Mauston, and the question
in the case was whether the defendant was
liable for the injury to Mrs. Brown, admit
ting it to have been caused by her walk
The majority of the court finding that
“there was no intervening independent
cause of the injury other than the act of the-
defendant," and that "all the acts done by
the plaintiffs, and from which the injury
flowed, were rightful on their part, and
compelled by the act of the defendant," heldi
that “the injury to Mrs. Brown was the di
rect result of the defendant,s negligence,
and that such negligence was the proximate,
and not the remote, cause of the injury,"
quoting Lord Ellenborough in Jones v. Boyce,
1 Starkie, 493, that “if 1 place a man in such
a situation that he must adopt a perilous al
ternative, I am responsible for the conse
quences."
The case of Car Co. v. Barker, 4 Colo. 844,
is opposed to the case in Wisconsin, as are
also Hobbs v. Railroad Co., L. R. 10 Q. B.
111I and Francis v. Transfer Co., 5 310. App.
7. But it is not necessary to express any
opinion upon the conflict which these cases
disclose, because in the case before us there .
was an independent cause intervening the
fault of the defendant and the injury the
plaintiff sustained, and from which the in
jury resulted as a direct and immediate con
sequence. To show what is understood by
intervening cause, it may be useful to refer
to a few cases:
Livie v. Janson, 12 East, 648, was a case
of insurance on a ship warranted free of
American condemnation. In sailing out of
New York she was damaged by perils of the
sea, stranded, and wrecked on Governor,s
island, and then seized and condemned. It
was the peril of the see. that caused the ves
sel to be seized and condemned; but as the
condemnation was the proximate cause of
the loss, the insurers were held not liable.
A similar case is Delano v. Insurance Co.,
10 Mass. 354, where a like result was reach
ed.
In Tisdale v. Norton, 8 Metc. (Mass) 388,
the facts were that a highway was defective
anu the plaintiff, who was using it, went
out of it into the adjoining field, where he
sustained an injury. He brought suit
against the town, whose duty it was to keep
the highway in repair. But the court held
that only as a remote cause could the in
jury of the plaintiff be said to be due to the
defect in the highway. The proximate, not
the remote, cause is that which is referred
to in the statute which gives an action
against the town; and the proximate cause
in this case was outside the highway, not
within it. .
In Anthony v. Slaid, 11 Metc. (Mass) 290,
the plaintiff, who was contractor with a
town to support for a specified time and for
a fixed sum all the town paupers in sickness
and in health, brought suit against one who,
it was alleged, had assaulted and beaten one
of the paupers, as a consequence of which
the plaintiff was put to increased expense
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for care and support. but the action was held
not maintainable.
In Silver v. Frazier, 3 Allen, 382. it was
decided that a principal whose agent has
disobeyed his instructions, induced to do
so by the false representations of a third
party, cannot maintain an action against
such third party for the damage sustained.
Said Bigelow, C. J.: “The alleged loss or
injury suffered by the plaintiff is not the
direct and immediate result of the defend
ant’s wrongful act. Stripped of its techni
cal lunguage, the declaration charges only
that the agent employed by the plaintiff to
do a certain piece of work disobeyed the
orders of his principal, and was induced to
do so by the false statement of the defend
ant. In other words, the plaintiff alleges
that his agent violated his duty, and thereby
did him an injury, and seeks to recover dam
ages therefor by an action against a third
person, on the ground that he induced the
agent, by false statements, to go contrary to
the orders of his principal. Such an action
is, we believe, without precedent. The im
mediate cause of injury and loss to the plain
tiff is the breach of duty of his agent. This
is the proximate cause of damage. The
motives or inducements which operated to
cause the agent to do an unauthorized act
are too remote to furnish a good cause of
action to the plaintiff."
In Dubuque Wood & Goal Ass‘n v. Du
buque, 30 Iowa, 176, the facts were that the
plaintiff had a quantity of wood deposited
at one end of a bridge, which was to be tak
en over the bridge into the city of Dubuque.
The bridge was out of repair, and, while
awaiting repair by the city, whose duty it
was, the wood was carried away by a flood.
The plaintiff sued the city for the value of
his wood; but it was held he could not re
cover. Beck’ J., in deciding the case, il
lustrates the principle as follows: “An own
er of lumber deposited upon the levee of the
city of Dubuque, exposed to the floods of the
river, starts with his team to remove it.
A bridge built by the city, which he at
tempts to cross, from defects therein, falls,
and his horses are killed. By the breaking
of the bridge and the loss of his team he
is delayed in removing his property. On
account of this delay his lumber is carried
away by the flood and lost. The proximate
consequence of the negligence of the city is
the 10s of his horses; the secondary conse
quence, resulting from the first consequence,
is the delay in removing the lumber, which
finally caused its loss. Damage on account
of the first is recoverable, but for the second
is denied." Similar to this are Daniels v.
Ballantine, 23 Ohio St. 532; and McCiary
v. Railroad Co., 3 Neb. 44. In each of these
cases the negligence of the defendant left
the property of the plaintiff where, by an act
of God,—in one case a flood. and in the other
a tornado,—it was lost or injured, and in
each the act of God, and not the negligence,
was held to be the proximate cause of in
jury.
In Scheffer v. Railroad Co., 105 U. S. 249,
it appeared that, by a collision of railroad
trains, a passenger was injured, and, be
coming thereby disordered in mind and body,
be, some eight months thereafter, committed
suicide. Action was brought against the
railroad company as the negligent cause of
his death. Miller, J ., speaking for the court.
and referring to Insurance Co. v. Tweed,
7 Wall. 44, and Railroad Co. v. Kellogg, 94
U. S. 469, said: “The proximate cause of
the death of Scheffer was his own act of self
destruction. It Was, within the rule in both
these cases. a new cause, and a suflicient
cause of death. The argument is not sound
which seeks to trace this immediate cause
of the death through the previous stages
of mental aberration, physical suffering, and
eight months’ disease and mediml treatment,
to the original accident on the railroad."
In Bosch v. Railroad Co., 44 Iowa, 402,
the piaintiffs house took fire, and the fire
department, because, as was alleged, of the
wrongful occupation and expansion of the
river bank, were unable to get to the river
to obtain water for putting out the fire.
Plaintiff sued the defendant for the loss of
his property, but the court said the acts of
defendant complained of “have no connection
with the fire, nor with the hose or other
apparatus of the fire companies. They are
independent acts, and their influence in the
destruction of plaintiffs property is too re-
mote to be made the basis of recovery."
In this last case, Metallic Compression Co.
v. Railroad Co., 109 Mass_ 277, was referred
to and distinguished. The facts there were
that the plaintiff,s building was on fire, and
water was being thrown upon it through
hose. when an engine of defendant was
recklessly run upon the hose and severed it,
thereby defeating the efforts to distinguish
the fire, which otherwise were likely to
succeed. In that case the relation of the
plaintiff,s injury to the defendant,s act was
direct and immediate. So it was also in
Billman v. Railroad Co., 76 Ind. 166; Lane v.
Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136; and Ricker
v. Freeman, 50 N. H. -i20,—ali of which are
ruled by the Squib Case, (Scott v. Shepherd.
2 W. Bl. 892;) and so, perhaps, are Fair
banks v. Kerr, 70 Pa. St. 90; and Lake v.
Milliken, 62 Me. 240.
In Henry v. Railroad Co., 76 Mo. 288, it
appeared that the nlaintifl! was wrongfully
‘\commanded to get ofl! a caboose of the de
fendant, where he had a right to be. He
obeyed the command, and, while upon the
ground, stepped upon a track. where he was
run upon and injured by a train. Hough.
J., speaking for the court’ said: “It is per
haps probable that if the plaintiff had not
been ordered out of the caboose he would
not have been injured. But this hypothesis
does not establish the legal relation of cause
and effect between the expulsion and the
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injury. If the plaintiff had not left home
he certainly would not have been injured
as he was, but his leaving home could not
therefore be declared to be the cause of his
injury. As the plaintiff,s injury was neith
er the ordinary, natural, nor probable conse-
quence of his expulsion from the caboose,
such expulsion, however it might excite our
indignation, in the absence of any regulation
of defendant to justify it, cannot be con
sidered in this action. and the legal aspect of
the case is precisely the same that it would
have been if no such expulsion had taken
place. It is to be regarded as if the plain
tiff had gone to the caboose and could not
get in because it was locked, or, being able
to get in, chose to remain outside."
Further reference to authorities is need
less. The application of the rule that the
proximate, not the remote cause is to be re-
garded, is obscure and difficult in many
cases, but not in this. By the wrong of the
defendant the plaintiff was carried past the
station where he had a right to be left, and
beyond where he had a right, from the in
formation received from defendant,s serv
ants, to suppose he was when he left the car.
For any injury or inconvenience naturally
resulting from the wrong, and traceable to
it as the proximate cause, the defendant
may be held responsible.) But before any in
jury had been sustained the plaintiff dis
covered where ‘he was, and started back for
the road which he had intended to take.
Whatever danger there was to be encounter
ed in the way was to be found in the cattle
guard, and this he understood and calculated
upon. Evidently it did not appear to him
of a formidable nature; for, on the supposi
tion that he was north of the highway when
he left the train, he had voluntarily started
south with the expectation of crossing the
cattle-guard on that side, over which he
might or might not find a plank laid, when
by stepping back a few rods, where he sup
posed the station-house to be, he might pass
from thence out to the highway by the pas
sage-way for persons and vehicles leading
from the station-house to it, and thereby avoid
the cattle-guard altogether. It is very clear
that he did not anticipate danger. Neither,
probably, would any other person have an
ticipated it. The crossing was a simple
matter; it was only to ascertain first wheth
er a plank or timber was laid across, and if
so to cross upon it; and if not, to step down in
to the excavation and out on the other side.
Where was he to look for danger? The night
was dark, it is true, but even by the sense
of feeling, when he knew he was within a
few feet of the cattle-guard, one would ex
pect him to be able to determine its exact
location. But then something happened
which it is evident that the plairitiff, with
full knowledge of all the facts, did not at
all expect and had not feared. Misled ap
parently by visual deception, he moved for
‘ unexpectedly arose. If lightning had chan
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ward under a supposition that the cattle
guard, upon the brink of which he already
stood, was some paces oil‘, and his decep
tion, with the slipping of his foot, concurred
to produce the injury. What was this but
pure accident? It was an event which hap
pened unexpectedly and without fault. The
defendant or its agents had not produced the
deception or caused the foot to slip; and such
wrong as the defendant had been guilty of
was in no manner connected with or related
to the injury except as it was the occasion
for bringing the plaintiff where the accident
occurred. It was after the plaintiff had
been brought there that the cause of injury
red to strike the plaintiff at that place, the
fault of the defendant and its relation to
























now, and the injury could have been chargedwes
to the defendant with precisely the same
reason as now.
of a gun in the hands of some third person
had wounded the plaintiff as he approached
the cattle-guard, the connection of defend
ant’s wrong with the injury would have
been precisely the same which appears here.
But the proximate cause of injury in the
one case would have been the act of God;
in the other, inevitable accident; but not
more plainly accident than was the proxi
mate cause here. Back of that cause in this
case were many others, all conducing to
bring the plaintiff to the place of the danger
and the injury; the act of the defendant
was the last of a long sequence; but, as be
tween the causes which precede the proxi
mate cause, the law cannot select one rather
than any other as that to which the final
consequence shall be at.tributed, and it stops
at the proximate cause, because to go back
of it would be to enter upon an investigation
which would be both endless and useless.
The injury being the result of pure acci-/
dent, the party upon whom it has chanced to .
fall is necessarily left to bear it. No compen
sation can be given by law in such cases.
Weaver v. Ward, Hob. 134; Gibbons v. Pepper,
1 Ld. Raym. 3“; Losee v. Buchanan. 51 N. Y.
476; Vincent v. Stinehour, 7 Vt. 62; Morris
v. Platt, 32 Conn. 75; Brown v. Collins, 53
N. H. 442; Bizzell v. Booker, 16 Ark. 3(B;
Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N. J. Law, 339;
Paxton v. Beyer, 67 Ill. 1312; Express Co. v.
Smith, 33 Ohio St. 511; Plummer v. State,
4 Tex. App. 310; Parrot v. Wells, 15 Wall.
524; Holmes v. Mather, L. R. 10 Exch. 261.
A case like this appeals strongly to the
sympathies, but sympathy cannot rule the
decision.
Upon the undisputed facts of the case the
plaintiff has no right of action for the injury
which has befallen him, and the circuit court
was correct in so holding. The question
what judgment shall be rendered in the case
is for the present reserved.
The other justices concurred.
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MONMOUTH PARK ASS,N v. WALLIS
IRON YVORKS.
(26 Atl. 140; 55 N. J. Law, 132.)
Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.
March 6, 1893.
Error to supreme court.
Action on a contract by the Monmouth
Park Association against the Wallis Iron
Works. Plaintiff had judgment, and defend
ant brings error. Reversed.
The other facts fully appear in the follow
ing statement by DIXON, J.:
The plaintiff brought an action in the su
preme court against the defendant to re
cover $6,384.66, and interest, as a final bal
ance for work done, chiefly, under a sealed
contract between them. providing for the
construction of a grand stand at the Mon
mouth Park race course. The present writ
of error is prosecuted by the defendant to
review questions of law raised at the trial in
the Hudson circuit. The following is a copy
of the contract:
“Articles of agreement made and concluded
this first day of October, A. D. 1889, by and
between the Wallis Iron Works, a corpora
tion of New Jersey, of the first part, and the
Monmouth Park Association, of the second
part, witnesseth, that for and in considera
tion of the covenants and payments herein
after mentioned, to be made and performed
by the said party of the second part, the said
party of the first part doth hereby covenant
and agree to furnish all the labor and ma
terials. and perform the work, necessary to
complete, in the most substantial and work
manlike manner, to the satisfaction and ac
ceptance of the chief engineer of the said
party of the second part. a grand stand at
the race course of mid party of the second
part, at Monmouth Park, Monmouth Co., New
Jersey, excepting the necessary excavation,
incidental thereto; the said work to be fin
ished as described in the approved plans and
following specifications, and agreeably to
the directions received from the said chief en
gineer, on or beiore the first day of March,
1890. In case the said party of the first part
shall to fully and entirely, and in conformity
to the provisions and conditions of this agree
ment, perforn and complete the said work,
and each and every part and appurtenance
thereto, within the time hereinbefore limited
for such performance and completion, or
within such further time as, in accordance
with the provisions of this agreement. shall
be fixed or allowed for such performance and
completion, the said party of the first part
shall and will pay to the said party of the
second part the sum of one hundred dollars
v
ior each and every day that they, the said
party of the first part, shall be in default,
which said sum of one hundred dollars per
day is hereby agreed upon, fixed, and deter
mined by the parties hereto as the dam
ages which the party of the second part will
suffer by reason of such default, and not by
way of penalty. And the said party of the
second part may and shall deduct and retain
the same out of any moneys which may be
due or become due to the party of the ffrst
part under this agreement.
“Specification. The entire work to be con
structed and finished, in every part, in a
good, substantial, and workmaniike manner,
according to the accompanying drawings and
specifications, to the full extent and mean
ing of the same, and to the entire satisfaction,
approval, and acceptance of the chief en-'
gineer and owners of the said party of the
second part, and under the supervision and
direction of such agent or agents as they
may appoint. Additional detail and working
drawings will be furnished, in exemplification
of the foregoing, from time to time, as may
be required; and it is distinctly understood,
that all such additional drawings are to be
considered as virtually embraced within, and
forming a part of. these specifications. Fig
ured dimensions shall in all cases be taken
in preference to scale measurements. The
said engineer shall have the right to make
any alterations, additions, or omissions of
work or materials herein specified, or shown
on the drawings, during the progress of the
structure, that he may find to be necessary,
and the same shall be acceded to by the said
party of the first part, and carried into ef
fect, without in any way violating or vitiat
ing the contract. If any additions, altera
tions, or omissions are made in the struc
ture during the progress of the work, the
value of such shall be decided by the said
chief engineer, who shall make an equitable
allowance for the same, and shall add the
amount of said allowance to the contract
price of the work, if the cost has been in
creased, or shall deduct the amount. if the
cost has been lessened, as he, the said chief
engineer, may deem just and equitable. The
said party of the second part will pay for no
extra work or material unless ordered in
writing by them, through their treasurer.
Any disagreement or difference between the
parties to this contract, upon any matter or
thing arising from these specifications, or the
drawings to which they refer, or to the con
tract for the work, or the kind or quality of
the work, required thereby, shall be decided
by the said chief engineer of the party of
the second part, whose decision and inter
pretation of the same shall be considered
final, conclusive, and binding upon both par
ties. All materials and labor used lbl‘0n;.‘,,ir
out the structure must be of the best of their
several kinds. and subject to the approval of
the chief engineer. The said chief engineer
shall have full power, at any time during the
progress of the work, to reject any materials
that he may deem unsuitable for the purpose
for which they were intended, or which are
not in strict conformity with the spirit of
these specifications. He shall also have the
power to cause any inferior or unsafe work
to be taken down and altered at the cost
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of the said party of the ffrst part. Partic
ular care must be taken of all the ffnished
work, which work must be covered up and
thoroughly protected from injury or deface
ment, during the erection and completion of
the structure. All refuse material and rub
bish that may accumulate during the prog
ress of the work shad be removed from
time to time as may be directed by the chief
engineer, and, on the completion of the work,
the structure, grounds, and streets be. thor
oughly cleaned up, and the surplus material
and rubbish removed. The said party of the
second part will not transport free any of the
workmen or materials for this work, but all
materials must be shipped in the name of the
party of the first part, and in no case shall
it be shipped in care of, or in the name of,
‘the company, or any of its oflicers or em
ployee, and said party of the first part must
pay the regular freight rates arranged for
with the freight department.
“And the said party of the second part
doth promise and agree to pay to the said
party of the first part, for the work to be
done under this contract, the following prices,
to wit: One hundred and thirty-three thou
sand ($133,000) dollars. On or about the last
(day of each month, during the progress of
‘this work, an estimate shall be made of the
relative value of the work done and deliver
ed, to be judged by the engineer; and ninety
per cent. of the amount of said estimate shall
be paid to the party of the first part on or
about the fifteenth day of the following
month. And when all the work embraced in
this contract is completed, agreeably to the
specifications, and in accordance with the
.directions, and to the satisfaction and ac
.ceptance, of the engineer, there shall be a
final estimate made of said work according
to the terms of this agreement, when the bal
.ance appearing due to the said party of the
first part shall be paid to them, within thirty
days thereafter, upon their giving a release,
under seal, to the party'of the second part,
from all claims and demands whatsoever
growing in any manner out of this agreement,
.and upon their procuring and delivering to
the parties of the second part full releases. in
proper form, and duly executed, from me
chanics and material men, of all liens, claims,
and demands for materials furnished and
provided, and work and labor done and per
formed, upon or aboutvthe work herein con
tracted for under this contract It is fur
ther covenanted and agreed between the said
parties that the said party of the first part
will at all times give personal attention, by
.competent representative, who shall superin
tend the work. It is further agreed that the
contractors are not to interfere in any way
with the construction of the bookmakers’
stand, members’ stand or the paddocks, or
other work. It is further agreed and under
stood that the work embraced in this con
‘ tract shall be commenced within ten days
from this date, and prosecuted with such
force as the engineer shall deem adequate
to its completion within the time specified;
and if at any time the said party of the first
part shall refuse or neglect to prosecute the
work with a force suflicient, in the opinion
of the said engineer, for its completion with
in the time specified in this agreement, then,
in that case, the said engineer in charge. or
such agents as the engineer shall designate,
may proceed to employ such a number of
workmen, laborers, and overseers as may,
in the opinion of the said engineer, be neces
sary to insure the completion of the work
within the time hereinbefore limited, at such
wages as he may find necessary or expedient
to give, pay all persons so employed, and
charge over the amount so paid to the party
of the first part as for so much money paid
to them on said contract, or for the failure
to prosecute the work with an adequate
force, for noncompliance with his di
rections in regard to the manner of con
structing it, or, for any other omission or
neglect of the requirements of this agree
ment and specifications on the part of the
party of the first part, the said engineer
may, at his discretion, declare this contract,
or any portion or section embraced in lt,
void. And the said party of the first part hath
further covenanted and agreed to take, use.
provide, and make all proper, necessary, and
suflicient precautions, safeguards, and pro
tections against the occurrence or happening
of any accident, injuries, damages. or hurt to
any person or property during the progres
of the construction of the work herein con
tracted for, and to be responsible for, and to
indemnify and save harmless, the said par
ties of the second part, and the said engineer,
from the payments of all sums of money by
reason of all or any such accidents, injuries,
damages, or hurt that may happen or occur
upon or about said work, and from all fines,
penalties, and loss incurred for or by reason
of the violation of any city or borough ordi
nance or regulation or law of the state, while
the said work is in progress of construction.
And it is mutually agreed and distinctly lili
derstood that the decision of the chief en
gineer shall be final and conclusive in any
dispute which may arise between the par
ties to this agreement, relative to or touching
the same.
“In witness whereof, the parties herein
named have hereunto set their seals, and
caused their presents to be signed by their
secretary, the day and year herein first
above named. As to Wallis Iron Works,
James I. Taylor.. Wallis Iron Works. [Seal.]
Wm. T. Wallis, Sec‘y. The Monmouth Park
Ass’n. [Seal.] By A. J. Cassatt, President.
Witness to signature of A. J. Cassatt: T.
M. Croft.
“It is hereby further agreed that, in addi
tion to the work hereinbefore described and
provided for, the said party of the first part
shall provide as hearing pieces to receive
ends of puriins, and in lieu of the angle irons
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already provided for, 3x6 angle irons, 10 8-10
lbs. per foot, and 7 feet long, well bolted to
roof truss and to purlin ends. The party of
the first part will also construct, complete. the
front steps to grand stand, as per revised
sheet No. 26. In consideration of the fore
going changes, the party of the second part
agrees to pay the additional sum of nineteen
hundred and seventy-one ($1,971.61) dollars.
Wallis Iron Works. [Seal.] Wm. T. Wallis,
Treas. [Seal.] The .\Ionmouth Park Ass‘n.
By A. J. Cassatt, President. Witness this
11th day of December, 1889: T. M. Croft."
Added to this are “Revised Specifications,"
the last clause of which is: “Payments. On
or about the first day of each month, the en
gineer will make an approximate estimate
of the amount of work erected and delivered
under these specifications during the preced
ing month, and the contractor will be paid
ninety per cent. of the amount of these esti
mates. Thirty days after the acceptance of
the completed work by the owner, the retain
ed ten per cent. will be paid the contractor,
upon his furnishing satisfactory evidence that
no liens or unsatisfied claims exist on the
work, or any part of it." These specifications
were also signed and sealed by the parties.
The pleadings are sufficient to warrant the
questions involved in the exceptions taken
at the trial.
Jos. D. Bedle, for plaintiff in error. Gil
bert Collins, for defendant in error.
DIXON, J. (after stating the facts). The
first exception to be considered took its rise
from the fact that the structure was not com
pleted within the time limited by the con
, tract, nor until 94 days after the expira
tion of a month’s extension of that time.
The defendant claimed a deduction or set
off of $100 for each day,s delay. The plain
tiff met this claim by insisting that the
clause in the contract mentioning the $100
per day is unintelligible, and therefore nuga
tory, because in its opening line it reads:
“In case the said party of the first part shall' ‘ ' to fully and entirely," etc., omitting
any effective verb. We agree, however, with
the trial judge, in thinking that the context
shows the verb which should be supplied.
It makes the $100 payable for each day that
“the party of the first part shall be in de
fault." This plainly indicates the verb “fail"
as the omitted word, to be supplied as an
equivalent for the expression, "be in default."
The right of a court of law to read an in
strument according to the obvious intention
of the parties, in spite of clerical errors or
omissions which can be corrected by perusing
the instrument, is sufllciently vindicated by
the decision of this court in Sisson v. Don
nelly, 36 N. J. Law, 432. See, also, Burchell
v. Clark, 2 C. P. Div. 88.
Taking the clause thus perfected, the plain
tif! urged that the $100 a day was a penalty;
and so the trial judge ruled. requiring that
the defendant should prove the actual dam
ages, and be allowed only for what was
proved. To this ruling the defendant except
ed.
contracting parties have declared payable on
default in performance of their contract is
to be deemed a penalty, or liquidated dam
ages, the general rule is that the agreement
of the parties will be effectuated. Their
agreement will, however, be ascertained by
considering, not only particular words in
their contract, but the whole scope of their
bargain, including the subject to which it
relates. If, on such consideration, it appears
that they have provided for larger damages
than the law permits. e. g. more than the
legal rate for the nonpayment of money, or
that they have provided for the same dam
ages on the breach of any one of several
stipulations, when the loss resulting from
such breaches clearly must differ in amount,
or that they have named an excessive sum
in a case where the real damages are cer
tain, or readily reducible to certainty by
proof before a jury, or a sum which it would
be unconscionable to award, under any of
these conditions the sum designated is deem
In determining whether a sum which’
ed a penalty. And if it be doubtful, on the /
whole agreement, whether the sum is in
tended as a penalty or as liquidated damages,
it will be construed as a penalty, because the
law favors mere indemnity. But when dam- L
ages are to be sustained by the breach of a
single stipulation, and they are uncertain in
amount, and not readily susceptible of proof
under the rules of evidence, then, if the par
ties have agreed upon a sum as the measure
of compensation for the breach, and that sum
is not disproportionate to the presumable
loss, it may be recovered as liquidated dam
ages. These are the general principles laid
down in the text books. and recognized in the
judicial Reports of this state. Cheddick’s
Ex‘r v. Marsh, 21 N. J. Law, 463; Whitfield
v. Levy, 35 N. J. Law, 149; Hoagland v.
Segur, 38 N. J. Law, 230; Lansing v. Dodd,
45 N. J. Law, 525. In the present case the
default consists of the breach of a single
covenant, to complete the grand stand as de-
v
scribed in the approved plans and specifica
tions within the time limited. It is plain that
the loss to result from such a breach is not
easily ascertainable. The magnitude and im
portance of the grand stand may be inferred
from its cost,—$133,000. It formed a neces
sary part of a very expensive enterprise.
The structure was not one that could be said
to have a definable rental value. Its worth
depended upon the success of the entire ven
ture.
edifice might affect that success, and what
the profits or losses of the scheme would be,
were topies for conjecture only. The condi-V
tions. therefore, seem to have been such as to
justify the parties in settling for themselves
the measure of compensation. The stipula
tions of parties for specified damages on the
breach of a contract to build within a limited
time have frequently been enforced by the
How far the noncompletion of this /
/
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courts. In Fletcher v. Dyche, 2 Term R. 32,
£10 per week for delay in finishing the parish
church; in Duckworth v. Alison, 1 Mees. &
W. 412, £5 per week for delay in completing
repairs of a warehouse; in Legge v. Har
lock, 12 Q. B. 1015, £1 per day for delay in
erecting a barn, wagon shed, and granary;
in Law v. Local Board (1892) 1 Q. B. 127,
£100 and £5 per week for delay in construct
ing sewerage works; in Ward v. Building
Co., 125 N. Y. 230, 26 N. E. $6, $10 a
day for delay in erecting dwelling houses;
and in Malone v. City of Philadelphia (Pa.
Sup.) 23 Atl. 628, $50 a day for delay in com
pleting a municipal bridge,—were all deemed
liquidated damages. Counsel has referred
as to two cases of building contracts, where
a different conclusion was reached: Mul
doon v. Lynch, 66 Cal. 536, 6 Pac. 417, and
Clements v. Railroad Co., 132 Pa. St. 445, 10
Atl. 274, 276. In the former case a statutory
rule prevailed, and in the latter the real dam
age was easily ascertainable, and the stipu
lated sum was unconscionable. In the case
at bar we have no data for saying that $100
a day was unconscionable. The sole ques
tion remaining on this exception, therefore, is
whether the parties have agreed upon the
sum named as liquidated damages. Their lan
guage seems, indisputably, to have this mean
ing. They expressly declare the sum to be
agreed upon as the damages which the de
fendant will suffer, they expressly deny that
they mean it as a penalty, and they provide
for its deduction and retention by the de
fendant in a mode which could be applied,
only if the sum be considered liquidatwl.flam
ages. But it is argued that as th : vid ‘st
authorized the engineer of the defen\..l.it to
make any alterations or additions that he
might find necessary during the progress of
the structure, and required the plaintiff to
accede thereto, it is unreasonable to suppose
that the plaintiff could have intended to bind
itself, in liquidated damages, for delay in
completing such a changeable contract. But
this argument seems to be aside from the
present inquiry, which is, not whether the
plaintiff became responsible for damages by
reason of the noncompletion of the grand
stand on the day named. but whether, if it
did becbme so responsible, those damages
are liquidated by the contract. On the ques
tion first stated, changes ordered by the en
gineer may afford matter for consideration;
on the second question, they are irrelevant.
Certainly the bills of exceptions do not indi
cate any alterations or additions which, as
matter of law, would relieve the plaintiff
from responsibility for the admitted delay,
and consequently there may have been
ground for considering the defendant’s dam
ages. If there was, the amount of the dam
ages was adjusted by the contract at $100
per day. We think the ruling at the circuit
on this point was erroneous. '
We think, also, that the letter, Exhibit P
8, written September 10, 1890, by F. Latou
rette to the plaintiff, was illegally received in
evidence. It was offered and admitted as a
decision by the chief engineer of the defend
ant uuder the contract. Since it was writ
ten after the completion of the work. and
after the writer had ceased to be the engi
neer of the defendant, and without notice to
the defendant, it could not possess the char
acter attributed to it.
The only other exception which it appears
useful to notice is that relating to the exist
ence of claims by outside parties. The agree
ment contains two clauses on this subject,——
one under the head, “Speciflcation;" the oth
er, under the head; “Revised Specification."
It seems proper to hold that the latter clause
is substituted in the contract for the former,
and therefore it only need be considered. It
reads: “Thirty days after the acceptance of
the completed work by the owner, the re
tained ten per cent. will be paid the contract
or, upon his furnishing satisfactory evidence
that no liens or unsatisfied claims exist on
the work, or any part of it." The expres
sion, “liens or unsatisfied claims on the work,"
must mean claims which can be enforced
against the work, and such claims could exist
only under our mechanic’s lien law. By
“liens" the parties intended claims flied un
der that law; by “unsatisfied claims," they
intended claims which were not, but might
be, filed under that law. The statute (RtL
vision, p. 668, § 2) provides “that when any
building shall be erected, in whole or in part,
by contract in writing, such building, and
the land whereon it stands, shall be liable to
the contractor alone for work done or ma
terials furnished in pursuance of such con
tract: provided such contract, or a dupli
cate thereof, be flied in..the office of the clerk
of the county in which such building is sit
uate before such work done or materials fur
nished;" and (section 13) “that no debt shall
be a lien by virtue of this act unless a claim
is filed as hereinbefore provided within one
year from the furnishing the materials or
performing the labor for which such debt is
due." The contract between these parties
was filed January 2, 1890. Hence no liens
could arise in favor of outside parties for
work done or materials furnished after that
date. For work done or materials furnished
before that date, no debt would be a lien un
less a claim were flied within a year, i. e.
before January 2, 1891. At the date last
named, no such claim was filed, and, so far
as appears, no. such claim was ever filed.
The suit was commenced .\Iarch 12, 1891.
We think these facts furnished satisfactory
evidence that there were no liens or unsatis
fied claims on the work when the action was
brought, and that on this point there was no
error at the trial.
The other exceptions adverted to by counsel
for the defendant are either untenable, or on
questions not likely to arise upon a new trial.
Let the judgment be reversed, and a venire
de novo be awarded.
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on which the law awards damages is com'
elements being the intent of the parties and
(24 Atl. 170, 148 Pa. 645.)
May 2,1892.
Appeal from court of common pleas, Le
high county; Edwin Albright, Judge.
Assumpsit by Emeline C. Keck against Syl
vester Bieber on a bond whereby he prom
ised to pay her $2,000 upon the non.perform
ance of certain conditions. There was no
dispute as to the breach of condition, and
a verdict was directed for plaintiff for the
full amount of the bond. From a judgment
entered thereon, defendant appeals. Re-
versed.
Jas. S. Biery and Edward Harvey, for ap
KECK v. BIEBER.
,
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
pellant. C. J. Erdman and R. E. Wright,s
Sons, for appellee.
MITCHELL, J. The general principle up!
pensation for the loss suffered. The amount
may be fixed by the parties in advance, but,/
where a lump sum is named by them, the,
court will always look into the question".
whether this is really liquidated damages or‘
only a penalty, the presumption being that
it is the latter. The name by which it is,
called is but of slight weight, the controlling
the special circumstances of the case. The
subject has always presented difiiculties in
the formulation of a general rule, and es
pecially in its application. The books are
full of inharmonious decisions. In no state,
however, have the difficulties been more suc
cessfully minimized than in Pennsylvania,
and in no case that I have seen is there a
better generalization than that by Agnew,
J., in Streeper v. Williams, 48 Pa. St. 450:
“In each case we must look at the language
of the contract, the intention of the parties
as gathered from all its provisions, the sub
ject of the contract and its surroundings, the
ease or difliculty of measuring the breach in
damages, and the sum stipulated, and from
the whole gather the view which good con
science and equity ought to take of the case."
The only criticism to which this would seem
to be fairly open is that it does not perhaps
give suflicient prominence to the intention
of the parties as the controlling element, and
it should therefore be read in connection
with the restatement of it by our late Broth
er Clark, in March v. Allabough, 103 Pa. St.
335: “The question ‘ ' “ is to be de
.termined by the intention of the parties,
drawn from the words of the whole contract,
examined in the light of its subject-matter
and its surroundings; and in this examina
tion we must consider the relation which the
sum stipulated bear to the extent of the in
jury which may be caused by the several
breaches provided against, the eae or difll
culty of measuring a breach in damages, and
such other matters as are legally or neces
sarily inherent in the transaction." The in
tent of the parties being, therefore, the prin
cipal object of ascertainment, Greenleaf lays
down certain rules as the result of the cases,
and, among them, that the sum is to be
taken as a penalty “where the agreement
contains several matters of different degrees
of importance, and yet the sum named is
payable for the breach of any, even the
least." 2 Greenl. Ev. § 258. This rule is
approved in Shreve v. Brereton, 51 Pa. St.
175, and the present case falls exactly within
it. The conditions of the appellant,s bond
are two—First, be is to “save, defend, keep
harmless, and indemnify the said Emelina
C. Keck" from liability by reason of the as- ’
signment to him over the head of Neiser,
and the termination of the latter’s mining
rights. This is clearly a covenant for indem
nity only, and, as no breach was assigned,
need not be further discussed. But, second
ly, he is to pay the royalty accruing in the ,
future, and “keep and perform all the cove
nants, conditions, and stipulations of the said
lease and assignment." Turning now to the
lease, we find that plaintiffs covenants with
Kemmerer, which appellant thus bound him
self to keep and perform, were to save harm
less and indemnify him against all costs and
damages to his neighbors from the washing
of the ore, to run the water in such places as
the lessor should order, to pay a stipulated
royalty, to fill up holes made and left in the
search for ore, to produce or pay royalty up
on a minimum of one thousand tons a year,
‘to use the old wagon road for hauling said
iron ore. and, in case there are gates or bars
on s road, ‘ ' I to keep said gates
and bars in repair, ' ' ' and keep them
shut when through," etc. The assignment
adds to these a covenant to pay plaintiff,
the assignor, an additional royalty upon a
sliding scale of the price of ore per ton. No
better illustration of the propriety of the rule
referred to could be stated. Here are nu
merous covenants of the most varied kinds\
and importance. The covenants to indem
nify against claims by Neiser, and against
damages to the neighbors by the operation
of washing, are undertakings which may be
of serious magnitude; and under Dick v. Gas
kill, 2 Whart. 184; Shreve v. Brereton, 51
Pa. St. 175; Moore v. Colt, 127 Pa. St. 289, 18
Atl. 8,-and similar cases, the recovery for a
breach would probably not be limited by th
sum named in the bond. On the other hand,
the covenants to fill up the holes made in
prospecting for ore, and to keep the gates on
the old wagon road in repair and shut, are
against such trivial inconveniences that it
would savor of absurdity to suppose that the
parties meant to stipulate for $2,000 damages
for the breach of any one of them. We are
therefore of opinion that defendant,s fourth
point, that the contract of the parties was
for a penalty, should have been aflirmed.
It will not follow, however, as appellee seems
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to fear, that her recovery must be limited to
the loss of the royalty due her at the time
of bringing suit, and that she must bring re
peated suits for future failures to pay. The
defendant has, by his acts, disabled hlmelt
absolutely and permanently from perform
ance of his covenants. Under such circum
LAW n1m.—9
stances, the plaintlff may sue on the con
tract from time to time for the royalties due,
and for such other damages as she may sut
fer, or she may, at her election, treat the
contract as rescinded, and claim damages
in one action for the entire breach. Judg
ment reversed, and venire de novo awarded.
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TENNESSEE MANUF,G CO. v. JAMES.
(18 S. W. 262, 91 Tenn. 154.)
Supreme Court of Tennessee. Jan. 26, 1892.
Error to circuit court, Davidson coun
ty; W. K. MCAi.LI8TER, Judge.
Action by liiinnie James,a minor, by
her next friend, against the Tennessee
Manufacturing Company, to recover on a
quantum meruit ior work and labor per
iormed by her ior defendant. Judgment
ior plaintiff, and defendant brings error.
Reversed.
Dickinson & Frazer.ior plaintiff in error.
E. J. Wickware, for defendant in error.
LURTON, J. .\iinnic James. a minor, was
an vmployc of the ap1vl'»nr_ " 1..-t.pm-li_ 1
tion engaged in the manufacture of cotton
goods. The contract of employment was
in writing, and was with the minor and ‘
her father. By oneofthe provisions of the
contract it was stipulated that the em
ploye should give two weeks‘ notice of her
intention to quit. his further provided
that' in caseshe should leave without giv
ing two weeks’ notice, “or fail or refuse
to faithfully work during a period of two
weeks after giving notice oi an intention
to leave, " ‘ ‘ then it is hereby agreed
that the amount stated below ior the
class to which I may belong is agreed
upon as liquidated damages due said Ten
nessee Manufacturing Company at the
time of my failure to comply with the
terms of this contract, to compensate it
for all damages, both actual and exem
plary, and all loss, arisingfrom my failure
to carry out the terms of this agreement;
and it is further agreed upon that said
amount, applicable to the class of em
ployes to which I may belong, shall be de
ducted from any sum which maybe due
me by said company, whether on account
of services rendered or otherwise.” The
class to which appellee belonged was that
of those receiving 50 cents per day and un
der $1. The damages stipulated ior this
class was $10. At the foot of this agree
ment. which was signed by appellee, was
this further agreement signed by her in
ther: “ ’1‘he foregoing agreement has been
read by me, and, fully understanding the
same, it is also agreed to by me, as binding
both me and my daughter, Minnie James,
who is legally disqualified from making
this contract, to all its terms and con
ditions. I agree, further, that said Minnie
James is hereby authorized to receive the
wages of said work, and that all sums
paid to said employe are to be accepted
as fully discharging all liability, to the full
amount so paid; and said wages are to
be subject to all the conditions of this con
tract, as though said employs was legally
empowered to .act in person." Appellee
gave notice of her intention to leave, and
thereafter worked 10 days, but at the end
of that time quit without any excuse. At
the time she quit there was due her 20
days’ wages, including the 10 days after
her notice. if the stipulation as to dam
ages is invalid. then the company is due
her $10; if valid. then nothing is due her.
lfpon quitting she brought suit, by her
father as next friend, upon a quantum
meruit. The contract has been set up as
a defense to her suit.
The circuitjudge being of opinion that
the contract was invalid, as being one
with a minor who had a legal right to
repudiate same, gave judgment for the
plaintiff. In this we think his honor erred.
lithe contract had been alone with the
minor. she might undoubtedly repudiate
it, and recover upon a quantum meruit.
The law would give the infant the privi
lege of judging whether such acontract
was beneficial or not, and of avoiding it
if she elected to do so, and recovering the
value of her services as if she worked
without any contract. 10 Amer. & Eng.
Enc.Law,tit.“Infant." But thiscontract
was in law with the father, who agreed
that the wages in law due to him might
be paid over to his child, “subject to all
the conditions of this contract." The
wages of a minor. peculiar circumstances
out of the way. are due to the father.
This springs from his legal duly to sup
port and educate his child. He may per
mit the minor to take and use his own
earnings. This is called “emancipation."
and emancipation will be a defense to th
father,s suit ior the minor,s wages. It
may be express or implied; entire or par
tial. It may be conditional.
in writing or oral; ior the whole minority
or ior a shorter term; as to a part of the
child,s wages or as to the whole. Eman
cipation will not enlarge the minor’s ca
pacity to contract; it simply precludes
the father from asserting his claim to the
wages of his child. Bish. Cont. § 898. If
one employ a minor with notice of the
non-emancipation of the infant, it will be
no defense to the father,s suit for the
wages that the child has received them.
On the other hand, payment to the father
will be no defense to the minor’s suit. if
the employer knew of the fact of emanci
pation. These principles oi the'common
law are well settled, and have not been
affected by statute. Cloud v. Hamilton,
11 Humph. N15. The cases in America are
collected in a note to Wilson v. McMillan,
35 Amer. Rep. 117.
In view of these principles, we must con
strue the contract of the father as an




to damages in case his child shall quit v
without cause and without the stipulated
notice. It is as much as if he had said:
"My child is a minor. As such, I am en
titled to her wages. I am willing that she
shall work in your mill, and that the
wages she may earn shall be paid to her.
I agree that she shall comply with this
contract, and, if she does not, then the
wages legally due me shall be detained by
you to the extent provided in the contract
I make ior her, and only such wages paid
to her as i would be entitled to receive if
the contract were exclusively with me. "
This was a conditional emancipation, un
der a special contract made by and with
the father ior himselfand his child. Her
emancipation was partial. The father,
having a legal right to her en tire wages,
has stipulated that none shall be paid her
beyond the sum due under this agreement
with him. If this contract is binding on




him, the minor cannot recover beyond its.l holding the sum stipulated as liquidated
limits.
him, as stipulating ior a penalty, then it
will not be in the way of plaintiff,s suit.
We agree with the circuit judge in holding
that this contract does not fall within the
case of Schrimpf v. Manufacturing Co., 86
Tenn. 219, 6 S. W. Rep. 131. That case
concerned a contract construed as stipu
la ting ior a penalty in case of a breach. It
was held not to be an agreement ior liqui
dated damages, because the iorfelturecov
cred all the wages due at time of breach,
regardless of amount due, and regardless
as to whether the arrearages were the
consequence of the default oi the company.
It wasa contract harsh and unconscion
able. lt preserved no proportion bet ween
the sum forfeited and the actual damages,
and put all employee upon same iooting,
whether much or little was earned. much
or little due, when breach occurred. The
damages were to he all that was due, in
any case. To one, this might have been
the wages of months; to another, the
earnings of but a day. But in that case
Chief Justice TURN]-DY quoted and indorsed
the language oi CAMPBELL, J., in Richard
son v. Woenler, 26 Mich.90, where he said:“ We have no difliculty in holding that the
injury caused by the sudden breaking off 1
of a contract oi service by either party in
volves such difliculties concerning the act- i
nal loss as to render a reasonable agree
ment ior stipulated damages appropriate.
If a fixed sum, or a maximum within
which wages unpaid and accruing since
the last pay-day might be forieited,should
be agreed on. and shall not be unreason
able or an oppressive exaction, there would
if the contract is invalid as to I damages'
The plaintifi in error was a cotton-mill,
having in its employment hundreds oi
hands. The work is divided into manv
departments. The raw material is
handled by one set of hands, and put in
condition ior another, and the second de-
partment still further advances its manu
facture; and so on, through successive
stages of progress. The evidence shows
that each department is dependent upon
that immediately below it. Now, if the
operatives of one department quit, or their
work is delayed. its effect is ielt in all to a
greater or less degree. It is also shown
that it is not always easy to replace an
operative at once, and that the uncx pected
quitting of even one hand will to some ex
tent afiect the results
throughout
the mill.
Yet the efidence shows t let it would be
impossible to calculate with any certainty
the precise, actual loss due to an unex
pected breach of an em ploye’s engage
ment; though it is shown that there are
some departments oi work where thequit
ting of a small number of hands. without
notice, would stop the entire mill. and
throw other hundreds out ofemployment.
In this day of great inctories, and the
consequent division of labor into separate
departments, a degree of interdependence
among employee exists, which they ought
and do recognize, and which makes the
‘ obligation oi each to the whole, and to
seem to be no legal objection to the stip- .
ulation, if both parties are equally and
justly protected." Applying these prin
ciples to the case for judgment, we have .
no difliculty in holding that the stipula
tion here is ior liquidated damages. and
not ior a penalty, and that thecontract is
neither unreasonable nor oppressive.
“The tendency and preference of the law is .
to regard stated sums as a penalty, be
cause actual damages can then be recov
ered. and the recoverylimited to suchdam
ages. This tendency and preference, how
ever, do not exist when the actual dam
ages cannot be ascertained by any stand
ard. A stipulation to liquidate damages
in such cases is considered favorably.“ 1
Suth. iiam. 490. This contract oi employ
ment on its face affords no data by which
the actual damages likely to result from
its non.observance can with any certainty
be ascertained. Such a circumstance has
been regarded as justifying the courts in
the common employer, all the more im
portant.
certainty of some damage, and the uncer
tainty of means and standards by which
the actual damage can be ascertained, re
quire the courts to uphold the contract
as one ior liquidated damages, and not as’
providing ior a penalty. The sum fixed is
certain. It is proportioned to the earning
capacity of theemploye, and hence presum
ably with regard to the particular results
of a breach in each department. There is
no hardship in the agreement requiring
2 weeks‘ notice. if the operative leaves
ior good cause, the contract would not
apply. if able to work, the pay continues
on til notice has been worked out.
That she returned the next day after
quitting, and offered to work out her no
tice, is no compiiance. The mischief had
been done. She had voluntarily, and with
out pretense of excuse, or asking to be re
leased, gone off, and left her work stand- ,
ing, and endeavored to get others to go
with her. The damages had accrued, and,
under the facts of this case, appellant was
not bound to restore her. Reverse. Judg
ment here ior plaintif?! in error.
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TODE et al. v. GROSS.
(28 N. E. 469, 127 N. Y. 480.)
Court of Appeals of New York, Second Divi
sion. Oct. 6, 1891.
Appeal by defendant from ajudgment
of the general term of the supreme court
in the second judicial department, affirm
ing a judgment entered upon the decision
of the court after a trial without a jury.
Affirmed.
Action ior breach of covenant to recov
er the sum of $5,000 as stipulated dam
ages. On the 15th of October, 1884, the de
fendant owned a cheese factory situate in
the town of Monroe, Orange county, com
prising two parcels of land, with the
buildings thereon, and a uantity of fixt
ures, machinery, and "t )()|8 connected
therewith. For some time prior, with
the assistance oi her husband. Conrad
Gross, her brother-in-law, August Gross,
and her father. John Hoffman,she had
been engaged in the business oi manufact
uring cheeses at said factory known as‘ “ Fromage de Brie." “Fromage d’Isigny, "
and ".\‘eufchatel.” Such cheeses were
made by a secret process known only to
herself and her said agents. On the day
last named, she entered into a sealed
agreement with the plaintiffs, whereby she
agreed to sell and transfer to them the
said factory and all its belongings, togeth
er with the “good-will, custom. trade
marks, and names used in and belonging
to the said business," ior the sum of $25.
000, to be paid and secured March 1, 1885,
when possession was to be given. Said
instrument contained a covenant on her
part that she would "communicate after
the first day of March, 1985, or cause to be
communicated, to" said plaintiffs, “by
Conrad Gross, John Hoffman, and August
Gross, or one or other of them, the secret
of the manufacture of the cheeses known
as ‘Fromage de Brie,’ ‘Neuichatel,’ and
‘D’1signy,, and the recipe thereior, and
for each of them. and will instruct or
cause to be instructed them. and each of
them, in the manufacture thereof. And
that she and the said Conrad Gross, John
Hoffman, and August Gross will refrain
. from communicating the secret recipe and
instructions for the manuiactute of said
cheeses, or either of them. to any and all
persons other than the above-named par
ties of the second part, [plaintiffs,] and
.will also, after the first day of April, 1885.
refrain from engaging in the business of
making, manufacturing, or vending of
said cheeses, or either of them, and from
the use of the trade-marks or names, or ei
ther of them, hereby agreed to be trans
ferred in connection with said cheeses, or
either of them, or with any similar prod
uct, under the penalty of five thousand
dollars, which is hereby named as stipu
lated damages to be paid by the party of
the first part, [defendant,] or her heirs,
executors, administrators, or assigns, in
case of a violation by the party of the
first part [defendant] of this covenant,
of this contract. or any part thereof. with
in five years from the date hereof." She
further covenanted that she herself. as
Well as “said Conrad Gross, John Hoff
man, and August Gross, during and up to
‘and until the first day of May, 1885, shall
continue and remain in said county of
Orange, and from time to time, and at all
reasonable times during said period, by
herself, or by said Conrad Gross, John
Hoffman, and August Gross, whenever so
requested by the said parties of the second
part, [plaintiffs,] impart to them, or ei
ther of them, the secret of making such
cheeses, and each of them, and instruct
them, and each of them, in the process of
manufacturing the same, and each of
them, as fully as she or the said Conrad
Gross, John Hoffman, or August Gross,
or either of them, are iniormed concern
ing the same.” Both parties appear to
have duly kept and periormed the agree
ment, except that, as thetriai court iound,
“subsequently to the 1st day of May, 1885,
lonrad Gross, the husband of defendant,
went to New York city, and engaged in
the busmess of selling ‘ioreign and domes
tic iruits, and all kinds of cheese and saus
ages, &c.,’ ' " " and while so engaged' ' " sold and personally delivered
from his place of business to one John
Wassung three boxes of cheese marked
and named ‘ Fromage d’Isign_v,’ and hav
ing substantially the same trade-marks
thereon as that sold by defendant to
plaintiffs, and having stamped thereon
the name ‘Fromage d,Isigny,’ and that
said cheese so sold by him to said Was
sung was a similar product to that ior
merly manufactured by defendant. " Also,
that“said August Gross, the brother-in
law of defendant. subsequent to the 1st
day of May, 1885, engaged in the business
of retailing fancy groceries in the city of
New York. and in and during the fall of
1887, and prior to the commencement of
this action, kept ior sale at his place of
business in New York city boxes of cheese
marked or stamped ‘Fromage d’lsign_v."’
The court further iound that the cheese
so sold by Conrad Gross under the name
of “ Fromuge d’lsigny, _ “ was neversold by
plaintiffs, nor made or manufactured by
them, or either of them, but that the
same was a similar product." The court
found as conclusions of law that said
agreement was a reasonable one. and
was iounded upon a good and sufficient
consideration; that said sale by Conrad
and said keeping ior sale by August
Gross was a direct violation of the cove
nant in question; that the restriction im
posed was no more than the interests of
the parties required, and that it was not
in restraint of trade or against public
policy. Judgment was ordered ior the
plaintiffs ior the sum of $5,000 as stipulat
ed damages.
John Fennel, ior appellant.
con, ior respondents.
Henry Ba
VANN, J. (after.stating the facts).
The business carried on by the defend
ant was iounded on a secret process
known only to herself and her agents.
She had the right to continue the busi
ness, and by keeping her secret to enjoy
its benefits to any practicable extent.
She also had the right to sell the business,
including as an essential part thereof the
secret process, and, in order to place the
purchasers in the same position that she
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occupied, to promise to divulge the secret
to them alone, and to keep it irom every
one else. In no other way could she sell
what she had, and get what it was worth.
Having the right to make this promise,
she also had the right to make it good to
her vendees, and to protect them by cove
nants with proper safeguards against the
consequences 0! any violation. Such a
contract simply leit matters substantially
as they were beiore the sale, except that
the seller oi the secret had agreed that she
would not destroy its value after she had
received iull value ior it. The covenant
was not in general restraint oi trade, but
was a reasonable measure oi mutual pro
tection to the parties, as it enabled the
one to sell at the highest price, and the
other to get what they paid ior. It im
posed no restriction upon either that was
not beneficial to the other, by enhancing
the price to the seller, or protecting the
purchaser. Recent cases make it very
clear that such an agreement is not op
posed to public policy, even ii the restric
tion was unlimited as to both time and
territory. Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N. Y.
473, 13 N. E. Rep. 419: Hodge v. Sloan, 107
N. Y. 244, 17 N. E. Rep. 335; Leslie v. Loril
lard, 110 N. Y. 519, 534. 18 N. E. Rep. 363;
Thermometer Co. v. Pool, (Sup.) 4 N. Y.
Supp. 861. The restriction under consider
ation, however, was not unlimited as toJ time.
The chief reliance oi the defendant in
this court, where the point seems to have
been raised ior the first time, is that the
covenant, so far as stipulated damages
are concerned, is confined to the personal
acts oi Mrs. Gross, and does not embrace
the acts oi her agents. A careiul reading
of the agreement, however, in the light oi
the circumstances surrounding the parties
when it was made, shows that no such re
suit was intended. What was the object
of the covenant? It was to heepsecrct,
at all hazards, the process upon which the
success of the business depended. On no
other basis could the plaintiffs saiely buy,
or the deiendantsell, ior what her property
was worth. Who had the power to keep
the process secret? Clearly the defendant,
if any one,as she had confided it to no one
except her trusted agents. who were near
ly related to her by blood or marriage.
But could she covenant against the acts of
those over whom she had no control? She
had the right to so covenant, by assum
ing the risk oi their actions; and, unless
she had done so, presumptively she could
not have sold her iactory ior so largea
sum. It was safer ior her to sell with
such a covenant than it was ior the plain
tlffs to buy without it. She could exercise
some power over her own husband and
her lather and her husband,s brother, all
of whom had been associated with her in
carrying on the business, and whose ac
tions in certain other respects she assumed
to control ior a limited time, whereas the
plaintiifs were powerless. unless they had
her promise to keep the process secret at
the peril of paying heavily if she did not.
It is not surprising, thereiore, to find that
the restrictive part oi the covenant ap
plies with the same iorce to her agents
that it does to herseli; ior she undertakes
i
that neither she nor they will disclose the
secret, or engage in making or selling ei
ther kind oi cheese, or use the trade-marks
or names connected with the business.
We do not think that a personal act oi the
deiendantis essential to a violation oi this
covenant by her; ior if she permits, or
even does not prevent, her agents from
doing the prohibited acts, the promise is
broken. While it is her exclusive cove
nant, it relates to the action of others;
and, it they do what she agreed that they
would not do, it is a breach by her. al
though not her own act. She violated her
agreement, not by selling herself, but by
not preventing others irom selling. This
construction oi the restrictive part of the
covenant would hardly be open to ques
tion, were it not that in the same sentence
occurs the reparative or compensatory
part designed to make the plaintifis whole
ii the deiendant either could not or did
not keep her agreement. While this pro
vides that any violation involves the pen
alty oi $5,000, it adds, “ which sum is here
by named as stipulated damage to be
paid " by the defendant incase oi a viola
tion by her oi the covenant in question.
What kind oi violation is thus referred to?
The defendant says a personal violation
by her only, but we think, ior the reasons
already given, that the spirit oi the agree
ment includes both a violation by her
own act and by the act oi those whom
she did not prevent from selling, although
she had agreed that they would not sell.
As no one not a party to a contract can
violate it, every act 01 deiend:int, iormer\.agents contrary to her covenant was a vi- »
olation thereof by her, whether she knew ,f
oi it or assented to it or not. Whenever../
that was done which she agreed should
not be done, it was a breach of a covenant
by her, even if the act was contraryto her
wishes, and in spite o! her efiorts to pre
vent it. Her covenant was against a cer
tain act by any one oi iour persons, in
cluding herself. Two of those persons
separately did the act which she had
agreed that neither oi them should do,
and thus there was a violation of the cove
nant by her, the same as if she had done
the act in person. The argument oi the
learned counsel ior the defendant that the
contract fixed a sum to be paid in case of
a violation by the dciendant, but not in
case oi a violation “ by the other parties,"
while plausible, is unsound, ior there were
no "other parties" who could break the
covenant. She was the sole covenantor,
and unless she kept the covenant she broke
it; and she did not keep it. As the actual
damages ior a breach of the covenant
would necessarily be “wholly uncertain,
and incapable oi being ascertained except
by conjecture, " wethink that the parties in
tended to liquidate them when they pro
vided that the sum named should be “as
stipulated damages. " Theuse oi the wordl
“ penalty" under the circumstances is not
controlling. Bagley v Peddie, 16 N. Y.
469; Dakin v. Williams, 17 Wend. 448,
aflirmed 22 Wend. 201; Wooster v. Kisch,
26 Hun, 61. As there is no other question
that requires discussion, the judgment
should be aiiirmed. with costs. All con
cur, except Baown J., not sitting.
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CONDON v. KEMPER.
(27 Pac. 829, 47 Kan. 126.)
Supreme Court of Kansas. Oct. 10, 1891.
Error from district court, Labette coun
ty; Gnonor:CnA.\,ni.tI:n, Judge.
This was an action brought in the dis
trict court of Labette county by L. H.
Kemper against C. M. Condon to recover
$500 as liquidated damages for the alleged
breach of the following written contract,
to-wit: “This agreement between L. H.
Kemper and (T. M. Condon witnesseth’
that whereas, the said Kemper has sold
to said Condon lot 7, block 38, in Oswego,
Kansas. said Condon,as a part ofthe con
sideration therefor, agrees to erect thereon
a two-story stone or brick building, not
less than 100 feet deep, within six months,
and to give use of the north wall thereof
to said Kemper; or else remove the house
now on lot 6, in said block 38, three feet
north of where it now stands, as said
Condon shall elect to do. and put said
building in as good condition asit is in its
present location. It is mutually agreed
between said parties that a failure on the
part of said Condon to perform these ob
ligations shall entitle said Kemper to re
cover from him the sum of five hundred
dollars as liquidated and ascertained
damages ior the breach of this contract.
C. M. Coupon. Oswego. Kansas. March
11. i887.
" The defendant answered as iol
lows: “Said defendant admits the execu
tion and delivery of the writing marked
‘Exhibit A.’ attached to and made part
of plaintiff,s petition, but he alleges the
fact to be that said writing was executed
and delivered under a misapprehension
and a mistake of the facts in reference to
the subject-matter of the transaction
therein referred to as they actually exist
ed, and that but ior such mistake such
writing would not have been executed.
Defendant alleges that plaintiff was the
owner of lots 6 and 7, in block 38, in the
city of Oswego, Kansas. That the frame
house mentioned in said writing‘ belonged
to plaintiff. and was appurtenant to said
purchased from plaintiff said lot 7 with a
view of erecting thereon a stone or brick
building. That at the time of purchasing
said lot 7, and of executing and delivering
said writing, both plaintiff and defendant
understood and believed that said frame
house, mentioned in said writing, and
which belonged on and was appurtenant
to said lot 6, stood on the line between
said lots 6 and 7; the main part of it be
ing. as said parties supposed, on lot 6,
and about two or three feet in width of it
standing on said lot 7. That to permit
defendant to build on his said lot 7 would
necessitate the removal of said house, as
said parties believed, some three feet to
the north. That plaintiff sold, and de
fendant bought, said lot under such belief.
That plaintiff, in negotiating ior the sale
of said lot 7, objected to being put to the
expense of removing said house so that it
would all stand on his own lot 6, orinsist
ed. if he were put to such expense, he
should be compensated therefor; and to
this defendant assented. and agreed that
he would, at his own expense, remove
said frame houseso that it should entirely
stand on said lot 6, and far enough across
the line between said lots 6 and 7 not to
interfere with the erection of a wall on
said line, and put it in as good condition
as it then was, where it then stood; or if
he should so elect, instead of removing
and repairing said house as aioresaid, he
might erect on said lot 7 a brick or stone
building not less than 100 feet deep, and
give plaintiff the use of the north wall
thereof as compensation ior his moving
and repairing said house as aioresaid.
That it was to meet such contingency,
and secure such end, that said writing
was executed and delivered. That there
after this defendant elected not to erect
said stone or brick building on said lot 7,
and not to furnish plaintiff the use of the
north wall thereof. That, by agreement
between said plaintiff and defendant. said
,
block was afterwards surveyed. and the
fact was then ascertained that said frame
building did not stand, as both of said
parties had supposed it did, across the
line between said lots 6 and 7,—a part on
6 and a part on 7,—but thatit all then
stood on said lot 6, and so far from the
line between lots 6 and 7 as not to inter
fere with the erection ofa wall thereon,
and thereiorea removal ofsaid frame build
ing was unnecessary, and would he of no
advantage whatever to plaintiff. De
fendant alleges that the only purpose on
. the part of plaintiff or defendant in the
execution and deliverypf said writing
was to indemnify plaintiff against cost
and expense in the removal and repair of
said house as aioresaid, and that, had
plaintiff desired its removal after the fact
in reference to its true lOc€tion was ascer
tained, he could have had it removed
three feet north of where it then stood,
and put in as good condition as it was,
where it then stood,at a cost and expense
of not to exceed one hundred dollars.
That said house could, at the time of the
execution of said writing, or at any time
since then, have been removed three feet
.north of where it then stood and now
, . stands. and put in as good condition as
lot 6. That defendant negotiated for and 1 it then was, in its then location’ at a cost
of not to exceed one hundred dollars.
That in no event could plaintiffs dum
age,had he desired to have had said house
removed, exceed one hundred dollars.
That to indemnify against such possible
damage was the only object in giving said
writing. Defendant alleges that plaintiff
has not removed said house, and has in
no way been to any cost or expense on ac
count of the removal of said house, or ior
any other purpose referred to in any way
in said writing. Defendant denies that
plaintiff has suffered any damage on his
account, and denies any liability to him
in any respect. Whereiore defendant asks
that this cause be dismissed. and that he
recover his costs herein._ The plaintiff
replied, denying every allegation of the
answer inconsistent with the allegations
of his petition. At; the February term,
1889, when the case was called for trial,
the plaintiff moved ior judgment upon the
pleadings; and the court sustained the
motion, and rendered judgment accord
ingly in favor of the plaintiff and against
the dcfendant ior $500, with intcre:,t and
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lowing text-books upon this subject may
be examined with much profit: 1Sedg.
Dam. (Kth Ed.) c. 12, §§ 389-427; 1 Suth.
Dam. pp. 475-530. c. 7.§6; 13 Amer. & Eng.
Enc. Law, pp. 857—8(i8; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur.
§§ 440—447; 3 Pars. Cont. pp. 156-l63,§ 2.
The text-books upon this subje .t unite in
saying that the tendency and
§preierenceoi the law is to regard a state
costs; the defendant excepted, and after
wards, as plaintiff in error, brought the
case to this court ior review.
Case & Glasse, ior plaintifi in error.
H. Morrison, ior defendant in error.
J.
VALEN,l‘INE,J. (alter stating the facts
as above). The substantial question in
volved in this controversy is whether the
plaintiff below, L. H. Kemper, may re
cover irom the deiendant below. (3. M.
Condon, the sum of $500 as agreed and liq
uidated damages. or whether he can re
cover only tbe amount of his actual loss
or damage resulting irom the breach oi
the contract sued on, which amount. ac
cording to the iacts oi the case as pre
sented to us’ cannot exceed $100. The
contract upon which Kemper seeks to re
cover contains the iollowing among other
stipulations: “It is mutually agreed he
tween said parties that aiuilure on the
part oi said Condon to periorm these ob
ligations shall entitle said Kemper(to re
cover irom him the sum oiflve hundred
dollars as liquidated and ascertaine
damages ior the breach o! this contract.
It will be seen that the parties themselves
have used the words “liquidated and as
certained damages;", but nearly all the
authorities agree that neither these
words, nor any other words of similar
import. are conclusive, but that the
amount named, notwithstanding the us.e
oi such words, may nevertheless be noth
ing more than a penalty. Some oi such
authorities are the iollowing: Lampman
v. Cochran. 16 N. Y. 275: Ayres v. Pease,
12 \Vend. 393; Hoag v. McGinnls’22 Wend.
163; Beale v. Hayes. 5 Sandi. 640; Gray v.
Crosby, 18 Johns. 219; Jackson v. Baker,
2 Ed w. Ch. 471 ; Shreve v. Brereton, 51 Pa.
St. 175; Fitzpatrick v. Cottingham’ l4
Wis. 219; Fisk v. Gray, 11 Allen’132; Wal
lis v. Carpenter,13 Allen, 19; Ex parte Pol
lard, 2 Low. 411; Basye v. Ambrose. 28
Mo. 39; Carter v. Strom. 41 Minn. 522, 43
N. W. Rep. 394; Schrimpi v. Manufactur
ing Co., 86 Tenn. 219. 6 S. W. Rep. 131;
Haideman v. Jennings. 14 Ark. 329; l)avis
v. Freeman’ 10 Mich. ll~is; Hahn v. Horst
man. 12 Bush, 240; Low v. Nolte, 16 Ill.
475; Kemble v. Farren. 6 Bing. 14l ; Davies
v. Penton’6 Barn. & (3. 216; Horner v.
Flintoii, 9 Mees. & W. 678; Newman v.
Capper. 4 Ch. Div. 724. Oi course, the
words oi the parties with respect to dam
ages, losses, penalties, ioricitures, or any
sum oi money to be paid’ received’ or re
covered, must be given due consideration,
and. in the absence oianything to the con
trary, must be held to have controiiin
force; but when it may be seen from t e
entire contract, and the circumstances un
der which the contract was made. that
the parties did not have in contemplation ,
actual damages or actual compensation.
,and did not attempt .to stipulate with
reference to the payment or recovery of,
actual damages or actual compensation.
then the amount stipulated to be paid on -
the one side, or to be received or recov
ered on the other side. cannot be consid
ered as liquidated damages, but must be
considered in the nature of a penalty; and
this, even if the parties should name such'
amount “liquidated damages.” The ioi-ll_.,
RuN] as B.
because actual damages can then here
covered, and the recovery be limited to
such damages. 1 Suth. llam.490;13A1ner.
& Eng. Enc. L W, pp. 853. 860. The decis
ions oi this court are also in this Iams
line. The only decisions of this court up
on the subject oi liquidated damages are
the iollowing’ Kurtz v. Sponable, 6 Kan.
395; Foote v. Sprague, 13 Kan. I55; Rail
way Co. v. Shoemaker, 27 Kan. 677; Heat
wole v. Gorrell, 35 Kan. 692’ 12 Pac. Rep.
135. We are satisfied with the foregoing
decisions oi this court, but they do not go
to the extent oi controlling the decision
in the present case. The last case cited
is supported by the iollowing additional
cases: Davis v. Gillett. 52 N. H. 126:
Caswell v. Johnson. 58 Me. 164; Burrill
v. Dnggett, 77 Me. 545. 1 Atl. Rep. 677.
in 1 Sedgwick on Damages (8th Ed.) the
iollowing among other language is used:
“From the ioregoing we derive the iul
ilowing as a general rule governing the
lwhole subject: Whenever the damages
‘were evidently the subject of calculation
and adjustment between the parties’ and
a certain sum was agreed upon and in
tended ascompensation. and is in tact rea
sonable in amount. it will be allowed by
the court as liquidated damages." Sec
tion 405. “And here we are brought back
by a somewhat circuitous path to the
great iundamental principle which under
lies our whole system,—that oi compensa
tion. The great object oi this system is
to place the plaintifi in as good a position
as he would have had if his contract had
not been broken. Solong aspartles them
selves keep this principle in view. they will
be allowed to agree upon such a sum as
will probably be a lair equivalent of a
breach oi contract. But when they go be
yond this, and undertake to stipulute.not
ior compensation. but ior a sum out oi all
proportion to the .measure of liability
which the law regards as compensatory,
then the law will not allow the ag‘n-ement
to stand. In all agreements’ tipereiore.
fixing upon a sum in advance as the meas
ure or limit oi liability’ the final question
is whether the subject of the contract is
such that itviolates this iundamental rule
of compensation. Ii it does so, the sum
fixed is necessarily a penalty. Iiit does
not do so, the question arises. as in any
other contract’ as to what agreement the
parties have actually made; and here, as
in all other cases’ their intention. as as
certained irom the language employed. is
a guide." Section 406. “ Where the stipu
la ted sum is wholly collateral to the object
oi the contract. being evidently inserted
merely as security ior periormance, it will
not be allowed as liquidated damages."
Section 410. “ Whenever an amount stip
ulated is to be paid on the non-pa_v
ment oi a less amount, or on deiault in de
livering a thing oi let-is value, the sum will
penalty’ instead of liquidated damages.//
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generally be treated as a penalty.” Sec
tion 411. “ Whenever thestipulated sum is
to be paid on hreach of a contract of such
a nature that the loss may be much great
er or much less than the sum, it will not
be allowed as liquidated damages." Sec
tion 4l2. “A sum fixed as security for
the periormance of a contract containing
a number of stipulations of widely differ
ent importance, breaches of some oiI which
are capable of accurate valuation, for any
of which the stipulated sum is an excess
ive compensation, is a penalty.” Section
413. “If the contract is one in which the
measure of damages ior part periormance
is asccrtainable, and a sum is stipulated
for breach of it, this sum will not be al
lowed as liquidated damages, in case of a
partial breach." Section 415.
In 1 Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence
the folio wing language is used: “Where
an agreement contains provisions ior the
performance or non.periormance of several
acts of different degrees ofimportauce, and
then a certain sum is stipulated to be paid
upon a violation of any or all of such pro
visions, and the sum will be in some in
tances too large. and in ‘others too small,
a compensation ior the injury thereby oc
cnsioned, that sum is to be treated as a
penalty, and not as liquidated damages.
This rule has been laid down in a some
what different iorm, as iollows: Where
the agreement contains provisions ior the
periormance or non-periormance of acts
which are not measurable by nny exact
pecuniary standard,and also of one or
more other acts in respect of which the
damages are easily ascertainable by a
jury, and a certain sum is stipulated to be
paid upon a violation of any or of all
these provisions, such sum must be taken
to be a penalty.” Section 443. “Whether
an agreement provides ior the periormance
or non-periormance of oncsingle act, or oi
several distinct and separate acts, if the
stipulation to pay a certain sum of money
upon a default is so framed, is of such a
nature and effect, that it necessarily ren
ders thedeiaulting party liable in the same
amount at all events, both when his fail
ure to perform is complete and when it is
only partial, the sum must be regarded
as a penalty, and not as liquidated dam
ages._ Section 444.
In Sutherland on Damagesthe following
among other language is used: “ While no
one can fail to discover a very great amount
of apparent conflict, still it will be iound
on examination that most of the cases,
however conflicting in appearance. have
yet been decided according to the justice
and equity of the particular case.“ Page
478. “To be potential and controlling
that a stated sum is liquidated damage,
that sum must be fixed as the basis of
compensation, and substantially limited
to it; ior just compensation is recognized
as the universal measure of damages not
punitory. Parties may liquidate the
amount by previous agreement. But,
when a stipulated sum is evidently not
based on that principle. the intention to
liquidate damages will either be found not
to exist, or will be disregarded, and the
stated sum treated as a penalty. Con
tracts are not made to be broken; and
hence, when parties provide for consequen
ces of a breach,they proceed with less cau
tion than if that event was certain, and
they were fixing asum absolutely to be
paid. The intention in all such cases is
material; but. to prevent a stated sum
rom being treated asa penalty, the in
tention should be apparent to liquidate
damages in the sense of making just com
pensation. It is not enough that the par
ties express the intention that the stated
sum shall be paid in case of a violation of
the contract. A penalty is not converted
into liquidated damages by the intention
that it be paid. It is intrinsically a differ
ent thing,and theintention thatit be paid
cannot alter its nature. A bond, literally
construed, imports an intention that the
penalty shall be paid if there be default in
the performance of the condition; and
iormerly that was the legal effect. Courts
of law now, however, administer thesame
equity to relieve from penalties in other
iorms of contract as from those in bonds.
The evidence of an intention to measure
the damage, thereiore, is seldom satis
factory when the amount stated varies
materially from a just estimateof theactu
al loss finally sustained. “ Pages 480, 481.
See also. especially, 3 Parsons on (Jon
tracts (16th Ed., p. 156 et seq.)
Many courts hold that the intention of
the parties must govern, but say that if
the damages stipulated to be paid, re
ceived, or recovered on the breach of the
contract are out of proportion to the act
ual damages that might be sustained, then
the parties could notin fact have intended
liquidated damages.but merely a penalty,
whatever their language might be. Other
courts hold that it makes no difference
what the intention of the parties might
be; that the nature of the contract itself
must govern, and if the amountstipulated
to be paid, received, or recovered is out of
all proportion to the actual damages that
might be sustained; then that such amount
must be treated asn penalty, whatever
may have been the intention of the par
ties; that in fact, and in the very nature
oi things, such amount would be a penal
ty, and could not be anything else; that
the parties could not by misnamingz the
amount, and calling it liquidated damages,
make it such. In this connection, the
following language of Judge CHRIs,i‘lANC\,,
who delivered the opinion of the court in
the case of Jaquith v. Hudson,5 Mich. 1%,
136, 137, isinstructive: “ Again, the attempt
to place this question upon the intention
of the parties. and to make this the gov
erning consideration, necessarily implies
that, if the intention to make the sum
stipulated damages should clearlyappear,
the court would eniorce the contract ac
cording to that intention. To test this,
let it be asked whether, in such a case, if
it were admitted that the parties actually
intended the sum to be considered as stip
ulated damages, and not as a penalty,
would a court of law enforce it ior the
amount stipulated‘? Clearly, they could
not, without going back to the technical
and long-exploded doctrine which gave
the whole penalty of the bond, without
reference to the damages actually sus
tained. They would thus besimplychang
log the names of things, and enforcing,
under the name of stipulated damages,
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what in its own nature is but a penalty.
The real question in this class of cases will
be iound to be, not what the parties in
tended, but whether the sum is in fact in
the nature of a penalty; and this is to be
determined by the magnitude of the sum,
in connection with thesubiect-matter, and
not at all by the words or the understand
ing of the part‘es. The intention of the
parties cannot alter it. While courts of
law gave the penalty of the bond,the par
ties intended the payment of the penalty
as much as they now intend the payment
of stipulated damages. Itmust thereiore,
we think, be very obvious that the actual
intention of the parties in this class of
cases, and relating to this point,is wholly
immaterial; and, though the courts have
very generally professed to base their de
cisions upon the intention of the parties,
that intentionis not,and cannot be made,
the real basis of these decisions. In en
deavoring to reconcile their decisions with
the actual intention of the parties, the
courts have sometimes been compelled to
use language wholly at war with any idea
of interpretation, and to say ‘ that the
parties must beconsidered as not meaning
exactly what they say.’ Horner v. Flint
oh, 9 Mees. & W. 678, per PARKE. B. May
it not be said. with at least equal proprie
ty, that the courts have sometimes said
what they did not exactly mean?" And
in the case of Myer v. Hart, 40 Mich. 5l7,
523, the supreme court of Michiga1: held as
follows: “Just compensation ior the in
jury sustained is the principle at which
the law aims, and the parties will not be
permitted, by express stipulation, to set
this principle aside."
We might quote further from the text
books and the reported cases. but we think
the foregoing is sufficient; and from the ;
ioregoing it certainly follows that the
plaintiff below, Kemper,cannot “recover"
“ the sum of $500 as liquidated and ascer-
'
tained damages ior the breach of this con
tract." notwithstanding such is the lan
1zuag,eof the contract. If the defendant,
(.‘ondon, had removed the building situat
ed on lot 6 three ieet north, and had then
put the same in as good condition as it
was beiore, he would have so completed
his contract that not one cent of damage
could be recovered from him: and to so
remove such building, and to put it in as
good condition as it was beiore. would
not have cost to exceed $100. But sup
pose that Condou had removed the build
ing, and then have failed to put the same
in as good condition as it was beiore; he
would have committed a breach of the
contract, but the actual damages might
not have been $25. Then. should the
plaintiff, Kemper, recover the said sum of
$500? Or suppose that Condon had re
moved the house. and attempted to put it
in as good condition as it was beiore, but
have failed torepalr a lock, or a small por
tion of the plastering, or a broken win
dow, which repairing might not have cost
$1; then, should Kemper have the right
to recover the said sum of $500? All this
shows that the parties did not have in
contemplation the matter of actual com
pensatory damages when they stipulated
that Kemper might re.-cover $500 from
Condou asliquidated and ascertained dam
agosdncaseol a breach of the contract. but
shows that in fact, though not in words,
they fixed the sum of $500 as a penalty to
cover all or any damages which might re
suit from a breach of the contract. The
judgment oi the court below will be re
versed. and cause remanded ior iurther
proceedings. All the justicesconcurring.
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In error to the circuit court of the United
States for the eastern district of Pennsyl
vania.
v
This was an action on the case, brought
January 25, 1888, by Frank J. Primrose, a
citizen of Pennsylvania, against the Western
Union Telegraph Company, a corporation of
New York, to recover damages for a negli
gent mistake of the defendant,s agents in
transmitting a telegraphic message from the
plaintiff, at Philadelphia, to his agent at
Waukeney, in the state of Kansas. .
The defendant pleaded (1) not guilty; (2)
that the message was an unrepeated mes
sage, and was also a cipher and obscure mes
sage, and therefore, by the contract between
the parties under which the message was
sent, the defendant was not liable for the
mistake. At the trial, the following facts
were proved and admitted:
On June 16. 1887, the plaintiff wrote and
delivered to the defendant, at Philadelphia,
for transmission to his agent, William B.
Toland, at Ellis, in the state of Kansas, a
message upon one of the defendant,s printed
blanks, the words printed below in italies













“Send the following message,
subject to the terms on back Jun‘ 16 1887‘hereof, which are he r e by
agreed to.
‘To Wm. B. To’and, Ellis, Kansas.
“Deapnt am ezreedingly busy bay all kinds qua
perhaps bracken half of it mince moment promptly
of purchases.
“FRANK J. PRIJIROSE.
“WanAa THE NOTICE AID AGREEMEIT oN
BACK or nus BL..\NK._&]"
Upon the back of the message was the fol
lowing printed matter:
“ALL MESSAGES TAKEN BY THIS COM
PANY ARE SUBJECT TO THE FOL
LOWING TERMS:
“To guard against mistakes or delays, the
sender of a message should order it RF
PEATED; that is, telegraphed back to the
originating oflice for comparison. For this.
one.half the regular rate is charged in ad
dition. It is agreed between the sender of
the following message and this company
that said company shall not be liable for
mistakes or delays in the transmission or
delivery or for nondelivcry of any UNRE
PEATED mesmge, whether happening by
negligence of its servants or otherwise, be
yond the amount received for sending the
same; nor for mistakes or delays in the
transmission or delivery or for nondelivery
of any’ REPFZATED message beyond fifty times
the sum received for sending the same, un
less specially insured; nor in any case for
delays arising from unavoidable interruption
in the working of its lines, or for errors in
cipher or obscure messages. And this com
pany is hereby made the agent of the send
er, without liability, to forward any mes
sage over the lines of any other company
when necessary to reach its destination.
“Correctness in the transmission of a mes
sage to any point on the lines of this com
pany can be nvsunnn by contract in writing,
stating agreed amount of risk, and payment
of premium thereon, at the following rates.
in addition to the usual charge for repeated
messages, viz. one per cent. for any distance
not exceeding 1,000 miles, and two per cent.
for any greater distance. No employe of the
company is authorized to vary the foregoing.
“No responsibility regarding messages at
taches to this company until the same are
presented and accepted at one of its trans
mitting oflices; and, if a message is sent to
such otflce by one of the company,s messen
gers, he acts for that purpose as the agent
of the sender.
“Messages will be delivered free withm
the estahlished free delivery limits of the
terminal oflice. For delivery at a greater
distance, a special charge will be made to
cover the cost of such. delivery.
"The company will not be liable for dam
ages or statutory penalties in any case where
the claim is not presented in writing within
sixty days after the message is filed with
the company for transmission.
“NORVIN GREEN. President.
“THOS. T. ECKERT, General Manager."
On the evening of the same day. an agent
of the defendant delivered to Toiand, at
Wankeney, upon a blank of the defendant
company. the message in this form’ the writ
ten words being printed below in italies:
"THE WESTERN UNION
TELEGB?PHCOMPANY.
“This company TRANSMITS and DE
LIVERS messages only on conditions limit
ing its liability, which have been assented to
by the sender of the following message.
“Errors can be guarded against only by re
peating a message back to the sending sta
tion for comparison, and the company will
not hold itself liable for errors or delays in
transmission or delivery of UNREPEATED
MESSAGES beyond the amount of tolls
paid thereon. nor in any case where the claim
is not presented in writing within sixty days
after sending the message.
“This is an UNREPEATED MESSAGE,
and is delivered by request of the sender,
under the conditions named above_
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"THOs. T. ECKIERT, NOBVlN GREEN,
General Mnnaner. President.
!\‘L‘MliE[l sl£.\"l‘ BY llEC,D BY CllEi.‘K.
RL S. 1".N. 22 Collrcl 8e;drawords.
“RECEIVED at 5 K. p. 111 June 16, 1_ss7.‘
“ Dated P/u'l¢nielphia, 16. Forwarded from Ellis.
“To W. B. Toland, Waukeney, Kansas.
“Destroy am exceedingly busy buy all kinds quo
perhaps bratlcm half of it mince moment promlitiy
of purchase.
“FRANK J. PRIJIROSE."
The difference between the message as
sent and as delivered is shown below, where
so much of the message sent as was omitted
in that delivered is in brackets, and the
words substituted in the message delivered
are in italies.
“[Despot] Destroy am exceedingly busy
[bay] buy all kinds quo Derhaps bracken half
of it mince moment promptly of purchase[s]."
By the private cipher code made and used
by the plaintiff and Toland, the meaning of
these words was as follows:
“Yours of the [fifteenth] serenteentk re
ceived; am exceedingly busy; [I have bought]
buy all kinds. five hundred thousand pounds;
perhaps we have sold half of it; wire when
you do anything; send samples immediately,
promptly of [purchases] purchase."
The plaintiff testified that on June 16. 1887,
he wrote the message in his own oiiice on
one of a bunch or book of the defendant,s
blanks which he kept at hand, and sent it to
the defendant,s oftlce at IIhiladclphia; that
he had a running account with the defend
ant,s agent there, which he settled monthly,
amounting to $180 for that month; that he .
did not then read, and did not remember that
he had ever before read, the printed matter
on the back of the blanks; and that he paid
the usual rate of $1.15 for this message, and
did not pay for a repetition or insurance of it.
He also testified that he then was, and for
many years had been, engaged in the busi
ness of buying and selling wool all over the
country, and had employed Toland as his
agent in that business, and early in June,
1887, sent him out to Kansas and Colorado,
with instructions to buy 50,000 pounds, and
then to await orders from him before buying
more; that, before June 12th, Toland bought
50,000 pounds, and then stopped buying; and
that he had sent many telegraphic messages
to Toland during that month and previously,
using the same code.
The defendant’s agent at Philadelphia,
called as a witness for the plaintiff, testified
that he sent this message for the plaintiff,
and knew that he was a dealer in wool, and
that Toinnd was with him, but in what ca
pacity he did not know; that he had fre
quently sent messages for him, and consid
ered him one of his best customers during the
wool season; that telegraphic messages by
the present system were sent and received by
sound, and were all dots and dashes; that
"b“ was a dash and three dots, and "y" was
two dots, a space, andthen two dots; and that
the difference between “a" and “u" was one
dot, “a" being a dot and a dash, and “u" two
dots and a dash, and the pause upon the last
touch of the “u;" that an experienced tale-
graph operator, if the words were properly
rapped out, and he was paying proper atten
tion, could not well mistake the one for the
other, but might be misled if he way not
careful; and that it was very likely that an
other dot could be put in if there was any in
terruption in the wire. He further testified
that there was a great difference between the
words “despot" and “destroy" in telegraphic
symbols; and that the letter "s" was made
by three dots, so that, if an operator received
the word “purchases" over the wires, and
wrote down “purchase," he omitted threc
dots from the end of the word.
The plaintiff introduced depositions, taken
in September, 1888, of one Stevens and one
Smith, who were respectively telegraph op
craters of the defendant at Brookville and at
Ellis, in the state of Kansas, on June 16,
1887.
Stevens testified that Brookville was a relay
station of the company, at which messages
from the east were repeated westward; that
on that day one Tindall, his fellow operator
in the Brookville oflice, handed him a copy in
Tinuan,s handwriting of the message in ques
tion (an impression copy of which he identi
fied and annexed to his deposition), contain
ing the words “despot“ and “bay," and be im
mediately transmltted it, word for word, to
Ellis; that the equipment of the ofllce at
Brookvillc was in every respect good and suf
iiclent; and that he had no recollection of
the wires between it and Ellis having been in
other than good condition on that day.
Smith testified that on that day he received
the message at Ellis from Brookville, and
immediately wrote it down, word for word,
just as received (and identified and annexed
to his deposition an impression copy of what
he then wrote down), containing the words
"destroy" and “buy," and transmitted it. ex
actly as he received it, to “,aukonoy, to
which Toland had directed any messages for
him to be forwarded; and that the oflice at
Ellis was well and sufficiently equipped for
its work, but he could not recall what was
the condition of the wires between it and
Brookville.
The plaintiff also introduced evidence tend
ing to show that June 16, 1887, was a bright
and beautiful day at Ellis and Waukeney;
that Toland, upon receiving the message at
Waukeney, made purchases of about 300,000
pounds of wool; and that the plaintiff, in set
tling with the sellers thereof, suffered a loss
of upwards of $20,000.
The circuit court, following White v. Tele
graph Co., 5 McCrary, 103, 14 Fed. 710,
and Jones v. Telegraph Co., 18 Fed. 717,
ruled that there was no evidence of gross
negligence on the part of the defendant; and
that, as the message had not been repeated,
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the plaintiff, by the terms printed upon the
back of the message, and referred to above
his signature on its face, could not recover
more than the sum of $1.15, which he had
paid for sending it. The plaintiff not claim
ing that sum, the court directed a verdict for
the defendant, and rendered judgment there
on. The plaintiff tendered a bill of excep
tions, and sued out this writ of error.
Geo. Junkin and Jos. de F. Junkin, for
plaintiff in error. Silas W. Pettlt. John H.
Dillon, Geo. H. Fearons, and Bush Taggart,
for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the case,
delivered the opinion of the court.
This was an action by the sender of a tele
graphic message against the telegraph com
pany to recover damages for a mistake in the
transmission of the message, which was in
cipher, intelligible only to the sender and to
his own agent, to whom it was addressed.
The plaintiff paid the usual rate for this mes
sage, and did not pay for a repetition or in
surance of it.
The blank form of message, which the
plaintiff filled up and signed, and which was
such as he had constantly used, had upon its
face, immediately above the place for writing
the message, the printed words, “Send the
following message, subject to the terms on
back hereof, which are hereby agreed to;"
and, just below the place for his signature,
this line: “E§‘Read the notice and agree
ment on back of this blank_E3. "
Upon the back of the blank were conspicu
ously printed the words, “All messages taken
by this company are subject to the following
terms," which contained the following condi
tions or restrictions of the liability of the
company:
"[1] To guard against mistakes or delays,
the sender of a message should order it RE
PEATED; that is, telegraphed back to the
originating oflice for comparison. For this,
one-half the regular rate is charged in addi
tion. It is agreed between the sender of the
following message and this company that
said company shall not be liable for mistakes
or delays in the transmission or delivery or
for nondelivery of any urmarnArsn message,
whether happening by negligence of its serv
ants or otherwise, beyond the amount re
ceived for sending the same; [2] nor for mis
takes or delays in the transmission or deliv
cry or for nondelivery of any REPEATED mes
sage beyond fifty times the sum received for
seudihg the same, unless specially insured;
[3] nor in any case for delays arising from
unavoidable interruption in the working of
its lines, or for errors in cipher or obscure
messages." After stating the rates at which
correctness in the transmission of a message
may be insured, it is provided that “no em
ploye of the company is authorized to vary
the foregoing." “[4] The company will not
be liable for damages or statutory penalties
in any case where the claim is not presented
in writing within sixty days after the mes
sage is filed with the company for transmls
sion."
The conditions or restrictions, the reason
ableness and validity of which are directly
involved in this case, are that part of the
first by which the company is not to be lia
ble for mistakes in the transmission or de
livery of any message beyond the sum re
ceived for sending it, unless the sender or
ders it to be repeated by being telegraphed
back to the originating oflice for comparison,
and pays half that sum in addition; and that
part of the third by which the company is
not to be liable at all for errors in cipher or
obscure messages.
Telegraph companies resemble railroad
companies and other common carrier, in
that they are instruments of commerce, and
in that they exercise a public employment,
and are therefore bound to serve all custom
ers alike, without discrimination. They
have, doubtless, a duty to the public to re
ceive, to the extent of their capacity, all
messages clearly and intelligibly written.
and to transmit them upon reasonable terms.
a-’»_11_t_i.11_@:;_=%%Ttt9L_cIw__<'\,_.I1*“r1@rs-
Their
uties are i erent, and are per ormed in
different ways; and they are not subject
to the same liabilities. Express Co. v. Cald
well, 21 Wall. 264, 269, 270; Telegraph Co. v.
Texas, 105 U. S. 460, 464.
The rule of the common law by which
common carriers of goods are held liable
for loss or injury by any cause whatever, ex
cept the act of God or of public enemies, does
not extend even to warchousemen or wharf
ingers, or to any other class of bailees, except
innkeepers, who, like carriers, have peculiar
opportunities for embezzling the goods or
for collusion with thieves. The carrier has
the actual and manual possession of the
goods. The identity of the goods which he
receives with those which he delivers can
hardly be mistaken. Their value can be
easily estimated, and may be ascertained by
inquiry of the conslgnor, and the carrler’s
compensation fixed accordingly; and his lia
bility in damages is measured by the value
of the goods.
But telegraph companies are not bailees,
in any sense. They are intrusted with noth
ing but an order or message, which is not to
be carried in the form or characters in which
it is received, but is to be translated and
transmitted through differeut symbols, by
means of electricity, and is peculiarly liable
to mistakes. The message cannot be the
subject of embezzlement. It is of no intrin
sic value. Its importance cannot be estimat
ed, except by the sender, and often cannot
be disclosed by him without danger of de
feating his purpose. It may be wholly val
ueless, if not forwarded immediately; and
the measure of damages, for a failure to
transmit or deliver it, has no relation to any
value of the message itself, except as such
value may be disclosed by the message, or
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be agreed between the sender and the com
pany.
v
As said by Mr. Justice Strong, speaking
for this court, in Express Co. v. Caldwell,
above cited: "Like common carriers, they
cannot contract with their employers for ex
emption from liability for the consequences
of their own negligence. But they may by
such contracts, or by their rules and regula
tions brought to the knowledge of their em
ployers, limit the measure of their responsi
bility to a reasonable extent. Whether their
rules are reasonable or unreasonable must
be determined with reference to public poli
cy, preciely as in the case of a carrier."
By the settled law of this court, common
carriers of goods or passengers cannot, by
any contract with their customers, wholly
exempt themselves from liability for dam
ages caused by the negligence of themselves
or their servants. Railroad Co. v. Lock
wood, 17 Wall. 357; Liverpool 8: G. W.
Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397,
442, 9 Sup. Ct. 469, and cases cited.
But even a common carrier of goods may,
by special contract with the owner, restrict
the sum for which he may be liable, even in
case of a loss by the carrier,s negligence;
and this upon the distinct ground, as stated
by Mr. Justice Blatchford, speaking for the
whole court, that “where a contract of the
kind, signed by the shipper, is fairly made,
agreeing on the valuation of the property
carried, with the rate of freight based on
the condition that the carrier assumes lia
bility only to the extent of the agreed valu
ation, even in case of loss or damage by the
negligence of the carrier, the contract will
be upheld as a proper and lawful mode of
securing a due proportion between the
amount for which the carrier may be respon
sible and the freight he receives, and of pro
tccting himself against extravagant and fan
ciful valuations." l-lart v. Railroad Co., 112
U. S. 331, 343. 5 Sup. Ct. 151.
By the regulation now in question, the tele
graph company has not undertaken to wholly
exempt itself from liability for negligence;
but only to require the sender of the message
to have it repeated, and to pay half as much
again as the usual price, in order to hold the
company liable for mistakes or delays in
transmitting or delivering or for not deliv
ering a message, whether happening by neg
ligence of its servants or otherwise.
In Telegraph Co. v. Hall, 12-} U. S. 444.
453, 8 Sup. Ct. 577, the effect of such a regu
lation was presented by the certificate of
the circuit court, but was not passed upon
by thi court, because it was of opinion
that, upon the facts of the case, the damages
claimed were too uncertain and remote.
But the reasonableness and validity of such
regulations have been upheld in McAndrew
v. Telegraph Co., 17 C. B. 3, and in Baxter
v. Telegraph Co., 37 U. C. Q. B. 470, as well
as by the great preponderance of authority
in this country. Only a few of the principal
cases need be cited.
'
In the earliest American case, decided by
the court of appeals of Kentucky, the reasons
for upholding the validity of a regulation
very like that now in question were thus
stated: “The public are admonished by the
notice that, in order to guard against mis
takes in the transmission of messages, every
message of importance ought to be repeated.
A person desiring to send a message is thus
apprised that there may be a mistake in its
transmission, to guard against which it is
necessary that it should be repeated. He is
also notified that, if a mistake occur, the
company will not be responsible for it unless
the message be repeated. There is nothing
unreasonable in this condition. It gives the
party sending the message the option to send
it in such a manner as to hold the company
responsible, or to send it for a less price at
his own risk. If the message he unimport
‘ant, he may be willing to risk it without
paying the additional charge. But if it be
important, and he wishes to have it sent cor
rectly, he ought to be willing to pay the cost
of repeating the message. This regulation,
considering the accidents to which the busi
ness is liable, is obviously just and reasona
ble. It does not exempt the company from
responsibility, but only fixes the price of that
responsibility, and allows the person who
sends the message either to transmit it at
his own risk, at the usual price, or by paying
in addition thereto half the usual price to
have it repeated, and thus render the com
pany liable for any mistake that may occur."
Camp v. Telegraph Co., 1 Metc. (Ky.) 164,
168.
In Telegraph Co. v. Carew, 15 Mich. 525,
535, 536, the supreme court of Michigan held
that a similar regulation was a valid part
of the contract between the company and the
sender, whether he read it or not. “The
regulation," said Chief Justice Christianey,
“of most, if not all, telegraph companies op
erating extensive lines, allowing messages to
be sent by single transmission for a lower
rate of charge, and requiring a larger com
pensation when repeated, must be considered
as highly reasonable, giving to their custom
er the option of either mode, according to
the importance of the message or any other
circumstance which may affect the question."
"The printed blank, before the message was
written upon it, was a general proposition
to all persons of the terms and conditions
upon which messages would be sent. By
writing the message under it, signing. and de
livering it for transmission, the plaintiff be
low accepted the proposition, and it became
a contract upon, those terms and conditions."
In Birney v. Telegraph Co., 18 Md. 341,
358. the court of appeals of Maryland, while
recognizing the validity of similar regulations,
held that they did not apply to a case in
which no effort was made by the telegraph
company or its agents to put the message on
its transit.
In Telegraph Co. v. Gihiersleve, 29 Md.
232, 2-16, 248, the same court, speaking by
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Mr. Justice Alvey (since chief justice of Mary
land and of the court of appeals of the dis
trict of Columbia), said: “The appellant had
a clear right to protect itself against extra
ordinary risk and liability by such rules and
regulations as might be required for the pur
pose." “The appellant could not, by rules
and regulations of its own making, protect
itself against liability for the consequences
of its own willful misconduct or gross neg
ligence or any conduct inconsistent with
good faith; nor has it attempted by its rules
and regulations to afford itself such exemp
tion. It was bound to use due diligence, but
not to use extraordinary care and precaution.
The appellee, by requirmg the message to be
repeated, could have assured himself of its
dispatch and accurate transmission to the
other end of the line. if the wires were in
working condition; or, by special contract
for insurance, could have secured himself
against all consequences of nondelivery. He
did not think proper, however, to adopt such
precaution, but chose rather to take the risk
of the less expensive terms of sending his
message: and, having refused to pay the
extra charge for repetition or insurance,
we think he had no right to rely upon the
declaration of the appellant,s agent that the
message had gone through, in order to fix the
liability on the company."
In Passmore v. Telegraph Co., 9 Phila. 90,
78 Pa. St. 238, at the trial in the district
court of Philadelphia, there was evidence
that Passmore, of whom one Edwards had
offered to purchase a tract of land in West
Virginia, wrote and delivered to the company
at Parkersburg, upon a blank containing
similar conditions, a message to Edwards,
at Philadelphia, in these words: "I hold the
Tibbs tract for you; all will be right,"—but
which, as delivered by the company in Phila
delphia, was altered by substituting the
word "sold_ for "hold;" and that Edwards
thereupon broke ofl! the contract for the pur
chase of the land, and Passmore had to sell
it at a great loss. The verdict being for the
plaintiff, the court reserved the question
whether the defendant was liable, inasmuch
as the plaintiff had not insured the message
nor directed it to be repeated, and after
wards entered judgment for the defendant,
notwithstanding the verdict, in accordance
with an opinion of Judge Hare, the most im
portant parts of which were as follows:
“A railway, telegraph, or other company,
charged with aduty which concerns the public
interest, cannot screen themselves from lia
bility for negligence; but they may prescribe
rules calculated to insure safety, and dimin
ish the loss in the event of accident, and
declare that, if these are not observed, the
injured party shall be considered as in de
fault, and precluded by the doctrine of
contributory negligence. The rule must
however. be such as that reason, which is said
to be the life of the law, can approve; or.
at the least, such as it need not condemn.
By no device can a body corporate avoid
liability for fraud, for willful wrong, or for
the goss negligence which, if it does not in
tend to occasion injury, is reckless of con
sequences, and transcends the bounds of
right with full knowledge that mischief may
ensue. Nor, as I am inclined to think, will
any stipulation against liability be valid
which has the pecuniary interest of the cor
poration as its sole object, and takes a safe-
guard from the public without giving anything
in return. But a rule which, in marking out
a path plain and easily accessible, as that in
which the company guaranties that every
one shall be secure, declares that, if any man
prefers to walk outside of it, they will ae
company him, will do their best to secure
and protect him, but will not be insurers,
will not consent to be responsible for acci
dents arising from iortuitous and unexpected
causes, or even from a want of care and
watchfuiness on the part of their agents,
may be a reasonable rule, and, as such, up
held by the courts."
“The function of the telegraph differs from
that of the post office in this: that while the
latter is not concerned with the contents of
the missive, and merely agrees to forward
it to its address, the former undertakes the
much more diflicuit task of transcribing a
nmssage written according to one method of
notation, in characters which are entirely
different, with all the liability to error neces
sarily incident to such a process. Nor is
this all. The telegraph operator is separated
by a distance of many miles from the paper
on which he writes, so that his eye cannot
discern and correct the mistakes committed
by his hand. It was also contended during
the argument that the electric fluid which is
used as the medium of communication is lia
ble to perturbations arising from thunder
storms and other natural causes. It is there
fore obvious that entire accuracy canuot al
ways be obtained by the greatest oare, and
that the only method of avoiding error is to
compare the copy with the original, or, in
other words, that the operator to whom the
message is sent should telegraph it back to
the station whence it came."
“Obviously he who sends a communication
is best qualified to judge whether it should
be returned for correction. If he asks the
company to repeat the message, and they
fail to comply, they will clearly be answera
ble for any injury that may result from the
omission. If he does not make such a re
quest, he may well be taken to have acqui
esced in the conditions which they prescribe,
and at all events cannot object to the want
of a precaution he has virtually waived. It
is not a just ground of complaint that the
power to choose is coupled with an obligation
to pay an additional sum to cover the cost of
repetition." 9 Phlia. 92-94; 78 Pa. St. 242
244.
The judgment was affirmed by the supreme
court of Pennsylvania, for the reasons given
\ (.17.;
‘ .
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by Judge Hare and above stated. 78 Pa. St.
246; Telegraph Co. v. Stevenson, 128 Pa. St.
442, 455, 18 At]. 441. .
In Breese v. Telegraph Co., 48 N. Y. 132,
the plaintiffs’ agent wrote, at his own oiiice
in Palmyra. on one of the company’s blanks.
substantially like that now before us, and
delivered to the company at Palmyra, a mes
sage addressed to brokers in New York, and
in these words, “Buy us seven ($700) hundred
dollars in gold." In the statement of facts
upon which the case was submitted, it was
agreed that he had never read the printed
part of the blank, and that “the message
thus delivered was transmitted from the
ofiice at Palmyra as written; but, by some
error of the defendant,s operators working
between Palmyra and New York," it was
received in New York and delivered in this
form, “Buy us seven thousand dollars in
gold," and the brokers accordingly bought
that amount for the plaintiffs, who sold it at
a loss. It was held that there was no evi
dence ot negligence on the part of the com
pany, and that, the message not having been
repeated, the company was not liable.
In Kiley v. Telegraph Co., 109 N. Y. 231,
235—237, 16 N. E. 75, a similar decision was
made. the court saying: "That a telegraph
company has the right to exact such a stipu
lation from its customers is the settled law
in this and most of the other states of the
Union and in England. The authorities htild
that telegraph companies are not under the
obligations of common carriers; that they
do not insure the absolute and accurate trans
mission of messages delivered to them; that
they have the right to make reasonable regu
lations for the transaction of their business,
and to protect themselves against liabilities
which they would otherwise incur through
the carelessness of their numerous agents,
and the mistakes and defaults incident to the
transaction of their peculiar business. The
stipulation printed in the blank used in this
case has frequently been under consideration
in the courts, and has always in this state,
and generally elsewhere, been upheld as rea
sonable." “The evidence brings this case
within the terms of the stipulation. It is not
the case of a message delivered to the oper
ator, and not sent by him from his oflice.
This message was sent, and it may be infer
red from the evidence that it went so far as
Buffalo, at least; and all that appears fur
ther is that it never reached its destination.
“fhy it did not reach there remains unex
plained. It was not shown that the failure
was due to the willful misconduct of the de
fendant, or to its gross negligence. It the
plaintiff had requested to have the message
repeated back to him, the failure would have
been detected and the loss averted. The case
is therefore brought within the letter and
purpose of the stipulation."
In the supreme judicial court of Massachu
setts. the reasonableness and validity of such
regulations have been repeatedly aflirmed.
Ellis v. Telegraph Co., 13 Allen, 226; Red
path v. Telegraph Co., 112 Mass. 71; Grinnell
v. Telegraph Co.,‘113 Mass. 299; Clement v.
Telegraph Got, 137 Mass. 463.
There are cases, indeed, in which such reg
ulations have been considered to be wholly
void. it will be sufficient to refer to those
specially relied on by the learned counsel for
the plaintiff, many of which, however, upon
examination, appear to have been influenced
by considerations which have no application
to the case at bar.
Some of them were actions brought. not by
the sender, but by the receiver, of the mes
sage, who had no notice of the printed con
ditions until after he received it, and could
not therefore have agreed to them in ad
vancc. Such were Telegraph Co. v. Dryburg.
35 Pa. St. 298; Harris v. Telegraph Co., 9
Phiia. 88; and De la Grange v. Telegraph
Co., 25 La. Ann. 383.
Others were cases of night messages, in
which the whole provision as to repeating
was omitted, and a sweeping and comprehen
sive proviion substituted, by which, in ef
fect, all liability beyond the price paid was
avoided. True v. Telegraph Co., 60 Me. 9, 18;
Bartlett v. Telegraph Co., 62 Me. 209, 215;
Candee v. Telegraph Co., 34 Wis. 471, 476;
I-Libbard v. Telegraph Co., 33 Wis. 558, 56.1.
In Bartlett’s Case the court said: “Most, if
not all, the cases upon this subject, refer to
rules requiring the repeating o!1‘messages to
insure accuracy, and seem to be jtiStl1l8(l in
their conclusion on the ground that, owing
to the liability to error from causes beyond
the skill and care of the operator, it is but
a matter of common care and prudence to
have the messages repeated, the neglect of
which in messages of importa.nce, after being
warned of the danger, is a want of care on
the part of the sender, and, as the person
sending the message is presumed to be the
best judge of its importance, he must, on his
own responsibility, make his election wheth
er to have it repeated." 62 Me. 216, 217.
The passage cited from the opinion of the
circuit court of appeals in Delaware & A.
Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. State. 3 U. 8.
App. 30, 105, 2 C. C. A. 1, and 50 Fed. 677,
in which the same judge who had decided
the present case in the circuit court said, “It
is no longer open to question that telephone
and telegraph companies are subject to the
rules governing common carriers and others
engaged in like public employment," had re
gard, as is evident from the context, and
from the reference to Budd v. New York. 143
U. S. 517, 12 Sup. Ct. 468, to those rules only
which require persons or corporations exer
cising a public employment to serve all alike,
without discrimination, and which make
them subject to legislative regulation.
In Rittenhouse v. Independent Line, etc, 1
Daly, 474, 44 N. Y. 263, and in Turner v. Tel
egraph Co., 41 Iowa, 458, it does not appear
that the company had undertaken to restrict
its liability by express stipulation.
kg."
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The Indiana decisions cited appear to
have been controlled by a statute of the state
enacting that telegraph companies should “be
liable for special damages occasioned by fail
ure or negligence of their operators or serv
ants in receiving, copying, transmitting, or
delivering despatches." Telegraph Co. v.
Meek, 49 Ind. 53; Telegraph 00. v. Fenton,
52 Ind. 1.
The only cases cited by the plaintifl! in
which, independently of statute, a stipulation
that the sender of a message, if he would hold
the company liable in damages beyond the
sum paid, must have it repeated and pay half
that sum in addition, has been held against
public policy and void, appear to be Tyler v.
Telegraph Co., 60 Ill. 421, 74 I1l. 168; Ayer v.
Telegraph Co., 79 Me. 493, 10 Atl. 495; Tele
graph Co. v. Griswold. 37 Ohio St. 301; Tele
graph Co. v. Grail, 38 Kan. 679, 17 Pac. 309;
Telegraph Co. v. Howell. 38 Kan. 685, 17 Pac.
313; and a charge to the jury by Mr. Justice
Woods, when circuit judge, as reported in
Dorgan v. Telegraph Co., 1 Am. Law T. (N.
S.) 406, Fed. Gas. No. 4,004, and not included
in his own reports.
The fullest statement of reasons, perhaps,
on that side of the question, is to be found in
Tyler v. .‘.‘elegraph Co., above cited.
In that case the plaintiffs had written and
delivered to the company on one of its blanks,
containing the usual stipulation as to repeat
ing, this message, addressrd to a broker:
“Sell one hundred (100) Western Union; an
swer price." In the message, as delivered by
the company to the broker, the message was
changed by substituting “one thousand
(1,000)." It was assumed that “Western
Union" meant shares in the Western Union
Telegraph Company. The supreme court of
Illinois held that the stipulation was “unjust,
unconscionable, without consideration, and
utterly void." 60 Ill. 439.
The propositions upon which that decision
was based may be sufiiciently stated, in the ‘
very words of the court, as follows: “Wheth
er the paper presented by the company, on
which a message is written and signed by the
sender, is a contract or not, depends on cir
cumstances;" and “whether he had knowl
edge of its terms, and consented to its restric
tions, is for the jury to determine as a ques
tion of fact, upon evidence aliunde." "Admit
ting the paper signed by the plaintiffs was a
contract, it did not, and could not, exonerate
the company from the use of ordinary care
and diligence, both as to their instruments
and the care and skill of their operators."
“The plaintiffs having proved the inaccuracy
of the message, the defendants, to exonerate
themselves, should have shown how the mis
take occurred;" and, "in the absence of any
proof on their part, the jury should be told
the presumption was a want of ordinary care
on the part of the company.." The printed,
conditions could not “protect this company
from losses and damage occaioned by causes
wholly within their own contro ," but “must
be conffned to mistakes due to the inflrmities
of telegraphy, and which are unavoidable."
60 Ill. 431-433.
The ‘effect of that construction would be
either to hold telegraph companies to be sub
ject to the liability of common carriers, which
the court admitted in an earlier part of its
opinion that they were not, or else to allow to
the stipulation no effect whatever; for, if they
were not common carriers, they would not,
even if there were no express stipulation, be
liable for unavoidable mistakes, due to causes
over which they had no control.
But the final, and apparently the principal,
ground for that decision, was restated by the
court when the case came before it a second
time, as follows: “On the. question whether
the regulation requiring messages to be re
peated, printed on the blank of the company
on which a message is written, is a contract,
we held it was not a contract binding in
law, for the reason the law imposed upon the
companies duties to be performed to the pub
lic, and for the performance of which they
were entitled to a compensation fixed by
themselves, and which the sender had no
choice but to pay, no matter how exorbitant
it might be. Among these duties, we held,
was that of transmitting messages correctly;
that the tariff paid was the consideration for
the performance of this duty in each particu
lar case, and, when the charges were paid, the
duty of the company began, and there was
therefore no consideration for the supposed
contract requiring the sender to repeat the
message at an additional cost to him of fifty
per cent. of the original charges." 74 Ill. 170,
171.
The fallacy in that reasoning appears to us
to be in the assumption that the company, un
der its admitted power to fix a reasonable
rate of compensation, establishes the usual
rate as the compensation ior the duty of
transmitting any message whatever; where
as, what the company has done is to fix that
rate for those messages only which are trans
mitted at the risk of the sender, and to re
quire payment of the higher rate of half as
much again if the company is to be liable for
mistakes or delays in the transmission or de
livery or in the nondelivery of a message.
Indeed, that learned court frankly admitted
that its decision was against the general cur
rent of authority, saying: “It must, however,
be conceded that there is great harmony in
the decisions that these companies can pro
tect themselves from loss by contract, and
that such a regulation as the one under which
appellees defended is a reasonable regulation,
and amounts to a contract." And, again:
“We are not satisfied with the grounds on
,which a majority of the decisions of respect
able courts are placed." 60 Ill. 430, 431, 435.
In the case at bar, the message, as appeared
by the plaintiff,s own testimony, was written
by him at his oflice in Philadelphia, upon one
of a bunch of the defendant,s blanks, which
he kept there for the purpose. Although he
testified that he did not remember to have
read the printed matter on the back, he did
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not venture to say that he had not read it;
still less that he had not read the brief and
clear notices thereof upon the face of the
message, both above the place for writing the
message and below his signature. There can
be no doubt, therefore, that the terms on the
back of the message, so far as they were not
inconsistent with law, formed part of the
contract between him and the company un
der which the message was transmitted.
The message was addressed by the plain
tiff to his own agent in Kansas, was written
in a cipher understood by them only, and
was in these words: “Despot am exceed
ingly busy bay all kinds quo perhaps bracken
halt of it mince moment promptly of pur
chases." As delivered by the company to
the plaintiffs agent in Kansas, it had the
words "destroy" instead of "despot," "buy"
instead of "bay," and “purchase" instead of
"purchases." .
The message having been sent and received
on June 16th, the mistake, in the first word, of
“despot" for “destroy," by Which, for a word
signifying to those understanding the cipher,
that the sender of the message had received
from the .person to whom it was addressed
his message or June 15th, there was substi
tuted a word signifying that his message of
June 17th had been received (which was evi
dently impossible), could have had no other
effect than to put him on his guard as tov
the accuracy of the message delivered to
him.
The mistake of substituting, for the last
word "purchase," in the singular, the word
“purchases,” in the plural, would seem to
have been equally unimportant, and is not
suggested to have done any harm.
The remaining mistake, which is relied on
as the cause of the injury for which the
plaintiff seeks to recover damages in this ac
tion, consisted in the change of a single let
ter, by substituting “u" for "a," so as to put
“buy" in the place of “bay." By the cipher
code, “buy_ had its common meaning, though
the message contained nothing to suggest to
any one, except the sender or his agent, what
the latter was to buy; and the word “bay,"
according to that code, had (what no one
without its assistance could have conjec
tured) the meaning of "I have bought."
The impression copies of the papers kept
at the defendant,s offices at Brookvillc and
Ellis, in the state o1' Kansas (which were an
nexed to the depositions of operators at those
oflices, and given in evidence by the plain
tifl! at the trial), prove that the message was
duly transmitted over the greater part of its
route, and as far as Brookville; for they
put it beyond doubt that the message, as re
ceived and written down by one of the opera
tors at Brookville, was in its original form,
and that, as written down by the operator
at Ellis, it was in its altered form. While
the testimony of the deponents is conflicting,
there is nothing in it to create a suspicion
that either of them did not intend to tell the
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truth; nor is there anything in the case tend
ing to show that there was any defect in the
defendant,s instruments or equipment, or
that any oi.‘ its operators were incompetent
persons.
If the change of words in the message was
owing to mistake or inattention of any of the
defendant,s servants. it would seem that it
must have consisted either in a want of
plainness of the handwriting of Tindall, the
operator who took it down at Brookville, or
in a mistake of his fellow operator, Stevens,
in reading that writing or in transmitting it
to Ellis, or else in a mistake of the operator
at Ellis in taking down the message at that
place. If the message had been repeated,
the mistake, from whatever cause it arose,
must have been detected by means of the
differing v.ersions made and kept at the of
flces at Ellis and Brookville.
As has been seen, the only mistake of any
consequence in the transmission of the mes
sage consisted in the change of the word
“bay_ into “buy," or rather of the letter “a"
into “u." In ordinary handwriting, the like
ness between these two letters, and the like
lihood of mistaking the one for the other,
especially when neither the word nor the
context has any meaning to the reader, are
familiar to all; and in telegraphic symbols,
according to the testimony of the only wit
ness upon the subject, the difference between
these two letters is a single dot.
The conclusion is irresistible that, if there
was negligence on the part of any of the de
£endant,s servants, a jury would not have
been warranted in finding that it was more
than ordinary negligence; and that, upon
principle and authority, the mistake was one
for which the plaintiff, not having had the
message repeated according to the terms
printed upon the back thereof, and forming
part of his contract with the company, could
not recover more than the sum which he had
paid for sending the single message.
Any other conclusion would restrict the
right of telegraph companies to regulate the
amount of their liability within narrower
limits than were allowed to common carriers
in Hart v. Railroad Co., already cited, in
which five horses were delivered by the plain
titf to a ral oad company for transportation
under a bi f lading, signed by him and by
its agent, which stated that the horses were
to be transported upon the terms and con
ditions thereof, "admitted and accepted by"
the plaintiff “as just and reasonable," and
that freight was to be paid at a rate speci
lied, on condition that the carrier assumed
a liability not exceeding $200 on each horse;
and the circuit court, and this court on writ
of error, held that the contract between the
parties could not be controlled by evidence
that one of the horses was killed by the neg
ligence of the railroad company, and was a
race horse, worth $15,000. 2 .\IcCrary, 333,
7 Fed. 630; 112 U. s. 331, 5 Sup. C9151.
It is also to be remembered that, by the
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third condition or restriction in the printed
terms forming part of the contract between
these parties, it is stipulated that the com
pany shall not be “liable in any case_ “for
errors in cipher or obscure messages;" and
that it is further stipulated that “no em
ployo of the company is authorized to vary
the foregoing," which evidently includes this
as well as other restrictions.
It is diflicult to see anything unreasonable
or against public policy in a stipulation that
if the handwriting of a message delivered
to the company for transmission is obscure,
so as to be read with difficulty, or is in
cipher, so that the reader has not the usual
assistance of the context in ascertaining par
ticular words, the company will not be re
sponsible for its miscarriage. and that none
of its agents shall, by attempting to trans
mit such a message, make the company re
sponsible.
As the message was taken down by the
telegraph operator at Brookville in the same
words in which it was delivered by the plain
tiff to the company at Philadelphia, it is evi
dent that no obscurity in the message, as
originally written by the plaintiff. had any
thing to do with its failure to reach its ulti
mate destination in the same form.
But it certainly was a cipher message, and
to hold that the acceptance by the defend
ant’s operator at Philadelphia made the com
pany liabie for errors in its transmission
would not only disregard the express stipu
lation that no employe of the company could
vary the conditions of the contract, but would
wholly nullify the condition as to cipher
messages, for the fact that any message is
written in cipher must be apparent to every
reader.
Beyond this, under any contract to trans
mit a message by telegraph, as under any
other contract, the damages for a breach
must be limited to those which may be fairly
considered as arising according to the usual
course of things from the breach of the very
contract in question, or which both parties
must reasonably have understood and con
templated, when making the contract, as
likely to result from its breach. This was
directly adjudged in Telegraph Co. v. Hall,
124 U. S. 444, 8 Sup. Ct. 577.
In Hadley v. Baxendale (decided in 1854)
9 Exch. 345, ever since considered a leading
case on both sides of the Atlantic, and ap
proved and followed by this court in Tele
graph Co. v. Hall, above cited, and in How
ard v. Manufacturing Co., 139 U. S. 199, 201;'
207, 11 Sup. Ct. 500; Baron Alderson laid
down, as the principles by which the jury
ought to be guided in estimating the dam
ages arising out of any breach of con
tract, the following: “Where two parties
have made a contract which one of them
has broken, the damages which the other
party ought to receive in respect of such
breach of contract should be such its
either arising naturaily—i. e. according to the
usual course of things—from such breach of
contract itself, or such as may reasonably
be supposed to have been in the contempla
tion of both parties, at the time they made
the contract, as the probable result of the
breach of it. Now, if the special circum
stances under which the contract was actual
ly made were communicated by the plaintiffs
to the defendants, and thus known to both
parties, the damages resulting from the
breach of such a contract, which they would
reasonably contemplate, would be the amount
of injury which would ordinarily follow from
a breach of contract under these special cir
cumstances so known and communicated.
But, on the other hand. if these special cir
cumstances were wholly unknown to the
party breaking the contract, he, at the most,
could only be supposed to have had in his
contemplation the amount which would arise
generally, and in the great multitude of cases
not affected by any special circumstances,
from such a breach of contract." 9 Exch.
354. 35.3.
In Sanders v. Stuart, which was an action
by commission merchants against a person
whose business it was to collect and trans
mit telegraph messages, for neglect to trans
mit a message in words by themselves wholly
unintelligible, but which could be understood
by the plaintiffs‘ correspondent in New York
as giving a large order for goods, whereby .
the plaintiffs lost profits, which they would
otherwise have made by the transaction, to
the amount of £150, Lord Chief Justice Coler
idge, speaking for himself and Lords Jus
tices Brett and Lindley, said: “Upon the
facts of this case, we think that the rule in
Hadley v. Baxendale applies, and that the
damages recoverable are nominal only. It
is not necessary to decide, and we do not
give any opinion, how the case might be if
the message, instead of being in language
utterly unintelligible, had been conveyed in
plain and intelligible words. It was con
veyed in terms which. as far as the defend
ant was concerned, were simple nonsense.
For this reason, the second portion of Baron
Alderson’s rule clearly applies. No such
damages as above mentioned could be ‘rea
sonably supposed to have been in the con
templation of both parties, at the time they
made the contract, as the probable result
of the breach of it;‘ for the simple reason
that the defendant, at least did not know
what his contract was about. nor what nor
whether any damage would follow from the
breach of it. And for the same reason, viz.
the total ignorance of the defendant as to
'
the subject-matter of the contract (an ignor
ance known to, and indeed intentionally pro
cured by, the plaintiffs). the ffrst portion of
the rule applies also; for there are no dam
ages more than nominal which can ‘fairly
and reasonably be considered as arising nat
urally—i. e. according to the usual course of
may fairly and reasonably be considered ] t.hings——from the breach‘ of such a contract
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as this." 1 C. P. Div. 326, 328, 45 Law J.
C. P. (W, 684.
In Telegraph Co. v. Gildersleve, already re
ferred to, which was an action by the sender
against a telegraph company for not deliver
ing this message received by it in Baltimore,
addressed to brokers in New York, “Sell
fifty (50) gold," Mr. Justice Alvey, speaking
for the court of appeals of Maryland, and ap
plying the rule of Hadley v. Baxendalc. above
cited, said: "While it was proved that the
dispatch in question would be understood
among brokers to mean fifty thousand dol
lars of gold. it was not shown. nor was it
put to the jury to find, that the appellant,s
agents so understood it, or whether they un
derstood it at all. ‘Sell fifty gold‘ may have
been understood in its literal import, if it
can be properly said to have any, or was
likely to be taken to mean fifty dollars .
fifty thousand dollars by those not initiated;
and, if the measure of responsibility at all
depends upon a knowledge of the special cir
cumstances of the case, it would certainly
follow that the nature of this dispatch should
have been communicated to the agent at the
time it was offcred to be sent, in order that
the appellant might have observed the pre
cautions necessary to guard itself against the
risk. But without reference to the fact as
to whether the appellant had knowledge of
the true meaning and character of the dis
patch, and was thus enabled to contemplate
the consequences of a breach of the contract,
the jury were instructed that the appellee
was entitled to recover to the full extent of
his loss by the decline in gold. In thus in
structing the jury, we think the court com
mitted error, and that its ruling should be
reversed." 29 Md. 232, 251.
In Baldwin v. Telegraph Co., which was an
action by the senders against the telegraph
company for not delivering this message,
“Telegraph me at Rochester what that well
is doing," Mr. Justice Allen, speaking for the
court of appeals of New York, said: “The
message did not import that a sale of any
property or any business transaction hinged
upon the prompt delivery of it, or upon any
answer that might be received. For all the
purposes for which the plaintiffs desired the
information, the message might as well have
been in a cipher or in an unknown tongue.
It indicated nothing to put the defendant up
on the alert, or from which it could he in
ferred that any special or peculiar loss would
ensue from a nondelivery of it. Whenever
special or extraordinary damages, such as
would not naturally or ordinarily follow a
breach, have been awarded for the nonper
formance of contracts, whether for the sale
or carriage of goods or for the delivery of
messages by telegraph, it has been for the
reason that the contracts have been made
with reference to peculiar circumstances
known to both, and the particular loss has
been in the contemplation of both, at the
time of making the contract, as a contingen
cy that might follow the nonperformance."
"The dispatch not indicating any purpose
other than that of obtaining such information
as an owner of property might desire to have
at all times, and without reference to a sale,
or even a stranger might ask for purposes en
tirely foreign to the property itself, it is very
evident that, whatever may have been the
special purpose of the plaintiffs, the defend
ant had no knowledge or means of knowledge
of it, and could not have contemplated either
a loss of.a sale, or a sale at an tmdervalue,
or any other disposition of or dealing with
the well or any other property, as the proba
ble or possible result of a breach of its con
tract. The loss which would naturally and
necessarily result f:om the failure to deliver
the message would be the money paid for its
transmission, and no other damages can be
claimed upon the evidence as resulting from
the alleged breach of duty by the defendant."
45 N. Y. 7-14, 749, 750, 752. See, also, Hart
v. Cable Co., 86 N. Y. 633.
The supreme court of Illinois, in Tyler v.
Telegraph Co., above cited, took notice of the
fact that in that case “the dispatch disclosed
the nature of the business as fully as the case
demanded." 60 11l. 434. And in the recent
case of Cable Co. v. Lathrop the same court
said: “It is clear enough that, applying the
rule in Hadley v. Baxendaie, supra, a recov
ery cannot be had for a failure to correctly
transmit a mere cipher dispatch, unexplained,
for the reason that to one unacquainted with
the meaning of the ciphers it is wholly unin
telligible and nonsensical. An operator would
therefore be justifiable in saying that it can
contain no information of value as pertain
ing to a business transaction, and a failure to
send it or a mistake in its transmission can
reasonably result in no pecuniary loss." 131
Ill. 575, 585, 23 N. E. 583. ‘
The same rule of damages has been applied,
upon failure of a telegraph company to trans
mit or deliver a cipher message, in one of the
Wisconsin cases cited by the plaintiff, and in
many cases in other courts. Candee v. Tele
graph Co., 3.} Wis. 471, 479-481; Beaupre v.
Telegraph Co., 21 Minn. 155; Mackay v. Tele
graph Co., 16 Nev. 222; Daniel v. Telegraph
Co., 61 Tex. 452; Cannon v. Telegraph Co.,
100 N. C. 300, 6 S. E. 731; Telegraph Co. v.
Wilson, 32 Fla. 527, 14 South. 1; Behm v.
Telegraph Co., 8 Biss. 131, Fed. Gas. No.
1,,.’34l; Telegraph Co. v. Martin. 9 Ill. App.
587; Abeles v. Telegraph Co., 37 Mo. App.
554; Kinghorne v. Telegraph Co., 18 U. C. Q.
B. 60. 69.
In the present case the message was, and
was evidently intended to be, wholly unintel
ligible to the telegraph company or its agents.
They were not informed, by the message or
otherwise, of the nature, importance, or ex
tent of the transaction to which it related, or
of the position which the plaintiff would
probably occupy if the message were correct
ly transmitted. Mere knowledge that the
plaintiff was a wool merchant, and that To
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land was in his employ, had no tendency to
show what the message was about. Accord
ing to any understanding which the tele
graph company and its agents had, or which
the plaintiff could possibly have supposed
that they had, of the contract between these
parties. the damages which the plaintifl seeks
to recover in this action, for losses upon wool
purchased by Toland, were not such as could
reasonably be considered, either as arising,
according to the usual course of things, from
the supposed breach of the contract itself, or
as having been in the contemplation of both
parties, when they made the contract, as a.
probable result of a breach of it.
In any view of the case, therefore, it was
rightly ruled by the circuit court that the
plaintiff could recover in this action no more
than the sum which he had paid for sendtug
the message. Judgment afllrmed.
Mr. Chief Justice FULLER and Mr. Justice
HARLAY dissented.
Mr. Justice WHITE, not having been a
member of the court when this case was ur
gued, took no part in its decision.
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WESTERN UNION TEL. CO. v. WILSON.
(14 South. 1, 32 Fla. 527.)
Supreme Court of Florida. Nov. 8, 1893.
Appeal from circuit court, Escambia coun
1)‘; James F. McClellan, Judge.
Action by Charles M. Wilson against the
Western Union Telegraph Company for a
failure to transmit and deliver a message.
Plaintiff had judgment, and defendant ap
peals. Reversed.
Mallory & Maxwell, for appellant.
C. Avery, for appellee.
John
TAYLOR, J. The appellee sued the ap
pellant in the circuit court of Escambia
county, in case, for damages for its failure
to transmit and deliver a telegraphic mes
sage in cipher. The suit resulted in a judg
ment for the plaintiff in the sum of $688.88,
and therefrom the defendant telegraph com
pany appeals.
The declaration alleges as follows: “That
the Western Union Telegraph Company. 0.
corporation, the defendant, on the 12th day
of December, 1887, was engaged in the busi
ness of transmitting telegraphic messages
between Pensacola, Fla., and New York, in
the state of New York, and in the delivery
thereof to other cable and telegraph com
panies for transmission to Liverpool, Eng
land, where the said plaintiff had a regular
merchant broker or agent, to wit, one A.
Dobell, through whom the plaintiff negoti
ated, by means of such messages, the sale in
Europe of cargoes of lumber and timber, the
plaintiff being then and there a timber and
lumber merchant at the city of Pensacola.
That on said day the 'plaintiff delivered to
the defendant, and the defendant received
from him at its oflice in the city of Pensa
cola, and undertook to transmit and cause
to be transmitted, and it was its duty to
transmit and cause to be transmitted, to the
said A. Dobell, the following cipher message:
‘Dobell, Liverpool: Gladfuiness—shipment—
rosa — bonheur — luciform — banewort —
margin,,—which the said Dobell would have
understood, and the plaintiff intended to be
an offer of a cargo of lumber and timber
from aid port of Pensacola for sale through
the said Dobell in Europe, and the said Do
bell would have sold the same for the plain
tiff on the tcrms of said offer at a proiit to
the plaintiff of twelve hundred dollars, but
the defendant failed and neglected to send
the said message, in violation of its duty
to the plaintiff, and to the plaintiffs loss of
$1,200,_ and therefore he sues, etc. I
At the trial the plaintiff, over the defend
ant,s objection, was permitted to testify, in
establishment of the damages claimed, that
he had to sell his cargo of lumber in"Europe
upon the market for the best price he could
get, which was 52 shillings a load, and
which amounted to $630.84 less than the
price at which he offered same for sale in
the message failed to be sent. The over
ruled objection of the defendant to this testi
mony was that the damage sought to be shown
thereby was too remote, and was not in the
contemplation of the parties at the time of
the alleged making of the contract for the
transmission of said message. To this rul
ing the defendant excepted, and it is assigned
as error. The question presented is, what is
the proper W damages to be re
covered of a telegraph company holding it
self out to the service of the public, for hire,
as the transmitter of messages by electricity,
upon its failure to transmit or deliver‘ a mes
sage written in cipher, or in language un
intelligible except to those having a key to
its hidden meaning. As this question has
heretofore been passed upon by this
court contrary to the views we find it im
possible to become divested of, and, as we
think, contrary to the great weight of the
well-reasoned adjudications both in this
country and in England, we take it up with
diiiidence that finds no palliative in the fact
that the decision heretofore was by a di
vided court. Telegraph Co. v. Hyer, 22 Fla.
637, 1 South. 129. In that case the majority
of the court, while approving the following
well.established rule first formulated in
reference to carriers of goods in the cause
celebre of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch.
341: “Where two parties have made a con
tract, which one of them has broken, the
damages which the other party ought to re
ceive in respect of such breach of contract
should be either such as may fairly and sub
stantially be considered as arising naturally,
i. e. according to the usual course of things,
from such breach of contract itself, or such
as may reasonably be supposed to have been
in the contemplation of both parties at the
time they made the contract, as the probable
result of the breach of it,"—hold that it has
no applicability to the contracts of telegraph
companies for the transmission of messages,
and that such companies may be justly con
sidered and treated as standing alone,—a
system unto itself. The reasoning leading
to this conclusion is as follows: “The com
mon carrier charges different rates of freight
for dlfferent articles, according to their bulk
and value, and their respective risks of
transportation, and provides different meth
ods for the transportation of each. It is not
shown here that the defendant company
had any scale. of prices which were higher
or lower, as the importance of the dispatch
was great or small. It cannot be said, then,
that for this reason the operator should be
informed of its importance, when it made
no difference in the charge of transmission.
It is not shown that, if its importance had
been disclosed to the operator, that he was re
quired by the rules of the company to send
the message out of the order in which it
came to the oflice, with reference to other
messages awaiting transmission; that he
was to use any extra degree of skill, any
different method or agency for sending it,
from the time, the skill used, the agencies
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employed, or the compensation demanded
for sending an unimportant dispatch, or that
it would aid the operator in its transmission.
For what reason. then, could he demand in
formation that was in no way whatever to
affect his manner of action, or impose on
him any additional obligation? It could
only operate on him persuasively to perform
a duty for which he had been paid the price
he demanded, which, in consideration thereof,
he had agreed to perform, and which the
law, in consideration of his promise, and the
reception of the consideration therefor, had
already enjoined on him." The answer to
all this is that the same argument is equally
applicable as a reason why the rule in Had
ley v. Baxeudale should not apply to carriers
of goods for hire. The carrier of goods, in
contracting to carry and deliver, deals with
the tangible. When he contracts, he has in
his mind’s eye, from the visible, tangible
subject of his contract, what will be the
probable damage resulting directly from a
breach of it on his part, and so has the
other party to the contract with the carrier.
Therefore, the damage likely to flow from
a breach by the carrier can properly be said
to enter mutually into the contemplation of
both parties to the contract, and it is this
mutuality in the contemplation ofboth parties
to the contract of the results that will be
likely to flow directly from its breach that
really furnishes that equitable feature of the
rule that the damages thus mutually contem
plated arc in fact the damages that the law
will impose for the breach. Why? Because,
in the eye of the law, the parties having
mutually contemplated such damages in go
ing into such contract, those damages can
alone be inferred as having entered into their
contract as a silent element thereof. The rule
in Hadley v. Baxendale is applicable alone to
breaches of contract, and formulates con
cisely the measure of damages for the breach
of those contracts that do not within them
selves, in express terms, fix the penalty to
follow their breach. In other words, this
rule does nothing more than to give ex
pression to that part of the contract which.
in the eye of the law, has been mutually
agreed upon between the parties, but con
cerning which their contract itself is silent.
This essential leading feature of the rule, we
think, was wholly lost sight of in the discus
sion of the question in Telegraph Co. v. Hyer.
supra, i. e. that the damages provided for un
der the rule arise ex contractu, and that, un
less there is mutuality in all the essential ele
ments that enter into or grow out of the
contract, the whole fabric becomes unilateral,
and abhorrent in the eyes of the law. The
assertion. as a rule of law, that one party to
a contract shall alone have knowledge that
a breach of that contract will directly re
suit in the loss of thousands of dollars, and
that upon such breach he can recover of the
other party to the contract all of such, to
him, unforeseen, unexpected. uncontempiated,
noucousented.to damages, seeins to us to
be a complete upheaval of all the old land
marks in reference to damages upon broken
contracts, and the establishment of a new
rule, that is neither fair, just, or equitable,
and which, if it is to be applied to the broken
contracts of telegraph companies, must also,
according to every principle- of consistency,
be applied, under like conditions, to every
violated contract where individuals are the
contracting parties. The argument in Tele
graph Co. v. Hyer, supra, that it was not
shown that the telegraph company would
have charged more, or used more dispatch,
or taken more care, or been aided in any
way in the performance of its duty, if it had
been informed of the contents or purport of
the message contracted to be sent in that
case, is entirely foreign to the question. In
arriving at the rule of law as to the damage
that parties to contracts are entitled to, as
matter of legal right, upon breach thereof,
a consideration of anything that might or
might not in fact have prevented the wrong
ful breach has nothing to do with the sub
ject whatever. But we are to look to and
consider the mutual rights of the parties
from the inception of the contractual rela
tions between them, down through the con
tract itself, to the breach complained of.
One of the primary rights that each party
has, who is about to enter into a contract
with another, a breach of which may result
in damage, is to be so situated that he may
foresee what direct, probable results will
reasonably, and in the usual course of
events, follow bad faith, neglect, or other
breach upon his part. Why? Not that it
will or will not in fact deter him from being
delinquent, but that he may, if he will, so
act as to guard against and avoid, for his
own beneiit, the foreseen, calamitous conse
quence, or that he may, if he does not, be
held to have knowingly and willingly sub
jected himself to the contemplated conse
quences of his wrong. that, from being fore
seen and contemplated, the law will impute
his consent thereto.
That the rule formulated in Hadley v. Bax
endale, supra, is the one properly ap
plicable to the contracts of telegraph com
panies for the transmission of messages has
the support of the overwhelming weight of
the decided cases, not only as to the numer
ical strength of the decisions concurring
therein, but in the logical soundness of the
reasoning upon which their conclusions rest,
as will be seen from the following authori
ties: Telegraph Co. v. Hall, 124 U. S. 444,
8 Sup. Ct. 577; Sanders v. Stuart, 1 C. P.
Div. 326; Behm v. Telegraph Co., 8 Biss. 131:t
White v. Telegraph Co., 14 Fed. 710; Bald
win v. Telegraph Co., 45 N. Y. 744; Tele
graph Co. v. Graham. 1 Colo. 230; First
Nat. Bank v. W. U. Tel. Co., 30 Ohio St. 555;
Gandce v. Telegraph Co., 34 Wis. 471; Dan
iel v. Telegraph Co., 61. Tex. 4522; Beanpre
v. Telegraph Co., 21 Minn. 155; True v. Tel
1 Fed. Gas. No. 1,234.
DAMAGES AGAINST TELEGRAPH COMPANIES. 151
egraph Co., 60 Me. 9; Squire v. Telegraph
Co., 98 Mass. %2; Telegraph Co. v. Wenger,
55 Pa. St. 262; Tyler v. Telegraph 'Co., 60
Ill. 421; Telegraph Co. v. Gildersleve, 20 Md.
232; Telegraph Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 76 Tex.
217, 13 S. W. 70; Cannon v. Telegraph Co.,
100 N. C. 300, 6 S. E. 731; Landsbcrger v.
Telegraph Co., 32 Barb. 530; Manville v.
Telegraph Co., 37 Iowa, 214; Telegraph Co.
v. Edsall, 63 Tex. 668; Hibbard v. Telegraph
Co., 33 Wis. 558; Thompson v. Telegraph
Co., 64 Wis. 53l, 25 N. W. 789; Abeles v.
Telegraph Co., 37 Mo. App. 554; Telegraph
Co. v. Cornweli, 2 C01o. App. 491, 31 Pac.
393; 3 Suth. Dam. 298; Wood, Mayne, Dam.
40; Thomp. Elect. §§ 311-316, inclusive; Id.
§§ 346, 358-375, inclusive. Opposed to this
array of authorities are the following de
cisions by divided courts, with the exception
of the Georgia and Mississippi cases: Tel
egraph Co. v. Hycr, supra; Daughtery v.
Telegraph Co., 75 Ala. 168; Id., 89 Ala. 191,
7 South. 660; Telegraph Co. v. Way, 83 Ala.
542, 4 South. 844; Telegraph Co. v. Fatman,
73 Ga. m Alexander v. Telegraph Co., 66
Miss. 161, 5 South. 397. The case of Tele
graph Co. v. Reynolds, 77 Va. 173, is also
cited as sustaining a contrary rule. but a
careful reading of that case will disclose the
fact that the conclusions reached are predi
cated upon a statutory provision in their
Code. In the case at bar, the message that
it is alleged the defendant company failed to
send was in cipher, and contained nothing
that would indicate to the defendant,s oper
ator whether it contained a criticism upon
the “Horse Fair" painting by the great artist,
Rosa Bonheur, named in the message, or
whether it related to a matter of dollars and
cents. There was no explanation made to the
operator as to its meaning or importance.
except that the plaintiff said that the word
“gladfuiness." in the message, had a special
meaning. What that special meaning was,
he did not disclose. Under these circum
stances, ail that the plaintiff could rightfully
recover for the defendant,s failure to send or
deliver the message would be nominal dam
ages, or, at most, the sum paid by him as the
price of its transmission. It was error,
therefore, for the court to admit testimony
as to the damage sustained by the plaintiff
by the loss of sale of a cargo of timber con
sequent upon the failure to forward the mes
sage.
There is another feature presented in the
proofs, aside from all that has been said up
on the rule of damages in such cases. that
would prevent the recovery had in this case.
The plaintiff himself testifies that he re
ceived from his agent, Dobeli, in Europe, an
offer for the cargo of timber. What that
offer was, is nowhere stated or shown. Then
he says: “I decided to make a final propo
sition, which I did by taking the message to
the telegraph oflice, that was not sent, which
message, when translated, was an offer by
me of said cargo of timber for sale at 54
shillings per ioa ." Then he says that be
missed the sale of the cargo at the terms
offered by him in his message in consequence
of the defendant,s failure to send it, and con
sequently had to sell on the market for the
best price he could get, which was 52 shil
lings per load. There is not a word of proof
in the record to show that his offer contained
in the unsent message would ever have been
accepted, or that he could ever at any time
have sold the timber at the price at which
he so offered it, or that it could ever have
been sold at any greater price than the one
he actually received for same, whether his
message had been sent or not. Yet, in the
face of this state of the proofs, damages
have been allowed to the plaintiff equal to
the difference between a price at which he
simply offered his timber for sale, and the
price actually received by him for it, with
out a word of proof to show whether the
higher price at which he offered it for sale
could ever have been obtained for it or
not.
The appellee contends that because of the
decision in Telegraph Co. v. Hyer, supra,
the question of damages cannot be consid
ered; that, as to this case, it is stare decisis.
This doctrine. as we understand it, is rop
erly applicable to decisl ns furnishin rules
of property, and those onstrui g statutes,
and to those passing upon th validity of
contracts in which investments have or may
have been made upon the faith of the adju
dication as to their validity, in which cases
former decisions upon the same questions
will be adhered to. but we do not think this
case falls within the rule.
In reversing the former ruling of the court
in the Hyer Case, we do not interfere with
any vested right acquired upon the faith of
that adjudication, but pass upon the rule of
damages, as upon an abstract proposition, to
follow the breach of such contracts. Of the
crroneousness of the rule as laid down in
that case, we are perfectly and clearly sat
isfled; and in such case, in determining the
propriety of overruling it as a solemn adju
dication, we are to be governed largely by a
consideration of the results that will likely
flow from the enunciatlon and establishment
of the one or the other of the two rules. If,
in such case, we conclude that the aflirmance
of what we deem to be the erroneous rule in
that case will be productive of more far
reaching and harmful results than would
follow the disaflirmance thereof, then it be
comes our duty to overturn it, and such we
think would be the result here. Besides be
ing unilateral and wholly unfair, as we have
before stated, we cannot see why, if the pro
tection of the rule in Hadley v. Baxendaie is
to be withheld from contracts with telegraph
companies. it should not also he denied in
the daily recurring contractual controversies
between individuals. To overturn the rule in
controversies as between man and man,
would be uch an uprooting of the old land
marks as to make it impracticable to sur
mise the harmful results that would follow.
Q 4;h\
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Entertaining these views, we do not think
that the doctrine of stare decisis constrains
us to adhere to the rule in the Hyer Case,
but thin. mat less harm will follow our re
turn to the well-beaten and familiar track
that furnishes a plain and easily compre
hended rule for all contracting parties, be
they corporate or individual.
The judgment appealed from is reversed,
and a new trial ordered.
RANEY, C. J., (concurring.) A reconsid
eration of the question of the measure of
damages involved here confirms the correct.
ness of the view expressed in my dissenting
opinion in Telegraph Co. v. Hyer, 22 Fla.
649 et seq., 1 South. 129, and I concur in the
opinion of Judge Taylor, that the rule fol
lowed in the case mentioned is unfair, and
ought not to be perpetuated; and, without
committing myself further upon the question
of stare decisis, my conclusion is that more
injury will result in the future from adhering
to the rule of the Hyer Case than will accrue
to parties to past transactions from changing
it, and that the judgment should be re
versed. Cooley, Const. Lim. (5th Ed.) 63'),
and note 1; Wells, Stare Dec. § 624 et seq.;
Chaniberlain, Stare Dec. 19.
MABRY, J., (dissenting.) The question of
liability to damage for a failure on the part
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of a telegraph company to send a cipher
message is not a new one in this court.
Over six years ago this question was delib
erately settled here by the decision in the
case of Telegraph Co. v. Hyer, 22 Fla. 652, 1
South. 129. It is proposed now to reverse
this case, and my view is that it should not
be done. Every question in reference to
cipher messages entering into the case now
before us was fully discussed and maturely
considered in the Hyer Case, and this case
has the support of decisions in Alabama,
Mississippi, Georgia, and Virginia. Under
the decision in the Hyer Case, there was a
remedy for damages for a failure on the part
of a telegraph company to send a cipher mes
sage, when it had, for compensation, agreed
to do so. There is much merit in the rule
that, where the company holds itself out to
the public as a transmitter of cipher mes
sages for pay, it should not be allowed, after
receiving the money and agreeing to send the
message, to deny its liability for damages
resulting from its own violation of duty on
the ground that the message was in cipher,
and its contents not known to the company
when it agreed to send it. This court hav
ing planted itself in favor of this rule over
six years ago. I do not think we should now
disturb it. I do not see how greater harm
will result from adhering to the decision than
overruling it.
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CONNELL v. \YESTERN UNION TEL. CO.
(22 S. W. 345, 116 Mo. 34.)
Supreme Court of Missouri. Division No. 2.
May 16, 1893.
Error to circuit court, Pettis county; Rich
ard Field, Judge.
Actionby Mathew Connell against the West
ern Union Telegraph Company for failure to
promptly deliver a telegram. From an or
der of dismissal for want of jurisdiction,
plaintifi appeals. Aflirmed.
Wm. S. Shirk, for plaintiff in error. Karnes,
Holmes & Krauthoff. Charles E. Yeater, and
G. H. Fcarons, for defendant in error.
GANTT, P. J. This is an action for dam
ages for the negligence of defendant in
failing. to deliver to plaintiff the following
telegraphic message sent to him by his wife:
“Sedal1a. Mo., Dec. 13, 11:89. To Matt Con
nell, Soldiers’ Home, Leavenworth, Kan
sas: Your child is dying. Mary." The
plaintiff alleged that his wife paid the cus
tomary charge, 50 cents, for its transmis
sion. and that he had refunded that sum to
her.
the 24th day of December, 1889. “and that if
said message had been transmittedl and
delivered with any degree of diligence or
promptness whatever, he would have een
able to be present with his said child ,ing‘
its last sickness, and at its death, and that .
by reason of the great negligence and care
lessness of defendant in failing to deliver
said message, and of his being thereby de- 1
prived of being wlthhis said child during
its last sickness, and at its death, he lost,
not only the fifty cents paid for sending said
message, but also suffered great anguish and
pain of mind and body. and was physically
and mentally prostruted when he learned that
his child had died. and been buried, without
knowledge on his part of its sickness and
dea " He alleges that he was an inmate
of the soldiers’ home from December 13,
1880, continuously, till February 21, 1890,
and by the slightest diligence he could have
been found. He alleges. further, that he is
damaged in the sum of $5,000, for which he
prays judgment. On motion of defendant the
circuit court struck out of the petition the
words, “but also suffered great anguish and
pain of mind and body, and was physically
and mentally prostrated, when he learned
that his child had died, and had been buried,
without knowledge on his part of its sick
ness and death." This left the action pend
ing for the 50 cents only, and, plaintifi’ declin
ing to amend, the court sustained another
motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction
of the subject-matter of the action.
The sole question discussed by the appeh
lant in this case is this: “Where a telegraph
company is advised by the contents of a
message that great mental suffering and pain
will naturally result from its neglect to trans
mit and deliver the message promptly, can\




damages be recovered by the sendee for suclgl
mental agony and distress, caus y a fail
ure to promptly transmit and deliver?" The
proposition, it will be observed, relates sim
ply to damages arising from a breach of
contract. Prior to this time there had been
but one opinion expressed in the decisions of
this court, and that is clearly adverse to the
contention of the appellant, and this is not
questioned by the able counsel who repre
sents the appellant; but he urges that, in
asmuch ns telegraphy is of comparatively re
cent origin, we should, in view of the func
tion lt performs, make an exception in the
construction of the contracts made by those
engaged in it, and the damages which flow
from a breach thereof. That an action for
mental anguish, disconnected with physical
injury, for the breach of a contract, could.
not be maintained at common law, with the
single exception of the breach of a marriage
contract, we think, is abundantly established.
Wood, Mayne, Dam. 75; Lynch v. Knight. 9
H. L. Cas. 577; Walsh v. Railroad Co., 42
Wis. 23; Wyman v. Le-avitt, 71 Me. 22".
The subject came under view in this court
in Trigg v. Railway C00 74 Mo. 147. In
that case a lady, with twollttle children, was
carried beyond the station to which she was _'
traveling. It was not claimed that any in
dignity was offered. or that she suffered per
sonal injury; The trial court instructed that
the jury might award her damages for the
anxiety and suspense of mind suffered in con
sequence of the delay in reaching her desti
nation. This court, in reversing the cause,
said:
damages was erroneous. Neither the anxi
ety and suspense of mind suffered by the
plaintifl? in consequence of the delay, nor the
effect upon her health, nor the danger to
which she was exposed in consequence of
the. train being stopped an insufllcient length
of time, were proper elements of damage in
this case, as no personal injury was received.
by the plaintiff, and no circumst’ances of ag
gravation attended the wrongful act com
If the anxiety and suspense of
mind suffered by the plaintiff in consequence
of the delay in this case is a ground of recov
ery, similar suspense and anxiety of mind
would be an equally good ground of recov
ery in a case where a railroad train should
wrongfully stop to take on a passenger."
The general rule is that “pain of mind, when
connected with bodily injury, is the subject
of damages; but it must be so connected
in order to be included in. the estimate, unless
the injury is accompanied by circumstances
of malice, insult, or inhumanity;“ citing
Pierce, 11. R. (1881) 302; Railway Co. v:
Birney. 71 Ill. 391. The authority of this
case has never been questioned. by the courts
of this state, to our knowlezlge. The rule
announced is in strict harmony with that of
the courts of last resort in our sister states,
until, in 1881, the supreme court of Texas,
in So ltelle v. Telegraph Co., 55 Tex. 308. an
nounced the doctrine that the sender of a so
“The instruction as to the measure of‘
v
l
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clal telegram could recover for the mental an
guish caused by delay in its delivery. The
authorities relied upon by the supreme court of
Texas in that case were actions for physical
injuries, in which the mental agony formed
an inseparable part,.—a doctrine never ques
tioned in this state since Porter v. Railroad
Co., 71 Mo. 66. The learned commissioner
who prepared the opinion did quote a sug
gestion of the authors of Shearman & Red
field on Negligence, to the effect that they
thought such an action ought to lie, but they
did not claim that any court in this country
or England had previously sustained their
view. The Texas case has been followed in
that state in a great number of cases, and
has been adopted in Indiana, North Carolina,
Kentucky, Alabama, and Tennessee. On the
other hand, this new departure has been vig
orously assailed and denied by the supreme
courts of Mississippi, Georgia, Kansas, and
in Dakota, and in a most luminous dissenting
opinion by Judge Lurton. of the supreme
court of Tennessee, now judge of the United
States circuit court for the sixth circuit, in
which Folkes, J., concurred. The majority
of the supreme court of Tennessee do not
go to the length contended for by the appel
lant here. The majority lay great stress
upon the fact that by virtue of a statute
in Tennessee a cause of action is given to
the aggrieved party for damages for failure
to deliver any message.
that, as the party has the right to ome
damages by virtue of the statute. they con
clude they may add the anguish of mind as
an element. It is impossible to escape the
feeling that the very able judges were re
sorting to a fiction to justify them in sup
porting the action. The case of So Relle
v. Telegraph Co., 55 Tex. 310, has been no
where more flatly repudiated than by the
supreme court of Texas itself, in Railway Co.
v. Levy, 59 Tex. 563. Judge Stayton, in an
able and lucid discussion of the authorities,
demonstrates “that the cases in which
damages have been allowed for mental dis
tress ' ‘ ‘ was the incident to a bodily
injury suffered by the distressed person. or
cases of injury to reputation or property, in
which pecuniary damage was shown, or the
act such that the law presumes some dam
age. however slight, from the act complained
of. They are not cases in which the bodily
injury or other wrong was suffered by one per
son. and the mental distress by another." The
reasoning of the supreme court of Tennessee
—that, because the Oode gave an action for
some damages, that opened the way to add
damages for mental dlstress—is, we think, at
complete variance with our own decisions.
In this state we have a damage act which
gives a right of action where death has re
sulted, and similar statutes exist in most of
the states. The construction placed upon
these statutes has been that no relative,
save those named in the statute. can
recover at all. and no recovery as a
solatium for mental suffering is allowed,
Hence they argue .
where not expressly given by the statute.
Field, Dam. 498; Porter v. Railroad Co., 71
Ho. 66; Parsons v. Railroad Co., 94 Mo.
286, 6 S. W. Rep. 464; Scihaub v. Railroad
0o., 106 Mo. 74, 16 S. W. Rep. 924.
But it is said damages for injury to the
feelings have always been allowed in actions
founded upon a breach of promise to marry,
and this is true in this as in other states. Wil
bur v. Johnson, 58 Mo. 600; Bird v. Thomp
son, 96 Mo. 424, 9 S. W. Rep. 788. But it
has always been regarded as an exception to
the rule. In this action, plaintiifs pecuniary
loss forms an important element The ac
tion is of common-law origin, and at common
law the husband, on marriage, became liable
for the wife,s debts, and for support in a
manner and style commensurate with his
own social standing. and evidence of his sta
tion in life and financial condition has always
been admitted. Wilbur v. Johnson. supra.
As was well said by Cooper, J., in Telegraph
Co. v. Rogers, 68 Miss. 748, 9 South. Rep.
8,13: “This action, though in form one for
the breach of contract. partakes in sev
eral features of the characteristies of an
action for the willful tort; and, though the
damages recoverable for the plaintiff for
mental sut‘l’ering are spoken of as ‘compen
satory,’ the fervent language of the courts
indicates how shadowy is the line that sep
arat them from those strictly pecuniary."
Ha on v. Swift, 13 Allen, 144; Kurtz v.
Frank’ 76 Ind. 595; Thorn v. Knapp, Q N.
Y. 475; Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N. J. Law,
77. "Especially those cases in which evi
dence of seduction is admitted to ascertain
the damages. So much, indeed, does the
motive of the defendant enter into the ques
tion of damages, that in Johnson v. Jenkins,
24 N. Y. 252, the defendant was permitted
to give in evidence, in mitigation of dam
ages, the fact that he refused to consummate
the marriage because of the settled opposi
tion of his mother, who was in infirm
health."
'
These considerations sufficiently indicate
the reasons that actuated the courts to
make this exception. Few precedents for
this action will be found where the defend
ant was impccunious. The learned counsel
has collected various other cases in which
mental anguish was recognized as an ele
ment of damage, and concludes with the
query, "It allowed in these, why not in this
action?" Let us consider these in the order
of his brief: Assault and battery. Under
this head is cited the case of Craker v.
Railway Co., 36 Wis. 657. In that case the
conductor of a train seized upon .the mo
ment when the other empioyes were absent
from the car to take improper liberties with
a lady passenger. The evidence showing that
lie placed his ‘arm around her, and, again.~u.
her vehement protests, kissed her. It was
a clear physical violation of her person.
which the courts have ever held constituted
an assault and battery, and actionable. The
law redresses such a wrong in its initial
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stages. The protection of the person has
ever been an object of great solicitude to
the common law. The present ability of
actual violence often justifies recourse to
extreme measures in preventing a consum
mation of threatened wrong to the person.
’l,he cases cited under this head clearly add no
weight to plaintiffs claim. The cases of‘ ma
licious prosecution and false llIi[)risv',nln€Dt
come under that general class of willful
wrong to the person, affecting the liberty,
character, reputation, personal security, and
domestic relations. Judge Lumpkin, in Chap
man v. Telegraph Co., (Ga) 15 S. E. Rep. 901,
disposes of the argument attempted to be
drawn from this class as follows: “In an ac
tion for wrongful attachment, on the ground
that the defendant was about to dispose of his
property with intent to deprive his creditors,
it was held (ivy a divided court) that the mor
tiiication was a part of the actual damages.
Byrne v. Gardner, 33 La. Ann. 6. Of course
it was a case of serious injury to the plain
tiff,s business standing, and therefore, even if
sound, is no authority on the present question.
In an action for false imprisonment, or for
malicious arrest and prosecution, mental an
guish has been held a proper subject for
compensatory damages. Fisher v. Hamil
ton, 49 Ind. 341; Stewart v. Maddox, 63
Ind. 51;
essentially willful, and, besides, are viola
tions of the great right of personal security
or personal liberty." As to the action of
seduction, every lawyer knows that proof
of some service by the daughter has been
invariably required to sustain it; and the
same rule is rigidly adhered to in Magee v.
Holland, 27 N. J. Law, 86, to which we are
cited by counsel, for the forcible abduction
of a daughter. In the case of enticing away
a daughter, we are referred to Stowe v.
Heywood,7 Allen, 118. The court permitted
damages for mental suffering on the express
ground that it was a willful injury, and
declined to say whether such damages could
ever be recovered for negligence alone, as
in the case at bar.‘ This cae illustrates the
greatest difliculty in estimating damages
for mental suffering. Judge Mctcalf says.:
"Mental suffering cannot be measured aright
by outward manifestations, for there may
be a show of great distress where little or
none is felt. And great distress may be
concealed, and borne in silence, with an
apparently quiet mind. Ab inquieto saepe
simulatur qules." “And we nowhere find
that any other evidence of mental suffer
Lllg, besides that of the injury which was
the alleged ca\us,e‘\ of action, was ever be
fore admitted.’, \ The court reversed the
case because the trial court permitted evi
dence “tending to show" plaintiff suffered
from "pain andlanxiety of mind." It is
hardly necessary ‘to add that in a case of
libel or slander, if the words are not ac
tionable per se, special damages must be a1
Coleman v. Allen, 79 Ga. 637, 5
‘
S. E. Rep. 204. Of course, such injuries are i
leged and proved. When they are action
able per se, they are construed because
of their evident tendency to degrade the
citizen in the estimation of his neighbors,
and in both cases they are malicious. We
have now gone through the list, and we
find in none of them any reason for adopt
ing the rule that, for the mere negligent
failure to comply with a contract, damages
may be recovered on the sole ground of in
jured feelings, when the plaintiff has suf
fered no physical injury. The law, up to
this time, has essayed to protect the per
son and property of the individual. All the
cases cited are based upon this principle.
Repuiailon is included in the person. John
son v. Bradstreet Co., 87 Ga. 79, 13 S. E.
Rep. 250.
The damages claimed in this action can
not be allowed as exemplary damages. The
Texas court, in one case, did so bold, but
afterwards repudiated it. Stuart v. Tele
graph Co., 66 Tex. 580, 18 S. W. Rep. 351.
‘ But we do not think that the courts of Eng
land and of this country, prior to 1881, were
rejecting actions like this on a mere arbi
‘ trary assumption, unsustained by reason.
A doctrine which has passed so long un
challenged by the great jurists who have
adorned the bench of our state and federal
courts is not to be lightly discarded at the
behest of ingenious and able counsel. The
‘ law is, and ought to be. more stable than
i this. It has long been the boast of com
mon.law writers that the common law was
a system founded upon reason; and one of
1 its maxims has ever been that, when the
reason upon which a law was based ceased,
the law itself ceased. Speaking for our
. selves. we are satisfied that the common
l law, denying an action for mental distress
alone. was founded upon the best of reason,
and an enlightened public policy. And we
question if the real reasons were ever more
clearly and satisfactorily stated than by
i Judge Lurton, which opinion we adopt: (“,i‘he
reason why an independent action for such
. damages cannot and ought not to be sustained
is found in the remoteness of such dam
ages, and in the metaphysical character of
such an injury. considered apart from phys
I ical pain. Such injuries are generally more
sentimental than substantial. Depending
largely upon physical and nervous condition,
the suffering of one under precisely the
same circumstances would be no test of the
suffering of another. Vague and shadowy,
there is no possible standard by which such
an injury can be justly compensated, or even
approximately measured. lliasily simulated,
,and impossible to disprove, it falls within
Iall the objections to speculative damages,
which are universally excluded because of
their uncertain character. I‘ That damages so
imaginary, so metaphysical, so sentimental
shall be ascertained and assessed by a jury
with justnes, not by way of punishment to
the defendant, but as mere compensation to
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plaintiff, is not to be expected. That the
grief natural to the death of a loved relative
shall be separated from the added grief
and anguish resulting from’ delayed informa
tion of such mortal illness'or death, and
compensation given for the latter only, is
the task imposed by the law, as determined
by the majority of the supreme court of
Tennessee." “It is legitimate to consider
the evils to which such a precedent logically
leads' Upon what sound legal considera
tions can this court refuse to award dam
ages for injury to the feelings, mental dis
tress, and humiliation, when such injury re
sults from the breach of any contract? Take
the case of a debtor who agrees to return
the money borrowed on a certain day, who
breaches his agreement willfully, with
knowledge that such breach on his part
will probably result in the financial ruin
and dishonor of his disappointed creditor.
Why shall not such a debtor, in addition to
the debt and the interest, also compensate his
creditor for this ruin, or at least for his
'
mental suffcrings? Upon what principle
can we longer refuse to entertain an action
for injured feelings consequent upon the
use of abusive and defamatory language,
not charging a crime, or resulting in special
pecuniary damages? Mental distress is, or
may be. in some cases, as real as bodily
pain, and it as certainly results from lan
guage not amounting to an imputation of
crime; yet such actions have always been
dismissed as not authorized by the law as
it has come down to us, and as it has been
for all time administered."
Why, if this rule is to become the law of
this state in regard to this contract, shall it
not apply to all disappointments and mental
sufferings caused by delays in railroad
04,)‘, trains? Tele ra h com anies
9°‘; I.J ‘1
mm
carriegsg so are railroad companies; and yet
this court, in the Trigg Case, held the com
_pany not liable for mental anguish, as an
independent cause of.action for a mere act
of negligence. A similar conclusion was also
reached in the United States circuit court
for the fourth circuit in Wilcox v. Railroad
Co., 52 Fed. Rep. 264, 3 C. C. A. 73, where
the plaintifl! made a special contract for a
train to take him to the bedside of a sick
parent. The court held that the trouble of
mind caused by the delay at a railroad
station could not be made the basis of an
action, saying: “But we know of no decided
case which holds that mental pain alone,
unattended by injury to the person, caused
by simple negligence, can sustain an action."
“The plaintiff was the subject of two mental
pains,—one, for the condition of the sick
person; the other, from the delay at the sta
tion,—the latter, only, being the subject of
this action." "It cannot be pretended that
damages from the latter cause of ‘anxie
ty’ and ’suspense’—uncertain, indefinite, un
definable, unascertainable, dependent so
largely on the peculiar temperament of the





l is seriously challenged.
I minds, completely refutes it.
templation of the defendant when it entered
into the contract." Griifin v. Colver, 16 N.
, Y. 489; Telegraph Co. v. Hall, 124 U. S. 444,
v
b Sup. Ct. Rep. 577. But, as before said,
if we establish the rule as to one common
carrier or private person, with what sort of
consistency can we refuse to extend it to
all? The courts of Texas have already
spoken of a similar case as “intolerable litiga
tion." We see no reason for making this
innovation or exception. The legislature has
v
imposed a penalty for each infraction of
its duty in delaying a message, and it seems
very clear to us that, if it is to become the
policy of the state to adopt this new rule,
the legislature, and not this court, should do
it. The common law has always attempted
to deal with the citizen, and his rights and
wrongs, in a practical way, and the declared
object of awarding damages is to give com
pensation for pecuniary less. The right, in a
civil action, to inflict punishment by way
of punitory damages, has been ably contro
verted. .The allowance of damages for
wounded feelings, when they are the con
comitant or result of a physical injury, is
placed rightfully on the ground that the
. mind is as much a part of the body as the
bones and muscles. and an injury to the
body included the whole, and its effects were
1 not separable; but the experience of every
‘judge and lawyer teaches him how unsatis
factory, in these personal injury cases, are .
the verdicts of juries. They are utterly in
consistent, and the courts do not attempt
l to justify these inconsistencies upon any
other theory than that it is the sole province
of the jury to fix the amount. The result
‘ is that, in nearly every appeal that reaches
this court, one ground for reversal is the
excessive damage awarded; and the right
of this court to interfere at all on this ground
It is no uncommon
thing to have the appellee voluntarily enter
a remittitur to save his verdict from the
charge of passion or prejudice. Under these
circumstances, is it wise to venture upon the
ar more speculative field of mental anguish,
,‘,without guide and without compass? We
think not. We have examined the cases in
the courts of Kentucky, Indiana, Tennessee,
Alabama, and North Carolina. They are all
based upon the So Relle Case, in 55 Tex.
. 808, which, we have shown, stands upon
no previous adjudication, but is opposed by
the Levy Case, in 59 Tex., which, to our
The caes
holding this view are Stuart v. Telegraph
Co., 66 Tex. 580, 18 S. W. Rep. 351; Rail
road Co. v. Wilson, 69 Tex. 739, 7 S. W. Rep.
653; Telegraph Co. v. Cooper, 71 Tex. 507, 9
S. W. Rep. 598; Same v. Broesche, 72 Tex.
654, 10 S. W. Rep. 734; Same v. Simpson,
73 Tex. 423, 11 S, W. Rep. 385; Same v.
Adams, 75 Tex. 531, 12 S. W. Rep. 857;
Wadsworth v. Telegraph Co., 86 Tenn. 695,
8 S. W. Rep. 574; Reese v. Same, 123 Ind.?
294, 24 N. E. Rep. 163; Beasley v. Same, 39
Fed. Rep. 181; Telegraph Co. v. Henderson,
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89 Ala. 510, 7 South. Rep. 419;Thompson v.
Tele;.:raph Co., 106 N. C. 549, 11 S. E. Rep.
269; Chapman v. Same, (Ky.) 13 S. W. Rep.
880; Young v. Same, 107 N. C. 370, 11 S. E.
Rep. 1044; Thomp. Elect. § 378, and cases
The cases opposing this view are, no
tably, the dissenting opinion of Judge Lurton
in Wadsworth v. Telegraph Co., 86 Tenn.
1395, 8 S. W. Rep. 57-i; Chapman v. Telegraph
Co., (Ga.) 15 S. E. Rep. 901, in which Judge
Lumpkin, of the supreme court of Georgia,
reviews all the cases in a most admirable
tone, and with great clearness; Wilcox v.
Railroad Co., (4th clrcult,) 52 Fed. Rep. 264.
3 G. C. A. 73; Crawson v. Telegraph Co., 47
Fed. Rep. 544; Chase v. Same, 44 Fed. Rep.
554, where all the authorities are cited; West
v. Same, 39 Kan. 93, 17 Pac. Rep. 807; Russell
v. Same, 3 Dak. 315, 19 N. W. Rep. 408; Tele
graph Co. v. Rogers, 68 Miss. 748, 9 South.
Rep. 823; Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. 577; Com
missioners v. Couitas, L. R. 13 App. Cas. 222;
‘Tyler v. Telegraph Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 634;
Kester v. Telegraph Co., (Taft, Judge.) 55
Fed. Rep. 603.
We are fully aware that the plaintiff,s
claim appeals strongly to the sensibilities;
but to adopt that view we must either be
guilty oif adopting one rule of damages for
one class of common carriers, and the breach
of their contracts, or we must conclude _that
all of our predecessors in the great common
law courts were at fault, and henceforth
repudiate, not only their utterances, but our
own, on this subject, and this we have no
inclination to do. We prefer to travel yet
awhile super antiquas vias. It’, in the evolu
tion o1f society and the law, this innovation
should be deemed necessary, the legislature
can be safely trusted to introduce it, with
those limitations and safeguards which will
be absolutely necessary, judging from the
variety of cases that have sprung up since
the promulgation of the Texas case. Our
conclusion is. the judgment should be and is
affirmed. All concur.
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DYVYER v. CHICAGO. ST. P., M. & 0. BY.
CO.
(51 N. W. 2-i4, 84 Iowa, 479.)
Supreme Court of Iowa. Feb. 1, 1892.
Appeal from district court, Plymouth coun
ty; Scott M. Ladd, Judge.
Action for personal injury. Judgment for
plaintifl? and the defendant appealed.
J. H. & C. M. Swan, for appellant.
Hudson, Call & Joy, for appellee.
-ToY,
GRANGER, J. 1. The plaintiff is the ad
ministrator of the estate of Ann Dwyer,
deceased, who was on the 9th day of July,
1889, struck by defendant,s cars. as a re
sult of which she died about 30 days there
after. The petition specifies the injuries sus
tained, and adds: “All of which caused her
great pain and suffering for a period of about
thirty days, when she died from such in
juries." A motion to strike out the words as
to pain and suffering was overruled, and the
court instructed the jury that, if it found for
the plaintiff, to allow a "reasonable compen
sation for pain and suffering." The jury re
turned a general verdict for the plaintiff for
$3,000, and specially found that $2,300 of the
amount was for "pain and suffering," and
$700 “as damages to the estate." An assign
ment brings in question the correctness of
the court’s action in permitting the jury to
consider pain and sufferiug as an element of
damage. The action was commenced after
the death of plaintiffs intestate. If the ac
tion had been commenced in her life-time, it
is unquestioned that pain and suffering caus
ed by the injury would have been a proper
element of damage; and this would be true
if, after the commencement of the action, she
had died, and her administrator had been sub
tituted as party plaintiff, and prosecuted
the suit to judgment. Muldowney v. Rail
way Co., 36 Iowa, 462. We come, then, to
the important inquiry if such damages are
permissible in such a case, where the action
is commenced by the administrator. The
only authority for maintaining such an action
by the legal representative is by virtue of the
statute. At the common law, the cause of
action abated with the death of the injured
party. The law authorizing the action is
found in Code, § 2525. “Ali causes of action
shall survive and may be brought notwith
standing the death of the person entitled or
liable to the same." We are cited to no case,
in this or any other state, where the rule
contended for by the appellee, and allowed
by the district court, has been sustained. It
is claimed, however, that the reason for this,
as to other states, is because of the peculiar
ity of the statutes under which such actions
are permitted to survive. In several cases
this court has expressed its view as to the
measure of damages in such cases, and in
such a way that the appellant regards the
law on this point as settled in its favor, while
the appellee regards the language thus relied
upon as merely incidental to other points de
termined, and in no way decisive of the ques
tion now before us. It is true that the pre
cise question now before us was not involved
for determination in any of the Iowa cases
cited, and the language relied upon by the ap
pellant has been used incidentally in the dis
cussion of other questions; but it is not to be
understood, because of this, that such lan
guage is without value in our deliberations on
this question; for much of the language so
used is in regard to questions so allied to this
in its legal significance as to make them de
terminable upon quite similar considerations.
For instance, the rule as to the measure of
damage in cases of this kind has been consid
ered, and, with the point before us in view, a
rule excluding such damage has been adopted.
In Rose v. Railway Co., 39 Iowa, 24b‘, it is
said: "The action is brought by the adminis
trator for the injury to the estate of the de
ceased sustained in his death. There is there
fore no basis for damage for pain and sufl!er
ing. ' * ‘ Compensation for the pecuniary
loss to his estate is alone to be allowed."
See, also, Donaldson v. Railway Co., 18 Iowa,
at page 290, and Muldowney v. Railway Co.,
36 Iowa, at page 468. In the latter case the
action was commenced by the injured party,
who died pending the suit, and his adminis
trator was substituted; and it was held that
pain and suffering were proper elements of
damage because of the action having been
commenced by the injured party; but the
court guards the rule by saying: “A different
rule would obtain if the action had been com
menced after his death." It is thought that
the expression may be accounted for on the
theory that the case was determined under a
different statute. Rev. St. § 3467, under
which the action arose, is as follows: “.\,o
cause of action ex delicto dies with either or
both of the parties, but the prosecution there
of may be commenced or continued by or
against their personal representatives." With
reference to the particular matter under con
sideration, lt is difliicuit to trace a distinction
between the statutes. The one says. in ef
fect, that such causes of action shall survive
the party, and the other that it does not die
with the party. The effect of each i to cre
ate a survival. and the one, as plainly as the
other, contemplates the existence of the cause
of action before the death. It is not the ef
fect of either, as seems to be thought by the
appellee, to create a cause of action because
of the death. The statutes deal with the
“cause of action," and not with the rule of
damage to be applied. In fixing the dam
age, we iook to the wrong to be remedied;
to the injury to be repaired. If the action is
brought by the injured party, the law at
tempts to remedy the wrong to him.—not spe
cifically to hi estate,—and that may include
loss of property, time, and that bodily ease
and comfort to which he is entitled as against
the wrong-doers. If the action is brought to
repair an injury to his estate, the law looks,
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in fixing the rule of damage, to how the es
tate is affected by the act, and attempts to
repair the injury. Loss of time and expenses
paid, as a result of the wrong, presumably
lessen the estate; but bodily pain and suffer
ing in no manner affect it. It is an item of
damage peculiar to the person, and not to
pecuniary or property rights. Under our stat
ute, these damages belong “to the estate of
the deceased." Uode, § 2526. This distinc
tion is maintained throughout all the cases
and authorities that have come to our notice.
This court has repeatedly said that these ac
tions are for “injury to the estate." See
cases cited supra: Rose v. Railway Co., Don
aldson v. Railway Co., Muldowney v. Rail
way Co. Mr. Sutherland, in his work on
Damages, (volume 3, p. 282.) speaking in gen-‘
eral of these statutes of survival of actions,
says: “The measure of damages is not the
loss or suffering of the deceased, but the in
jury resulting from his death to his family.
it is only for pecuniary injuries that this stat
utory right of action is given. Although it
can be maintained only in cases in which an
action could have been brought by the de
ceased if he had survived, damages are given
on different principles and for different caus
es. Neither the paiu and suffering of the de
ceased, nor the grief and wounded feelings of
his surviving relatives, can be taken into ac
count in the estimate of damages." In Rail
way Co. v. Barron, 5 Wall. 90, a like case, it
is said. speaking of the wife or next of kin,
who, under the Illinois statutes, are the bene
iiciaries in such a case: “They are confined
to the pecuniary injuries resulting to the wife
and next of kin; whereas, if the deceased had
survived, a wider range of inquiry would
have been admitted. It would have embraced
personal suffering as well as pecuniary loss,
and there would have been no fixed limita
tion as to the amount." The language of
the Illinois statute is different in phraseology
from ours, but not to the extent of inducing
a different rule in this respect. Under the
statute of Minnesota, so similar to ours as to
justify the same rule as to these damages, it
is held that “no compensation can be given
"‘ ' ' for the pain and suffering of the de
ceased." Hutt.hins v. Railway Co. (Mina) 46
N. W. 79. We conclude, without doubt, that
the district court erred in its ruling on the
motion and the instruction to the jury. Some
other questions are argued which we have
examined, the consideration of which would
require extensive quotations from the evi
dence, and we think they do not involve re
versible error, and it is unnecessary to dis
cuss them. The cane is remanded to the
district court, with instructions to deduct
from the judgment entered the $2,300 allowed
for pain and suffering, and give judgment for
the balance. Modified and aflirmed.
<
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If MORGAN v. SOUTHERN PAC. CO. (No.
14,SB.)
(30 Pac. 603, 95 Cal. 510.)
Supreme Court of California. Aug. 5, 1892.
Department 2. Appeal from superior court,
Kern county; A. R. Conklin, Judge.
Action by Flora Morgan against the South
ern Pacific Company to recover damages for
the death of her child caused by defendant,s
negligence. From a judgment rendered on
the verdict of a jury in favor of plaintiff, de
fendant appeals. Reversed.
The facts fully appear in Morgan v. Pacific
Co., 30 Pac. 601.
E. L. Craig, Foshay Walker, Horace Hawes,
and R. B. Carpenter, for appellant. Charles
G. Lamberson, Lamberson & Taylor, and J.
W. Ahern, for respondent.
McFARLA.ND, J. The parties to this ac
tion are the same as in Morgan v. Pacific Co.,
30 Pac. Rep. 001 (No. 14,841, this day decid
.ed), in which plaintiff recovered a judgment
for $15,000 for alleged personal injuries re
ceived by being thrown from the steps of de
fendant,s car, which judgment was by this
court aflirmed. When she fell from the steps
of the car she had in her arms her infant
daughter, aged about two years. Nine days
afterwards the child died from an attack of
pneumonia; and plaintiffl brought this present
action to recover damages for the death of said
child, upon the theory that the pneumonia was
.caused by said fall. The jury gave her dam
ages in the amount of $20,000, for which sum
judgment was rendered; and defendant ap
peals from the judgment, and from an order
denying a motion for a new trial. The evi
.dence upon the issues of the alleged negligence
of defendant,s employes at the time of the ac
cident, and the alleged contributory negligence
of plaintiff, was substantially the same as in
the other case, and as to those issues the ver
.dict cannot be disturbed. There was some ev
idence tending slightly to show that the death
of the child was caused by the accident, but
it is not necessary to inquire whether or not it
was suflicient to establish that fact, because
the judgment must clearly be reversed on ac
count of the excessive damages awarded by
the jury.
There was no averment in the complaint of
any special damage, and no averment of any
damage at all, except the general statement
that the child died, “to the damage of plaintiff
in the sum of fifty thousand doilars;" and
there was no evidence whatever introduced or
offered upon the subject of damage. The ju
ry, therefore, had nothing before them upon
which to base damages except the naked fact
of the death of a female child two years old;
and it is apparent, at first blush, that “the
.amount of the damages is obviously so dispro
portionate to the injury proved as to justify
the conclusion that the verdict is not the result
of the cool and dispassionate discretion of the
jury." The main element of damage to plain
tiff was the probable value of the services of
the deceased until she had attained her ma
jority, considering the cost of her support and
maintenance during the early and helpless.
part of her life. We think that the court erred’
in charging that “the jLu,y is not limited by the
actual pecuniary injury sustained by her, by
reason of the death of her child." An action
to recover damages for the death of a relative
was not known to the conmion law; it is of
recent legislative origin. There are statutes
in many of the American states providing for
such an action, and it has been quite uniform
ly held that in such an action the plaintlff does
not represent the right of action which the de
ceased would have had if the latter had sur- ,
vlved the injury, ‘mt can recover only for the
,
pecuniary loss suffered by the plaintiff on ac
count of the death of the relative; that sorrow
and mental anguish caused by the death are
not elements of damage; and that nothing can
be recovered as a solatium for wounded feel
ings. ] The authorities outside of this state are
almost unanimous to the point above stated.
The following are a few of such authorities:
Railroad Co. v. Vandever, 36 Pa. St. 298; Iron
Co. v. Rupp, 100 Pa. St. 95; Railroad Co. v.
Freeman, 30‘ Ark. 41; Railroad Co_ v. Brownv
26 Kan. 443; Pennsylvania 00. v. Lilly, 73
Ind. 252; Donaldson v. Railroad Co., 18 Iowa,
280:, Railroad 0o. v. Pauik, 24 Ga. 356; Ball
road Co. v. .\liller, 2 Colo. -t6(3; Kesler v.
Smith. 66 N. C. 154; March v. Walker, 48
Tex. 372; Railroad Co. v. Levy, 59 Tex. 563;
James v. Christy, 18 Mo 162; Hyatt v.
Adams, 16 Mich. 180', Chicago v. Major, 18
Ih. 349; Railroad Co. v. Delaney, 82 Ill. 198;
Blake v. Railroad Co., 18 Q. B. 93.
With respect to the decisions in this state we
do not think those cited by respondent (except
one) are, when closely examined, inconsistent
with the general authorities. Beeson v. \Iin
ing Co., 57 Cal. 20, is a leading case on the
subject, and is cited by all the cases which
follow it. in that case the action was brought
by the widow for the death of her husband,
and the question was whether or not the lower
court erred in allowing evidence of the kindly
relations between the plaintiff and the de
ceased during the lifetime of the latter. The.
court sustained the ruling of the court below,
but clearly upon the ground that those rela
tions could be considered only in estimating
the pecuniary loss. The court say: “It is
true that in one sense the value of social re
lations and of society cannot be measured
by any pecuniary standard; * ‘ ' but. in
another sense, it might be not only possible,
but eminently fitting, that a loss from sever
ing social relations, or from deprivation of
society, might be measured or at least con
sidered from a pecuniary standpoint. ' ' "‘
If a husband and wife were living apart by
mutual consent, neither rendering the other
assistance or kindly oflices, the jury might
take into consideration the absence of social
relations and the absence of society in esti
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mating the loss sustained by either from
the death of the other. So if the husband
and wife had lived together in concord, each
rendering kindly ofllces to the other, such
facts might be taken into consideration, not,
as the books say, for the purpose of afford
ing solace in money, but for the purpose of
estimating pecuniary losses. The loss of a
kind husband may be a considerable pe
cuniary loss to a wife; she loses his advice
and assistance in many matters of domestic
economy." A quotation is made from a
Pennsylvania case where the same rule was
applied to the loss of a wife, the court say
ing that “certainly the service of a wife is
pecuniarily more valuable than that of a
mere hlreling." The Beeson Case, therefore,
does not decide that the jury may depart
from a pecuniary standpoint in assessing
damages; it merely holds that in estimating
the pecuniary losses of a wife from the
death of her husband they may consider
whether or not the deceased was a good hus
band, able and willing to provide well for
his wife. The opinion of the court no doubt
goes somewhat further in this direction than
the general current of authorities, but it de
cides nothing more than above stated. Cook
v. Railroad Co., 60 Cal. 604, also cited by re
spondent, decides nothing more than the
Beeson Case. In McKeever v. Railroad Co.,
59 Cal. 300, the point was not involved, and
in Nehrbas v. Railroad Co., 62 Cal. 320, the
point does not appear in any way to have
been involved; and the dictum at the. close
of the opinion, as it refers to the Beeson
Case, must be held as only intended to go to
the length of the latter case. It is true, how
ever, that in Cleary v. Railroad Co., 76 Cal.
240, 18 Pac. 269, a decision in department,
views were expressed favorable to respond
ent,s contention. The opinion of the commis
sion in that case was, however, expressly
based on Beeson v. Mining Co., supra, and
upon, as we have seen, a misunderstanding
of that case. There appears to have been no
petition for a hearing in bank. It was stat
ed in that case that there could be a recov
ery for the “mental anguish and suffering of
the parents," but we have been referred to
no other case that holds such doctrine. Cer
tainly it was not so held in the Beeson
Vase. But entirely contrary views were ex
pressed in the latest decision of this court
on the subject (Munro v. Reclamation Co.,
84 Cal. 515, 24 Pac. 303). In that case
which was for the death of an adult son
the lower court had instructed that the jury
in estimating the damages might consider
“the sorrow, grief, and mental suffering oc
casioned by his death to his mother;" and
this court held the instruction erroneous,
and for that reason reversed the judgment,
the court holding that such a rule would
‘afford an “opportunity to run into wild and
excessive verdicts." The court said: “We
are of opinion that the court erred in includ
lilg in the instruction the words, ’sorrow,
t...uv mm.-—11
grief. and mental suffering, occasioned by
the death of the son to his mother.’ In thus
directing the jury the court fell into error.
In our opinion, the damage should have been
confined to the pecuniary loss suffered by
the mother, and the loss of the comfort, so
ciety, support, and protection of the deceas
ed. ' ' ' We have found no case in which
damages for sorrow, grief, and mental suf
fering are allowed, under any of the stat
utes." And, further, that the statutory ac
tion is a new one, "and not the transfer to
the representative of the right of action
which the deceased person would have bad
if he had survived the injury." The case
was decided in bank. Justice Thornton de
livered the opinion, which was concurred in
by two other justices,.and a fourth justice
concurred in the judgment, and must, there
fore, have concurred in the one main rea
son for which the judgment was reversed.
He may not have been ready to say that the
“comfort and society" of the deceased could
be considered. There was only one dissent.
but upon what ground does not appear. We
think, therefore, that the case is full author
ity on the main point. At all events, we
think that the .opinion states the general
propositions of law governing the case cor
rectly, although, as to one matter, it may be
misunderstood. The language, “the loss of
the comfort, society, support, and protection
of the deceased," must be held as having
been used within the meaning given to it in
Beeson v. Mining Co., supra, as hereinbefore
stated, that is, with reference to the value
of the life of the deceased, and the pecuniary
loss to the plaintiff caused by the death.
The said language would not be correct in
any other sense. But in the case at bar the
jury were not confined by the instructions to
pecuniary loss or any other kind of loss;
they were given wide range to run into any
wild and excessive verdict which their ca
price might suggest. Wedonot think that the
complaint is defective because it does not
specially aver the loss of the services of the
deceased; _ that was a natural and necessary
sequence of the death. It was not special
damage necessary to be averred. There is
nothing in the point made by respondent
that the answer was not verified. Upon that
point the court ruled in favor of defendant,
and piaintlff is not appealing. The judg
ment and order appealed from are reversed,
and a new trial ordered.
SHARPSTEIN, J. I concur.
DE HAVEN, J. I concur in the judgment
and generally in the foregoing opinion. The
measure of damages in actions by a parent
for the death of a child, when the facts are
not such as to warrant exemplary damages,
is correctly stated in section 763 of Shear
man and Rediieid on Negligence, as follows:
“The damages recoverable bya husband. par
ent, or master for a negligent injury to the
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person of his wife, child, or servant are
strictly limited to an amount fully compen
satory for the consequent loss of service for
a period not exceeding the minority of the
child, or the term of service of a servant,
and the expenses which the plaintiff has in
curred in consequence of the injury, such
as for surgical attendance, nursing, and the
like." The sixth instruction given upon the
;;quest of plaintiff, to the effect that “in
estimating the damage sustained by her the
jury is not limited by the actual pecuniary
injury sustained by her by reason of the
death of her child, but such damages may
be given as under all the circumstances of
the case may be just," is contrary to this
rule, and was erroneous. The object of sec
tion 376 of the Code of Civil Procedure is
not to give redress or compensation for the
mental distress of a mother, consequent up
on the death of her child. The general lan
guage of section 377 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, that in actions of this character
“such damages may be given as under all
the circumstances of the case may be just,"
L-\
\
is used with reference to the fact that the
damages which are allowed to be recovered
by sections 376 and 377 of the Code of Civil
Procedure are, with the exception of the ex
penses incurred by the plaintiff in conse
quence of the injury resulting in the death
for which they are claimed, prospective in
their nature, relating, as they do, to the loss
of future service, and necessarily based up
on probabilities, and upon data which in
many respects are uncertain, and therefore
the estimate of such damages must neces
sarily call for the exercise of a very large dis
cretion upon the part of the jury; and all
that is meant by the language quoted is that
the jury shall, in view of all the circumstan
ces of the case, and considering also the age
and the ability of the deceased to serve the
relative for whose benefit the action is
brought, give such damages as they shall
deem just, keeping in view that such dam
ages are to be measured by what shall fair
ly seem the pecuniary injury or loss to the
plaintiff.
Hearing in bank denied.
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DWIGH‘1‘ v. ELBIIRA, C. & N. R. CO.
(30 N. E. 398, 132 N. Y. 199.)
Court of Appeals of New York, Second Division.
March 15, 1892.
Appeal from supreme court, general term,
Fourth department.
Action by Ira Dwight against the Elmira,
Cortland & Northern Railroad Company.
From a judgment for plaintiff entered on an
order aflirming a judgment entered on the
report of a referee, defendant appeals. Re
versed.
James Armstrong, for appellant.
mond L. Smith, for respondent.
Ray
PARKER, J. The judgment awards to
the plaintiff $503 for damages occasioned by
the defendant,s negligence in setting on fire
and destroying 21 apple-trees, 2 cherry-trees,
and 2% tons of standing grass, and also in
juring 7 apple-trees, the property of plain
tiff. The only question presented on this ap
peal is whether the proper measure of dam
ages was adopted on the trial.
A witness called by the plaintiff was ask
ed: “Question. What were those twenty-one
trees worth at the time they were killed?"
Objection was made that the evidence did
not tend to prove the proper measure of
damages, but the objection was overruled,
and the answer was: “Answer. I should
say they were worth fifty dollars apiece."
Similar questions were propounded as to the
other trees; a like objection interposed; the
same ruling made; answers to the same ef
fect, except as to value, given; and appro
priate exceptions taken. Testimony was al
so given, tending to prove that the land
burned over by the fire was depreciated in
value $30 per acre. The only evidence of
fered by the plaintiff, touching the question
of damages, was of the character already
alluded to.
Fruit-trees, like those which are the sub
ject of this controversy,,.have little if any
value after being detached from the soil, as
the wood cannot be made use of for any
practical purpose; but, while connected with
the land. they have a producing capacity
which adds to the value of the realty. Neces
sarily the testimony adduced tended to show,
not the value of the trees severed from the
freehold, but their value as hearing trees,
connected with and depending on the soil
for the nourishment essential to the growth
of fruit. How inuch was the realty, of which
the trees formed a part, damaged, was the
result aimed at by the questions and at
tempted to be secured by the answers. Can
the owner of an injured freehold because
the trees taken or destroyed happen to
be fruit instead of timber trees, have his
damages measured in that manner? is the
question presented now, for the first time,
in this court, so far as we have observed.
The learned referee followed the decision in
Whitbeck v. Railroad Co., 36 Barb. 644, in
which the proposition is asserted that, while
fruit-trees form a part of the land, the true .
rule is that if the thing destroyed has a
value which can be accurately measured
without reference to the value of the soil in
which it stands, or out of which it grows,
the recovery must be for the value of the
thing destroyed, and not for the difference
in the value of the land before and after
such destruction. The court cited no au
thority for the conclusion reached, and our
attention has not been called to any prior
decision j_ustifying its position. Nor has the
Whitbeck Case been approved in this court,
although cited and distinguished in Argot
singer v. Vines, 82 N. Y. 309. While the
rule is, undoubtedly, as stated by the learned
judge in the Whitbeck Case, that a recovery
may be had for the value of the thing de
stroyed, where it has a value which may
be accurately measured without reference
to the soil in which it stands, he apparently
overlooked the fact that fruit-trees do not
have such a value; and the rule was, there
fore, as we think, wrongly applied. Cases
are not wanting to illustrate a proper appli
cation of that rule. Where timber forming
part of a forest is fully grown, the value of
the trees taken or destroyed can be recover
ed. In nearly all jurisdictions, this is all
that may be recovered; and the reason as
signed for it is that the realty has not been
damaged, because, the trees having been
brought to maturity, the owner is advantag
ed by their being cut and.sold, to the end
that the soil may again be put to productive
uses. 3 Suth. Dam. p. 374; 3 Sedg. Dam.
(8th Ed.) p. 45; Single v. Schneider, 30 Wis.
570; Webster v. Moe, 35 Wis. 75; Webber
v. Quaw, 46 Wis 118, 49 N. W. 830; Hasel
tine v. Mosher, 51 Wis. -H3, 8 N. W. 273;
Tuttlo v. Wilson, 52 Wis. 643, 9 N. W. 822;
Wooden-Ware Co. v. U. S., 106 U. S. 432, 1
Sup. Ct. 398; Graessle v. Carpenter, 70 Iowa,
166, 30 N. W. 392; Ward v. Railroad Co., 13
Nev. 44; Tilden v. Johnson, 52 Vt. 628;
Adams v. Blodgett, 47 N. H. 219; Cushiug v.
Longfellow, 26 Me. 306. In this state it is
settled that even where full-grown ‘mber
is cut or destroyed the damage to land
may also be recovered, and in such cases
the measure of damages is the difference in
the value of the land before and after the
cutting or destruction complained of. Argot
singer v. Vines, 82 N. Y. 308; Van Deusen
v. Young, 29 N. Y. 36; Easterbrook v. Rail
road Co_, 51 Barb. 94. The rule is also ap
plicable to nursery trees grown for mar
ket, because they have a value for trans
planting. The soil is not damaged by their
removal, and their market value necessarily
furnishes the true rule of damages. 3 Sedg.
Dam. (Sth Ed.) p. 48; Birket v. Williams. 30
11l. App. 451. Coal furnishes another illus
tration of the rule making the value of the
thing separated from the realty, although
once a part of it, the measure of damages.
where it has a value after removal, and the
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land has sustained no injury because of it. 3
Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) p. 48; 3 Suth. Dam.
p. 374; 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 36, note
2; Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Cone Iron-Works,
102 Mass. 80; Goal Co. v. Rogers, 108 Pa.
St. 147—152; Dougherty v. Chesnutt 86 Tenn.
1, 5 S. W. 444; Coleman’s Appeal, 62 Pa. St.
232; Ross v. Scott, 15 Lea, 479-488; For
syth v. Wells, 41 Pa. St. %1; Chamberlain
v. Collinson, 45 Iowa, 429; Morgan v. Pow
ell, 3 Q. B. 2'8; Martin v. Porter, 5 Mees. &
W. 351. On the other hand, cases are not
. wanting where the value of the thing de
tached from the soil would not adequately
compensate the owner for the wrong done,
and in those cases a recovery is permitted,
embracing all the injury resulting to the
land. This is the rule where growing tim
ber is cut or destroyed. Because not yet
fully developed, the owner of the freehold
is deprived of the advantage which would
accrue to him could the trees remain until
fully matured. His damage, therefore, nec
essarily extends beyond the market value of
the trees after separation from the soil, and
the difference between the value of the land
before and after the injury constitutes the
compensation to which he is entitled. Long
fellow v. Quimhy, 33 Me. 457; Chipman v.
Hibberd, 6 Cal. 163; Wallace v. Goodall, 18
N. H. 439-456; Hayes v. Railroad Co., 925
Minn. 17-20, 47 N. W. 260. In Wallace’s
Case, supra, the court said: “The value of
young timber, like the value of growing
crops, may be but little when separated from
the soil. The land, stripped of its trees may
be valueless. The trees, considered as tim
ber, may from their youth be valueless; and I
so the injury done to the plaintiff by the tres
pass would be but imperfectly compensated
unless he could receive a sum that would be 1
equal to their value to him while standing
upon the soil." The same rule prevails as to
shade-trees, which, although fully developed,
may add a further value to the freehold for
ornamental purposes, or in furnishing shade
for stock. Nixon v. Stillwell (Sup.) 5 N. Y.
Supp. 248, and cases cited supra. The cur
I
rent of authority is to the effect that fruit
trees and ornamental or growing trees are
subject to the same rule. Montgomery v.
Locke, 72 Cal. 75, 13 Pac. 401; Mitchell
v. Billingsley, 17 Ala. 391-393; Wallace v.
Goodall, 18 N. H. 439-456; 3 Sedgw. Dam.
(8th Ed.) § 933.
It is apparent from the authorities already
cited, as well as those following, that in cases
of injury to real estate the courts recognize
two elements of damage: (1) The value of
the tree or other thing taken after separa
tion from the freehold, if it have any; (2)
the damage to the realty, if any, occasioned
by the removal. Ensley v. Mayor, 2 Baxt.
144; Striegel v. Moore, 55 Iowa, 88, 7 N. W.
413; Longfellow v. Quimby, 33 Me. 457;
Foote v. Merrill, 54 N. H. 490. A party may
be content to accept the market value of the
thing taken when he is also entitled to re
cover for the injury done to the freehold.
But if he asserts his right to go beyond the
value of the thing taken or destroyed after
severance from the freehold, so as to secure
compensation for the damage done to his
land because of it, then the measure of dam
ages is the difference in value of the land
before and after the injur . In this case the
plaintiff was not satts ed with a recovery
based on the value of the trees destroyed.
after separation from the realty, of which
they formed a part,—as indeed he should not
have been, as such value was little or noth
ing,—so he sought to obtain the loss occa
sioned to the land by reason of the destruc
tion of an orchard of fruit-bearing trees,
which added largely to its productive value.
This was his right, but the measure of dam
ages in such a case is. as we have observed.
tter the injury; and as this rule was not
llowed, but rejected, on the trial, and a
method o1’ proving damages adopted not rec
ognized nor permitted by the courts, the judg
ment should be reversed. All concur, except






differencein value of the land before and
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BEEDE v. LAMPREY.
(15 Atl. 133, 64 N. H. 510.)
Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Belknap.
July 19, 1888.
Trover for 200 spruce logs. The defendant
was defaulted, with the right to be heard as
to the assessment of damages. Facts found
by the court. The parties own adjoining tim
ber lots in Moultonborough. The defendant,
while engaged in an operation on his own lot,
negligently, but without malice, cut over the
line dividing the lots, and cut down, trimmed,
hauled to, and deposited in the lake at Mel
vin village, in Tuftonborough, and thence
towed to his saw-mill, the trees in question,
which facts constitute the cause of action.
The question whether the measure of dam
ages is the value of the stumpage, or the
value of the logs when cut and trimmed, or
when deposited in the lake. or when deliv
ered at the mill, was reserved.
E. A. & C. B. Hlbbard, for plaintiff. Jew
ell 8; Stone, for defendant.
ALLEN, J. The claim of the plaintiff to
recover as damages the value of the logs at
the mill, which includes the value added by
cutting and transporting them, is iounded up
on his title and right of possession of the
property there, and his right to treat it as
converted at any time between its severance
from the realty and the commencement of the
action. The plaintiff had the title to the logs
and the right of possessing them at the
mill. Whenever and wherever they may have
been converted, the conversion did not change
the title so long as the property retained its
identity. The title could be changed only by
a suit for damages with judgment, and satis
faction of that judgment. Smith v. Smith, 50‘
N. H. 212, 219; Dearth v. Spencer, 52 N. H.
213. The plaintiff might have recovered the
logs themselves at the mill, or wherever he
could have found them, and so availed him
self of their value there, by replevin, or by
any form of action in which the property in
specie, and not pecuniary damages, are sought.
But in such a case, if the claimant makes a
title, no question of damages or compensation
for loss arises. He recovers his own in.the
form and at the time and place in which he
finds it. In trespass quare clausum, with an
averment of taking and carrying away trees,
the plaintiff may recover for the whole in
jury to the land, including the damage for
prematurely cutting the trees, and for the loss
of the trees themselves, but nothing for the
value added by the labor of cutting and trans
porting them. Wallace v. Goodall, 18 N. H.
456; Foote v. Merrill, 54 N. H. 490. Trover
cannot be maintained for any injury to the
wealty, but only for the conversion of chattels;
f’ and in this case the plaintiff is limited in his
recovery to the loss of the trees; that is, his
2 loss by the
defendant,s converting them by
their severance from the land. The usual rule
I damages in actions of trover is compensa
tion to the owner for the loss of his property
occasioned by its conversion; and where the
conversion is complete, and results in an en
tire appropriation of the property by the
wrong-doer, the loss is generally measured by
the value of the property converted with in
terest to the time of trial. Hovey v. Grant,
52 N. H. 569; Gove v. Watson, 61 N. H. 136.
The defendant converted the logs by cutting
and severing the trees from the land, and, the
conversion being complete by that wrongful
act, their value there represents the plaintitfs
loss. His loss is no greater by reason of the
value added by the labor of cutting and trans
portation to the mill. It does not appear that
the logs were of special or exceptional value
to the plaintiff upon the land from which they
were taken, nor that he had a special use for
them other than obtaining their value by a
sale, nor that the market price had risen aft
er their conversion. If, in estimating the
damages, the value at the mill, increased by
the cost of cutting andhansportation, is to
be taken as the criterion, the plaintiff will re-
celve more than compensation for his loss.
With such a rule of damages, if, besides the
defendant, another trespasser had cut logs of
an equal amount upon the same lot, and had
hauled them to the lake shore, and a third had
simply cut and severed the trees from the
land. and sold them there, and suits for their
conversion had been brought against each
one. the sums recovered would differ by the
cost of transporting the logs to the place of
the alleged conversion, while the loss to the
plaintiff would he the same in each of the
three cases. The injustice of such an appli
cation of the rule of damages is apparent
from the unequal results. In Foote v. \Ier
rill, supra, which was trespass quare claus
um. and for cutting.and removing trees. it
was decided that the plaintiff could recover
for the whole injury to the land, including the
value of the trees there, but not any increase
in value made by the cost of cutting and tak
ing them away. In the opinion it is said,
(Hibbard, J.:) “If the owner of mber cut
upon his land by a trespasser g s posses
sion of it increased in value, he has the bene
fit of the increased value. The law neither
divests him of his property, nor requires him
to pay for improvements made without his
authority. Perhaps, in trover, and, possibly,
in trespass de bonls asportatis, he may be en
titled to the same benefit." This dictum, not
being any part of, nor necessary to, the tie-
cision of that case, and given in language ex
pressive of doubt, cannot be invoked as a
precedent decisive of this case. When tres
pass de bonis asportatis is coupled with tres
pass ouilre ciausum. either as a separate count
or as an averment in aggravation of dam
vages. as in Foote v. Merrill, the increase in
damages bv reason of such averment and
proof of it is the value of the chattels taken
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as the whole damages would have been in an
action of tresoas de bonis. Smith v. Smith,
‘50 N. H. 212. 219. Had the plaintiff in Foote
v. Merrill, sued in trespass for taking and
carrying away the trees merely, he would
have recovered their value upon the lot at the
time of the taking, allowing nothing for the
expense of cutting and removing them; and
no good reason appears why the same rule of
daunages should not prevail in trover as in
trespass de bonis asportatis. The loss to the
plaintiff from the taking and carrying away
of his property is. ordinarily, the same as the
conversion of it by complete appropriation,
‘land the rule of compensation for the loss




time and place of taking or conversion, and
\interest from that time for its detention.
The English case upon the subject give as
the rule of damages, when the conversion and
appropriation of the property are by an inno
cent mistake. and bona fide. or where there
is a real dispute as to the title, the value of
the property in place upon the land. allow
ing nothing for enhancement of value by la
bor in its removal and improvement. But
when the conversion is by fraud or willful
trespass, the full value at time of demand
and refusal is given. Martin v. Porter, 5
Mess. & W. 351; Morgan v. Powell, 3 Adol.
& E. (N. S] 2'8: YVo0d v. Morewood, Id. 4-10,
note: Wild v. Holt. 9 Mees. & W. 672; In re
United Collieries Co., L. R. 15 Eq. 46. The
early New York cases give the full value at
the time of conversion. including any value
added by labor and change in manufacturing.
Betts v. Lee. 5 Johns. 348; Curtis v. Great.
6 Johns. 16%; Babcock v. Gill, 10 Johns. 287;
Brown v. Sax, 7 Cow. 95; Baker v. Wheeler,
8 Wend. 505. In these cases the conversion
is treated as tortlous, and the same as if
made by willful trespass. In later cases a
distinction is made between a willful taking
and conversion, and the rule of just compen
sation is upheld in case of the conversion of
trees at least, and their value upon the land,
is given as damages when the conversion
does not result from willful trespass. Whit
beck v. Railroad Co0 36 Barb. 614; Spicer v.
Waters, 65 Barb. 227. The Illinois decisions
‘make no distinction between cases of willful
trespass and those of conversion by mistake
or inadvertence, and include in damages all
enhancement in value, from any cause, be
fore suit is brought. Robertson v. Jones, 71
ill. 405; Coal Co. v. Long,.81 Ill. 359; Rail
road Co. v. Ogle, 82 Ill. 627. In Maine the
increased value added by cutting and re
moving the timber is not included in the
damages, although the conversion be by will
ful trespass. Cushing v. Longfellow, 26 Me.
306; Moody v. Whitney, 38 Me. 174. And
the same rule seems to govern in assachu
setts, (Iron Co. v. iron-Works, 102 Mass. 80,
86.) and did in Wisconsin (Weymouth v. Rail




converted; and in such a case is the same | Wis. 570) until the legislature of that state,
in 1873, enacted a statute providing that the
rule of damages, in the case of one wrong
fully cutting and converting timber on the
land of another, should be the highest mar
ket value of the property up to the time of
trial, in whatever state it might be put.
Webster v. Moe. 35 Wis. 75; Ingram v. Ran
kin. 47 Wis. 406, 2 N. W. 755. The weight
of authority, however, in this country is in
favor of the rule which gives compensation
for the loss; that is, the value of the prop
erty at the time and place of conversion,
with interest after, allowing nothing for
value subsequently added by the defendant,
when the conversion does not proceed from
i
V
willful trespass, but from the wrong-doer,s
v
mistake or from his honest belief of owner
ship in the property, and there are no cir
cumstances showing a special and peculiar
value to the owner or a contemplated special
use of the property by him. Forsyth v.
Wells, 41 Pa. St. 291; Herdic v. Young, 55
Pa. St. 176; Wooley v. Carter, 7 N. J. Law,
85; Coal Co. v. McMillan, 49 Md. 549; Coal
Co. v. Cox, 39 Md. 1; Bennett v. Thompson,
13 Ired. 146; Railway Co. v. Hutchins, 32
Ohio St. 571; Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich.
311; Winchester v. Craig, 33 Mich. 205; Nes
bitt .v. Lumber Co., 21 Minn. 491; Ellis v.
Y/Wi1e, 33 Ind. 127; Ward v. Wood Co., 13
Nev. 44; Waters v. Stevenson, Id. 177; Gol
ler v. Fett, 30 Cal. 481; Gray v. Parker, 38
Mo. 160. 166; Wooden Ware Co. v. U. S.,
106 U. S. 432, 434, 1 Sup. Ct. 398; Sedgw.
Dam. (5th Ed.) 571, 572; Cooley, Torts, 457,
458, note. In cases of conversion by willful
act or by fraud, the value added by the
wrong-doer, after conversion, is sometimes
given as exemplary or vindictive damages,
or because the defendant is precluded from
wrong, and from claiming a corresponding
reduction of damages. The contention of
the plaintiff that he is entitled to recover
the value of the logs increased by the ex
pense of cutting and removal to the mill in
\’Volfbonough, because, as the case finds, the
defendant’s acts constituting the conversion
were negligent, cannot be sustained on any
ground warranting vindictive damages. The
cutting and taking the logs was not willful
trespass; nor does it appear that the de
fendant’s want of reasonable care amounted
to a fraud. No malice is shown, nor were
there other facts of outrage upon which such
damages could be predicated. No part of
the damages in dispute is found ‘as exem
plary, and the plaintiff cannot be permitted
to assign as damages to his feelings a mere
value added to the property by the defend
ant after the completion of the tort, nor take
as a benefit that which is outside of compen
sation for the wrong. Fay v. Parker, 63 N.
H. 342; Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N. H. 4536; Kim
ball v. Holmes, 60 N. H. 163. The damages
must be according to the usual rule in trover,
showing an increase in value by his own
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which is the value of the property at the
time of conversion, and interest after. The
severance of the trees from the land, and
their conversion from real to personal prop
erty, was in law a conversion of the proper
ty to the defendant,s use. The value of the
trees, immediately upon their becoming chat
tels,—that is, as soon as felled,—whlch is
found to be $1.50 per thousand feet, with in
terest from that time, the plaintiff is entitled
to recover. Judgment for the plaintiff.
SMITH, J., did not sit. The others con
curred.
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‘ff / GASKINS v. DAVIS.
(20 s. E. 188, 115 N. c. s5.)
Supreme Court of North Carolina. Oct. 16,
1894.
Appeal from superior court, Craven county;
Bynum; Judge.
Action of trespass by Patsy Ann Gaskins
against Henry C. Davis. Judgment was ren
dered for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.
XV. W. Clark, for appellant. F. M. Sim
mons
and P. M. Pearsall, for appellee.
I
AVERY, J. The plaintiffs complaint is in
the nature of a declaration for ti.espass in
the entry by the defendant upon her land,
after being forbidden, and cutting, carrying
away, and converting to his own use valuable
timber that was growing thereon, to her
damage $500. The logs, after being severed,
were transported to Newbern in two lots. one
of which lots was seized by plaintlff after
reaching that city, where it was much more
valuable than at the stump, and was sold
by her for the sum of $112. The other lot
was converted into boards and sold by the
defendant. The defendant, for a second de
fense, sets up by way of counterclaim the
seizure of the logs by the plaintiff; and
though the counterclaim may be a defective
statement of the defendant,s cause of ac
tion, in that it fails to aver an unlawful tak
ing. the defect is cured, if the, counterclaim
can be maintained at all, by the reply, which,
by way of alder, raises the question of the
rightfuiness of the seizure. "he well-estab
lished rule is that in such cases the injured
party is entitled to recover of the trespasser
the value of the timber where,it was first
severed from the land and became a chattel
(Bennett v. Thompson, 13 Ired. 146), together
with adequate damage for any injury done to
the land in removing it therefrom. As long
as the timber taken was not changed into a
different species, as by sawing into boards,
the owner of the land retained her right of
property in the specific logs as fully as when
by severance it became her chattel, instead
of a part of the realty belonging to her. Pot
ter v. Uardre, 74 N. C. 40. The value of the
material taken indicates the extent of the
loss, where there are no circumstances of ag
gravation or willfuiness shown, and is the
usual measure of damages. Where the tres
passer has converted the property taken into
a different species, under the rule of the
civil law which we have adopted, the article,
in its altered state, cannot be recovered, but
only damages for the wrongful taking and
conversion, when the change in its form is
“made by one whois acting in good faith, and
under an honest belief that the title was in
him." In Potter v. Mardre, supra, Rodman,
.l0 delivering the opinion of the court, says:
“The principle of equity [applied in that case]
is supported by the analogy of the rule estab
lished in this state by the decisions which
hold that a vendee of land by a paroi con
tract of sale, who takes possession and makes
improvements, and is afterwards ejected by
the vendor, may recover the value of his im
provements. Albea v. Griffin, 2 Dev. & B.
Eq. 9. So if one who has purchased land
from.another, not having title, enters and im
proves, believing his title good, and is ejected
by the rightful owner, he is entitled to com
pensation. In bothgeases one who is morally
innocent has confused his property with that
of another, and he is held entitled to sep
arate it in the only why it can be done, viz.
by being allowed the value of his improve
ments in the raw material." The judge laid
down correctly the rule as to the damage
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover of
the defendant for the original trespass,—the ’
value of the logs when severed at the stump, /
and adequate damage for injury done to the
land in removing them. Potter v. Mardre.
supra; 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law. p. 36; Ross
v. Scott, 15 Lea, 479. The character of the
logs had not been changed by cutting and
transporting to Newbern, but the value had
probably been greatly enhanced. The ap
proved rule, where the plaintiff is asking
damage for trespass, seems to be that the
owner is entitled to recover the value of
the logs when and where they were severed,
and without abatement for the cost of sever
ance. Coal Co. v. McMillan, 49 .\Id. 549.
But, if he prefers to follow and claim the
timber removed, he is entitled to do o, as
long as the species remains unchanged. The
plaintiff was entitled to recover in a claim
and delivery proceeding the logs that she
seems to have acquired peaceful possession
of without action. Was the ‘defendant en
titled, by way of recoupment, to the benefit
of the enhanced value imparted to the prop
erty by transporting it to market? Had they
been sawed up in planks, and used to con
struct a boat, the plaintiff would not have
been entitled to recover the boat, or the ma
terial used in its construction. But if the
plaintiff had then unlawfully seized and lost
or destroyed the boat, and the defendant had
been thereby driven to an action to recover
compensation for his loss, he might have re
covered the value of the boat. together with
the damage, if any, done to his land in re
moving it therefrom; but the present plain
tiff would have been entitled “to deduct,
by way of counterclaim, the value of the
timber which was manufactured into the
boat, just after it was felled and converted
into a chattel." Potter v. Mardre, supra. It
seems to have been conceded that the defend
ant cut and carried away the logs under the
honest but mistaken belief that the land upon
which they were growing was his own.
Where a trespasser acts in good faith under
a claim of right in removing timber, though
he may not be allowed compensation for the
cost of converting the tree into a chattel, may
he not recoup,in analogy to the equitable doc
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. 17 Wis. 550, the court say:
trine of betterments, for additional value im
parted to the property after its conversion in
to a chattel, and before it is changed into a
different species? The judge below, in allow
ing the defendant, by way of recoupment,
the benefit of the enhanced value imparted to
the logs by removal from the stump to the
Newbern market, seems to have acted upon
the idea that the defendant, by reason of his
good faith, was entitled to the benefit of the
improvement in value imparted by his labor
and expense. In Ross v. Scott, supra, where
it appeared that the defendant had entered
upon land to mine for coal, and, under the
honest but erroneous belief that he was the
owner, liad built houses thereon, it was held
that the plaintiff might recover the cost of
the coal in situ, subject to reduction by an
allowance for permanent improvements put
upon the land. See, also, In re United
Merthyr Coilieries Co., L. R. 15 Eq. 46; Hil
ton v. Woods, L. R. 4 Eq. 432: Forsyth v.
Wells, 41 Pa. St. 291. The weight of authori
ty, it must be conceded, sustains the rule
that, where the action is brought for damages
for logs cut and removed in the honest belief
on the part of the trespasser that he had title
to them, the measure of damages is the value
in the woods from which they were taken,
with the amount of injury incident to re
moval, not at the mill where they were car
ried to be sawed. Tilden v. Johnson, 52 Vt.
(:28. 36 Am. Rep. 769, and note, 770; Herdic
v. Young, 55 Pa. St. 176: Hill v. Canfield. 56
Pa. St. 454; Moody v. Whitney. 38 Me. 174;
Cushing v. Longfellow, 26 Me. 306; Golier v.
Fett, 30 Cal.. 482; Foote v. Merrill, 54 N. H.
496; Railway Co. v. Hutchins, 32 Ohio St. 571.
In the absence of any evidence that would
justify the assessment of vindictive damages,
there is only one exception to the rule, as we
have stated it, and that is where the trees
destroyed are not the ordinary timber of the
forest, but are peculiarly valuable for orna
ment, or as shade trees.
It being settled in this state that the right
to the specific chattel, which vests on sever
ance from the land in the owner of the soil,
remains in him till the species is changed,
we are constrained to go further, though
it may sometimes subject a mistaken tres
pnsser to hardship, and hold that the true
owner is entitled‘ to regain possession of a
log cut and removed from his land, either
I
by recapture or by any other remedy pro-.
_ vided bylaw, whatever additional value may
have been imparted to it by transporting it
to a better market, or by any improvements
in its condition short of an actual alteration
of species. In Weymouth v. Railroad Co.,
“In determining
the question of recaption the law must either
allow the owner to retake the property, or it
must hold that he has lost his right by the
wrongful act of another. If retaken at all,
it must be taken as it is found, though en
hanced in value by the trespasser. It cannot
be returned to its original condition. The
law, therefore, being obliged to say either
that the wrongdoer shall lose his labor, or
the owner shall lose the right to take the
p’operty wherever he may find it, very prop
erly decides in favor of the latter. But where
the owner voluntarily waives the right to re
claim the property itself, and sues for dam
ages, the difliculty of separating the en
hanced value from the original value no long-_
er exists. It is then entirely practicable to
give the owner the entire value that was
taken from him, which it seems that natural
justice requires, without adding to it such
value as the property may have afterwards
acquired from the labor of the defendant. In
the case of recaption the law does not allow
it, because it is absolute justice that the orig
inal owner should have the additional value.
But where the wrongdoer has by his own
act created a state of facts, when either he
or the owner must lose, then the law says
the wrongdoer shall lose." Id., 26 Am. Rep
529, note. When, therefore, the plaintiff re
captured the one lot of logs that had been
enhanced in value by transportation from
the stump to the city market, she but excr
cised the right given her by law to peace
fully regain possession of her own chauels
wherever found. She was guilty of no in
fringement of the rights of t.he defendant. for
which an action would lie. It is familiar
learning that a defendant can only maintain
successfully a counterclaim when it is of
such a nature that he could recover upon it 1
in a separate suit brought against the plain
tiff. The defendant could not recover, there
fore, either in a distinct action for the taking
of . the logs, or by way of counterclaim.
When the plaintiff recaptured the logs she
was guilty of no wrong, and the question of
title to the property so rightfully taken was
eliminated from all possible future contro
versy. Her remedy by act of the law re
mained as to so many of the logs as she had
not regained possession of by her own act.
After she had recaptured one lot the property
in them in their altered state, and at the new
situs, revested in her, with the absolute jus
disponendi, as in the case of her other per
sonal property. Nothing remained to be ad
justed in the courts, except her claim for
damages for the taking of the other lot and
the injury to the land, if any, incident to the
removal of both lots. It was error. there
fore, to instruct the jury that the enhanced ,
value imparted by removal to the one lot \
of logs might be allowed the defendant as a
counterclaim, so as to set off the damages
assessed for injury to the land and for the
value at the stump of the other lot, and the
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¢?OMAHA & GRANT S.\IELTI.\’G &. RE
FINING CO. et al. v. TABOR et al.
(21 Pac. 925, 13 Colo. 41.)
Supreme Court of Colorado. May 28, 1889.
Commissioners’ decision. Appeal from Ms
trict court, Lake county.
Two suits, in the nature of actions in tro
ver, brought by Horace A. W. Tabor, David
H. Moffatt, Jacob J. B. Du Bois, James G.
_ Blaine, and Jerome B. Chaffee,—the first,
against Eddy, James. and Grant; the second,
against the Omaha 80 Grant Smelting & Re
fining Company, in which it appears the bus
iness of the former defendants was merged.
Plaintiffs alleged that they, with Charles E.
Rider, were the owners and in the possession
of the mine in the county of Lake known as
the “Maid of Erin Lode," and as survey
“Lot No. 568," and “Mineral Entry No.
384," from the 1st day of January, 1882, un
til the 11th of October, 1883. That between
the 3d of July and the 31st of August’ 1883,
Thomas Ovens, Stanley G. Wight, and oth
ers wrongfully entered upon the property,
and mined and took out a large quantity of
valuable ore, and sold the same to the defend
ants, who converted it to their own use; and
that the ore so mined, sold, and purchased
by the defendants was of the value of $25.
O00 over and above the cost of mining, rais
ing, hauling, and treating. That about the
9th day of March, 1886, the plaintiff Jerome
B. Chaffee died, and David H. Moffatt be
came executor. That on or about the 20th
of November, 1885, Charles E. Rider sold and
transferred to l"_1vid H. Motiait his cause or
causes of action in the premises, and that the
defendants mixed and confused the ores of
plaintiffs with other ores, destroyed their
identity, and sold and converted them into
money. Plaintilfs pray judgment for $25’
OOO. and interest. Defendants answer, de
nying all the allegations in the complaint,
except the allegation of sale and assignment
by Rider to Moffutt, in regard to which they
say they are not informed, and the allegation
that defendant had not paid plaintiffs for the
ore, which is admitted. For further defense,
defendants allege that, at the time of the al
leged entry and wrongful taking of ore, Stan
ley G. Wight, Jervis Joslin, Chester B.
Bullock, Boyd Park, A. W. Rucker, and
Rucker were the owners and in the
possession of the Vanderbilt lode mining
claim, which conflicted with and embraced a
part of the Maid of Erin claim. That the
territory in conflict was in litigation between
the respective parties. That several actions
at law and equity concerning it were pend
ing and undetermined. That at the dates
mentioned in the complaint Wight and oth
ers were mining and taking ores from the
Vanderbilt claim, and from that part in con
flict with the Maid of Erin. That these facts
were unknown to defendants; and that the
ore so taken, or a part of it. was sold and
delivered to the defendant at its smelting
works in Leadville. as ore from the Vander
bilt lode, and purchased by defendants in
regular course of business. That long after
the purchase of the ore by defendants they
were informed that the ore was taken from
the ground in dispute. Defendants further
say, in answer, that some time during Au
gust or September. 1883, they did purchase
ores belonging to Wight, ltucker, and others
which were known as and called “Vander
bilt Ores," which as defendants believe were
taken from the Vanderbilt claim, of which
the said Wight and others were the owners
and claimants, and in possession under claim
and color of title. Plaintiffs, in reply, deny
that Wight and others were the owners of
any part of the Vanderbilt claim in conflict
with the Maid of Erin claim; deny that any
part of the Vanderbilt claim conflicted; and
allege that prior to the date mentioned the
government of the United States had sold to
the plaintiffs Tabor and Du Bois the Maid of
Erin claim, and given areceiver’s receipt for
the same from the land-ofiice at Leadville;
and aver that Ovens and Wight wrongfully
went into a portion of the ground described
in the complaint while plaintiffs were in pos
session of it, and mined and carried away the
ore, which was the same ore mentioned in
defendants’ answer; deny that Ovens and
Wight had any title to the ground from which
ore was taken, and Aver that all the posses
sion they had was wrongful and illegal, and
temporary, for the purpose of obtaining the
ore; that the entry of Ovens and Wight was
through a. shaft on the Big Chief claim, not
owned by either party to the controversy,
and that from such shaft they worked over
the boundary into plaintiffs’ property; deny
that defendants did not know that Ovens and
Wight were taking the ore from plaintiffs’
ground; and aver full notice and knowledge
of the fact. The two suits were consolidated
for the purpose of the trial. The venue was
changed to Lake county; the cause tried be
fore the court and a jury, April 15. 1888;
verdict for plaintiffs against Eddy, James,
and Grant for $3,990.45, and against the
Omaha do Grant $melting & Refining Com
pany for $14,397.67. There are 61 assign
ments of error. Of these, 38 are to the rul
ing of the court in admitting and rejecting
testimony; 22 (being those from 39 to 60,
both inclusive) are to the rulingsof the court
in giving and refusing theinstructions asked;
the 61st and last is to the refusal of the
court to grant a new trial. The other facts
necessary to a proper understanding of the
case necessarily appear in the opinion.
Patterson & Thomas, for appellant. Wol
cott & Va.ile, J. B. Bis.sell, and L. 0. Rock
well, for appellees.
REED, C., (after stating the facts as
abmre.) The lirst I5 and the 18th errors as
signed are to the ruling of the court on thtI
cross-examination of plaintiffs‘ witness 0. II.‘
Harker. Counsel in their argument for ap
pellants say: “The defendants sought to
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show by cross-examination of the plaintiffs’
witnesses that at the time of the commission
of the trespasses complained of, the Maid of
Erin mine was owned by the llenriett Mm
ing &. Smelting Company and J. B. Du Bois,
and that the original trespassers were en
joined at the suit of these parties by proper .
proceedings instituted for that purpose, but 1
they were not permitted to do so." it ap
pears that counsel for appellants (defendants
below) upon the trial attempted, on cross
examination of the witness, to show that the
plaintiff Du Bois owned one-half of the Maid
of Erin property, and the Henriett Company
the other half, and that the other plaintiffs
were not owners, by showing that the wit
ness had so stated in a legal document signed
and verified by him as manager and agent in
some former proceeding concerning the prop
erty, in which case an injunction was issued
to restrain a trespass upon the Maid of Erin
claim upon the complaint so signed and ver
ified; but the court would not permit it to be
done. An examination of the questions asked
the witness, which the court did not per
mit him to answer, will show that none of
the testimony sought went to any issue in
the case, was not directed to an_vthing in his
direct testimony, and was not legitimate
cross-examination. Many of the questions
were in regard to facts that could only have
been proved by production of records or doc
uments.
gard to suits at law and proceedings where
there is nothing in the record to show he in
any way participated or of which he had any
knowledge; and all the testimony sought, in
our view of the case, was immaterial. except
in so far as it tended to discredit him or
weaken his testimony by showing that his
acts or declarations on previous occasions
were at variance and inconsistent with his
testimony at that time. This counsel had a
right to do by introducing the records or doc
uments, and asking him in regard to oral
statements. ‘It appears that in the course of
the trial the papers executed by the witness,
to which his attention was called, were ad
mitted in evidence for the purpose of im
peachment,—the only legitimate purpose they
could serve.
'
It is clear that the title of the Henriett
Company to one-half of the Maid of Erin
claim could not have been established by pa
rol statements, or the acts of an agent in
verifying papers where the facts were so
statel. Counsel say this was one purpose
for which the evidence was sought to be elic
ited on cross-examination. Had it been
proper cross.examination, aml directed to an
issue, it was incompetent for the declared
purposes for which it was I sought. The
agency of the witness had not been estab
lished by any testimony but his own. He stat
ed under oath at the time suit was brought
that he was the manager. and agent of the
1lenriettCompany. This wasinsuliicient. An
agency cannot be established by his own dec
larations. llarker v. Dement, 9 Gill, 16:
Some of the questions were in re-
v
.
James v. Stooke.y. 1 Wash. C. C. 330.t
agency had been proved, it was that at the
time of verifying the papers he was the man
ager and agent of the Henriett Company;
and his sworn statement that he was such
agent, and that his principal owned one-half
of defendants’ claim, could not be binding
upon or in any way affect the plaintiffs in
this action. And although he was the agc0t
of plaintiffs, in charge of their work in the
Maid of Erin, no statement, no matter how
. solemnly made by him as theagent of the
llem iett Company, in favor of such company,
or against the title of plaintiffs, could affect
either, much less conclude and estop the plain
ttffs from asserting the contrary, as is urged
by counsel. There was no plea of property in
the Henriett Company, and of entry and justi
fication under such a title. The defendant in
this case cannot set up a title of a third per
son in defense, unless he in some manner
connects himself With it. Duncan v. Spear.
11 Wend. 54; Weymouth v. Railroad Co., 17
Wis. 555; Harker v. Dement, 9 Gill, 7. It
follows that the court did not err in limiting
the testimony on the cross-examination to
the attempted discrediting of the witness,
and in refusing to admit records, except for
purposes of impeachment.
It is assigned for error that the court al
lowed plaintiff Tabor to testify to a conver
sation with Mctfomb after the latter had
been called, and had given his version of it.
Counsel put it upon the ground that a party
cannot be allowed to contradict or impeach
his own witness. It does not appear that
Tabor was called for any such purpose. or
that his testimony had that effect. He was
called to give his version of what occurred
at that interview with McComb. A careful
comparison of the testimony of both shows
that of Tabor more corroborative of than con
tradictory to that of McComb,—at least, as
to the result of such conversation,—although
there is some discrepancy in regard to the
language used. “The party calling a wit
ness is not precluded from proving the truth
of any particular fact by any other competent
testimony." 1 Greenl. Ev. § 443.
Appellants’ counsel rely upon the conver
sation of Tabor with Mctlomb as a license or
consent on the part of Tabor to the entry and
taking of the ores from the Maid of Erin
ground, and contend that his license or con
sent as a co-owner to the extent of one-six
teenth of the Maid of Erin ground was con
clusive upon himself’ and also upon his co
owners of the other fifteen-sixteeuths, and
was equivalent to a license or consent from
all, to the extent of covering the entire prop
erty. A license or consent cannot be ex
tended by inference as a consent to enter
property not spoken of or rcferre:l to in the
conversation, and we can find nothingin the
testimony of either .\IcComb or Tabor in re
gard to entering and taking ore from the
Maid of Erin ground. It was not attempted
t Fed. Cas. No. 7,181.
If an
172 INJURIES BESPECTING REAL PROPERTY.
to be shown that Ovens. Wight’ and Rocker
entered under license or consent from Tabor.
At the conversation both testify that Tabor
was iniormed the parties had entered under
an order from the court, against which he
was powerless for the time. It further ap
pears that those parties were in at the time
McComb and Tabor had the conversation,
and McComb only asked consent to join .
them. It cannot be contended that such a
consent was a license to Ovens, Wight, and
Rucker to enter. The testimony went to the
jury, and in the eighth and ninth instruc
tions given on prayer of plaintiffs the_v were
instructed, in effect. that they could not limit
or reduce the amount to be recovered by rea
son of the supposed license or consent of
Tabor, unless they should find that there was
a consent on his part that they should enter
through the Big Chief shaft, and take the
ore from the Maid of Ii,rin claim; and the
same proposition is submitted in theinstruc
tion given on behalf of defendants in place
of No. 7, refused. These instructions on
that point, we think, were correct’ and fairly
submitted to the jury the question of license
or consent. And it is evident from the ver
dict that the jury iound against any such
license or consent; and’ the jury having so
found, it would srem unnecessary to deter
mine whether the instructions were correct
or otherwise in regard to the extent such con
sent. if found, should affect or modify the
amount; or, in other words. whether it should
cover,the,whole taking of ore, or be confined
to the one-sixteenth owned by Tabor. The
jury having found no consent or license on
the part of Tabor, defendants could not be
prejudiced by the instructions of the court in
regard to its effect, if it were found.
The question is quite different from what
it would be if it related to a transaction in
the ordinary course of business relative to
the joint property of tenants in common.
Here it is attempted to justify atort, and
the injury to the entire property by the sup
posed license of one joint owner. If the en
try had been made by Tabor in person, and
the wrongs attempted to be juslified under
permission from. had been done by, him, his
co-tenants could have had against him the
same actions at law for injuries to their in
terests that all are attempting to enforce
against parties having no interest. It is
held "an action on the case sounding in tort
may be maintained by one tenant in common
against his co-tenant for a misuse of the com
mon property, though not amounting to a
total destruction of it." .\lcLellan v. Jen
ness, 43 Vt. 183; Agnew v. Johnson. 17 Pa.
St. 373; Lowe v. Miller, 3 Grat. 205. And,
if one tenant in common assume to own and
sell the thing held in common, the other may
maintain an action of trover against him.
Burbank v. Grooker, 7 Gray, 159; Wheeler
v. Wheeler, 83 Me. 347; Coursin’s Appeal,
79 Pa. St. 220; White v. Osborn, 21 Wend.
72; binyth v. Tankersley. 20 Ala. 212. The
authorhy of the tenant in common could not
be extended to cover acts of others that he
could not legally have done himself. Hence
the court was correct in holding and instruct
ing the jury that the consent or license of
Tabor, if such were found, could only extend
to the iuter‘st owned by him in the cominon
property.
Appellants further assign for errorthe rul
ing of the court in admitting the testimony
of Tabor when called by the plaintiffs to
show that, by a purel agreement made at; the
time of the conveyance of the different inter
ests by Tabor, Motfatt, and Chaffee in the
Henriett Company, possession of the proper
ty conveyed was to remain in the grautors
until the purchase price was paid; that it
never was paid; and possession under the
conveyance never delivered. A part of such
testimony—0that which went to show that
possession was to be retained—was inad
missible. “All conveyances of real estate
and of any interest therein duly execuled
and delivered shall be held to carry with
them the right to immediate possession of
the premises or interest conveyed. unless a
iiuture day for the possession is therein speci
fied." Gen. St. c. 18, § 9; Drake v. Root,2
Colo. 685. Under the statute. it is certainly
required that the intention to postpone the
operation of a deed shall be declared in the
instrument. and it cannot be proved by parol.
It follows that the instructions of the court
on this point were in part erroneous; that
part of the testimony going to prove that
possession of the property was never deliv
ered, aad remained in the grantors, was
clearly competent and proper; and the in
structions of the court were proper on that
point.
The admission in evidence of the deeds of
reconveyance by the Henriett Mining Com
pany and the assignment of Rider of his
cause of action was not erroneous, and
should be sustained,—the former investing
plaintiffs with full title before the com
mencement of suit; and of tlye validity of
the latter, so as to enable Moffatt, assignee,
to succeed to all the rights of his assignor.
there can be no question under our statute.
Had defendants,_ by proper and competent
testimony, attempted to prove the owner
ship of one-half of the Maid of Erin claim in
the Hemiett Company, it would have been
inadmissible. There was no attemped justi
fication of entry of VViglll; and others un
der the Henriett title of one-half. Under a
plea that the close upon which the alleged
trespass was committed was not at that
time the close of the plaintiff, the defendant
may show lawful right to the possession of
the close in a third person, under whom he
claims to have acted. Jones v. Chapman, 2
Exch. 803. But a bare tort-fensor cannot
set up in defense the title of a third person
between whom and himself there is no priv
ity of connection. Branch v. Doane, 18
Conn. 233. In justifying under a third per
son, the defendant must show both the title
and the possess.on of that person, (Chambers
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v. Donaldson, 11 East, 65; Merrill v. Bur
bank, 23 Me. 538; Reed v. Price, 30 Mo.
442,) and that the acts were done by that;
person’s authority. (Dunlap v. Glidden, 31
Me. 510.) A defendant can only justify up
on the ground of a better right or title than 1
the plaintiffs have. And it has been held
that mere naked possession, however ac
quired, is good as against a person having
no right to the possession. Knapp v. Win
chester, 11 Vt. 351; llaslem v. Lockwood,
37 Conn. 500; Cook v. Patterson, 35 Ala. ‘
102. It will be apparent that in thejudg
ment of this court the effort of defendants
to set up title to half of the property in the
Maid of Erin claim in the Bennett Company,
without a plea to that effect, and attempt
ing to show privity or attempting to justify
under it, was unwarranted in law, and that
no testimony should have been taken in
support of any such attempted defense.
Another defense interposed, which seems
incompatible with the former. was that cer
tain parties, named in the answer, were the
owners of the Vanderbilt claim, and that
such claim conflicted with and comprised a
part of the Maid of Erin claim, and that the
claim was in the possession of the owners
named under claim and color of title; and
that the ground from which the ore was tak
en was in conflict between the owners of the
claim, and that divers suits in regard to the
same were pending and undetermined; that;
Wight and others, while engaged in mining
the Vanderbilt claim, took the ores from the
ground in controversy, which defendants
bought as Vanderbilt ore; and that the same
was taken by the owners of such claim while
the locus was in their possession under color
of title. it is shown in evidence that there
were two entries on the property in contro
versy,-the lirst by Wight, one of the owners
of the Big Chief in 1882’ after the Maid of
Erin had a receiver’s receipt from the United
States land-oliice, when a drift was run from
the Big Chief shaft for the Maid of Erin,
and was run over the line 20 or 28 feet, in
to the Maid of Erin ground. The second
entry was by the same party and others, in
‘the same way. and upon the same ground.
1.\,either entry was made by extending the
work of the Vanderbilt claim to its exterior
limits, and thus entering the Maid of Erin
property. The party entering and partici
pating in the proceeds of the ores mined
were not the owners of the Vanderbilt, but
seems to have been one made up for the occa
sion,—part of the owners .of the Vanderbilt,
some of the owners of the Big Chief, and, per
haps, parties owning in neither. The plain
tiffs pleaded title to the Maid of Erin claim
from the government of the United States,
and put in evidence a receiver,s receipt for
the purchase of the property, of date Novem
ber 23, 1881, and a patent from the United
States government dated March 17, 1884.
It has been frequently held that a patent for
land emanating from the government of the
United States is the highest evidence of title,
.by the certificate.
and in courts of law is evidence of the true
performance of every prerequisite to its is
suunce, and cannot be questioned either in
courts of law or equity, except upon ground
of fraud or mistake, and, if not assailed for
fraud or mistake, is conclusive evidence of
title. On the 23d of November, 1881, the gov
ernment parled with its title to the Maid of
Erin property, sold it to Tabor and Du liois,
and gave a receipt. The government could
thereafter no more dispose of the land than
if a patent had been issued. “The linal cer
tificate obtained on the payment of the money
is as binding on the government as the pat
ent. * * * When the patent issues it
relates back to the entry. * * * " As
trom v. Hammond, 3 McLean, 107;2 Blach
ley v. Coles, 6 Colo. 350; Poire v. Wells. id.
406; Steel v. Smelling Co., 106 U. S. 447. 1
Sup. Ct. Rep. 389; lleydenfeldt v. Mining
Co., 93 U. S. 634. The patent does not in
vest the purchaser with any additional prop
erty in the land. It only gives him better legal
evidence of the title which he first acquired
Cavender v. Smith, 5
Clarke, (lowa,) 189; Id. 3G. Green, 349; Ar
nold v. Grimes. 2 Clarke, (Iowa,) 1; Carroll
v. >‘afl’ord, 8 How. 460; Bagnell v. Broder
ick, 13 Pet. 450; Canaan v. Johnson, 29
Mo. 94; Hutchings v. Low, 15 Wall. 88. A
patent title cannot be attacked collaterally.
“Individuals can resist the conclusiveness of‘
the patent only by showing that it conflicts
with prior rights vested in them.” Boggs
v. Mining Co., 14 Cal. 362; Leese v. Clark,
18 Cal. 555; Jackson v. Lawton, 10 Johns.
24. An “adverse possession" is defined to
be the enjoyment of land, or such estate as
lies in grant, under such circumstances as
indicate that such enjoyment has been com
menced and continued under assertion or color
of right on the part of the possessor. Wal
lace v. Duflleld, 2 Scrg. & R. 527; French
v. Pearce. 8 Conn. 440; Smith v. llurtis, 9
Johns. 174. The entry of a strang.'er. and
the taking of rents or profits by him, is
not an adverse possession. When two parties
are in possession, the law adjudges it to be
the possession of the party who has the
right. Reading v. liawsterne, 2 Ld. lfaym.
829; Barr v. Gr0itz,v4 Wheat. 213; Smith v.
Burtis, 6 Johns. 218; Stevens v. Hollister, 18
Vt. 294; Brimmer v. Long Wharf, 5 Pick.
131. Possession, to be supported by the law.
must be under a claim of right, and adverse
possession must be strictly proved. Grube
v. Wells. 34 Iowa, 150. The color must
arise out of some conveyance purporting to
convey title to a tract of land. 3 Washb.
Real Prop. 155; Shackleford v. Bailey, 35
Ill. 391.
The title of the Maid of Erin claim was in
the government of the United States until
divested by its own act. There could be no
adverse possession against the government.
The claimants of the Vanderbilt claim en
tered under license only from the govern
! Fed. Gas. No. 596.
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ment. Admitting, for the purposes of this
case. that the entry under the license was
legal. that they had complied with the laws
of congress and the state, and that their pos
session extended to and was protected to their
exterior lines while the fee remained in the
government, when the fee passed from the
government to the other party conveying the
locus, before that time in controversy, the
supposed license was revoked, and all acts
and declarations of the parties themselves,
whether by record or otherwise, as estab
lishing a possessory right, were void as
against the grantees of the government,
and there could be no entry under color of
title. except by some right by conveyance
either from the government or its grantees.
The fact of the actual possession and occu
pancy ot the Maid of Erin by plaintiffs was
not seriously disputed, and the testimony
was ample to warrant the jury in finding the
fact_ The government had granted thel -nd
previous to the entry of Wight and others,
and that such possession under a legal title
was co.extensive with its bounds is so well
settled that authorities in its support are un
necessary.
We do not think the court erred in refusing
to admit the testimony offered in support of
possessory title of the Vanderbilt in the land
from which the ore was taken, nor in re
fusing the testimony in reference to litigation
and suits pending between the parties.
Neither the title nor right of possession of
plaintiffs could be attacked collaterally as at
tempted, and the testimony offered under
the law as shown above was incompetent and
inadmissible to prove either adverse pos
session or color of title. From our view of
the law controlling the case, as stated above,
it follows that the court did not err in re
fusing the instructions asked on this point
by the defendants, or in giving those which
were given. They were substantially correct.
The sale of ore by Wight and others, and
purchase by the defendants, was a conver
sion. A “conversion" is defined to he any
act of the defendant inconsistent with the
plaintiffs right of possession, or subversive
of his right of property. llarris v. Saunders,
2 Strob. Eq. 370, note; Webher v. Davis, 44
Me. 147; Gilman v. Hill, 36 N. H. 311; Clark
v. Whitaker, 19 Conn. 319. The defend
ants, by purchasing the ore, acquired no
title, and are consequently equally liable for
its conversion as the parties who sold it.
Clark v. Wells, 45 Vt. 4; Clark v. Rideout,
39 N. H. 238; Carter v. Kingman, 103 Mass.
517. And it was a matter of no importance,
so far as the legal liability of defendants was
concerned, whether they were ignorant or
informed of the true ownership. Morrill v.
Moultou, 40 "t. 242; Johnson v. Powers, Id.
611; Railroad Co. v. Car-Works Co., 32 N.
J. Law, 517; Dixon v. Caldwell, 15 Ohio St.
412; Hoffman v. Carow, 22 Wend. ‘285. The
principle caveat emptor applies. A person
purchasing property of the party in posses
sion, without ascertaining where the true
0
title is, does so at his peril, and, although
honestlymlstaken, will be liable to the owner
for a cunversion. Taylor v. Pope, 5 Cold.
413; (jihnore v. Newton, 9 Allen, 171;
Spraights v. Hawley, 39 N. Y. 441.
The question of the proper measure of
damages is one of much greater difliculty.
We can find no conclusive adjudication in our
own court. The decisions of the different
states are conflicting and irreconcilable. Al
though, under our Code, different forms of
action are abolished, the principles controlling
the different actions remain the same as be
iore its adoption. Consequently the law ap
plicahle and to be administered in each case
depends as much as formerly upon the nat
ure of the case,—the allegations and the dis
tinctive form the case assumes. In many
states the courts have attempted in this ac
tion to make the rule of damage correspond.
to that in the action of trespass. and make it.
in that respect as full and cumpletea remedy.
In the state of New York it was long held,
and perhaps still is. that the increased value
of the property, added by the labor and acts
of defendant, belongs to the rightful owner
of the property, and the value of the property
in its new and improved state thus becomes
the measure of damages, but the doctrine
has been questioned and severely criticised
in the same state. Brown v. Sax, 7 Cow. 95.
In trespass. damage for the whole injury, in
cluding diminution in the value of the land
by the entry and removal, as well as of the
value of the property removed. may be re
covered; and the character of the entry,
whether willful and malicious, or. i.n good
faith, through iuadvertence or mistake,is an
important element.—an element that cannot
enter into the action of trover. In trover,
the specific articles cannot be recovered as in
replevin. Consequently the same rule as to/
increased value cannot be applied as in that
action, where the specific property can be
followed, and’ when identified, taken without
regard to the form it has assumed. It seems,
on principle, therefore, (and this is in har
mony with the English authorities and those
of many of the states,) that where a party
makes his election, and adopts trover, the
rule of damage is and should be proper com/
pensation for the property taken and con
verted. regardless of the manner of entry and
taking; and, where the chattel was severed
from the realty, regardless of the diminished
value of the realty by reason of the taking.
In other words, the true rule should be the
value of the chattel as such when and where
first severed from the realty and becoming a
chattel. An examination of the authorities
will show that the rule of damages to some
extent depends upon the form of action,
—whether the action is for an injury to the
land itself. or for the conversion of a chattel
which had been severed from the land. This
distinction seems well founded in principle
'
and reason. This view of the law is sup
ported by Martin v. Porter, 5 Mees. d
z W. 352;
Wild v. Holt, 9 Mees. & \V. 672; Morgan v.,
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Powell, 3 Q. B. 278; Hilton v. Woods, L. It.
4 Eq. 432; Mayo v. Yappen, 23 Cal. 306;
Goller v. Felt, 30 Cal. 481; Coleman,s Appeal.
62 Pa. St. 252; Cushing v. Longfellow, 26
Me. 306; Forsyth v. Wells, 41 Pa. St. 291;
Kier v. Peterson, Id. 357; Moody v. Whit
ney’ 38 Me. 174. We are therefore of the
Opinion that the rule of damage adopted, and
the instructions of the court as to the meas
ure of damage, were erroneous. and tha it
should have beeu<lthe value of the ore
soldéasshown, less the reasonable and proper cos of
raising it from the mine after it was broken,
and hauling from the mine to the defendants’
place of business. We do not flnd it neces
sary to decide whether or not plaintiffs‘ coun
sel, by stating in the complaint that the ore
taken and converted was. of a certain value
“over and above the cost of mining, digging,
and extracting the same from the ground,
raising the same to the surface, hauling the
same to the defendants’ reduction works. and 0
the cost of treating the same," and defend
ants taking issue upon it, precluded them
from‘ proving and taking greater damage
upon the trial; but if it were necessary, for
the purpose of determining this case, we
should be inclined to so hold. In this action
value is a material averment, and the plain
tiffs have deliberately asserted one rule, and,
issue having been taken upon it. should not
be permitted to change base. and adopt upon
trial another more disadvantageous to the de
fendants. In this case it could not have
been said the evidence was in support of the
allegation or directed to an issue. The testi
mony should have been directed to the issue,
or the pleadings amended.
Counsel for appel lees, after obtaining leave
from this court, assigned for cross-error the
refusal of the court to allow interest on the .
amount found due from the time of the con
version, and the instruction of the court on
that point. It is true, as stated by the learned
judge, “that interest in this state is a creat
ure of statute, and regulated thereby; that it
is only recoverable in the absence of contract
in cases enumerated in the statute; and that
damages to property arising from a wrong or
negligence of the defendants is not one of the
enumerated cases." This could not come
under the last clause of the instruction. It
is not for damage to property. It is for the
wrongful detention of money belonging to ‘
plaintiffs. It is clearly distinguishable from
Railroad Co. v. Conway, 8 Colo. l. 5 Pac.
Rep. 142, and Hawley v. Barker, 5 Colo. 118.
There does not appear to have been any de
cision in this state directly on the question
presented. The same statute has been con
strued in Illinois (from which state it was
taken)as allowing interest in this class of cases
from the time of the conversion, and there
has been an unbroken line of decisions in
that state from Bradley v. Geiselman, 22 Ill.
494, to Railroad Co. v. Cobb, 72 Ill. 148, in
which it is said, reviewing the decisions:
“The doctrine established by these author
ities is, where property has been wrongfully
taken or converted into money, and an action
of trespass or trover may be maintained, in
terest may properly be recovered; and this
is based upon the statute which authorizes
interest when there has been an unreason
able and vexatious delay of payment. There
can be no difference between the delay of pay
ment of a money demand and one where prop
erty has been wrongfully taken, or taken and
converted into money or its equivalent. The
two rest upon the same principle." The rule
is that when the statute of another state is
adopted the construction of the statute in
that state is also adopted, and remains the
true construction until authoritatively con
strued by the courts of the state adopting it.
The general rule in trover is that the dam
ages should embrace the value of the prop
erty at the time of the conversion, with in
terest up to the time of judgment, and this
rule has been followed in almost if not all
the states, and seems right on principle. But
our statute does not seem to have received
the same construction here as in the state of
Illinois. While in that state it has been put
plainly and squarely as interest under the
statute. in our state damage for the detention
of the money equal to the legal interest upon
the value of the chattels converted from the
time of the conversion has been allowed, not
as interest, but as damage. Machette v.
Wanless, 2 Colo. 170; llauauer v. Bartels, Id.
514; Tucker v.I’arks, 7 Colo.62, 1 Pac. Rep.
427. We think the court erred in its instruc-
tions to the Jury on this point. They should
have been instructed to add to the amount
found as the value of the ore, as further
damage, a sum equal to legal interest on the
same from the time of the conversion. For
the errors in assessing the damage, the case
should be reversed, and remanded ior a new
trial in accordance with the views herein ex
pressed.
RICHMOND and PATTISON, CC., con
’ cur.
PER CURIAM. For the reasons stated
‘
in the foregoing opinion the judgment is re
versed.
Reversed.
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E. E. BOLLES WOODEN WARE CO. v.
UNITED STATES.
(1 Sup. Ct. 398, 106 U. S. 432.)
Supreme Court of the United States. Dec. ,18,
1882.
In Error to the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Eastern District of Wiscon
sin.
Samuel D. Hastings, Jr., for plaintiff in
error.
Asst. Atty. Gen. Maury, for defendant in
\Gl'ro r.
MILLER, J. This is a writ of error to
the circuit court for the eastern district of
VVisconsin, founded on a certificate of di
vision of opinion between the judges holding
that court. The facts, as certified, out of
which this difference of opinion arose ap
pear in an action in the nature of trover,
brought by the United States for the value
of 242 cords of ash timber, or wood suitable
for manufacturing purposes. cut and re
moved from that part of the public lands
known as the reservation of the Oneida tribe
of Indians, in the state of Wisconsin. This
timber was knowingly and wrongfully taken
from the land by Indians, and carried by
them some distance to the town of Depere,
and there sold to the E. E: Bolles Wood
‘Ware Company, the defendant, which was
not chargeable with any intentional wrong
.or misconduct or bad faith in the purchase.
The timber on the ground, after it was felled,
was worth 25 cents per cord, or $60.71 for
the whole, and, at the town of Depere, where
defendant bought and received it, $3.50 per
cord, or $850 for the whole quantity. The
question on which the judges divided was
whether the liability of the defendant should
be measured by the first or the last of these
valuations. It was the opinion of the circuit
Judge that the latter was the proper rule of
damages, and judgment was rendered
against the defendant for that sum. We
cannot follow counsel for the plaintiff in er
ror through the examination of all the cases,
both in England and this country, which his
commendable research has enabled him to
place upon the brief. In the English courts
the decisions have in the main grown out of
.coal taken from the mine, and in such cases
the principle seems to be established in those
courts that when suit is brought for the
value of the coal so taken. and it has been
the result of an honest mistake as to the
true ownership of the mine, and the taking
was not a willful trespass, the rule of dam
ages is the value of the coal as it was in the
mine before it was disturbed, and not it
value when dug out and delivered at the
mouth of the mine. Martin v. Porter, 5
Mees. & W. 351; Morgan v. Powell, 3 Adol.
8: E. (N. S.) 2"8; Wood v. Morewood. 3 Adoi.
& E. 440; Hilton v. Woods, L. R. 4 Eq. 438;
Jegon v. Vivian, L. R. 6 Ch. App. 760.
The doctrine of the l’.Englishl courts on
this subject is probably as well stated by
Lord Hatherly in the house of lords, in the
case of Livingston v. Coal Co., L. R. 5 App.
Cas. 33, as anywhere else. He said: “There
is no doubt that if a man furtively, and in
bad faith, robs his neighbor of his property,
and because it is underground is probably
for some little time not detected, the court of
equity in this country will struggle, or I
would rather say, will assert its aut’hority,
to punish the fraud by fixing the person with
the value of the whole of the property which
he has so furtively taken, and making him
no allowance in respect of what he has so
done, as would have been justly made to
him if the parties had been working by
agreement." But “when once we arrive at
the fact that an inadvertence has been the
cause of the misfortune. then the simple
course is to make every just allowance for
outlay on the part of the person who has so
acquired the property, and to give back to
the owner, so far as is possible under the
circumstances of the case, the full value of
that which (annot be restored to him in
specie."
here seems to us to be no doubt that in
the case of a willful trespass the rule as
stated above is the law of damages both in '
England and in this country, though in some
of the state courts the milder rule has been
applied even to this class of cases. Such are
some that are cited from Wisconsin. Single
v. Schneider, 24 Wis. 299; Weymouth v. Rail
road Co., 17 Wis. 56?. On the other hand,
the weight of authorit in this country as
well as in England favors the doctrine that
where the trespass is the result of inad
vertence or mistake, and the wrong was not
intentional, the value of the property when
first taken must govern)or if the conversion
sued for was after value had been added to
it by the work of the defendant, he should
be credited with this addition. Winchester
v. Craig, 33 Mich. 206, contains a full exam
ination of the authorities on the point.
Heard v. James, 49 Miss. 236; Baker v.
Wheeler, S Wend. 505; Baldwin v. Porter,
12 Conn. 484. While these principles are
suflicient to enable us to fix a measure of
damages in both classes of torts where the
original trespasser is defendant. there re
mains a third class where a purchaser from
him is sued, as in this case, for the conver
sion of the property to his own use. In such
case, if the first taker of the property were
guilty of no willful wrong, the rule can in
no case be more stringent against the de
fendant who purchased of him than against
his vendor.
ut the case before us is one where, by
reason of the willful wrong of the party who
committed the trespass, he was liable, under
the rule we have supposed to be established,
for the value of the tim r at Depere the
moment before he sold it, ndm
to be decided is whether the defendant who
estion .
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rchased it then with no notice that the
perty belonged to the United States. and
with no intention to do wrong, must respond
by the same rule of damages as his vendor
should if he had been sued. It seems to us
/that he must. The timber at all stages of
the conversion was the property of plaintiff.
Its purchase by defendant did not divest the
title nor the right of possession. The recov
ery of any sum whatever is based upon that
proposition. This right, at the moment pre
ceding the purchase by defendant at Depere,
was perfect, with no right in any one to set
up a claim for work and labor bestowed on
it by the wrong-doer. t is also plain that
by purchase from the rong-doer defendant
did not acquire any better title to the prop
erty than his vendor had.) It is not a case
where an innocent purchaser can defend
himself under that plea. if it were, he would 3
‘
fondant was the innocent purchaser of thebe liable to no damages at all, and no re
covery could be had. On the contrary, it is
:1 case to which the doctrine of caveat
emptor applies, and hence the right of re
covery in plaintiff. On what ground, then,
can it be maintained that the right to re- ,‘
firmed a judgment for the value at Anoka,cover against him should not be just what it
was against his vendor the moment before \
he interfered and acquired possession? If
‘the case were one which concerned addition
al value placed upon the property by the 1
meat.work or labor of the defendant after he had
purchased, the same rule might be applied as
in case of the inadvertent trespasser. But
here he has added nothing to its value. He
acquired possession of property of the United
States at Depere, which, at that place, and in
its then condition, is worth $850, and he
wants to satisfy the claim of the government
by the payment of $60. He founds his right
to do this, not on the ground that anything
he has added to the property has increased
its value by the amount of the difference be
tween these two sums, but on the proposition.
that in purchasing the property, he pur
chased of the wrong-doera right to deduct
what the labor of the latter had added to its
value.
if. as in the case of an unintentional tres
v
passer, such right existed, of course defend
ant would have bought it and stood in his
shoes; but, as in the present case, of an in
tentional trepasser, who had no such right
to sell, the defendant could purchase none.
Such is the distinction taken in the Roman
law as stated in.the Inst. Just. lib. 2, tit. 1,
§ 34.
After speaking of a painting by one man
‘court of Minnesota says:
be absurd that the work of an Appclles or
Parrhasius should go without compensation
to the owner of a worthless tablet, if the
painter had possession fairly, he says, as
translated by Dr. Cooper: “But if he, or any
other, shall have taken away the tablet felo
niously, it is evident the owner may prose
cute by action of theft."
The ease of Nesbitt v. Lumber Co., 21 Minn.
491, is directly in point here. The supreme
“The defendant
claims that because they [the logs] were en
hanced in value by the labor of the original
wrong-door in cutting them, and the expense
of transporting them to Anoka, the piaintlff
is not entitled to recover the enhanced value,
that is, that he is not entitled to recover the
full value at the time and place of converv
sion."
That was a case, like this, where the de
logs from the willful wrong-doer, and where,
. as in this case, the transportation of them to
a market was the largest item in their value
at the time of conversion by defendant; but
the court overruled the proposition and af
the place of sale. To establish any other
principle in such a case as this would be
very disastrous to the interest of the public
in the immense forest lands of the govern
It has long been a matter of com
plaint that the depredations upon these lands
are rapidly destroying the finest forests in
the world. Unlike the individual owner,
who, by fencing and vigilant attention, can
protect his valuable trees, the government
has no adequate defense against this great
evil. Its liberality in allowing trees to be cut
on its land for mining, agricultural, and oth
er speciiied uses, has been used to screen
the lawless depredator who destroys and.
sells for profit. To hold that when the gov
ernment iinds its own property in hands but
one remove from these willful trespassers,
and asserts its right to such property by the
slow processes of the law, the holder can
set up a claim for the value which has been
added to the property by the guilty party in
the act of cutting down the trees and remov
lug the timber, is to give encouragement
and reward to the wrong-doer, by providing
a safe market for what he has stolen and
compensation for the labor he has been com
pelled to do to make his theft effectual and
profitable.
We concur with the circuit judge in this
case, and the judgment of the circuit court
on the tablet of another, and holding it to 1 is aflirmed.
LAw DAM.—-12
178 JNJURIES RESPEGTING PERSONAL PROPERTY.
‘ unjust.
1; / GRIGGS v. DAY et al.
(82 N. E. 612, 136 N. Y. 152.)
of New York. Nov. 29,
1802.
Appeal from superior court of New York
City, general term.
Action by Clark R. Griggs against Mel
ville C. Day and another, as executors of
Cornelius K. Garrison, for an accounting
for transactions had between plaintiff and
said Garrison. From a judgment of a ref
eree both parties appeal. For former re
ports, see 11 N. Y. Supp. 835, 12 N. Y. Supp.
958, 18 l\,. 1'. Supp. 796, and 19 N. Y..Supp.
1019. Reversed.
Melville C. Day and Esek Cowen, for ap
pellants. John H. Post, for respondent.
Uourt of Appeals
EARL, G. J. This action was brought
against Cornelius K. Garrison, since deceas
ed, for an accounting. It was referred to
a referee. and he ordered judgment in favor
of the plaintiff for upwards of $188,000.
The record is very voluminous, and in the
briefs submitted and the arguments of coun
sel many questions of law and fact were
presented for our consideration. A careful
study of the record has satisfied me that the.
judgment appealed from is both illegal and
In September, 1879, the plaintiff
entered into a contract with the Wheeling
& Lake Erie Railroad Company, an Ohio
corporation, for the construction and equip
ment of its line of railroad in that state
according to the specifications and upon the
terms and conditions mentioned in the con
tract. By one of the provisions of the con
tract the railroad company was “to furnish
the contractor available subscriptions, or pro
ceeds thereof, and aid, to the amount of
$4,000 per mile of main track, branches,
and sidings, or so much as may be neces
sary to furnish right of way, grade, bridge,
and tie said railroad between Hudson,s and
Martin,s Ferry," a distance of 143 miles, and
“to use its best endeavors to secure for the
contractor available subscriptions and aid
to the extent of $4,000 per mile, or so much
as may be necessary," for a similar pur
pose. as to the balance of the road, a distance
of 58 miles. For the performance of this
contract, besides the aid to be furnished
as above stated, the plaintiff was to receive
bonds and stock of the company. He was
without financial ability, and he applied to
Garrison for financial aid to enable him to
perform his contract; and upon his appli
cation Garrisoii, from time to time, advanc
ed him large sums of money, amounting in
all, besides interest, to nearly $4,500,000. For
the money so advanced the plaintiff as
signed and delivered to Garrison as collat
eral security his construction contract and
bonds and stock of the company, and some
of it was repaid by the sales to him of bonds
n‘—_._=='I—q,-—
from the company for extra work claim
to have been done by him, and on accou
of its failure to perform the portions of the
contract above quoted, its promissory notes,
amounting to $1,049,710.72, and they were
delivered by him to Garrison for moneys ad
vanced and to be advanced by him for the
construction of the road. Garrison held
these notes until May, 1883, when there was
due to him for moneys advanced to the
plaintiff for the construction of the road
nearly $2,500,000. He then received from the
company 2,280 of its second mortgage bonds
of the denomination of $1,000, at 75 cents
on the dollar, amounting, with some interest,
to $1,736,600, to apply upon his claims, and
he then surrendered to it all of the above
mentioned promissory notes, and they were
canceled. On the same day he caused an
original entry to be made in his journal,
one of his account books,—as follows: "This
amount of notes and interest, $2,062,643.13,
taken from contractor at 75 per cent., $1,
546,982.35." He then charged the company
in his books of account with the whole
amount of the notes and interest, and gave
it credit for $1,736,600,—the price, including
interest, at which he took the second mort
gage bonds; and he credited the plaintiff
with the sum of $1,546,982.35. The differ
ence between the total amount due upon the
notes and the amount allowed by him for
the second mortgage bonds was $326,043.13,
and thus he had in his hands, not used for
the payment of the bonds, the notes to that
amount, which he then surrendered to the
company without any consideration what
ever; and, as the referee found, be elected
to look to the company as his debtor on
open account for that amount. The referee
also found that by reason of the surrender
of the notes in consideration of the purchase
of the bonds, and by reason of the surrender
of the balance of the notes, and by reason
of the election before mentioned, Garrison
discharged the indebtedness of the plaintiff
to him to the amount of the face value of
the notes at the time of the surrender. He
also found that the plaintiffs rights as
pledgor in the construction contract, and in
the bonds, stock, and other property trans
ferred to Garrison as collateral security, Were
never cut o11?by foreclosure of his rights, or
in any other way. These facts having been
found by the referee, he found. among other
conclusions of law, that the legal effect of
the surrender by Garrison to the railroad
company of the promissory notes held by
him as collateral security for moneys ad
vanced to the plaintiff, and of the charge
by him against the railroad company of the
full amount of the notes and interest, was
to relieve the plaintiff from any liability to
him for the amount thereof; and in the ac
counting he charged Garrison with the full
amount of the notes, with interest. The
and stock. In 1882 the plaintiff
re elv?
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only question which I deem it important’
now to consider is whether the learned
referee was right in making that charge.
The further fact must be‘ taken into con
sideration that the notes surrendered were
of no value as against the company. It
was utterly insolvent, with property no
more than suflicient to pay its first mort
gage bonds. The second mortgage bonds
were absolutely of no intrinsic value. The
referee held these facts to be immaterial,
and that, under the circumstances, Garri
son had made himself chargeable with the
full amount of the notes, without reference
to their value. Such a conclusion is some
what startling, and should not be sanctioned
unless it has support in well-recognized
principles of law or authorities which we feel
constrained to follow. The entries in Garri
son’s books of account in reference to these
notes have very little bearing upon the con
troversy between these parties. They were
private entries, made by Garrison, undis
closed to the plaintiff, and without his author
ity. They were important simply as evidence,
and are entitled to no more weight than would
have been the oral declarations or admissions
of Garrison made to any third party. They
show what use he made of the notes, and
about that there is no dispute. They did not
bind the plaintiff, and he has never, so far as
appears, assented to them. They show that
Garrison intended to take the notes at 75
cents on the dollar, and that he was willing
to allow the plaintiff that sum for them. But
there was no actual purchase of them. If that
entry had come to the knowledge of the plain
tiff, and he had adopted it, ‘and so notified
Garrison, he could probably have held him
to a purchase of the notes for that sum. But
he repudiates that entry, and refuses to let
Garrison have the notes for that sum. He
cannot use that entry to fasten upon him
a purchase of the notes at their face value.
The minds of the partlts never met upon
such a contract. Garrison either purchased
the notes used in exchange for the bonds at
75 per cent. of their face value, or he did
not purchase them at all. Therefore, as the
plaintiff repudiates the purchase at the price
named, there was no contract of purchase;
and as to these notes, pledged for collateral
security, Garrison ntust be held to have wrong
fully converted them to his own use. It would
make no difference whether we consider these
notes as having been exchanged for the bonds,
or as having been used in payment for the
bonds. In either view, Garrison was, at most,
guilty of a conversion of them. As to the
balance of the notes, which were surrendered
to the company without any consideration,
there was simply a wrongful converion of
them. They had no value as obligations
against the company, and it is preposterous to
suppose that Garrison intended by the sur
render to charge himself for their full face
value against an indebtedness of the plaintiff
to him for money actually loaned. By the
surrender he did not intend to release the
company from its indebtedness evidenced by
the notes, but he intended and elected still
to hold the indebtedness. evidenced by hi
charge in open account upon his books.
The obligation of the company was not im
paired or lessened by the transaction, and it
owed just as much after it as before. Even
if he made the notes his own by surrender
ing them, there was simply a conversion of
them. It is true that he elected to hold the
company as his debtor upon open account, just
as it was his debtor before for the same
amount evidenced by the notes. He did not
take a new debtor, but he retained and in
tended to retain the same debtor. Here
there was no novation. and nothing resem
bling it. It usually, if not always, takes
three parties to make a novation, and they
must all concur upon sufiicient consideration
in making a new contract to take the place
of another contract, and in substituting a
new debtor in the place of another debtor.
“l\,ovation" is thus brieiiy defined: "A trans
action whereby a debtor is discharged from
his liability to his original creditor by con
tracting a new obligation in favor of a
new creditor by the order of the original
creditor." 1 Pars. Cont. 217. Here there
was no element answering to this defini
tion. There was no intention to make a no
vation, no consideration for a new contract,
no concurrence of‘ the three or even of
the two parties. So we reach the conclusion
as to all the notes that Garrison, by their
surrender, made himself liable for a wrong
ful conversion of them to his own use, and
thus became responsible to the piaintitl’ for
the damages caused by the wrong; and the
question is, what were such damages? The
answer must be, the value of the notes con
verted. There can be no other measure, as
that measures the entire damage of the
plaintiff absolutely. As to the notes surren
dered for the bonds, the plaintiff could have
elected to take the bonds or their Value;
but this he refuses to do, as the bonds have
no value, and thus he is confined absolutely
to the value of the notes.
Now, how does the case stand upon au
thority? In Garlick v. James, 12 Johns. 146,
the plaintiff deposited with the defendant a
promissory note of a third person a collat
eral security for a debt, and the defendant,
without the knowledge or consent of the
plaintiff, compromised with the maker of the
note, and surrendered the note to him upon
payment of one half of the face thereof. It
was found that the maker was at the time
of the compromise abundantly able to pay
the full amount of the note, and under such
circumstances it was properly held that the
pledgee was liable for the balance unpaid up
on the note. In Hawks v. Hincheliff, 17
Barb. 492, the plaintiff sued the defendant
upon an account for merchandise delivered,
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and the defendant showed that the plaintiff
took two notes for the amount of the ac
count as collateral security for the payment
thereof; that he transferred one of the notes
to a person, who recovered judgment there
on against the makers, and afterwards as
signed the judgment to one Prindle; that he
recovered judgment upon the other note, and
assigned that to Prindle; and it appeared
that the defendants in those judgments had
never paid the notes or the judgments. It
was held that the plaintiff, the pledgee, could
not recover upon his account. It was not
shown upon what consideration the notes
and the judgments were transferred by the
pledgee, or that at the time of the transfer
the makers of the notes were not perfectly
solvent. The plaintiff there relied upon the
simple fact that the notes and judgments
were not paid. Upon this state of the facts
the court held that the presumption, nothing
appearing to the contrary, was that the note
and judgments were transferred by the plain
tiff for the full amount appearing to be due
upon them, and hence he was charged with
the full amount. There are some broad ex
pressions contained in the opinion, which,
when isolated from the facts of the case,
tend to give some countenance to the plain
tiff,s contention here. In Vose v. Railroad
Co., 50 N. Y. 369, it was held that a wrong
ful sale by a creditor of collateral securities
placed in his hands by the principal debtor
does not, per se, discharge even a surety
for the debt (much less the principal debtor)
in toto, but that by such sale the creditor
makes the securities his own to the extent
of discharging the surety only to an amount
equal to their actual value. In Potter v.
Bank, 28 N. Y. 6-i1; Booth v. Powers, 56 N.
Y. 22; and Thayer v. Manley, 73 N. Y. 305,
—it was held that in an action to recover
damages for the conversion of a promissory
note the amount appearing to be unpaid
thereon at the time of the conversion, with
interest, is prima facie the measure of dam
ages, but that the defendant has the right to
Vshow in reduction of damages the insolven
cy or inability of the maker, or any other
fact impugning the value of the note. In
Bank v. Gordon, 8 N. H. 66, where thebank
had received a note as collateral security,
and had subsequently, without the consent of
the pledgor, compromised it by receiving the
one half thereof from the maker, it was
held that the bank was bound to credit the
pledgor with only the amount received upon
compromise, upon proof that the compromise
was advantageous, and that the maker was
insolvent, and unable to pay the balance; and
the general rule was laid down which was
announced in the cases last above cited. If
the pledgee of the note of an insolvent mak
er may surrender it upon a compromise for
one dollar without being made liable for
more than he receives, upon what conceiva
ble principle can a pledgee be held for the
face value of a worthless note by surren
dering it without any consideration whatev
er? If one intrnsted with a note as agent,
or holding it as pledgee, loses it by his care-
lessness, or even willfully destroys it, he can,
in an action against him by the principal or
pledgor, be held liable only for the value of
the note. If Garrison had broken into the
plaintiffs safe and taken these notes with
out any right whatever, in .an action for
their conversion the plaintiff could have re
covered against him as damages only the ac-{
tual, not the face, value of the notes. I
need go no further. Other illustrations are
not needed. Our attention has been called
. to no case in law or equity which upholds
the plaintiff,s contention as to these notes.
I should be greatly surprised to find any,
and do not believe there are any. I have
assumed. without a careful examination of
the defendants’ objections to the notes, that
they were valid, and properly issued by the
company for their full amount. I have also
assumed, without examining the matter, that
upon this record we must hold against the
contention of the defendants that the sec
ond mortgage bonds took the place of the
notes given for them, and were held in their
stead as collateral security. Statements
made upon the argument by the counsel for
the appellants render it unnecessary for us
to consider any other objections to the judg
ment, and for the reasons stated the judg
ment should be reversed,and new trial grant
ed, costs to abide the event. All concur;
GRAY, J., in result.
Judgment reversed.
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' tionai Bank against Anthony W.
DIMOCK et al. v. UNITED ‘STATES NAT.
BANK.’
(25 Atl. 926, 55 N. J. Law, 296.)
Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.
Feb. 6, 1893.
Error to circuit court, Union county; Van
Syckel, Judge.
Action on a note by the United States Na
Dimock
and others. Plaintifl! had judgment, and
defendants bring error. Aflirmed.
The facts appear in the following state
ment by DEPUE, J.:
This suit was brought upon a note of which
the following is a copy:
“$50,000. New York, April 15, 1884. Four
months after date, without grace, we prom
ise to pay to the United States National
Bank, or order, at its ofiice in the city of
New York, the sum of fifty thousand 00/t00
for value received, with interest at the rate
of six per cent. per annum payable; having
deposited herewith, and pledged as collater
al security to the holder thereof, the fol
lowing property, viz.: 200 shares Bankers‘
& \Ierchants’ Tel. stock; 200 shares Mis
souri Pacific R./Ii. stock; 200 shares Dela
ware, Lac. dz W. ll. R. stock; 15 shares Cen
tral Iowa, Ill. Div. 1st bonds,—with author
ity to the holder hereof to sell the whole of
said property, or any part thereof, or any
substitute therefor, or any additions thcre
to, at any brokers’ board in the city of New
York, or at public or private sale in said
city or elsewhere, at the option of such hold
er, on the nonperformance of any of the
promises herein contained, without notice of




without notice of the time and place f sale,
each and every of which is hereby express
ly waived.
“It is agreed that, in case of depreciation
in the market value of the property hereby
pledged, (which market value is now
is ,) or which may hereafter be pledged
for this loan, a payment shall be made on
account of this loan upon the demand of the
holder hereof, so that the said market value
shall always be at least per cent. more
than the amount unpaid of this note; and
that, in case of failure to make such pay
ment. this note shall, at the option of the
holder hereof, become due and payable
forthwith, anything hereiubefore expressed
to the contrary notwithstanding; and that
the holder may immediately reimburse
by sale of the said property or any part
thereof. In case the net proceeds arising
from any sale hereunder shall be less than
the amount due hereon, promise to
pay to the holder, forthwith after such sale,
the amount of such deficiency, with legal
interest.
“It is further agreed that any excess in
the value of said collaterals, or surplus from
the sale thereof beyond the amount due
hereon, shall be applicable upon any other
note or claim held by the holder hereof
against now due or to become due,
or that may be hereafter contracted; and
that, if no other note or claim against
is so held, such surplus, after the payment
of this note, shall be returned to or
assigns.
“It is further agreed that, upon any sale
by virtue hereof, the holder hereof may pur
chase the whole or any part of such prop
erty discharged from any right of redemp
tion, which is hereby expressly released to
the holder hereof, who shall retain a claim
against the maker hereof for any deficiency
arising upon such sale. A. W. Dimock &
Co "
The other facts appear in the opinion of
the court.
Bradbury C. Chetwood,‘ for plaintiff in er
ror. Edward A. & William T. Day, for de
fendants in error.
DEPUE, .1. (after stating the facts). The
note on which this suit was brought was
in terms made payable in four months after
date. It became due August 15, 1884. This
suit was brought May 21, 1891. The suit
was in all respects regular, and its regu
larity was in no wise dependent upon that
paragraph in the pledge of securities which.
upon certain conditions, accelerated the ma
turity of the note, and made the money pay
able at a time earlier than that named on
its face. The securities pledged for the pay
ment of the note were sold by the plaintiff
on the 15th of May, 1884, as the note matured
in the following August. From the sale the
sum of $45,456.26 was realized, leaving a
balance due on the note of $4,456.25, for
which the plaintiff claimed judgment. The
defendants’ contention was that the sale in
May was unauthorized, and amounted in
law to a conversion. In all other respects
the sale was in conformity with the power.
On the theory that the sale at the time in
question was unauthorized, the defendants
contended that they were entitled to have
the value of the securities allowed to them
at their highest market price between the
conversion and the time of the trial. The
defendants gave in evidence the fact that in
December, 1886, and April and May, 1887,
these securities were worth in the market
the sum of $56,860, sufficient to pay the
plaintiffs note, andleave a balance of $6,
860 due the defendants. .The defendants‘
claim was disallowed, and judgment given
for thevplaintifl‘ for the sum of $4,456.25,
being the balance due on the note after cred
iting on it the proceeds of sale with interest.
The case was tried by the judge, a jury be
ing waived. . A general exception was taken
to his finding. Upon such an exception. if
there be evidence to sustain the finding, the
exception will not be sustained.
The plaintiff is a national bank. located in
the city of New York. The defendants, at
/'
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the time of these transactions, were bankers
and brokers in New York. The debt for
which the note was given was a loan of $50,
000 to the defendants.
tract pledging securities for the repayment
of loans is such as is usual in. that city. It
must be assumed that the parties were
aware of the effect of the terms of such con
tracts, and with the course of dealing in that
market with securities pledged as security
for loans.
By the first paragraph in the defendants‘
contract the plaintiff was authorized to sell
the securities at any brokers’ board in the
city of New York, or at public or private sale
in said city or elsewhere, at its option, on
the nonperformance of any of the defend
ants’ promises therein contained, without
any notice of the time and place of sale.
This contract was embodied in and made
part of the note itself, and the promise to
pay in the note was one of the promises on
the nonpayment of which a sale was author
ized. The sale was made through a firm of
brokers who were members of the stock ex
change in New York city. There is no
foundation in the evidence for complaint of
the manner or fairness with which the sale
was conducted.
The power of the plaintiff to sell the se
curities before the four months named in the
note had expired depends upon the con
struction and effect of the second paragraph
of the contract. There was some discussion
on the argument as to the right to fill the
blanks in that paragraph. The evidence was
not sufiicient to justify the court in filling
the blanks. The contract will be construed
in the condition it was in when it was de
livered to the plaintiff. In this paragraph
it is provided that, in case of a depreciation
in the market value.of the property pledged,
the defendants should, on demand by the
holder of the note, make a payment thereon,
so that the market value of the securities
should always be more than the amount of
the debt; and that, in case of the failure of
the defendants to make such payment, the
note should, at the payee’s option, become
due forthwith; and that the plaintiff might
immediately reimburse itself by the sale of
the property or any part thereof; and that in
case the net proceeds of such sale should be
less than the amount then due on the note.
the defendants should forthwith, after such
sale. pay the amount of such deficiency, with
interest. The power to sell the securities be
fore the maturity of the note, according to
its terms, was made to depend upon the con
currence of two conditions,—the depreciation
in the market value of the property pledged;
and the failure of the defendants, after de
mand, to_make a payment on account of the
loan, so that the market value of the secu
rities pledged should be more than the
amount due on the note. The proof was
that on the 6th of May, 1884, the firm of
Grant, Ward & Co. failed. and the \Iarine
The form of the con-'
Bank closed its doors. On the 14th, the .\Iet
ropolitan Bank closed its doors, and a num
ber of leading bankers failed. These fail
ures created a panic in the money market.
and a great depreciation in the market value
of all commercial securities. Early on the
morning of the 15th, the defendants’ embar
rassments led them to an assignment for
the benefit of their creditors. It fully ap
peared that, at the commencement of busi
ness hours on the morning of May 15th, the
securities pledged had so depreciated that
their market value was considerably below
the amount of the plaintiffs debt. Under a
pledge, with a power of sale such as exists
in this case, the pledgee, tmless restrained
by other conditions in the contract of pledge,
has a right to sell whenever the condition of
the market makes it prudent for him to do
so for the protection of his interests. The
other condition was that a demand should
be made upon the defendants, and that, up
on such demand, the defendants should pay
on account of the note a sum sufficient to re
duce the amount due below the market value
the securities then had. The case shows
that,‘B.t the beginning of business hours on
the morning of the 15th, two notices were
served on the defendants. One of these no
tices was in form signed by the cashier of
the bank, in these words: “I hereby call
your loan of April 15, 1884, for $50,000."
This notice was plainly not a demand in con
formity with the condition expressed in the
contract. A depreciation in the market vai
ue of the securities pledged did not convert
the loan, which was made on four months’
time, into a call loan. That condition of af
fairs imposed upon the defendants the obli-v
gation not to pay the note in full, but, by a
payment upon it, to reduce the loan until
the amount remaining due was under the
market value of the securities. It appeared
in evidence that the other notice served was
“a demand for the payment on account of
the loan to a degree corresponding to the
depreciation of the securities." Neither the
original notice nor a copy was produced.
The witness who testified upon this subject
was not able to state the amount of the de
preciation, but he added that such deprecia
tion was known to both the borrower and
lender. The object of a demand in a con
tract of this sort is to give the party an
opportunity to comply with the terms of his
contract, and preserve his securities from
sale before the expiration of the time for
which the loan was negotiated; and it would
be reasonable that, in making the demand.
the party, before he is put in default. should
have been made aware of the extent of the
depreciation. approximately at least. and the
sum required to be paid to save his rights
should be specified. If the case rested solely
on the sufficiency of the demand made, I
should have some hesitation in sustaining
this judgment. .
Assuming that the sale of the securities i




May was unauthorized, it was a conversion
of the property, though the sale was made in
good faith. Nevertheless, the judge,s find
ing, and the rule of damages applied, were
2 ‘orrect. The general rule is that the meas
. ure oi.‘ damages for conversion is the value
it
of the property at the time of the conversion.
This rule has been modified with respect to
the conversion of stocks and bonds, commer
cial securities vendibie in the market, the
market value of which is liable to frequent
and great fluctuations, caused by the depres
sion and inflation of prices in the market.
In Markham v. Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235, the
court of appeals held thatas between a cus
tomer and his broker, holding stock pur
chased for the former which had been pledg
ed as security for advances made in the
purchase, the measure of damages for the
conversion by an unauthorized sale was the
(highest market pl‘icefbetween the time of
the conversion and the trial. Relying upon
this case, the defendants put in evidence no
proof of value except the market value in
December, 1886, and April and May, 1887.
But Markham v. Jaudon has been overruled
by a series of cases in the New York courts,
and the rule adopted that in such cases the
principal may disaflirm the sale, and that
the advance in the market price trom the
time of sale up to a reasonable time to re
place it after notice of the sale was the prop
er measure of damages. Baker v. Drake,
53 N. Y. 211, 66 N. Y. 518; Gruman v. Smith,
81 N. Y. 25; Colt v. Owens, 90 N. Y. 368.
These decisions were made in cases where
the transactions were dealings between the
customer and broker in the purchase and
sale of stocks on a margin. Subsequently
the same rule was applied where the owner
of stock for which he had paid full value,
and which he held as an investment, put it
in the hands of a broker as collateral securi
ty for the debt of a third person, upon condi
tion that it’should not be sold for six months.
the stock having been sold without the own
er’s authority before the expiration of that
time. Under the decisions of the New York
courts, reasonable time, where the facts are
undisputed, is a question of law for the
court. ‘Wright v. Bank, 110 N. Y. 238, 18
N. E. 79. In Colt v. Owens, 90 N. Y. 368,
30 days after the sale and notice of it was
regarded as reasonable time. The rule of
the highest intermediate value between the
time of the conversion and the time of the
trial has been rejected in the supreme court
o1.’ the United States as the proper measure
of damages, and the rule that the highest in
termediate value between the time of the
‘ conversion and a reasonable time after the
owner has received notice of it was adopted
as the correct view of the law; for the rea
son. as expressed by Mr. Justlce Bradley,
that more transactions of this kind arise in
the state of New York than in all other parts
of the country, and that the New York rule,
as finally settled by its court of appeals, has
the most reason in its favor. Galigher v.
Jones, 129 U. S. 194, 9 Sup. Ct. 335. The
principle upon which this doctrine rests is
the consideration that the general rule that
in an action for a conversion the market
value of the property at the time of the con
version would afford an inadequate remedy,
or rather no remedy at all, for the real in
jury, which consisted in the wrongful sale
of property of a fluctuating value at an un
favorable time, chosen by the broker himself;
hence the cost of replacing the securities by ,
a purchase in the market, allowing a reason
;able time for that purpose, has been regard
{ed as the proper measure of damges. As
[was said by Mr. Justice Bradley in Galigher
v. Jones: "A reasonable time after the
wrongful act complained of is to be allowed
to the party injured to place himself in the
position he would have been in had not his
rightsbeen invaded." The general rule that .
the market value at the time of the conver
sion is the measure of damages being found
to be impracticable in these cases, and hav
ing been abandoned, the effort has been to
obtain some rule by which substantial jus
tice, as near as may be, may be attained.
In Ifingland the market value at the time of
the trial appears to be the measure of dam- '
ages. .Owen v. Routh, 14 G. B. 327. In
some of the sister states the rule of the high
est intermediate price before the trial has
been adopted. In New York, and in most of
the sister states. as well as in the supreme
court oI.,.the United States, the formula which
has been called the “New York Rule" has
been adopted, and is the rule which will ac
complisla the most complete justice in the or
dinary ’ausactions between the broker and
his cust mer dealing in stocks when an un
authorized sale is the act of conversion. In
such cases the customer has a choice of rem
edies. He may claim the benefit of the sale'
and take the proceeds; he may require the
broker to replace the stock, or replace it him
self, and charge the broker for the loss; or
he may recover the advance in the market
price up to a reasonable time within which
to replace it after notice of the sale. Cook,
Stock & S. 460. But where tocks and ne
gotiable securities are pledged as collateral’
security for the payment of a debt to be
come- due and payable on a future day, an
other element enters into the consideration
of the compensation to be awarded to the
owner of the securities for the unauthorized
sale of them before the debt matures. Up
on such a bailment it is the duty of the
pledgee to keep the securities in hand at all
times ready to be delivered to the pledgor on
the payment of the debt. Cook, Stock & S.
469-471. An unauthorized sale before the
debt matures is a conversion. for which the
pledgor may have remedy in the manner
above mentioned. But the sale may be made
when the market value is depreciated, and
the market with a downward tendency. The
market may revive, and prices be enhanced
K
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before the debt matures. Under such cir
cumstances, a rule that the pledgor shall be
at liberty to elect to treat the unauthorized
sale as a conversion, or to hold the pledgee
for the breach of his duty to keep the secu
rities until the maturity of the debt, and
recover as damages the market value of the
securities as of that time, would commend
itself in reason and justice. As applied to
the facts of this case, this rule would be
eminently just. The plaintiff in good faith
sold the securities in the manner authorized
by the contract of pledge. The breach of
duty was inseliing at an unauthorized time.
The debt was not paid or tendered at maturi
ty; and if the plaintiff had held the stock,
and sold it at that time, the sale would have
been strictly in conformity with the power.
If the defendants lost anything by the sale
at a time unauthorized, they would be rec
ompensed for that loss by an award of dam
ages equivalent to the market value of the
securities at the time the debt became due.
Tested by either of these standards, the prop
er credit was allowed, the proof being that
the prices of the securities were less when
the note matured than when the securities
were sold. No evidence of an increased
price prior to December, 1886, was produced.
The finding of the judge should be aflirmed
on the ground, also, that the sale was con
sented to and ratified by the defendants.
The notices served on the morning of May
15th informed the defendants that the secu
rities pledged had, in the plaintiff,s estima
tion, depreciated in market value, and that
the contingency provided for in this part of
the contract had happened, and also plainly
indicated the purpose on the part of the
plaintiff to avail itself of the right which,
under those circumstances, would accrue un- v
der the contract. Immediately after the sale
was made, the defendants had notice of'the
fact of sale, and, very shortly after, of the
amount realized therefrom. No objection
was made to the sale or the amount realized.
On the 4th of June, 1884, the defendants
filed a schedule of their indebtedness under
their assignment. This schedule was veri
fled by the oaths of the defendants that it
contained a true account of their creditors,
and of the sum owing to each, and also a
statement of any existing collateral or other
security for the payment of such debt. In
this statement the plaintiff was put down as
a creditor for the sum of $4,737.50, which
was about the amount due the plaintiff after
the proceeds were applied to the debt; and
to this specification of the existing debt due
the plaintiff was appended a statement that
for the payment of this debt there was no ex
isting collateral or other security. In Sep
tember, 1885, the defendants caused to be
presented to the plaintiff a composition
agreement with a view to a compromise with
their creditors, in which the debt due the
plaintiff was stated to be the sum of $5,118.
87, figures which represented approximately
the net amount due the plaintiff on the note
after applying thereon the proceeds of the
sale of the securities, with interest. This
agreement was signed by the plaintiff, but
the project fell through, the defendants being
unable to effect-a compromise with all their
creditors. The defendants had the election
either to ratify the sale, and claim the ben
eiit of it, or repudiate it, and hold the plain
tiff in damages. The act of the defendants
in applying the proceeds of the sale as a
credit on the plaintiff,s note is so positive
and emphatic an act of ratification and adop
tion that it cannot be retracted. The case
was properly decided at the trial, and the
judgment should be affirmed.
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6‘? ELLIS r. HILTON.
(43 N. W. 1048, 78 Mich. 150.)
Supreme Court of Michigan. Nov. 15, 1889.
Error to circuit court, Grand Traverse
county; RAMsDELL, Judge.
Pratt & Davis. for appellant. I orin Rob
erts (J. R. Adsit. of counsel), for appellee.
LONG, J. This is an action to recover
damages against the defendant for negli
gently placing a stake in a public street in
Traverso City, which plainLitI’s horse ran
against, and.was injured. It was conceded
on the trial by counsel for defendant that
the horse of plaintiff was so injured that it
was entirely worthless. Plaintiff claimed
damages, not only for the full value of the
horse, but also for what he expmded in at
tempting to effect a cure. and on the trial
his counsel stated to the court that plaintiff
was entitled to recover a reasonable expense
in trying to cure the horse before it was de
r.idrd that she was actually worthless. The
court ruled, however, that the damages could
not exceed the value of the animal. A claim
is made by the declaration for moneys expend
ed in trying toeffect a cure of the horse after
th pjury. Upon the trial the plaintiff testi
iier ‘hat he put the horse, after the injury, in
to the hands of a veterinary, and paid him
$;‘3 forcure and treatment. On his cross-ex
amiuation, he also testified that the veteri
nary said “there was hopes of curing her, if
the muscles were not too badly bruised. He
didn,t say he could cure her. He thought
thére was a chance that he might."
)r. DeCow, the veterinary, was called. and
testified, as to the injury, that the stake en
tered the brcast of the horse, on the left
side. about six inches; that the muscles were
bruised, and the left leg perfectly helpless.
He got the wound healed, but on account of
the severe bruise of the muscles the leg be
came paralyzed and useless, On being asked
whether we thought she could be helped when
he first saw her, he stated that he did not
know but she might; that she might be
helped, and kept for breeding purposes, and
be of some value.
It is evident from the testimony that the
r/fplaintiff acted in good faith in attempting
the cure, and under the belief that the mare,
could be helped, and be of some value. The
court below, however, seems to have liasol
its ruling that no greater damages could be
recovered than the value of the animal. and“
that these moneys expended in attempting ii.
cure could not be recovered, upon the ground
that the defendant was not consulted in rela
tion to the matter of the attempted cure.
'Whatever damages the plaiutilf sustained
were occasioned by the negligent conduct of
the defendant. and recovery in such cases is
always permitted for such amount as shall
com pensate for the actual loss. If the horse
had been killed outright the only loss would
have been its actual value. The horse was
seriously injured; but the plaintiff, acting in
good faith, and in the belief that she might be
helped and made of some value, expended
this $35 in care and medical treatment. Ile
is the loser of the actual value of the horse.
and what he in good faith thus expended.
lie is permitted to recover the value, but cut
off from what he has paid out. This is not
compensation.
. Counsel for defendant contends that such
damuges cannot exceed the actual value of
the property lost, because the loss or destruc
tion is total. There may be cases holding to
this rule; but it seems to me the rule is well
stated, and based upon good reason, in Wat
son v. Bridge, 14 Me. 201, in which the court
says: “l’laint;il't is entitled to a fair indem
nity for his loss. He has lost the value of
his horse, and also what he has exprnded in
endcavoring to cure him. The jury having
allowed this part of his claim, it must be um
derstood that it was an expense prudently
incurred. in the reasonable expectation that.
it would prove irenelicial. It was incurred,.
not to aggravate, but to lessen the amount
ior which the defendants might be held lla
ble. Had it proved successful, they would.
have had the benefit of it. As it turned out
othr.rwise, it is but justI in )ur judgment,
that they should sustain the oss." lu .\lur
phy v. McGraw, 41 N. W. iep. 917. it ap
peared on the trial that the horse was worth
less at the tune of purchase by reason of a.
disease called “eczema." The court charged
the jury that if the plaintiff was led by de
fendant to keep on trying to cure the horse
the expense thereof would be chargeable to the
defendant, as would also be the case if there
were any circumstances, in the judgment of
the jury, which rendered it reasonable that
he should keep on trying as long as he did to
effect the cure. The plaintiff recovered for
such expense and on the hearing here the
charge of the trial court was held correct.
It is a question, under the circumstances,
for the jury to determine whether the plain
tiff acted in good faith, and upon a reasona
ble belief that the horse could be cured, or
made of some value’ if properly taken care
of; and the trial court was in error in with
drawing that part of the case from them.
Such damages. of course, must always be
conlined within reasonable bounds. and no
one would be justlfied, under any circum
stances, in expending more than the animal
was worth in attempting a cure.
only error we ncel notice. The judgment
of the court below must be reversed, with
‘costs, and a new trial ordered.
,
CHAMPLIN and MORSE, JJ , concurred
with LONG, J.
‘ SHERWOOD, 0. J.
suit.
CAMPBELL. J.
I concur in the re
down at the circuit the proper one.
This is the
I think the rule laid.
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5?LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. WALLACE.
(17 S. W. 882, 91 Tenn. 35.)
Supreme Court of Tennessee. Dec. 12, 1891.
Appeal irom circuit court, Sumner coun
ty; H. C. CARTER, Judge.
Action by W. L. Wallace against the
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company
ior personal injuries. Judgment ior plain
tifi, and deiendant appeals. Reversed.
J. J. Turner, ior plaintifi. S. F. Wilson,
R. K. Gillespie, anu Geo. W. Boddie, ior de
iendant.
SNODGRASSJ. Thodeiendantin error,
while in the service oi the Louisville & Nash
ville Railroad Company as brakeman, sus
tained severe personal injury, resulting in
the loss oi a leg, which he alleged was
occasioned by the negligence of the com
pany. He sued ior $15,000 damages and
recovered judgment ior $9,940. The rail
road company appealed, and assigned nu
1
l
merous errors. It is not deemed mate- 1
rial to notice but one of them,as the others i
are not well taken. and involve nothing
‘
new, so as to make their consideration in
a written opinion necessary. The one ma
terial to be considered relates to the ques
tion oi interest. The court told the jury
it could assess plaintifi,s damages with or
‘
withoutiuterest, as the jury should see
proper, in connection with instructions
as to the measure oi damages not other
wise complained oi. The verdict assessed
the damages at $7,000 with 7 years‘ inter
est $2.940. aggegating $9,940. it is ob
jected in the assignment oi errors that the
charge on this qurstion. and verdict, with ‘
judgment thereon,are erroneous. This in
volves a consideration oi the question,
what is the true measure of damages ior
such personal injury? The rule ior deter
mining damages ior injuries not resulting
in death, (where the statute fixes the
measure.) and not calling ior exemplary
punishment, deducible from the decisions
of this court since its organization in this
state, is that of compensation ior mental
suiiering and physical pain. loss of time,
and expenses incident to the injury, and,
ii it be permanent, the loss resulting from
complete or partial disability in health.
mind, or person thereby occasioned. And
this is the rule most consonant to reason
adopted in other states. 3 Sedg. Dam.
(8th Ed.) § 481 et seq.; 5Amer. &Eng. Enc.
Law, pp. 40-44, and notes; Railroad Co.
v. Read, 87 Amer. Dec. 260. As this sum
in gross includes all the compensation
which is requisite to cover pain, suffering.
and disability to date oi judgment, and
prospectively beyond, it is intended to be
and is the iull measure of recovery, and
cannot be supplemented by the new ele
ment oi damages ior the detention of this
sum irom the date oi the injury. The
measure oi damages being thus fixed, it is
expected that in determining it juries and
courts will make the sum given in gross a
iair and just compensation, and one in full
oi amount proper to be iven when ren
dered, whether soon or ate alter the in
jury; as. ii given soon. it looks to contin
uing suiiering and disability-lust as, when
I given late, it includes that oi the past. it
is obvious thatdamageseould not begiven
ior pain and suflering and disability ex
perienced on the very day oi trial, and then
interest added ior years beiore. These
are items considered to make up the ag
gregate then due, and the gross sum then
ior the first time judicially ascertained.
The error oi the court below was in the
assumption that alike measure oi dam
ages is applied in this class oi cases as in
that oi injury to propegty effecting its de
struction or conversion or other unlawful
or iraudulent misappropriation, or deten
tion oi property or money, in which the
rule applied by the circuit judge is held to
be a proper one; not on the theory, even
in this class of cases, that interest as such
is due, but that the pinintifi is entitled to
the fixed sum oi money or definite money
value oi property converted or destroyed.
and the jury may give as damages an
amount equal to interest on the value oi
the property. But such rule applies alone
to such cases, and not to that oi e.rson
in,urv, which does not cease when'i‘iil‘i‘ict
Bil, and is not susceptible of definite and
accurate computation. it never creates
a debt, nor becomes one, until it is judi
cially nscertained and determined.
from that time can it draw interest; and
interest as damages cannot at any preced
ing time be added to it without changing
and superndding a new element, never
given in this state or any other in a similar
case. so iar as our investigation has dis
covered. The counsel oi piaintiii, who
cite many authorities supposed to be in
support oi the ruling below, were doubt
less misled by the generality of terms used
in some oi them. Under the head oi “In
terest," after stating that “it was gener
ally aliowed by law on two grounds,
namely, on contract, express or implied,
or by way oi damages either ior deiault in
payment of a debt or ior a use or bene
fit derived irom the money oi another," it
is stated in ii Amer. 8: Eng. Enc. Law
that, “ where it is imposed to punish tor
tions, negligent, or iraudulent conduct, it
is a question within the discretion oi the
. jury." Page For this proposition va
rious authorities are cited, including Mr.
Sedgu iek on Damages, p. 374, (the reierence
being to paging oi the fiith or earlier edi
tion.) This author uses similar general
terms, but neither was speaking oi cases
oi personal injury, but of the class oi cases
i to which we have reierred, as iully appears
irom Mr. Sedgwick’s iurther discussion oi
this general head, on pages 385, 386, and as
most clearly appears irom a reierence to‘
the authorities cited by both, which relate
. property controversies only.
to cases oi trover and trespass and to
In neither
oi these books is the proposition now
thought to be sustained by them ad
vanced,—that the measure oi damages for
a personal injury includes damages ior de
tention oi the supposed amount due. The
generality oi statement indulged in that
and iormer editions oi this work is cor
rected by editors of the last edition. Chap
ter 10 of the first volume of this edition is
devoted to interest allowed in actions
where it is by rule oi law, or in the dis
cretion oi the jury or court trying the
case, allowed as part oi the measure of
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and discussed those actions soundim,r in
tort in which interest may be given as
damages. The distinction is there taken.
as taken here, and actions ior personal in
juries excluded, because oi the existence of
a wholly different measure of damages re
specting them. In this connection we
quote section 320 in the volume and chap
ter referred to: “It sufficiently appears,
from what has already been said, that
there is no general principle which pre
vents the recovery of interest in actions of
tort. The fact that the demand is unllq
‘uldated has been shown to he insufheient
to exclude interest, and there is nothing in
the mere iorm of the action which renders
it unreasonable that interest should be
given. Nevertheless it is in the region of
tort that we find the clearest cases fordis
allowance of interest. There are many
cases which are not brought to recover a
sum of moneyrepresenting a property loss
of the plaintiff, and it is frequently said
broadly thatinterest is not allowed in
such actions.. It is certainly not allowed
in such actions as assault and battery. or
ior personal injury by‘ negligence. libel,
slander, seduction." etc.‘, The measure of
damage in such case seems nowhere to in
clude this,or be based upon tbisidea. Even
in respect to injury or destruction of prop
erty, where the supreme court of the United
States has adopted fully the prevailing
rule (allo wing damages in the iorm of in
terest n value of the property, the rule
hash enlimited to such injury of property
or property right as had a fixed or cer
tain value; and it is accordingly held in
that court that indefinite damages, as
that resulting from infringement oi a pat
ent, could not bear interest until after the
amount had been judicially ascertained.
Tilghman v. Proctor. 125 U. S. 161, 8 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 894.
The direct question we are umsidering
also came before the supreme judicial
court oi Maine. and it was there held that
the rule permitting damages equal tolu
terest on value of propertyin cases of tres
pass and trover did not apply, and that
interest could not he allowed upon a re
covery ior personal injury, and that, too.
under a statute authorizing a recovery
"to the amount of the damage sustained. "
(This is not material, however. as their
. sta tute ga ve no more nor less right than ex
ists here.) Sargent v. Hampden,38 Me. 581.
The cases cited by the editors of the last
edition oiSedgwick on Damages sustaining
the propositionlhat interest cannot be in
cluded in a recovery of damages ior per
sonal injuries are from eorgla and Penn
sylvania. Ratteree v.C apman,79Ga.57 .
4 S. E. Rep. 684: Railro (1 Co. v. Young, 81
Ga. 397, 7 S. E. Rep. 912: Railway Co. v.
Taylor, 104 Pa. St. 306. These cases have
all been examined, and fully sustain the
text. One oithe cases cited to the proposi
tion in Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law was a
Pennsylvania case, earlier than either of
A
those to which we have referred. The case
there cited, (Fasholt v. Reed, ifi Serg. 8:
R. 266.) which we have not been able to
find in libraries here. was evidently not
one of personal injury, or else not consist
ent with later holdings of that court. In
deed, the Pennsylvania court seems hard
ly to have gone as far on that question in
reference to allowance of interest as dam
ages in other actions ex delicto as other
courts. In suits ior the destruction of
property that court has held that, while
lapse of time may be looked to. it is error
to instruct the jury that plaintiff is enti
tled to interest on such damage from the
time it occurred. Township of Plymouth
v. Graver, 125 Pa. St. 24, 17 Atl. Rep. 249;
Emerson v. Schoonmaker, 135 Pa. St. 437.
19 Atl. Rep. 1025. Of the other cases cited
in Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, we have ex
amined those in 13 Wis. 31. (Hinckley v.
Beckwith,) 36 N. Y. 639. (Vandevoort v.
Gould.) and 30 Tex. 349. (Wolfe v. Lacy.)
They all sustain the text as it is intended
to be understood, and as we have herein
explained,and doubtless the other cases
do so. To the same effect are the cases of
Lincoin v. Claflin. 7 Wall. 132; Dyer v.
Navigation Co., 118 U. S. 507,6Sup.Ct.
Rep. ll7-i; U. S. v. North Carolina, l36 U.
S. 21l, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 920; Clement v.
Spear, 56 Vt. 401 ; and cases from A merican
decisions and reports cited in Rapaljc’s Di
gest. volume 1, pp. 1039-1041, under heads
“’l‘rover,“ and “ When Interest may he
Added, " and volume 2, p. 199i, under head oi
“Interest. " Sec,also’l1 Sedg. Dam. §§ 432
493, (8th Ed.) )The effect and meaning oi
statements quoted from Amer. & Eng.
Enc. Law and its reference to Sedg. Dam.
are made perfectly clear when these cases
and authorities herein added are examined.
and the generality of expresslonslimited lo
the purpose of their use and the class of
cases being considered. They were not
dealing at all, nor intended to be under
stood as dealing, with the uestiun of re
covery ior personal iujurics.(twhich is itself
a recovery of damages pure and simple,
and measured by a rule which needs no
upplement that would add damages to
damages The charge and verdict were
thereior erroneous on this point. and
prejudicial to defendant to the extent and
only to the extent of the injury. The cir
cuitjudge might have refused to receive
the verdict as to interest, and the same
effect may now follow a remitting of the
interest by plaintiff, if he elects to do so.
In that event the plaintiff is entitled to a
judgment ior $7,000, with interest from
date of its rendition, and costs, and with
this modification the judgment will be
affirmed. This was the practice adopted
in the Maine case on this point, as well as
in one of the Pennsylvania cases, (135 Pa.
St. 437’ ii) Ati. Rep. l0‘.‘5,) citing several
others, and is clearly the correct rule. in
default of such remission, a new trial will
be granted.
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WILSON v. CITY OF TROY..
(32 N. E. 44. 135 N. Y. 96.)
Court of Appeals of New York. Oct. 4, 1892.
Appeal from supreme court, general term,
third department.
Action by Walter V. Wilson against the
city of Troy to recover damages for an in
jury to a horse resulting from a defcctive
street. Plaintifl had judgment, which was
aflirmed at general term (14 N. Y. Supp. 721),
‘qpd defendant appeals. Aflirmed.
Wm. J. Roche, for appellant.
Patterson, for respondent.
Chas. E.
O,BRIEN, J. The record in this case pre
sents two questions: First, whether the find
ing of the jury that the damage was the re
sult of the defendant,s negligence is sustained
by any evidence; and, secondly, whether in
terest could legally be allowed by the jury in
estimating the amount of the damages. On
the night of the 13th of November, 1879, a
valuable horse belonging to one Learned,
plaintiff’s assignor, while being driven
through South street in the city of Troy, fell
into an open ditch or unguarded excavation,
made during that day, and was permanently
injured. There is little, if any, controversy
with respect to the value of the horse, the ex
tent of the injury, or the amount of damages.
The night was dark, and it is not denied that
there was evidence for the jury suflicient to
sustain a finding of negligence on the part of
some one by reason of the failure to protect
a place of danger in a public street, by proper
guards and lights. It was not shown that the
city had any actual notice of the existence
of the excavation, if made by private parties
without its permission; and a sufiicient pe
riod had not elapsed between the time of open
ing it and the accident to render the city lia
ble on the ground of implied notice. The ex
cavation was made for the purpose of con
ducting the water from the principal main in
the street. through lateral pipes, into a pri
vate house. The owner of the house em
ployed a firm of plumbers to do the work,
which included the digging of the trench as
well as laying and connecting the lateral
pipes with the main in the street. The firm
applied to the superintendent of the water
works for men to open the trench in the
street, and that oflicer directed laborers in
the employ of the city to do so. The open
ing in the street was made by them. and they
were paid for the work by the city, the plumb
era refunding to it the sum so paid. The
question is whether the men who dug the
ditch were under the control and direction of
the defendant, or subject to the orders of the
plumbers engaged in performing a piece of
work for the owner of the house.
The system of waterworks in Troy is the
property of the municipality, and is umlcr the
manpgement and control of a board of water
commissioners, which may be regarded as a
i department of the city government. The
commissioners are by law required to nom
inate, and the common council of the city to
appoint, a uperintendent of the waterworks,
who is the executive oflicer in that depart
ment, and who, in this case, directed the men
in the employ and pay of the city to ma»;
the excavation in the street. The board is
authorized by law to extend the distributing
pipes of the waterworks wherever they might
think proper, and to make such alterations
and improvements in the works, and in the
management and preservation thereof, as
they might deem necessary and expedient,
and to employ such persons and assistants as
they might require, to execute any of these
purposes, which employi.s were to be paid for
their services from the city treasury. The
commissioners were also empowered to enact
such by-laws, regulations, and ordinances as
they should deem necessary for the protec
tion of hydrants and water pipes, and the
preservation, protection, and management of
the waterworks. These by-laws. unless dis
approved by a vote of two-thirds of all the
members of the common council of the city,
were to have all the force and effect of law.
In pursuance of the power thus conferred by
the statute, the board of water commission
ers enacted by-laws and ordinances on the
subject which were in force at the time the
excavation in question was made. They, in
effect, prohibited any person except the super
intendent, and those employed by him or by
the commissioners, to tap or make any con
nection with the main or distributing pipe,
or to permit the same to be done, unless by
the permission and under the direction of the
superintendent. The learned counsel for the
defendant contends that this regulation sim
ply forbids the act of connecting the lateral
pipes from the house with the main, and did
not prohibit private persons from digging
the necessary trenches and uncovering the
main or distributing pipe, and hence that
part of the work was done by the contractors
who were employed by the owner of the
house to make the connection, and not by
the city. But a private individual had no .
right to dig in the street for this or any other
purpose without the permission of the proper
municipal authorities, and the object, as well
as the language, of the ordinance indicates
that it was intended to prevettt-t-he'fiover
ing of the main, or any interference with the
street in which it was placed, by private par
ties. At all events, the water board and its
chief executive oflicer, the superintendent, in
the discharge of the duties imposed upon
them by the statute, might very properly
give to it that construction, and act accord
ingly. To hold that such a by.law did not
embrace within its object and purview the
evils that might result from unguarded and
unregulated interference with the bed of the
street by private parties in order to reach the
main, would be giving to it a construction al
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together too narrow. The evidence tends to
show that the water board gave to it the
broader and more comprehensive meaning,
as it was the custom and practice for years
before the accident in question to make appli
cation to the superintendent for men to do the
digging, and they were always furnished, as
in this case. As between the owner of the
.house and the plumbers employed by her to
introduce the water into her house, the dig
ging was undoubtedly a part of the contract
or work of the latter. If no main had been
placed in the street at that time, they could
also have contracted with her to procure its
extension, but that part of the work would be
subject to the action and regulations of the
water board, and, while the contractors might
be obliged to pay the city for the whole or
some part of the expense, it would be none
the less the work of the city. One of the
plumbers testiiied that while he agreed with
the owner of the house to do all the work,
yet he knew then that it was the practice and
custom to apply to the superintendent of the
waterworks for men to do the digging and to
make the connection, and acted upon the as
sumption that he had no right to do it. He
also says that the men who made the exca
vation were not employed by him, but by the
city. We think that, upon the proof, it
could not be held, as matter of law, that the
men who dug the trench and left it unguard
ed ceased for the time being to be the serv
ants of the city, and subject to the directions
of the superintendent, and became, while do
ing this job of work, the servants of the par
ty employed to put in the lateral pipes into
the house, as is urged by the learned counsel
for the defendant. What party sustained the
relation of master to the men who dug the
trench, and had the control and direction of
them, and was charged with the duty of di
recting them to properly guard the ditch,—
whether the plumbers on the one hand, or the
.city, through the superintendent of the water
works, on the other,-was the important ques
tion to be determined, and the trial court sub
mitted it to the jury. Under all the circum
stances, the question became one of fact, and
this disposition oif it was not error. Ward v.
Fibre Co., 1-3-i Mass. 420, 28 N. E. Rep. 299.
This finding of the jury is conclusive upon
us, and imports that the city itself, through
one of its oflicers or departments, caused the
trench to be dug, and left it unguarded, re
sulting in the damage complained of. In
such a case the negligent act is imputable
to the city, and the doctrine of actual or im
plied notice has no application, or, at least,
is unnecessary, where one injured by the neg
lect of the city to properly guard a place
made dangerous by its own act brings the ac
tion. Petteugill v. City of Yonkers, 116 N.
Y. 558, 22 N. E. 1095; Walsh v. Mayor, etc.,
107 N.vY. 220, 13 N. E. 911; Turner v. City
of .\‘ewburgh, 109 N. Y. 301. 16 N. E. 344;
Brusso v. City of Buffalo, 90 N. 1,. 679; Bus
l , 1
.
sell v. Village of Canastota. 98 N. Y. 4903;
Nelson v. Village of Canisteo, 100 N. Y. 80, 2
N. E. 473; Ehrgott v. Mayor, etc., 96 N. Y.
273; Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S.
540.
The amount demanded in the complaint on
account of the injury to this horse was $3,000,
and the court instructed the jury that they
could not, in awarding damages, go beyond
that sum, with interest. The defendant,s
counsel excepted to this in so far as it author
ized interest, and requested the court to
charge that the jury could not allow interest
in the action. The court declined to so
charge, and the defendant,s counsel excepted.
The jury afterwards came into court, and an
nounced that they had found a verdict for the
plaintiff for $3,000 and interest. The court
then said: “You must compute the interest
if you give interest. You will have to render
your verdict in dollars and cents." This di
rection was complied with, and the verdict
as entered included interest from the date
of the injury, which result has been modiiied
by the general term by striking out the inter
est awarded prior to the date of the presenta
tion of the claim to the city, which was held
to be a prerequisite to the maintenance of the
action. The fair construction of the charge
is that the jury could include in the damages
interest upon the sum found to represent the
diminished value of the horse in consequence
of the injury, and not that the plaintilI was
entitled to interest as matter of right. The
exception, therefore, presents the question
whether, in an action to recover damages to
property by reason of negligence on the part
of the defendant, it is within the power of
the jury, in the excl.cise of discretion, to in
clude in their award of damages interest on
the sum found to represent the diminished
value of the property in consequence of the
injury from the time that the cause of action
accrued. When interest may be allowed as
part of the damagres, in actions of this char
acter, is a question which, in the present
state of the law, is involved in much confu
sion and uncertainty, and in regard to which
the decisions of the courts are not harmoni
ous. It is perhaps impossible to formulate
a general rule embracing every possible case.
The tendency of courts in modern times has
been to extend the right to recover interest
on demand far beyond the limits within
which that right was originally confined.
What seemed to be the demands of justice
did not permit the principle to remain sta
tionary, and hence it has been for years in'a
state of constant evolution. This, in some
measure, accounts for inany of the apparently
contradictory views to be found in the ad
judged cases. There are certain fundamental
principles. however, established by the deci
sions In this state, which, when properly ap
plied. will aid in the solution of the question.
There is, of course. a manifest distinction,
always to be observed, between actions
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sounding in tort and actions upon contract.
In the latter class of actions there is not
much difliculty in ascertaining the rule as to
interest until we come to unliquidated de
mands. The rule in such cases has quite re
cently been examined in this court, and prin
ciples stated that will furnish a guide in
most cases. White v. Miller, 78 N. Y. 393.
We are concerned now only with the rule
applicable in actions of tort. The right to
interest, as a part of the damages, in actions
of trover and trespass de bonis asportatis,
was given first in England by St. 3 & 4 Wm.
IV. The recovery was not, however, allow
ed by that statute as matter of right, but in
the discretion of the jury. The earlier cases
in this state followed the rule thus establish
ed in England, and permitted the jury, in
their discretion, to allow interest in such
cases.
v. Stone, 7 Wend. 354; Bissell v. Hopkins, 4
Cow. 53; Rowley v. Gibbs, 14 Johns. 385.
The principle that the right to interest in
such cases was in the discretion of the jury,
was, however, gradually abandoned, and now
the rule is that the plaintiff is entitled to in
terest on the value of the property converted
or lost to the owner by a trespass as matter
of law. The reason given for this rule is
that interest is as necessary a part of a com
plete indemnity to the owner of the property
as the value itself, and in fixing the damages
is not any more in the discretion of the jury
than the value. Andrews v. Durant, 18 N.
Y. 406; McCormick v. Railroad Co., 49 N. Y.
315; Turnpike Co. v. City of Buffalo, 58 N.
Y. 630; Parrott v. Ice Co., 40 N. Y. 369. It
v
ls diflicult to perceive any sound distinction
between a case where the defendant converts
or carries away the plaintiffs horse and a
case where, through negligence on his part,
the horse is injured so as to be valueless.
There is no reason apparent for a different
rule of damages in the one case than in the
other. In an early case in this state the
principle was recognized that interest might
be allowed, by way of damages, upon the
sum lost by the plaintiff in consequence of
defendant’s negligence. Thomas v. Weed, 14
We think the rule is now set
property is diminished by an injury wrong
fully inflicted, the jury may, in their discre
tion, give interest on the amount by which
the value is diminished from the time of the
Johns. 255.
/ tied in this state that, where the value of
in ury. That is the rule laid down in the
e ientary books and sustained by the ad- dged cases. 1 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) §§
317, 320; Walrath v. Redfleld, 18 N. Y. 457,
462; Malrs v. Association, 89 N. Y. 498; Dur
yee v. Mayor, etc., 06 N. Y. 477, 499; Home
Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 11 Hun, 182,
188; Moore v. Railroad Co., 126 N. Y. 671, 27
N. E. 791; Railroad Co. v. Ziemer, 124 Pa.
St. 560, 17 Atl. 187.
There is a class of actions sounding in tort,
.
in which interest is not allowable at all, such
Beals v. Guernsey, 8 Johns. 446; Hyde
as assault and battery, slander, libel, seduc
tion, false imprisonment, etc. There is an
other class in which the law gives interest on
the loss as part of the damages, such as tro
ver, trespass, replevin, etc.; and still a third
class in which interest cannot be recovered
as of right, but maybe allowed in the discre
tion of the jury, according to the circumstan
ces of the case. This action belongs to the
latter class, and, as we have construed the
charge as a direction that the jury might, in
their discretion, allow interest on the dimin
ished value of the horse, it was not erroneous.
Our attention has been called to the case
of Sayre v. State, 123 N. Y. 291, 25 N. E. 163,
and it is urged, upon the authority of that
case, that interest cannot be allowed in any
case for the recovery of unliquidated dam
ages arising from negligence. We think that
the case, when correctly understood, does not
sustain the contention, but, in effect, holds
the contrary. In that case a party appealed
from the decision of the board of claims up
on an award in his own favor, and the only
question was whether, upon the evidence
and findings, the claimant had been allowed
all the damages that he was entitled to, and
this court not only affirmed his right to all
the damages that the board had awarded
him, but increased the award from $3,000 to
$8,136. The claim was based upon the negli
gent act of the state in overflowing the lands
of the claimant, from which the damages
claimed resulted. The board of claims al
lowed no interest, nor did this court. In add
ing to the award a sum of over $5,000, this
court acted, in some sense, as a court of
original jurisdiction, and in making up the
sum which was to constitute the final award
it refused to allow an item of interest claim
ed. Now, it is admitted that a court or jury,
charged with the duty of making up the
amount of damages in such cases, may refuse
to allow interest, and that is precisely what
this court did, and nothing more, and there
fore the case is in harmony with the rule
above stated, and with the cases from which
we have deduced it. It is far from holding
that it is error when, in such a case, the jury,
or the original court, after considering all the
facts and circumstances bearing upon the
1os, allows interest, in the exercise of discre
tion, as part of the indemnity to which the
party is entitled. It simply recognized the
rule that interest in such cases was not a
matter of right, but of sound discretion, and
held that the claimant was fully indemnified
for his loss without adding interest. It is
true that the learned judge who gave the
opinion cited the cases arising upon contract
in which it has been held that interest is not
allowable, and remarked that he found no
case justifying an allowance of interest. That
was probably an inadvertence, but the deci
sion refusing interest was right, though the
reasons may have been based upon a princi
ple applicable to another class of actions. It
/
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must be remembered that the court was not
reviewing any question decided below in re
gard to interest, but seeking to make up
for itself a new award from the items of the
claim appearing in the record. and whatever
was said by way of argument, and as the
reason for throwing out an item of interest
on a sum claimed to have been expended in
restoring or reclaiming the land, cannot be
considered as the judgment of the court on
the question now under consideration. That
question was not noticed in the argument,
and was not involved in the case, except1 per
haps, as a matter of discretion. For these
reasons the judgment should be affirmed. All
concur, except EARL, C. J., and FINCH and
GRAY, JJ., dissenting.
Judgment uflirmed.
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5“? TRIGG et al. v. CLAY et al.
(13 s. E.434, ss Va. 330.)
‘Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. July
23, 1891.
Appeal from decree of circuit court of
Scott county rendered March 27, 1890, in a
suit wherein T. P. Tligg, A. Mt.Bradley,
and H. Fugn te, survivingparlncrs of them
selves and James C. Green way, deceased,
partners doing business in the firm name
Tiigg. Fugate & Co., were complainants,
and H. B. Clay, Jr., and W. D. Kenner,
partners in the firm name of H. B. Clay.
Jr., & Co., were defendants. The decree
being adverse to the complainants, they
appealed. Opinion states the case.
llaul. ,l‘rigz, ior appellants. Holdmap
& Ewing and J..l.A. Powell, ior appcllees.
LACY, J. The suit is a ioreign attach
ment in equity, brought to attach ihe
propertysituated within thejurisdiciion of
thecourt belonging to non-residentdefend
ants, and to subject the same to the satis
faction of the debt of the plaintiffs. The
case is briefly 8s iollows: The appellants,
a firm of lumber merchants resident at
‘ Abingdon,in Virginia, made a contract by
which they agreed to buy, at a stated
price, lumber of agreed dimensions from
the appellees, a firm of lumber getters,
resident at Bogersville, in the state of
‘Tennessee; the lumber to be delivered at
Clinchport, in Scott county, in Virginia.
from 500.000 feet to 703,000 feet thereof;
and the plaintiffs agreed to accept the
drafts of the said appeliees to the amount
of $3,000. And on the 28th day of Novem
ber, 1888, the date of the contract, the ap
pellee H. B. (‘lay, Jr., of the said firm. rep
resented to the appellants that 300.000 to
400,000 feet were already cut and dry or
drying: and that the residuemccessary to
compensate for the $3,000 in drafts to be
accepted at 60 days, should he delivered
at Clinchport at the maturity of the
drafts. The drafts were all made in the
first week in December, l8r‘8, a few days
after the contract was made, which was
on the 28th day of November, as has been
stated. The lumber was not delivered,—
not a ioot of it,—and the drafts were neg
lected and allowed to fall upon the hands
of the plaintiffs, when the lumber had not
yet been delivered, and the drafts had
been paid. So the plaintiffs, as had been
agreed between the parliesin case the said
contingency should arise that the drafts
should have tp be paid beiore the lumber
in sufficient quantity had arrived, draft
ed back upon the defendants for the money
thus paid out; but this action was treated
with derision by the appellee, and the
draft dishonored. Upon the hearing. the
circuit court decreed in favor of the plain
tiffs for the $3.000 paid on the draft and
the costs of protest, etc., and referred it
to a commission to ascertain what dam
ages the plaintiffs had sustained. It was
proved that the defendants had absolute
ly refused to fulfill the contract upon the
ground that the lumber had been priced
too low by them, and also refused to re
fund the money paid them under the con
tract. The plaintiffs proved that they
were lumber merchants, and, as was
known to the defendants. purchased the
lumber ior sale: and they proved that
they had actually placed this lumber. to
their customers at aprofit which amount-
,
ed to $1,000, but which they were made to
lose by the wrongful act and fraudulent
conduct of the defendants; and the com- .
missioner reported that the said plaintiffs
were entitled to this sum of actual dam
ages incurred by them. estimating the
profits on the maximum amount of the‘.
lumber to be delivered under the con tract.
But the defendants excepted to this re
port, " because the damage allowed is ex
cessive, and not supported by law; be
cause the commissioner had based his
damages on supposed profits. instead’
of the market value of the lumber at the
places of delivery. " The circuit court by
its decree of March 27, 1890, sustained
these exceptions, and held that the plain
tiffs were entitled to no specificdamages
ior the non-periormance of the contract
set out in the plaintiffs‘ bill, and rested
the matter where it had been placed by.
the former decree, which decreed in favor
of the plaintiffs ior the amount paid on
the said drafts. From this decree the up
peal is here. The idea of the circuit court
was that the general rule applied which
fixed the difference between the market‘
price at the place of delivery and the con-
tract price agreed to be paid. Upon the
principle that the buyer could supply him
self in the market overt, and when he had
been compensated ior the excess in the
cost, over and above what his cost would
have been under the contract, he had
nothing more to complain of. But this
case does not come within that principle,
(1) because there is no market at that‘
place from which, or in which, the plain
tiffs could supply their need; (2) because
there is no other market practically near
enough to purchase the lumber and add
transportation to the market price; (3)
because the plaintiffs, relying on the
promises and good faith of their bargain
crs, us they had a right to do, when tlwy
had themselves fully compiled on their
part by paying the purchase money there
ior, bad contracted to sell this lumber at .a
profit, which profit is the basis on which
the commissioner assessed his damages.
In a case like this, with such circumstan
ces as we have here, the case where there
had been a contract to resell them at an
agreed price, and when ihere is no market
to afiord a surer test, the price at which
they were bargained to a purchaser affords
the best and indeed very satisfac tory evi
dence of their value. This was a purchase
in that marks-t,and there was no more ior
sale. In acasc of such actual sale, why
should the court go into conjecture as to
what the goods were there worth? And
again, if lumber could have been purchased
and brought there at a lower price, there
is not only no proof of it, but we have sat
isfactory proof to the contrary, because
the defendants had the lumber, and were
by their solemn con tract under the highest;
obligations to deliver it: to say nothing
of the requirement of common honesty.
when they had agreed to do it, and had
collected the purchase price. And yet they
preferred to break their contract, and dis
'l_ . I '... *‘__-
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honored their bank obligation, rather
than deliver this lumber at the agreed
price, which they declared had been bar
gained at too low a price. In Wood,s
Mayne on Damages. § 22, it is said: "But,
if they [the goods] cannot be purchased ior
want of a market, they must be estimated
in some other way. ii there had been a
contract to resell them, the price at which
such contract was made will be evidence
' of their value." In the American and En
‘glislm Encyclopmdia of Law it is said:
“ Where there is no market at the place oi
delivery,the price of thegoods in the near
est market, with the cost of transporta
tion added, determines their value. " Ice
(lo. v. Webster, 68 Me. 463; Grifiin v. (‘ol
ver, 16 N. Y. 489. In the case of Colin v.
lass-Works, 108 Pa. St. 220, it is said:
‘ Upon the breach of a contract to furnish
goods, when similar goods cannot be pur
chased in the market, the measure of dam
ages is the actual loss sustained by the
purchaser by reason of the non-delivery. "
A distinction is drawn in some of the cases
between a resale made. at an advance sub
sequent to a contract of purchase and a
resale made at an advance beiore the con
tract of purchase, which was known to
the seller of the goods. Carpenter v.
Bank, 119 Ill. 354, 10 N. E. Rep. 18. ’l‘his is
rather a ianciiul distinction. It is not in
accord with the ordinary usages oi trade
that a dealer. :1. man buying to sell again,
should disclose his dealings with the sn me
goods ata profit to his vendor. But, if
there were any sound principle upon which
this could rest, ii the seller could he sup
posed to enter into his contract upon the
vbasis of a resale in which he had no inter
est, still, in this case, it is reasonable to
, suppose that a lmnbergetterselling 700.000
feet of lumber to adealer in lumber should
know (1) that it was ior a resale, (2) that
this resale was to be on a profit, and (3)
that heshould know that his vendee would
be damaged to the amount of his profit. if
the vendor should prove iaithless. But
the true basis of the general rule is that
when there is a market, the vendee cannot
be damaged. except in the difference be
tween what the lumber did actually cost
‘ him and what he had purchased it at from
the seller to him. But this rule can have,
upon reason, no application whatever to
a case where there is no market, (1) be
cause the disappointed purchaser cannot
buy in that market when there is no mar
ket to buy in, and (2) because the market
price cannot be ascertained when there is
no market.
Under the circumstances of this case, the
commissioner ascertained the true and
just amount of the damages. It has been
oiten held that profits which are the direct
and immediate fruits of the contract are
recovern.ble. There are many cases in
which the profit to be made by the bar
gain is the only thing purchased, and in
such cases the amount oi such profitis
strictly the measure oi damages. Wood,s
Mayne, llam. p. 82. It has been held that,
when the defendant refused to allow the ‘
contracts to be executed, the jury should
allow thepiaintifh as much as the con
tract wonld haw: benefited them,—profits
or advantages which are the direct and
immediate fruits of the contract, entered
LAw DAM.—13
into between the parties, are part and par
cel oi the contract itself, entering into and
constituting a portion of itscvery element,
something stipulated ior, and the right to
the enjoyment oi which is just as clear and
plain as to the fulfillment of any other
stipulation. They are presumed to have
been taken into consideration and delib
erated upon helore thecontract was made.
and formed, perhaps, the only inducement
to the arrangement. lithe inducement to
the plaintiffs to buy this lumber, they be
ing lumber dealers, and trading inlumber,
was not the profits they were to make by
a resale, what was their inducement?
And if the sellers did not understand and
contemplate this resale on a profit, whatv
contemplation on the subject can be rea
sonably ascribed to them? See Masterton
v. Mayor. etc.,? Hiil,62: Morrison v.Lorc
joy, 6 Minn.3l9, iGil.224;) Fox v. Harding,
7(‘ush. 516; Deviin v. A-layor.etc.,(i3 N. Y.S:
McAndrews v. Tippett, 39 N. J. Law, 105;
Kendall Bank Note Co. v. Commissioners oi
the Sinking Fund.79 Va.563: Bell v. Reyn
olds. 78 Ala. 5il. An examination oi the
cases will show that the courts have been
endeavoring to establish rules by the ap
plication oi which a party will be compen
sated ior the loss sustained by the breach
of contract; in other words. ior the bene
‘iits and gain he would have realized from
its pcrlormance. and nothing more. It is
sometimes said that the profit that would
have been derived from periormnnce can
not be recovered; but this is only true oi
such as are contingent upon some other
operation.‘ Profits which certainly would
hav been realized but ior the defendant’s
def ult are recoverable. It is not an un
certainty ns to the value of the benefit or
gain to be derived from periormance, but
an uncertainty or contingency whether
such gain or benefit can be derived at all.
It is sometimes said that specuiatlvedam
ages cannot be recovered because the
amount is uncertain. but such remarks
will generally be found applicable to such
damages as it is uncertain whether sus
tained at all from the breach. Sometimes
the claim is rejected as being too remote.
This is another mode of saying that it is
uncertain whether such damages resulted
necessarily and immediately irom the
breach complained of. The general rule is“
that all damages resulting necessarily and
immediately and directly irom the breach
are recoverable, and not those that are
contingent and uncertain. The latter de
scription embraces, as 1 think, such only
as are not the certain result oi the breach,
and does not embrace such as are the cer
tain result of the breach, but uncertain in
amount,ior which the plaintiff will be fully
compensated by recovering the value of
his bargain. He ought not to have more,
and I think he is not precluded from re
covering this by any infirmity in the law
in ascertaining the amount. Wakeman v.
.\IanufnctnrlugCo., 101 N. Y. 20.1. 4 N. E.
Rep. 264; Taylor v. Bradley, 4 A. b. Dec.
303; Bell v. Reynolds, 78 Ala. 511. In this
..ase the report oi the commissioner was
upon the correct principle, and 1ii(‘clI,c1liiZ
Court erred in sustaining the defendants’
exception to the said report: l‘or said ex
ceptions should have been overruled, and
the connnissiouer’s report confirmed. The
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decree of the circuit court appealed from
here is thereiore erroneous, and the ame
will he reversed and annulled, and this
court will render such decree as the said
circuit court ought to have rendered.
HINTON, J., dissen ts.
LEWIS, P., (dissenting.) In this case I
dissent from the opinion of the court and
am ior affirming the decree of the circuit
court The case is narrowed down by the
exception to the commissioner,s report to
the simplequestion of the measure 01 dam
ages. The rule adopted by this court is,
in my opinion, not only unjust, but con
trary to the lonz4settled rule which gov
ernsin such cases. Here the measure oi
damages is held to be the loss sustained
by the appellants by reason of their ina
bility, on account of the default of the ap
pellees,to fuliill certain contracts made by
them for the sale and delivery of lumber
to other parties. But those contracts
were cullateral to the contract between
the parties to this appeal, and were. in
point of time, subsequent thereto. They
could not, thereiore, have been in the con
templation oi the parties when the con
tract was made, the breach of which ii
the subject of this controversy.
Decree reversed.




(5 Atl. 150, 40 N. J. Eq. 668.)
Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.
November Term, 1885.
On appeal from a decree of the chancellor,
whose opinion is reported in Chamberlain v.
Hoffman, 38 N. J. Eq. 40.
P. S. Scovel, for appellant.
C. A. Bergen, for respondent.
REED, J. Sarah Chamberlain, the com
plainant below, together with one Amelia B.
Ellis, sold to Mary W. Miller, now Hoffman,
certain household furniture for the sum of
$1.800. A part of the property sold belonged
to Mrs. Chamberlain, and a part to Mrs. El
lis. It was paid for in the following manner:
$500 in cash were paid to Mrs. Ellis, and to
her were given, also, two notes of $150 each,
and one note of $100; to Mrs. Chamberlain
were given nine $100 notes. All of Mrs. El
lis’ notes are paid. Three of the Chamber
lain notes are paid, leaving still unpaid six
of the notes given to her. At the time these
notes were given a chattel mortgage was exe
cuted to Mrs. Chamberlain, to secure all
these notes, to the amount of $1,300. Mrs.
Chamberlain flied her bill to foreclose this
mortgage. The defense to it is that ome of
the articles sold did not belong to either Mrs.
Ellis or Mrs. Chamberlain. All the articles
to which title is alleged to have failed Yere
sold as the property of Mrs. Ellis, an all
the notes given to her have been paid. Only
the remaining six notes given to Mrs. ham
berlain are outstanding, and it is as s curity
for the payment of these that the chattel
mortgage is being foreclosed. if this trans
action is to be treated as involving two sales,
with a distinct consideration for each, then
.there is no defense to the present suit.
'
The failure of title to Mrs. Ellis’ goods
could not affect the consideration paid to
Mrs. Chamberlain under a distinct contract...
Upon a consideration of all the circumstan
ces surrounding the sale, I think the affair
was understood to be a single transaction, in
which all these household goods were sold
for a single price. The two ladies who sold
were relatives. and had been intimately con
nected in business. They desired to sell all
the furniture in the house to one person.
The values which they fixed to the separate
articles were for the purpose of determining
their separate interests in the consideration.
The notes were made in part to one and in
part to the other vendor, for the purpose of
convenience. The chattel mortgage was giv
en to secure all the notes, without regard to
whom they were payable. So far as the pur
r.haser felt concerned in the affair, all she
wished was to get all the furniture as it
stood in the house. She was not concerned
iii the proportion of interest in the entire
stock, so long as she got the title to it all.
The price was agreed upon, not in view of
any part, but of the whole lot. The consid
.eration was single, in which both vendors
were jointly concerned, and both vendors
were equally responsible for any defect in
the title to the goods sold for which this con
sideration passed.
In what articles was there a failure of
title? It is claimed that title failed to a por
tion of the goods which Mrs. Ellis had
bought of a Mr. Hutchins, and which Mr.
Hutchins recovered of Mrs. Chamberlain by
an action of replevin. It appears, however,
that the replevin suit against Mrs. Chamber
lain was undefended; no notice having been
given to Mrs. Ellis or Mrs. Hoffman of the
pendeucy of the action. .\,or does the evi
dence in this cause show that Mrs. Ellis had
no title to those articles. I think that she
had, and that the transaction by which she
got possession of the articles was a sale, and
not a bailment; and, although she had not
paid for them, she could and did pass a title
to Mrs. Chamberlain upon which she couldQ
have successfully stood in a defense to the
replevin suit. The remaining articles in
which there was an alleged failure of title
were the three Baltimore heaters. As to
these, it appears that they belonged to the
landlord of Mrs. Ellis. Although she put one
in the rented premises, the arrangement by
which this was done contemplated that it
should remain there after the termination of
her lease. The other two were placed in the
house by the landlord. In respect to these
heaters, neither of the vendors to Mrs. Cham
berlain had title, and there should be a de
duction from the amount due upon the six
outstanding notes for this failure of title.
The question then arises, what is the prop
er measure of the deduction to be allowed?
Perhaps no feature relating to the sale of
chattels has been so little and so unsatisfac
torily discussed and determined in previous
adjudications as this. It seems to be the
settled doctrine in the English courts that,
where there is a failnre of title to all the
chattels sold, the purchaser can treat the
transaction as presenting an instance of an
entire failure of consideration, and may sue
for the money paid. Eichholz v. Bannister,
17 C. B. (N. S.) 708. There is, however, no
case decided in their courts that holds that
the right of a purchaser is limited to a recov
ery of this sum in an action brought, not for
the money paid, but for a breach of the war
ranty of title. The rule is entirely settled
that for a breach of a covenant for title to
real property the measure of dam,l4_’es is the
consideration paid, and the interest upon
such s,um. This rule, early settled in the
English courts, is the rule in this and many
other states. This rule has also been adopted
in many states in this country as eounlly ap
plicable to breaches of the warranty of title
to personal property. The following cases
display the extent to which this rule has here
been adopted: Noel v. Wheatly, 30 Miss.
181; \Vare v. “,eathnall, 2 .\Ic(‘0rd. 413;
Wood v. Wood, 1 Metc. (liy.) 512; (Jritteuden
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v. Posey, 1 Head, 311; Ellis v. Gosney, 7 J . J.
Marsh. 111; Arthur v. Moss, 1 Or. 193; Goss
v. Dysant, 31 Tex. 186.
A perusal of the opinions in these cases,
and the reasons given for the adoption of this
rule in the sale of chattels, is not calculated
to vindicate the wisdom of the rule. The
doctrine, so far as it is applicable to breaches
of the covenants in real conveyances, rests
upon grounds which appertain to the charac
ter of real estate. The reason for the adop
tion of this rule in this class of actions is set
forth at length by Kent, in the leading case
of Slants v. Ten Eyck,.3 Gaines, Cas. 111.
The rule is an exception to the general prin
ciple which underlies the measure of dam
ages for breaches of contract; namely, the
standard of compensation. This latter rule
applies to actions for breaches of warranties
of quality in the sale of chattels to its full
extent. In what respect the loss resulting
from a breach of the warranty of title differs
from that resulting from a breach of the war
ranty of quality in dealing with personal
property is diflicult to conceive. Outside of
the vice of extending an exception to a gen
eral rule in any event, there appears to be
no reason why the rule of recovery should
not be uniform in actions upon both kinds
of warranties. Nor do the cases in which
the exceptional rule applicable to damages
for breaches of real covenants has been ex
tended to warranties of title to chattels. in
my judgment, present any reason for such
prejudicial action. In nearly all of these
cases the question arose in states when and
where slavery prevailed, and was in respect
to breaches of a warranty of title to slaves.
The reason stated in many of the cases for
the adoption of the rule was the precarious
and fluctuating character of that kind of
property. In other cases the court is con
tent with the citation of the early case of
Armstrong v. Percy, 5 Wend. 536, as the au
thority for the rule. 8
In regard to the latter case. it may be re-
marked that the rule is drawn from a remark‘
of the judge who delivered the opinion in
that case, in a single sentence, unsupported
by authority or reason. And this remark
was made in the face of the result in the pre
vious case of Blasdale v. Babcock. 1 Johns.
517. in which there was'a recovery of the
value of a horse, and costs, upon a warranty
of title. The matter actually decided in the
case of Armstrong v. Percy was that. where
an action had been brought against the pur
chaser by the real owner, who was not the
vendor, the purchaser could recover from the
vendor the money paid, besides the costs of
the suit which he was obliged to defend.
There was no suggestion that the rule con
trolling, in this respect, an action for breach
of this kind of warranty, differed from the
rule in actions upon other kinds of warran
ties. The cases cited-namely, Curtis v. Han
nay, 3 Esp. 82; Caswell v. Coare, 1 Taunt.
566; Lewis v. Peake, 7 Taunt. 153-—were all
actions for breach of warranty of quality,
and the measure of damages in these cases
was shown to have been dependent upon the
pleadings. In the first two of these cases no
special damages were set out in the declara
tion, and there was nothing but the amount
of the consideration to show what was lost,
so that was ruled to be the measure of dam
ages. In the last case, the claim for dam
ages having been broader, it was permitted
to the plaintifl? to recover. in addition to this,
the costs of a suit against him by his vendee,
to whom he had sold with a imilar war
ranty. .
There is nothing in the matters decided i
the case of Armstrong v. Percy which fixes,
as a rule, that for the present kind of war
ranties the measure of damages is limited to
the consideration paid, and interest. The
rule, I think, in all actions of this kind, is
compensation. Where no special damages
are set forth, the measure of the loss is the
value of the property purchased; and, where
there is no evidence of value but the consid
eration pald, that will be taken as the stand
ard of value.I Where there is a failure of
title to a part; or an inferior title only is sold.
the loss is the difference between the prop
rty as conveyed and its value had the title
been as warranted. ,
In support of the view that this general
rule, applicable to damages, appertains to ac
tions upon breaches of warranties of title to
chattels, are the cases of Grose v. Heunes
sey, 13 Allen, 389; Rowland v. Shelton. 25
Ala. 217; and the text of Mr. Sedgwick, on
Measure of Damages, 294. 4 My opinion is
that there should be a deduction, in this case.
of the difference between the value of the
entire lot of chattels sold and the value of
the lot without the heaters. The only evi
dence of the value of the entire lot is what
it was sold for, namely, $1,800. The evidence
in regard to the value of the heaters fixes
their value at about $200. Adopting these
values. there should be a deduction for the
latter sum from the notes, as of the date of
the sale, leaving due $100 and interest.
The decree should be reversed.
Decree unanimously reversed.
la
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$;_BERKEY & GAY FURNITURE CO. v. HAS
CALL.
(2-! N. E. 336, 123 Ind. 502.)
Supreme Court of Indiana. May 1, 1890.
Appeal from circuit court, Elkhart coun
ty; Jmuss D. Osson.sn, Judge.
Action by the Berkey & Gay Furniture
Company against Milo S. Hascall. Judg
ment was rendered ior defendant, and
plaintiff appealed.
J. M. Vanfleet, W. H. Vesey, and C. W.
Miller, for appellant. H. 1). Wilson and W.
J. Du vie, ior appellee.
OLDS, J. This was an action by iheap
pellant against the appellee to recorer a
balance of $374.62iorgoods sold and deliv
cred. The answer is in three paragraphs,
setting upacounter-claim. It is alleged in
the first paragraph that on August 26,
1881, the appellee had just completed his
hotel. with 50 rooms, and was in need of
new furniture thereior, without which he
could not carry on his business, as appe -
lant well knew; that on said day, for the
purpose of furnishing said hotel in all its
parts with suitable furniture, the appel
lant agreed with him to furnish said fur
niture and every part thereof complete,
and setitup in propershape and condition
in his hotel rooms, ready for use, by Sep
tember 15. 1881; that said rooms were ir
regular and different in size, dimensions.
and construction, and for the purpose of
making said furniture suitable ior said
rooms, appellant measured said rooms,
and a list of goods was agreed upon, and
at the foot thereof appellant executed a
memorandum in writing as follows: “ We
agree to put these goods all in good order, .
(set up in hotel, without charge, except
freight and enrtage,)castored, with brack
et wood-wheels on all beds. All bureaus and
washstands to have good wood-wheels
on rubber castors. Goods to be ready the
15th of September. Any goods not accord- \
ing to order, or not sa tisfactory, may be
returned free of charge. Goshen, Aug. 26th,
1851. ileum.:v & GAY Fun.\,t,runs ()o.. ’1‘.
M. .\IOI§ELI-1Y.”‘ The paragraph then al
leges that he was ready, able, and willing
to comply with his part of said contract.
but that appellant, with full knowledge of
all the facts, violated said agreement, in
this, to-wit: it failed to deliver any of
said goods prior to September 30. 1881,
whereby he lost the daily use of 29 rooms,
of the rental value of $2 per day for each
room from September 15th to September
30th; that appellant failed to deliver said
goods prior to ., inuary 18, 15042, except as
set iorth in t" omplaint; that said fur
niture was , I imsed to be delivered in
sets and suitsioi‘.specific rooms and places,
as set iorth in said ioregoing memoran
dum, but the articles so delivered were not
in sets or suits, but in disjointed and mis
matched pieces, and were not and could
not be properly set up or useduntil all
were delivered; by reason ofwhich he lost
the daily rental value and use of 20 of said
rooms, worth to defendant $2 each per
day from October 1, 1881, to January 18,
1>.i*l2,inclusive; that because of such failure
he was compelled to turn away, and did
turn away, 20 persons each day, who de
sired to become guests at said hotel,
whereby the income and profits of said
hotel business were diminished $50 per
day. The second paragraph of the coun
ter-claim alleges that on the 26th day of
August, 1881, he had just completed his
hotel, at a cost of $40.00(); that it con
tained 40 rooms (besides dining-room,
kitchen, etc.,) suitable ior the entertain
ment of guests; that it was then operated
and run by him in the business of hotel
kecping, and was so operated for the next
two years; that the rental value of said
hotel, when furnished, was $5,500 per year;
that on said 26th day of August, 1881, he
was in great need of furniture to supply
and furnish B0 of the aioresaid guest
rooms in said hotel, which rooms were
then unfurnished and empty,in which con
dition they were of no rental value to de
fendant, all of which appellant well knew;
that to supply and furnish said rooms and
hotel as aioresaid,appellant promised and
agreed with him to deliver and set up, in
good order and condition, the furniture
mentioned in its complaint by the15th day
of September, 1881, according to written
specifications and agreement, (copied into
first paragraph above;) that appellant
failed and refused to deliver said goods
until January 18, 1882, during which time,
from September 15.1881, to January 18,
1882, he was deprived of the use and rental
value of said hotel, and the several rooms
therein, which use and rental was of the
value of $2,000. The third paragraph of
. the counter-claim alleges allthe matters
contained in the other two paragraphs,
showing a little more minutely the rooms
for which the different articles of furniture
were designed. A reply in general denial
was filed to the answer.
The cause was submitted to a jury for
trial, and the jury returned a special ver
dict in the words and figures following:
“Special Verdict. '(1) We, the jury, find
that the plaintiff contracted with the de
fendant, on the 26th day of August, 1881,
to sell and deliver to defendant the several
items of property mentioned in plaintiffs
complaint, at and for the price of each ar
ticle as stated in plaintiff,s complaint, and
was to deliver the same and set the same
up in defendant,s hotel in Goshen, Ind.,
and have the same ready for use in defend
ant’s hotel, known as ‘ Hotel Hascall,’ by
or on the 15th day of September, 1881;
that plaintiff, at the time of making such
contract, knew the purpose ior which said
furniture was to be used. (2) Plaintiff
failed and neglected to deliver any of said
furniture until the 30th day of September,
1881. and thereupon and thereafter, until
the 18th day of January, 1882 plaintiff de
livered said furniture at the times, and in
the specific articles, as severally set forth
by the plaintiff in the complaint herein.
(3) Deiendantpaid plaintiff the sums cred
ited to defendant in plaintiffs complaint,
and returned to plaintiff the items of fur
niture, as stated in plaintiff,s complaint,
to the amount of $121.85, thus leaving un
paid of the purchase price of said furniture
the sum of $374.62, March, 1882, as stated
by the plaintiff. (4) We further find that
defendant, at and just prior to the milk
ing of said contract, had reconstructed
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and built his hotel building in the city of
Goshen, Ind.. at a cost of $40,000, and de
fend ant was proprietor and manager there
of, and had. within said hotel thirty (30)
rooms that were unfurnished, and when
so unfurnished were of no use or value to
the defendant ; that all said rooms remained
vacant, and of no use or value to de
fendant, from the 15th day of September,
1%l, to the 30th day of September, 1881,
on account and by reason of the failure of
plaintiff to comply with its agreement
aforesaid; that twenty-three (23) of said
rooms remained vacant. and of no use to
defendant, from the 30th day of Septem
ber, 1881, until the 19th day of October,
1881, because of the failure of plaintiff to
comply with said contract; that seven (7)
of said rooms remained vacant and of no
use from the 19th day of October, 1881, to
the 5th day of November, 1881, because of
the failure of plaintiff to complynvith said
contract; thatfrom the 5th day of Novem
ber, lS81, until December 15, 1881, six (6)
rooms of said hotel remained vacant, and
of no use to defendant, because of the non
fuliillmentof said contract bytbe plaintiff;
that the use of each one of said rooms to
the defendant was nothing, when unfur
nished. (5) We further find that the rent
al value and use of each of said rooms,
when furnished with the furniture desig
nated ior same in said contract, would
have been to the defendant 75-100 dollars
per day during‘ said time. (6) If, upon the
foregoing facts. the law be with the plain
tiff, then we find for the plaintiff; but, if
the law be with the defendant, then we
find ior the defendant. JonN A. S.\t1,ra,
Foreman." The appellant moved for
judgment on the special verdict, which
motion was overruled, and an exception
reserved. The appellee moved ior judg
ment on the special verdict, and the court
sustained said motion, to which the ap
pellant excepted. Fi,nal judgment was then
entered in favor of appellee ior $554.63,
and costs.
Appellant filed a motion ior new trial,
which was overruled, and exceptions re
served. The appellant assigns as error:
(1) That the court erred in overruling ap
pellant,s motion ior judgment in its favor
upon the special verdict. (2) That the
court erred in sustaining appellee,s mo
tion ior judgment in hisfavor on the spe
cial verdict. (3) That the court erred in
overruling appellan t’s motion ior a new tri
al. It is'contended that, under the facts
iound, the appellee is only entitled to com
pensatory or general damages, and not ior
the special damages set up as a counter
claim.
We think the facts found in the special
verdict entitled the appellee to recover the
special damages claimed. In Vickery v.
McCormick, 117 Ind. 594-597, 20 N. E. Rep.
v 495, the court says: “The general rule is
that a party who fails to comply with his
contract to furnish goods is liable for the
value of the goods in the open market at
the time of the failure. But, when similar
goods cannot be purchased in the market,
the measure of damages is the actual loss
sustained by the purchaserin not receiving
the goods according to the contract. "
See llahm v. Deig,23 N. E. Rcp.141, and au
thorities there cited. In Hadley v. Baxen
I
dale, 9 Exch. 3-ll, Sedg. Lead. Cas. 126-136,
the court states what we deem to be the
true rule governing the assessment of dam
ages in such cases as this. In that case it
is said: “ Where two parties have made a.
contract, which one of them has broken,
the damages which the other party ought
to receive in respect to such breach of con
tract should be such as may fairly and
reasonably be considered either arising
naturally—I. e., according to the usual
course of things——from such breach of con
tract itself, or such as may reasonably be
supposed to have been in the contempla
tion of both parties at the time they made
the contract as the probable result of the
breach of it.” The facts found by the jury
show that the appellee, at and just prior
to August 26, 1881, had reconstructed and
built his hotel building in the city of Go
shen, Ind., at a cost of $40,000, and that
appellee was proprietor and manager there
of, and had within said hotel 30 rooms
that were unfurnished, and when so an
furnished were of no use or value to the
appellee; that upon said day he contract
ed with the appellant to sell and deliver to
him the several items of property men
tioned in the appellant,s complaint, which
consisted of the necessary furniture to fur
nish said rooms, at and for the price of
each article as stated in the complaint,
and agreed to deliverthe same and set the
same up in appellee’s hotel, and have the
same ready for use in said hotel by or on
the 15th day of September, 1881; that the
appellant, at the time of the making of said
contract, knew the purpose for which said
furniture was to be used. The contract
was to furnish the furniture for 30 rooms
in an hotel, and setit up in the rooms, and
have it ready for use and occupancy by a
day named. From thesefacts it necessari
ly follows, as a conclusion, that the party
contracting to furnish thesame knew that
the rooms were valueless as. hotel apart
ments when unfurnished; that the furni
ture was necessary to enable the purchaser
to use and occupy the same, and operate
his hotel; and that the appellee would be
deprived of the use of such rooms ior such
purpose until itcomplied with its contract.
The facts iound further show that the ap
pellant commenced furnishing the furni
ture soon after the date when it was all to
have been furnished and put up inthe rooms,
furnishing part atone time and part at an
other. The facts show the appellee had
reconstructed and rebuilta valuable hotel,
and was operating; it himself, and the
damages naturally resulting from the
breach of the contract, according to the
facts found, were what “‘he rooms would
have been worth to ap
fix
' furnished ac
cording to the contrr Q ,. .f‘4.an they
were worth to him ur -‘‘e\\.\’,\ '-‘Turing the
delay in complving w. “\ D; contract. Ap
pellee built thé‘ house ior a particular pur
pose, and was having it furnished ior such
purpose. He was not bound to rent out
the rooms for another purpose, even if he
could have done so. If there had been a
breach and a total failure of the appellant
to have furnished the whole or any part
of the furniture, and the appellee had been
notified that he was not intending to fur
| nish it, then the appellant would have been, liable ior the difference in value of the fur
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nlturc between its price in the open war
kct and the contract price, as “'( ll as the
loss of the use of the rooms ior the time
necessary to have procured the furniture
elsewhere; but in this case the appellant
furnished the furniture, and appellee ac
cepted it, so that the damage was the loss
sustained byreasonofthedelay. Wethink
the loss of the use of the rooms as they
were to be furnished might fairly be con
sidered to have been contemplated by the
parties at the time of the making of the
con tract. In Richardson v. L‘hynoweth,
Wis. 656, it was held that a defendant
failing to deliver an article, knowing the
purpose for which it was purchased, was
. liable ior the profits the purchaser would
ha ve made. See 1 Sedg. Dam. (7th Ed.)
218—239; Field, Darn. § 250; City of Terre
Haute v. Hudnut,1l2 Ind. 542, 13 N. E. Rep.
686.
it is contended that the facts iound do
not state the damages correctly; that, if
the plaintiff is entitled to recover, the
amount he is entitled to recover would be
the difference between the rental value of
the rooms, unfurnished and furnished.
This objection we do not think available
ior a reversal of the judgment. When spe
ciai dmnages of this character are recover
able, it is the damage the party himself has
sustained that heis entitled to recover. If
A. purchase grain of B., and at thetimeA.
has a previous contract to sell and deliver
grain to C., and A. purchases the grain of
B. with a view of filling his previous con
tract with C.. and C. is advised of that fact,
and the contract is such that on failure
to deliver B. becomes liable to A. ior the
profit he would have made, thedamage re
coverable is the profit A. would have
made; and that amount might be deter
mined byaflnding of the facts showingthe
amount A. was to pay B. ior the grain, and
the amount he would have received from
C. ior thesa'me. So,in this case, the amount
of damage that the appellee was entitled
to recover was the difference in value to
the appellee in the rooms, furnished and
unfurnished, for the time they remained.
unfurnished by reason of appellant,s fail
ure to furnish the furniture; and that
amount is determined by finding what
the rooms were worth to the appcllce un
furnished, and what they were worth fur
nished, ior the time he was deprived of the
use of them ior the purpose for which they
were to be used. The jury has iound as‘
facts that the use of the rooms unfurnished
was worth nothing to the appellee during
that time, and furnished they would have
been worth 75 cents per day, and the num
ber of days each room was unfurnished
from the date appellant contracted to set
up the furniturein the rooms is also stated
and found in the verdict, and the gross
amount may be determined by a merecom
putation. The facts iound in the special
verdict entitle the appellee to a judgment
for the amount of the damages found to
have been sustained by him. Fussion v.
Lnndrey (this term) 24 N. E. 96. The facts
found cover all the issues in the case, and
éhat
is all that is required by a special ver
ct.
It is further contended that the court
erred in not sustaining the motion ior new
trial, forthe reason that the judgment ren
dered upon the verdict is in excess of the
amount found due the appeilee by the ver
dict, but this question is not presented by
the record. If the judgment does not iol
low the verdict, or is not such a judgment
as the party was entitled to have rendered
upon the verdict, to present any question
as to the amount oriorm of the judgment,
it was necessary to make a motion to
modify the judgment, and properly reserve
exceptions in case the motion was over
ruled. It iollows, thereiore, from the con
clusion we have reached, that there is no
error in the record ior which the judgment
should be reversed. Judgment aflirmed,
with costs. ‘
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BEEMAN v. BANTA.
(23 N. E. 887, 118 N. Y. 538.)
Court of Appeals of New York, Second Divi
sfon. Feb. 25, 1890.
Appeal from supreme court, general
term, iourth department.
Action by Marcus M. Beeman against
George.A.Banta. There was a verdict and
judgment for plaintiff, which was affirmed
by the general term, and defendant again
appeals.
Rhodes, Coons & Higgins and John H.
Parsons, for appellant. Baldwin & Ken
nedy, for respondent.
PARKER,J. The recoveryin this action
was ior damages claimed to have been sus
tained because of a breach of an express
warranty on the part of the defendant to
so construct a freezer ior the plaintiff as
that chickens could be kept therein in per
fect condition. The. jury have iound the
making oithe warranty,its breach. and the
amount of damages resulting therefrom.
The general term have affirmed these find
ings, and. as there is some evidence to sup
port each proposition, we have butto con
sider the exceptions taken. The appellant
excepted to the charge of thecourt respect
ing the measure of damages. Upon the
trial he insisted, and still urges, that the
proper measure of damages is the cost of
so changing the freezer as to obviate the
defect, and make it coniorm to the war
ranty. And Milk Pan Co. v. Remington,
109 N. Y. H3, 16 N. E. Rep. 48. is cited in
support of such contention. That decision
was not intended to, nor does it, modify
the rule as recognized and eniorced in Pas
singer v. Thorburn, 34 N. Y. 634: White v.
Milier,7l N.Y.l33; Wakeman v.Manufact
uring Co., 10l N. Y. 205, 4 N. E. Rep. 264;
Reed v. .\icConnell,101 N.Y. 276.4 N. E. Rep.
718; and kindred cases. In that case the
argument of the court demonstrates—
F1‘rst, thatim proper evidence was received;
and, second, that the finding of the referee
was without evidence to support it. No
other proposition was decided, and the
discussion is not applicable to the facts be
fore us. The plaintiff was largely engaged
in preparing poultry ior market. which he
had either raised or purchased. Beiore
mceflng the defendant. he had attempted
to keep chickens for the early spring mar
ket in a freezer or cooler which he had con,
structed for the purpose. The attempt was
unsuccessful, and resulted in a loss. The
jury have iound, in effect, that the defend
ant, with knowledge of this intention of
the plaintiff to at once make use of it in
the freezing and preservation of chickens
ior the May market iollowing, expressly
represented and warranted that for affout
$500 he would construct a freezer which
should keep them in perfect condition ior
such market: that he failed to keep his
contract in such respect, resulting in a loss
to the plaintiff of many hundred pounds of
chickens. Thecourtcharged the jury that,
if they should find for the plaintiff, he was
entitled to recover as one of the elements
of damage the difference between the value
of the refrigerator as constructed, and its
value as it would have beenif made accord
ing to contract. The correctness of this
instruction does not admit of questioning.
Had the defendant made no use of the
freezer, such rule would have embraced all
the damages recoverable. But he did make
use of it. and such use as was contem
plated by the contract of the parties. The
result was the total loss of hundreds of
pounds of chickens. The fact that the de
fendant well knew the use to which the
freezer was to be immediately put, and his
representation and warranty that it would
keep chickens in perfect condition, burden
him with the damage sustained because of
his failure to make good the warranty.
Upon that question the court instructed
the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to
recover the value of the chickens, less cost
of getting them to market, including freight
and fees of commission merchant. The
question of value was left to the jury, but
they were permitted to consider the evi
dence tending to show that frozen chickens
were worth 40 centsa pound in the market
during the month of May. Such instruc
tion we consider authorized. The object
of the freezer was to preserve chickens ior
the May market. The expense of construc
tion and trouble,as well as expense of op
eration, was incurred and undertaken in
order to secure the enhanced prices of the
month of May. It was the extra profit
which the plaintiff was contracting to se
cure, and, in so far as the profits contem
plated by the parties can be proven, they
may be considered. Gains prevented’ as
well as losses sustained. are proper ele
ments ofdamage. Wakeman v. Manufactur
ing Co., 101 N. Y. 205, 4 N. E. Rep. 264. We
have carefully examined the other excep
tions to the charge as made, and to the
refusals to charge as requested, and also
the exceptions taken to the admissibility
of testimony. but find no errorjustifying
a reversal. The insistence of the appel
lant that the judgment be reversed, be
cause against the weight of evidence, may
have been entitled to some consideration
by the general term, but it cannot be re
garded here. The iudgment should he of
firmed. All co.ncnr, except FOLLETT, C.
‘J., and VANN. J., not sitting.
Judgment affirmed.
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6‘ SHAW et al. v. SMITH et al.
srnuv v. mass.
,(25 Pac. sse’ B87, 45 Kan. 334.)
Supreme Court of Kansas. Feb. 7, 1891.
Error from distnct court, Cowley coun
ty; M. G. Tuocr, Judge.
Smnuei Dalton and Samuel J. Day. ior
plaintiffs in error. S. E. Fink, ior defend
ants in error.
VALENTINE, J. This was an action
brought beiore a justice of the peace of
Cowley county on January 31. 1887, by G.
B. Shaw & Co. against Yates Smith and
James W. M(‘Clellen. ior the recovery of
$12. and interest’ upon the following in
strument in writing, to-wit: “Cambridge’
April 30. 1886. On or before the first day
of October. .l$86’ we promise to pay to the
order of G. B. Shaw & Co., at their office
in Cambridge. twelve dollars, ior value re
ceived. with interest after maturity. at the
rate of ten per cent. per annum until paid.
This note is lgiven in part consideration of
the sale to Y. Smith of eight bushels flax
seed, by said G. B. Shaw & 0o.; and; as a
further consideration thereior, we agree to
plant 14 acres with said seed. to cultivate.
harvest. and clean the same in proper and
careful manner. and deliver to G. B. Show
& Co. at (‘ambridge. Kansas. on or before
the 1st day of 1)ecember, 1886, the whole
crop raised therefrom. at a price men
tioned below. per bushel of 56 lbs., ior
pure and prlmefiaxsced; fiaxseed not pure
and prime to beinspected and graded sub-‘
and use of his ground; and that he was
damaged thereby in the sum of $150. And
he asked judgment for that amount. and
costs of suit. The trial resulted in a ver
dict in favor of thedefendnnts and against
the plaintiffs for the sum of $90. and judg
ment was rendered accordingly; and the
plaintiffs. as plaintiffs in error. bring the
case to this court for review.
It appears from the evidence that the
facts of the case are substantially as fol
lows: The plaintiffs, G. B. Shaw & Co.,
were dealers in flaxseed at Cambridge, in
said Cowley county. Smith went to their
place of business about April 20. 1886, and
found Joseph Fraiey, their agent. in
charge. Shaw & Co. did not have any flax
seed on hand. but they were about to or
der some. Smith told Fraley to order
eight bushels for him, for the purpose of
sowing it and raising a crop. Fraley told
Smith that they would furnish the flax
seed upon the conditions substantially as
set iorth in the foregoing instrument.
Afterwards the flaxseed arrived. and Fra
iey gave notice to Smith. Smith then. on
April 30. 1886. went to Cambridge and re
ceived thesced.about8 bushels in amount,
inclosed in sacks. from Fraley’ and took
it home and sowed it upon about 12 acres
of ground. The seed appeared to be good,
and Fraley and Smith believed it to be
good, but in fact it was not good, and it
did not germinate; and Smith lost all his
time and labor in procuring it. and in pre
paring the ground for sowing it. and in
sowing it. and he got no crop, and lost
the use of his ground. And upon these
facts the jury iound in favor of the defend
ants and against the plaintiffs, and as
ject to the rules of the St.Louifl .\.fen.hmn;g’€r 'QI'se‘ssed the defendants’ damalzes at $90, as
Exchange. And should we sell or trade,
or attempt to offer to sell or trade. such
crop to any other person or persons than
said G. B. Shaw & Co., or order. then the
note hereto attached shall immediately
become due and payable; and the said G.
B. Shaw &.Co., or their assigns. are here
by authorized to enter any building or
premises without any legal process what
ever’ and seize and retuove such crop
whatsoever (and in whosesoever posses
sion the same may be found), and to pay
me the balance on demand, after the
amount due upon said note has been de
ducted. together with all costs and ex
pense incurred. where seizure is necessary;
price to bepuid per bushel. on basis of pure.
to be 35 cents less than St. Louis market
price on day of delivery. YA’l‘l4‘.s SMITH.
JAm.:s W. Mt..Ci.I0;t.Lr;.\,.” Afterwards the
case was taken on appeal to the district
court. where the case was tried before the
court and a jury. with the result hereafter
stated. ’l‘he plaintiffs’ bill of particulars
simply set up the ioregoing instrument.
and asked judgment thereon for $12, and
interest at the rate of 10 per cent. per an
num from October 1, 1886. The defend
ants’ amended answer thereto and cross
pctition alleged that the flaxseed ior which
the instrument sued on was given was
purchased by Smith,ior the purpose of
sowing it and raising a crop; that it was
warranted by the plaintiffs to be good,
but that it was worthless; that he
(Smith) sowed it. but that it (lid not ger
minate; and that he lost his time, labor,
worthlessness of the fiaxsced?
aioresaid. The only questions now in
volved in the case are as iollows: (1)
Under the contract between the parties.
and under the circumstances of the case,
was there any such implied warranty on
the part of Shaw &Co0 respecting thesufii
ciency of the fiaxseed ior the purposes of
sowing it and raising a crop’ that the
plaintiffs may be defeated in their action
on the aforesaid written instrument? (2)
if so’ then under such contract and war
ranty and circumstances, may the de
fendants. Smith and Mc(‘lellen. or rather
Smith, recoverdamages ior Smith’s losses,
necessarily occasioned by reason of the
(3) And,
if so. then what is the measure of Smith‘s
damages? The maxim of the common
law, ca veat emptor. is the general rule ap
plicable to purchasers and sales of person
al property so far as the quality of the
property is concerned: and, under such
maxim’ the buyer. in the absence of fraud.
purchases at his own risk, unless the seller
gives him an express warranty, or unless,
from the circumstances of the sale, a we r-
ranty may be implied. 1n the present case
no express warranty was given’ and the
question then arises, was there any im
plied warranty? At the time when the
contract for the purchase and sale of the
flaxseed was entered into, such seed was
not present so that it could be inspected
by the purchaser. and, when it arrived
and was delivered to him, the defect in
the seed was not apparent, and was prob
ably not discoverable by any ordinary
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means of inspection, and it was not dis
.covered until after it was sowed, and when
it failed to germinate. When the original
contract for the purchase and sale of the
flaxseed was made, the fiaxseed was pur
chased and sold ior the particular pur
l- pose, known to both the buyer and the
seller, of sowing it in a field, and of rais
ing a crop from it; and thereiore this pur
pose was a
manded that the seed should be suflicient
for such purpose. It, in effect, constitut
ed a warranty on the part of the seller
that the seed should be the kind of seed
had in contemplation by both the parties
when the contract was made. The pur
chaser had to rely upon the seller,s fur
nishing to him the kind O! seed agreed up
on, and the seller,in efiect,amced that the
seed furnished should be the kind of seed
agreed upon. The entire contract when
made was executory. and it was to be ex
ecuted and periormed afterwards. and to
be periormed in parts and at difierent
times. The seller was first to furnish the
se‘_ud, and he did so in about 10 days after
thecontract was made, and of course the
seed was to be a kind of seed that would
grow. The purchaser was afterwards to
sow it and to raise a crop, and afterwards
the purchaser was to sell, and the seller
/was to buy, the crop, upon certain terms" ' I and conditions expressed in the contract.
/
VVe think there was an implied warranty
on the part of the seller that the seed
part of the contract, and de- .
should be sufflcient for the purpose for
which it was bought and sold. Wolcott
v. Mount, 36 N. J. Law, 262. 38 N. J. Law.
496; Van Wyck v. Allen, 69 N. Y.61; White
v. Mlller,7 Hun. 427, 71 N. Y. 118: Whit
aker v. McCormick, 6 Mo. App. 114. We
also think that the purchaser may re
cover damages from the seller for all the
losses necessarily sustained by the pur
chaser, by reason of the worthiessuess of
the flaxseed furnished by the seller. See
the authorities abow: cited. and also the
following: Passinger v. ’l‘horburn, 34 N.
Y. 634; Flick v. Wetnerbce, 20 Wis. 392;
Ferris v. (.‘omstock, 33 Conn. 513; Randall
v. Raper, El., Bl. & El. 84. And it is not
claimed that the purchaser in the pres
ent case recovered for more than the fore
going losses. The claim is that the pur
chaser had no right to recover at all, and
that the seller had the right to recover on
the instrument sued on. No Other ques
tions are presented. We think no materi
al error was committed in the case, and
the judgment of the court below will he
aflirmed. All the justices concurring.
PER CURIAM. It is understood that
the same questions of law and fact are in
volved in the case of G. B. Shaw & Co. v.
T. L. Jones. !rom Cowley district court,
that are involved in the case of Shaw v.
Smith, just decided, and the judgment of
the court below in this case will be ai
flrmed upon the authority of that case.
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6 / BARNES v. BRO“"N et al.
(29 N. E. 760, 130 N. Y. 372.)
Court of Appeals of New York, Second Divi
sion. Jan. 20,.1892.
Appeal from supreme court, general term,
first department.
Action by Oliver W. Barnes against George
H. Brown, and James Seiigman, Jesse Selig
man. and David Seligman, as executors of
Joseph Seligman. The general term dismiss
ed the complaint as to the executors, and re
versed the referee,s decision, which awarded
only nominal damages against Brown._ Plain
tiff and Brown appeal. Afllrmed as to the
executors, and reversed as to Brown.
The other facts fully appear in the follow
ing statement by Bradley, J.:
The action was brought to recover dam
ages for the alleged breach of contract of
which the following is a copy, to-wit: “Oli
ver \V. Barnes having, by instruments hear
ing even date herewith, assigned and trans
ferred to us, George H. Brown and Joseph
Seligman, all claims and demands against the
New York City (‘entral Underground Rail
way Company. and his title to certain sub
scriptions to the capital stock of said com
pany, and also any interest he may have in ‘
a certain alleged contract made with the
said company by Francis P. Byrne, and hav
ing also transferred sixty shares of stock in
said company: Now, we, George H. Brown
and .io...spit Scligman, do hereby, in consid
eration of the premises and of one dollar to
us paid by the said Oliver W. Barnes, agree
that we will, upon certain amendments to the
charter of the said New York City Central
l.,n(lcl‘gro(nul Itailway (‘ompany. now pend
ing before the legislature of the state of New
York. becoming a low, pay. or cause to be
paid. to the said Oliver W. Barnes. his rcp
rc1-‘entatives and assigns, the sum of twen
ty-seven ilmusand five hundred dollars in cur
rency of the.United States, being the amount
of certain advances made and services ren
dered by the said Barnes to the said railway
company; and also that we will cause to be
delivered to the said Barnes or his assigns
at the time of the payment of the said mon
ey two thousand shares of the capital stock
of the said railway company, which said
stock is to be full-paid stock. And we fur
ther agree with the said Oliver W. Barnes,
his representatives and assigns, that, in the
event of the said amendments not becoming
. 1l law at the present session of the legislature,
we will either cause said money to be paid,
and said two thousand shares of stock deliv
ered to the said Barnes or his assigns, or
have reassigned to the said Barnes or his as
signs the claims. demands. and rights so as
signed to us, and transfer‘ to him or his as
signs the said sixty shares of stock so trans
ferred to us the next day after the close
of the present session of the legislature of
New York. And we further agree that not
more than one hundred additional shares of
the stock of said company shall be issued
until the said payment be made and stock
delivered without the consent of the said
Barnes, and that o much of said one hun
dred shares as shall be issued shall be trans
ferred to the said Barnes, if we do not ex
ercise our option of paying said twenty-sev
en thousand five hundred dollars, and deliver
ing said two thousand shares on the fai.lure
of the said amendments to become a law
at the present session. And we further agree
thatno contract for the construction of the
railway of the company shall be entered into
without the consent of the said Barnes until
the said money shall be paid and the stock
delivered. In witness whereof we have here
unto set our hands and seals this twenty
sixth day of March, in the year one thousand
eight hundred and seventy-two. George 11.
Brown. [L. S.l Joseph Seligman. [L. S.]"
\Vhen, in 1882, this action was commenced,
Joseph Seligmau had died, and executors of
his will were joined as defendants with
Brown. The alleged default was in the fail
ure or refusal to deliver to the plaintiff the
I
2,000 shares of the stock of the railway com
pany, as Brown and Seligman had under
taken by the contract. The plaintiff sought
to recover $200,000 and interest. The ref
eree found that the stock had no value, and
directed judgment against Brown for nomi
nal or six cents damages; and as to the dc
fendants (executors) the referee directed judg
ment of dismissal of complaint. Judgments
were entered accordingly. The general term
aiiirmed the latter, and reversed the judg
ment for nominal damages, and as to the de
fendant Brown granted a new trial.
Edward C. James and Ira Leo Bamherger.
for plaintiff. Hamilton Odell and DJoim E.
Parsons, for defendants.
BRADLIGY, J., (after stating the facts.)
The main controversy has relation to the
rule or measure of damages applicable to the
breach of the contract upon which this ac
tion was fonnded. While the plaintiff claim‘:
that damages cannot be less than $2I)0.000
and interest, it is insisted on the part of the
defense that they were only nominal. Before
proceeding to the consideration of the ques
tion in that respect, reference may properly
be made to the facts out of which the al
leged claim arose. The New York City Cen
tral Underground Railway Company was or
ganized under an act incorporating it, and
authorizing the company to construct and
operate an underground railway in the city
of New York, passed in 1868, and amended
in 1869. The authorized capital stock of the
company was $10,000,000. At the time the
contract of March 26, 1872. was made, the
plaintiff was president of the company. He
then had some claims against it, and only
117 shares of capital stock had been issued,
of which he held 63 shares. By the trans
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.cover nominal damages only.
fer of the 60 shares to Brown and Seligman,
. they took the control of the organization of
the company. The amendments to the char
ter then pending in the legislature did not
become a law. and consequently it was op
tional with them to either retain their pur
chase and pay, or surrender what they had
received, and put an end to the contract.
They, however, concluded to treat it as ef
fectual, and assumed the undertaking to per
form. and afterwards did pay to the plain
tiff the $27,500, and did deliver to the plain
tiff certificates of 2,000 shares of the capital
stock of the company. This was apparently
full performance, but in fact was not, be
cause that so delivered was not paid stock;
and when this was discovered by the plaintiff
he offered to return the certificates, and de
manded such as he was entitled to. Further
performance was refused, and this action fol
lowed. The only question as against the
defendant Brown was one of damages; and
the referee found that at the time when he
and Seligman undertook to deliver the stock
to plaintiff it had no actual or market value.
and determined that he was entitled to re
The stock cer
tainly had no market value. None was in
the market. This finding and conclusion
were challenged by the plaintiff,s exceptions
By reference to the condition of the company,
it is seen that the total amount of money re
ceived by it on account of subscriptions to its
stock was $5,700, and that was received in
1869 and 1871. The other credits to the cap
ital stock account were in demand loans and
special services rendered the company. The
various efforts prior to 1872 were unsucces
fully made to raise money for the purpose of
construction of the railway, and the reason
why the bonds of the company could not be
negotiated was that it had been unable to
obtain subscriptions to its capital stock to
pay for right of way. The land and conse
quential damages incident to the construction
of the railway were estimated at 5,000,000;
and the expenditures by the company for
work done towards construction and for land
and land damages did not exceed $4,000.
The indebtedness of the company was about
$350,000. This was, in general terms. the
situation of the company when the contract
of March 26, 1872, was made; and it was
known as well to Brown and Seilgman as
to the plaintiff. Whatever of value they took
by the contract was in the franchise of the
company, and was dependent upon the use
which could be made of it by way of the
construction and operation of an underground
railway. While the futility of the enter
prise tended to show that it never had any
actual value, there evidently was hope and
expectation of success entertained by Brown
and Seiigman'when they elected to retain the
benefit of the contract, and it is in that view
insisted by the plaintiff that the stock then
had a value which to him may at that time
have been available, although later it turn
ed out to have had none, and therefore he
lost whatever he may have realized by its
conversion, if it had in due time been deliv
ered to him. There is apparently some force
in this suggestion, but ‘it is entirely specula
tive, assuming that the stock then in fact
had no actual value as well as no market
value. There was some conflict in the ex
pert evidence upon the subject, founded up
on the situation of the company. While that
on the part of the defendants was that the
stock had no value, that of the witnesses
called by the piaintiff was to the effect that
it was, as the situation then appeared, worth
par. It may be observed that the plaintiff
held the stock represented by the certificates
so delivered to him until about September 1,
1874, upon the assumption that it was full
paid stock, before his discovery that it was
otherwise.
The finding of the referee that the stock
had neither actual nor market value was
supported by evidence, and for the purposes
of this review must be deemed conclusive.
But it is insisted by the learned counsel for
the plaintiff.that the plaintiff should never- .‘
theless have recovered the $200,000 and in
terest upon it because he was entitled to the
stock or to a sum which it would cost to
obtain it. As a general rule, the damages
which a party is entitled to recover against
another for breach of contract are such as
will indemnify him for the loss he has suf
fered by the default; and it is with a view
to that result that the rules for ascertaining
and awarding damages have been adopted.
The purpose of the rule in that respect is to
leave the party in no worse, and place him
in no better, condition than he would have
been if the act or default complained of had
had not been committed. It was with a
view to such measure of relief, and the
adoption of a rule to accomplish it, that
the doctrine which gave the highest market
value up to the time of the trial as the
measure of damages for conversion of proper
ty of fluctuating value, as held in ‘.\iarkhnm
v. Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235. and some prior cases,
was overruled in Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y.
211, and the market value for a reasonable
time within which to replace the property
was adopted as furnishing the guide to the
proper measure of damages and the more sat
isfactory means of indemnity. In that case
the defendants, pursuant to an arrangement
with the plaintiff, had purchased stocks to
hold and carry, subject to his order. so long
as he kept his margin good. The defend
ants disposed of the stock in violation of the
agreement; and the court there held sub
stantially that an amount sufiicient to indem
nify a party injured for the loss naturally,
reasonably, and proximately resulting from
the act complained of, and which a proper
degree of prudence on the part of the com
plainant would not have averted. is the prop
er measure of recovery when punitive dam
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vnnce in the market price of the stock from
the time of the sale up to a reasonable time
to replace it after the plaintiff received no
tice of the sale would afford a complete
indemnity." The principle upon which the
determination of BaIker v. Drake rested was
that the measure of the plaintiffs damages
was governed by the opportunity which was
afforded by the market for him within a
reasonable time to replace the stock or the
refusal of the defendant to do so. 66 N. Y.
518; Colt v. Owens, 90 N. Y. 368. And in
Wright v. Bank. 110 N. Y. 237. 18 N. E.
79, the same rule was held in like manner
applicable where stock fully paid for by the
owner is, through the honest mistake of the
piedgee, converted by him, and he refuses
to replace it. Thereupon the owner may do
so within a reasonable time, and the highest
market price within that time is the proper
measure of damages. This is the recognized
rule in this state, and it is applicable alike
to actions upon contract as in tort.
In the present case there was no market
to resort to for the plaintiff to supply him
self with the stock, nor any market value to
furnish the measure of damages. The rule
applied in the cases last cited was not, there
fore, in that.sense applicable to the situa
tion in the case at bar. A4subscription, how
ever, to 2,0(l) shares of the capital stock of
the railway company, and payment of the
full amount to the company, would have
produced the stock, and it may be assumed
that it could not otherwise have been pro
cured. It is upon that ground that the
plaintiff insists that the liability of the de
fendant ls measured by that amount. Thi
would have been so if the agreement of
Brown and Seiigmau had been to pay the
plaintiff $200,000 in the stock of the company.
Then their indebtedness or liability would
not have been controlled by the value of the
stock, but would have been fixed by the con
tract; but when the specific quantum of the
stock was made the considerntionin that re
spect for the plaintiffs sale to.thcm, on
their failure to deliver it he was entitled in
damages to the equivalent of that which they
had undertaken to render. In the absence
of special circumstances, in an action for
conversion of personal property, as well as
one for failure to deliver it in performance
of a contract, where consideration has been
received. the value of the property at the
time of such conversion or default, with in
terest, is the measure of compensation.
Ormshy v. Mining Co., 56 N. Y. 623; Parsons
v. Sutton, 66 N. Y. 92. No special circum
stances were alleged in the complaint to take
this case out of the general rule. Nor was
there any fluctuation in the value of the stock
succeeding the time for its delivery. under
the contract to qualify the application of such
rule.
The damages which a party ordinarily may
recover for breach of contract are those which
n:uurnlly flow from the default; and, if the '
contract is made in reference to special cir
cumstances affecting the measure of compen
sation, such circumstances may be treated as
within the contemplation of the parties, and
constitute a basis for the assessment of dam
ages. Booth v. Mill Co., 60 N. Y. 487. They
come within the meaning of special damages,
and must be the subject of allegation in
pleading to entitle the party to make proof
of them, unless objection in that respect be
waived. In the present case, no facts of
special character relating to damages were
alleged, nor were any established by the
evidence further than the mere fact that the
stock of the company had no market value.
If, notwithstanding that fact, the stock may
have had an actual value a different question
would have been presented; for the plaintifl.I
could not be subjected to loss, nor could the
defendant be permitted to profit, by the fact
that the stock had no market value at the
stipulated time for delivery. Then other
means than those afforded by the market
would be resorted to under the contract. as
within the contemplation of the parties to
ascertain the amount requisite to full indem
nity to the plaintiff. Sternfels v. Clark. 2
Hun, 122, 70 N. Y. 608. There may be cases
in which damages have no support in market
values, where the value is peculiar to the
party entitled to performance, and relief will
be given accordingly. Scattergood v. Wood,
14 Hun’ 269. 79 N. Y. 263; Parsons v. Sut
ton, 66 N. Y. 92. And when the remedy at
law for compensation is inadequate or im
practicable, it may be found in equity by
way of specific performance. Pom. Eq. Jur.
§ 1401. Those are supposed cases to which
the, principles of law adapt remedies when
they arise. But in the case at bar the stock
not only had no market value; it also had no
actual value. Nor does it appear that it
would have been of any value to the plain
tiff, or of any substantial benefit to him, for
any purpose{ if he had received it. The de
fendant Brown, and his associate. Scligman,
did not, by the contract, undertake to do
anything to give any future value to the
stock of the company. Thus we have the
-‘simple case of a contract to deliver a cer
tificate for a certain quantity of capital stock
then having no existence. and when due and
thereafter having no value. The claim that,
because the creation or issue of this worth
less stock would cost its par value, the plain
tiff is entitled to recover that sum. does not
seem to have the support of any well-defined
principle of law. But it is said that. with
knowledge of the situation. Brown and his
associate absolutely agreed to deliver the
stock, and therefore they were bound to pay
the amount requisite to accomplish it with
out regard to the value of the stock, or of
its beneficial use to the plaintiff. In an ac
tion at law to recover dmnages for bl,efi(h
of contract, the question of damages is one
of indemnity; and in that respect the reme
dy founded upon this contract does not differ
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from that upon any other contract for de- 1 and the plaintiff, upon a state of facts em
fault in the delivery of property which a
party has unquaiifledly undertaken to deliv
er for a consideration received. In Dana v.
Fiedler, 12 N. Y. 40, the measure of dam
ages for failure to deliver madder pursuant
to contract was founded upon the market
value at the time of the default. The ques
tion there arose upon the exclusion of evi
dence speculative in character, and which
for that reason was held inadmissible upon
the question of such value. Nor does Scat
tcrgood v. Wood have any essential applica
tion in principle to the case at bar. In that
case there was an element of exemplary dam
ages against the defendant, who had willful
ly deprived the plaintiff of the use of a test
machine designed by him for a special pur
pose. in consequence of which he was put I
to the expense of constructing another for
such purpose. Of this intended use the de-
fendant was advised when he appropriated
and withheld the machine from the plaintiff.
The recovery of the expense of constructing
the second one as damage for the detention
of the other was sustained, although, by rca- ‘
son (as it turned out) of its insufficiency,
the value of the latter was much less than
such cost. In the present case the action is
founded solely upon the failure to deliver to
the plaintiff the stock without any supported
claim of special circumstances for any dam
ages other than such as flow naturally and
reasonably from such default of Brown and
Seligman. While the performance of their
contract in that respect may have required
them to pay to ‘the company $200,000, the en
tire value of its performance to the plain
tiff was in the stock which they undertook
to deliver to him, and this was the only ben
efit he was entitled to take under that pro
vision of the contract. The value of the
stock or its pecuniary equivalent was the
measure of his injury by the default; and,
as it had no value, the plaintiff was award
ed complete indemnity by the conclusion of
the referee that he was entitled to recover
nominal damages only.
There was no error in the ruling of the
referee. by which evidence of value of the
stock was received. The complaint alleg
ed that on January 22. 1873, when the plain
tiff accepted the certificate before mentioned
‘ of stock in performance of the contract, the
stock of the company was worth and salable
in the market at its full par or face value,
and demanded judgment for that amount and
interest from January %, 1873. This was
the situation of the complaint when the evi
dence upon the question of value was given;
,1
0
braced in an hypothetical question, called up
on the witnesses to state the value of the
stock in January, 1873. This was the time
when, by the issue tendered in the complaint
and taken by the answer, the value of the
stock was by the pleadings brought in ques
tion; and it may be observed that the as
sumed facts upon which the answers of the
witnesses were predicated were the same,
and no different at that time than they were
on the day when the contract matured.
These views lead to the conclusion that,
as to the defendant Brown, the judgment
directed by the referee should be sustained.
But, as the order granting an additional al
lowance of costs to that defendant may be
deemed to have been reversed at general
term, that disposition of the order is aflirm
ed, and the costs recovered treated as re
duced accordingly. The contract was the
joint undertaking of Brown and Seligman.
The latter having died before the action
was commenced, his personal representatives
were joined as defendants with Brown. The
complaint was as to those executors dismiss
ed by the referee. upon the ground that facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action
against them were not alleged. Their tes
tator having only the relation of joint con
tractor with Brown, his death placed the
primary liability upon the latter, unless he
was unable to pay or insolvent. Upon that
fact the liability of those personal repre
sentatives to the plaintiff upon the contract
was dependent, and that fact was essential
to the cause of action against them. Grant
v. Shurter, 1 Wend. 148; Trustees v. Law
rence, 11 Paige, 80, 2 Denio, 577; Pope v.
Cole, 55 N. Y. 124, and cases there cited;
Hauck v. Craighead, 67 N. Y. 432. It was
not alleged. This defect was available by
objection which was taken at the trial.
Code, § 499.
It does not appear on what ground the
motion to amend the complaint was denied.
The plaintiff was not entitled to it as mat
ter of right; and the discretionary power of
the referee exercised in denying the amend
ment is not the subject of review here. The
judgment in favor of the defendants, Selig
man, as modified by the general term, should‘
be aflirmed; and the order reversing the judg
ment, and granting a new trial as against
defendant Brown, should be reversed. and
the judgment entered upon the report of the
referee (after deducting therefrom the amount
of the additional allowance of costs) afllrmed.
All concur.
Judgment accordingly.
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6'4 ALLEN v. MOHN.
(49 N. W. 52, 86 Mich. 328.)
Supreme Court of Michigan. June 5, 1891.
Error to circuit court, Branch county;
Nom P. Lovr’mnss, Judge.
1". A. Lyon, ior appellant. W. H.Lock
erhy, for appellee.
GRANT, J. Plaintiff and defendant
made a contract. by which plaintiff agreed
to sell to defendant certain real estate.
The contract was made in .\,oromher, lssli.
In September, 1890, defendant iniormed
plaintiff that he could not go on with the
contract, refused to pay the interest
P which was then due. and said that he
would give up the contract. While the tes
timony is not clear as to the circum
stances under which plaintiff took posses
sion of the land, it appears to he conced
,ed by both parties that defendant aban
doned the premlses, and plain tiff there
upon took possession. The contract con
tained the following clause: “It is mutu
ally agreed between the parties that the
said party of the second part shall have
possession of said premises on and after
date hereof, and he shall keep the same in
as good condition as they are at the date
hereof, until the said sum shall be paid as
aioresaid: and, if said party of the second
part shall fall to periorm this con tract.
or any part of the same. said party of the
first part shall, immediately after such fail
ure, have a right to declare thesame void,
and retain whatever may have been paid
on such contract, and all improvements
that may have been made on said prem
ises. and may consider and treat the party
of the second part as his tenant holding
over without permission. and may take
immediate possession of the premises, and
remove the party of the second part therefrom.“ Upon the abandonment of the
contract and of the premises by defend
ant plaintiff had his choice of three reme
dies: (1) Bill ior specific periormance; (2)
suit at law to recover the purchase price;
and (3) a repossession of the premises
and a suit to recover damagesiorabreach
of the contract. The latter remedy is sup
ported by theiollowing authorities: Rail
road v. l€vans,6 Gray, 25; Griswold v.Sn
bin, 51 N. H. 170: Meason v. Kaine.67 Pu.
SL126, 63 Pa. St. 335; Porter v. Travis,
40 Ind. 556; Wasson v. Palmer, 17 Neb.
330, 22 N. W. Rep. 773. In such case the
measure of damages is the difference be
tween the contract price and the value
of the land at the time of abandonment
and re-entry, less what has been paid.
This rule is just, and places vendor and
vendee upon a footing of equality hnd
mutuality. In order to deprive the ven
dor of this remedy it must either be ex
cluded by the terms of the contract, or
waived by his acts and conduct. In this
case the contract does not exclude it, nor
has the plaintiff waived it. The circuit
court was in error in directing a verdict
ior the defendant. Judgment is reversed,
with costs, and a new trial ordered. The-
other justices concurred.
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6' 2 HOGAN v. KYLE.
(35 Pac. 399, 7 Wash. 5053.)
Supreme Court of Vi,ashington. Jan. 6, 1894. .
Appeal from superior court, King county;
Mason Irwin. Judge.
Action by F. V. Hogan against George F.
Kyle for breach of contract to buy real
estate. From a judgment for plaintiff, de
fendant appeals. Reversed.
Preston, Albertson & Donworth, for appel
lant. H. B. Slauson, for respondent.
DUNBAR, C. J. On the 27th day of Feb
ruary, 1890, respondent and appellant entered
into a written contract wherein respondent
a;1reed to sell the appellant certain real estate
for the sum of $2,500, one-third of which was
paid at the time of the execution of the con
tract; appellant to pay the balance of the pm
chase price in two equal installments. the iirst
of which was to be paid on the 27th day of‘
May, 1890, and the second on the 27th day
of August, 1890. Time was expressly made
the éssence of the contract. The appellant
paid no part of the purchase price, except the
sum which was paid at the time the con
tract was executed. It does.not appear that
defendant entered into possession of the
property, or exercised any control over it.
On November 14, 1892, suit was commenced
by the respondent to recover a money judg
ment against the appellant for the amount
of the two unpaid installments, with in
terest. The complaint simply alleged the
making of the contract, failure to pay, the
ownership of the property, and the tender
of a good and suflicient deed prior to the
commencement of the action. A demurrer
was interposed to the complaint on the
ground that it did not state facts suffieiem
to constitute a cause of action. The de- ‘
murrer was overruled, and the defendant
answered, alleging possession in the re
spondent, but denying his power to give 0
good title. Alieging that respondent had
never demanded of appellant the contract
price of the land at any time priorto Novem
ber 14, 1802, the date of the commencement of
the action, and never tendered to appellant
any deed or conveyance purporting to con
vey said land until said 1-ith day of Novem
ber, 1892, and never at any time conveyed
said premises; that. long prior to said last
named date, appellant had informed and
notiiied respondent that he did not have or
claim any further interest in said property.
and that he would not pay any further in
stallment provided for by said contract, and
that the plaintiff did not, up to said Novem
ber 1-i, 1892, assert any further right to the
balance of said contract price, nor dissent
to nor deny said claim of defendant that he
was no longer bound by said contract; and
that lung prior to said last-named date the i
plaintiff had exercised said option reserved
to him under said contract. and had elected
to rescind said contract, and to retain as a
forfeit the first payment that had been
made to him by the defendant thereunder,
aforesaid. At the outset of the trial, ap
pellant objected to the introdu'tion of any
testimony in behalf of the piaintiff on the
ground that no cause of action was stated
in the complaint This objection was over
ruled. At the conclusion of respondent,s
testimony, appellant moved for a nonsuit,
which motion was overruled. Thereupon,
he rested upon his motion, and did not offer
any testimony; and the judge instructed the
jury to bring in a verdict against the appel
lant for the balance of the contract price.
with interest; which being done, judgment
was entered thereon, from which judgment
appellant has appealed. At the commence
ment of the action the appellant moved to
have the case transferred to the equity mien
dar, which motion was denied. The demur
rer and the motion for a nonsuit raised sub
stantially the same questions.
The judgment in this case will have to be
reversed, in any event, for under its terms the
respondent recovers the full purchase price,
and is allowed to retain the land which rep
resented the purchase price. In this case
these are dependent obligations upon which
the respondent is suing. When the first in
stallment became due, he could have recov
ered the amount then due as upon an inde
pendent contract; but having elected to wait
until the last installment became due, and
upon the payment of which defendant would
be entitled to a deed, the obligations become
dependent. They all relate back to the con
tract, and respondent cannot sustain an action
for either installment without proof of per
formance or readiness to perform on his part.
Mt.Croskey v. Ladd, (Cal) 31 Pac. 558, and
cases cited. In that case the court said:
“There is but one single cause of action,
one and indivisible.
would maintain his deed, must pay all; and
the plaintiff, if he would recover, must show
such a pcrformance on his part as would en
title him to all the unpaid consideration." It‘
is not enough that the deed was tendered
at any particular time, but the tender must
be kept good so that it may be taken into con
sideration in the entry of the judgment.\—'
Plaintiff here simply shows that the tender
had been made prior to the commencement
of the action, and it is therefore insufiicient
excepting on the theory that the judgment
could be rendered independently of the per
formance of his part of the cont"act by the
vendor, which would result in allowing the
vendor to keep both the money and the land.
On that proposition we quote from Warvelle
on Vendors, (page 961:) “There are cases,
both in England and the United States,
where, on the vendee,s default, the vendor,
having offered to perform, has been permit
ted to recover as damages the whole purchase
price. The injustice of such a measure, how
ever, is apparent on its face, for it gives the
vendor his land, as well as its value, and is
The defendant, if he ‘I








not now regarded as a correct rule in either ‘
country." The rule in such cases is that the
vendor has a right to the fruits of his bar
gain, and is entitled to compensation for any
loss he may suffer by reason of its noncon
summatlon. What his damages are, in such
circumstances, must be alleged and proven,
like any other fact in the case. Under one
set of circumstances, the measure of dam
ages might be one thing, and under other cir
cumstances the measure might be governed
by an entirely different rule. The land may
have deteriorated in value, and his damages
would be great, or it might have increased in
value, and the damages would be nominal.
As is well argued by the appellant in this
case, so far as the complaint reveals, the land
may be worth as much or more than it was
when the agreement was executed; and the
respondent, having received an advance pay
ment, which is forfeited, may actually be
benefited. The cases cited in Warvelie fully
sustain the announcement in the text, both as
to the unfairness of allowing the vendor to
retain the land and the money, and as to the
measure of damages. In Railroad Co. v..
Evans, 6 Gray, 25, it was held that, in an
action at law by the vendor to recover dam
ages for the breach of a contract for the sale
of land, the measure of damages is not the
contract price, but the difference between
that price and the price for which the land
could have been sold at the time of the
breach. Under this rule, which seems to us
to be an equitable one, and one which is
adopted by many courts, the complaint is I
plainly deficient. The case last above cited I
also holds that a vendor may enforce in equi
ty the specific performance of a written con
tract for the sale of land. In fact, the pre- 1
vailing modern authority is that in a casei‘
of this kind the vendor can either sue at law
for damages, or resort to equity for specifici
performance. Mr. Pomcroy, in his work on ‘.
(‘‘n1I.l,il(,t3, (page 6,) bases his adherence to this
doctrine on .the ground of mutuality. The
remedy which is enjoyed by one party to a
contract must be enjoyed by the other, and
as an example he gives the simplest form of
contract for the sale of land, when the vendor
agrees to convey, and the purchaser merely
promises to pay a certain sum as the price.
Since the latter may, by a salt at equity, ct su
pel the execution and delivery of the deed,
the former may also, by a similar suit, en
force the undertaking of the vendee, although
the substantial part of his relief is the re
covery of money. "A suit in equity against
the vendee, to compel a specific execution of ,
a contract of sale, while in effect an actidn .
for the purchase money, has nevertheless al- §
ways been sustained as a part of the appro
priate and acknowledged jurisdiction of such
court, although the vendor has in most cases
another remedy by an action at law upon the
agreement." Warv. Vend. pp. 779, 780, and
cases cited. So that, considering it either
as a legal or equitable action, and consider
LAw na’u.—l4
ing the complaint amended so as to incorpor
ate the allegations of tender sought to be set
up in the reply, the action must equally fail,
for the complaint, on its face, shows such a
delay on the part of the respondent in bring
ing his action that, unexplained, it amounts
to a waiver of respondent,s rights under the
contract, and an acceptance of the forfeiture.
“The court of chancery was at one time in
clined to neglect all consideration of time in
the specific performance of contracts for
sale, not only as an original ingredient in/v
them, but as affecting them by way of 1 es.
But it is now clearly established that the
lay of either party in not performing its
terms on his part, or in not prosecuting his
right to the interference of the court by the
institution of an action, or, lastly, in not dili
gently prosecuting his action, when instituted,
may constitute such laches as will disentitle
him to the aid of the court, and so amount,
for the purpose of specific performance, to
an abandonment, on his part, of the con
tract." Fry, Spec. Perf. § 1070. “The doc
. trine of the court thus established, therefore,
is that laches on the part of the plaintiff,
(whether vendor or purchaser) either in exe
cuting his part of the contract, or in apply
ing to the court, will debar him from relief.
‘A party cannot call upon a coiu,t of equity
for specific performance,’ said Lord Alvanley,
M. R., (it) ‘unless he has shown himself ready,
desirous, prompt, and eager.’ Or, house the
language of Lord Cranworth, ‘Specific per
formance is reiief which this court will not
give, unless in cases where the parties seek
ing it come promptly, as soon as the nature
of the case will pcrmit.", Id. § 1072. To the
same effect, Pom. Cont. §408, and cases cited.
It is true that a few of the states. notably
Ohio, hold that the laches must fall outside
of the statutes of limitation, but the great
weight of authority, as we have been able to
gather it from the cases, is to the contrary;
and relief has been refused on the principle
that acquiescence for an unreaonable length
of time after the party was in a situation to
enforce his right, under the full knowledge
of the facts, was evidence of a waiver or
abandonment of right, and what shall be
deemed a reasonable time must be determined
from the circumstances of Ithe case. Six
months, in some cases, might be as unreason
able as six years in others. It must be borne
in mind that a distinction is made, in the dis
cussion of the cases, between the cases where
time is made the essence of the contract, and
where it is not; and the conclusion deduced
from the authorities is that where time is
made the essence of the contract the appar
ent delay or omission of duty must be ex
plained, or the relief will not be granted.
In this case time was made the essence of
the contract, by express terms. The com
plaint shows that there was no attempt to en
force the claim until two years and three
months after the contract matured, and males
I no explanation whatever for the delay. Nor
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are the averments of the complaint strength
ened by the proofs, for the proofs show that
no demand, of any kind whatever, had been
made, on the part of respondent, until the
day the suit was brought. The respondent
should not be allowed to speculate in values,
so f..r a this contract is concerned; to wait
and see whether the value of the land would
enhance or depreciate before he made his
election either to enforce the performance
or accept the forfeiture. We think the pro
vision of this contract, that, “if the said
party of the second part, his heirs, adminis
trators, or assigns, shall fall to pay the full
amount of either of the above-specified in
stallments and interest when the same shall
become due, as above specified, the said party
of the first part shall have the right, at their
option, to rescind and cancel this agreement,
and in case of such rescission and cancellation
all rights of the said party of the second part,
his heirs and assigns, shall be terminated,
and all payments heretofore made on this
contract shall be forfeited," fairly construed,
guaranties to the respondent a right which
it must exercise at the maturity of the,con.
tract,—the time when he would have a right
to make the election; and, as he did not pro
ceed to enforce the contract. the appellant had
a right to presume that, inasmuch as he had
taken no affirmative action, by tendering the
deed, he had elected the remedy which was
consistent with silence, namely, the accept
ance of the forfeiture; and, considering the
rapid changes in value of the real estate in
this country, we think an unexplained delay
of two and a quarter years ought to prevent
.the respondent from asserting his claim in a
court of equity.
The complaint, therefore, being insufficient,
either at law or equity, appellant,s demurrer
should have been sustained. This conclusion
renders unnecessary the discussion of the oth
er errors assigned. For the reasons given,
the judgment will be reversed, with instruc
tions to sustain appellant,s demurrer to the
complaint.
STILES, HOIT, SCOTT, and ANDERS,
JJ., concur.
‘I
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69' McG“UINNESS v. WHALEN.
(18 Atl. 5,5‘, 16 I. 55 .) ‘
Supreme Cour§‘?f Rho e s n1 6 uly 13, 1889.
Assumpsit. On demurrer to the declara
tion.
Edwin D. Mt.Guinness and John Doran.
for plaintiff. Edward D. Bassett, for de
fendant.
DURFEE, C. J. The declaration sets forth
that at an administrator’s sale at auction, held
February 28, A. D. 1885, by William \V.
Nichols, administrator de bonis non on the
estate of John Charlton, deceased, all the
right, title, and interest of the decedent in
certain land described was struck off to the
defendant for $3,100 bid by him, said sum I
being the highest bid therefor; that the de- .
fendant paid $150 down as earnest money;
that afterwards, at a time appointed, the ad
ministrator was ready with his deed to con
vey the land in pursuance of the sale, but the
defendant refused to accept it’ and pay over
the residue of said $33,100; that subsequently,
on May 26, A. D. 1885, the property was
again put up at auction by said administra
tor, and struck ofl! to William H. Washburn
for $2,150, the highest bid therefor, and con
veyed to him for that sum. The declaration
then proceeds as follows, to-wit: “And the
plaintiff avers that on the 21st day of Novem
ber, 1887, he was appointed administrator
de bonis non of the estate of John Charl
ton, deceased, in the place and stead of said
Nichols, removed, whereby the defendant
became liable and promised to pay to the
plaintiff the difference between said sum of
$3,100 and the costs of said second auction
sale, viz., $40.17, and the sum of $2,150,
amounting to the sum of $990.17." The
declaration also contains the common money
count. The defendant has demurred to the
declaration generally, but both parties have
treated the demurrer as if it were simply a de
murrerto the special count. We will so treat
it. The question’ as it has been argued to us,
is whether the count is good as a count upon
a promise to beimplied from the facts alleged.
We think not. The contract which the de
fendant entered into when he made his bid
was a contract to pay the price bid by him for
the premises upon receiving a deed thereof,
and, if on tender of the deed he refused
to complete the payment, he committed a
breach of said contract, and laid himself
liable to an action upon it for damages.
In such action the measure of damage is t
the loss to the vendor from the default
of the vendee, and it may be that the
jury, upon proof of the second sale, would
find the damages to be the difference between
v
the two bids and the expense of the second
sale; but the question would be purely one of
damages, and they would not be shut up to
thatamount. McCombs v. McKennan. 2 Watts
& S. 216. In order to make the vendee liable
in asmmpsit for such difference and expense,
in case of his default, it should be made a
condition of the sale that in such case the
properly should be resold, and the vendee held
to pay such difference and expense. Adams
. v. .\lcMillan, 7 Port. (Ala.) 73, was a case of
real estate sold at auction. and afterwards re
sold on default by the vendee. The declara
tion contained a count like the special count
here. The court held that where a declara
1 tionv does not aver, as part of the contract of
sale, a condition that the land shall be re
sold in case of such default. but only al
leges the difference in price of the two sales.
and as a consequence of the vendee’s breach
of his contract a liability on his part to par
that difference, being framed on the supposi
tion that the diffcrence is recoverable as on a
contract, and not as unliquidated damages,
the declaration will be bad on demurrer.
Robinson v. Garth, 6 Ala. 204. The plaintiff
contends that the mode of declaring here
used is proper, because the sale was judicial.
and in such sales the defaulting vendee is lia
ble for the deficiency on resale, whether the
terms of sale so provide or not. An admin
istrator’s sale, however, under our statutes, is
not a judicial sale, as was decided by Judge
STORY in Smith v. Arnold, 5 Mason, 414. 420.
It has been held in Alabama that purchasers at
oflicial sales who make default are liable by
implied contract for the deficit on resale.
Lamkin v. ()rawl,ord, 8 Ala. 153; Hutton v.
Williams, 35 Ala. 503,513. We do not find
the doctrine recognized elsewhere, (2 Freem.
Ex’ns, 2d Ed., § 313;) nor. in our opinion,
can an administrator’s sale be regarded as an
oflicial sale. In some states the defaulting
purchaser is liable for “the deficiency arising
on resale" by statute. Alexander v. Herring,
54 Ga. 200. We have no such statute. The
subject of the sale under which the question
here arises was real estate, the title to which
could not pass to the purchaser without deed.
Whether, if the subject had beenv goods and
chattels, the same mode of declaring would
have been bad, is a question on which we ex
press no opinion. Demurrer. regarded as a
demurrer to the special count, sustained.
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6 YPUAIPELLY v. PHELPS.
(40 N. Y.~o4-.7- '9 q
Court of Appeals of New York. March, 1869.
Action for specific performance of a con
tract to convey land, or in the alternative,
damages for the breach. The plaintiff had
judgment below for damages, and defend
ant appeals.
John H. Reynolds, for appellant. Samuel
Hand, for respondents.
MASON, J. There has never seemed to
me to have been any very good foundation
for the rule, which excused a party from the
performance of his contract, to sell and con
vey lands, because he had not the title which
he had agreed to convey. There seems to
have been considerable diversity of opinion
in the courts as to the grounds upon which '
the rule itself is based.
In England, the rule seems to have been
sustained upon the ground of an implied
outstanding of the parties, that the parties
must have contemplated the difliculties at
tendant upon the conveyance. In the lead
ing case on this subject, of Flureau v. Thorn
hill, 2 W. Bl. 1078, Blackstone, J., said:
“These contracts are merely upon condition,
frequently expressed, but always implied,
that the vendor has a good title."
While in this country the rule is based up
on the analogy between this class of cases
and actions for breach of covenant of war
ranty of title. Baldwin v. Munn, 2 Wend.
399; Peters v. Mclieon, 4 Denio, 546. The
rule of damages, in an action for a breach
of covenant of warranty of title, is settled to
be the consideration paid, and the interest;
and yet this is an arbitrary rule, and works
great injustice many times; and the courts
met with the greatest embarrassment in set
tling it. These diflicultles were considered,
and well expressed, in the leading case in
this state, of Staats v. Ten Eyck,s Ex,rs, 3
(‘aines, 115, in which the court said: "To
find a rule of damages, in a case like this, is
a work of difliculty; none will be entirely
free from objection, or will not, at times,
work injustice.
“To refund the consideration, even with the
interest, may be a very inadequate compen
sation, when the property is greatly enhan
ced in value, and when the money might
have been laid out to equal advantage else
where. Yet to make this increased value the
criterion, where there has been no fraud,
may also be attended with injustice, if not
ruin.
"A piece of land is bought solely for the
purpose of agriculture, and by some unfore
seen turn of fortune, it becomes the site of
a populous city: after which an eviction
takes place. Every one must perceive the
injustice of calling on a bona fide vendor to
refund its value, and that few fortunes could
bear the demand. Who for the sake of one
hundred pounds would assume the hazard
of repaying as many thousands, to which
value the property might rise, by causes
unforeseen by either party, and which in
crease in worth wou.ld confer no right on the
grantor to demand a further sum of the
grantee?" There is still another class of
cases where the rule of simply refunding
the purchase-money and the interest oper
ates with great hardship and injustice upon
the purchaser. A. purchases of B. a city lot
for the purpose of building himself a dwell
ing or buildings upon it, and takes from B.
a full covenant deed of the premises, cove
nanting to assure, warrant and defend the
title. The buildings are constructed at the
cost of thousands of dollars, and then B. is
evicted by a paramount title ascertained to
be in some one else. The recovery of the
money and six years’ interest is not a very
just or reasonable return in damages for the
law to give to one who holds a covenant to
make good and defend the title.
The reasons assigned for this rule in ac
tions for a breach of covenant oi.‘ warranty
of title can scarcely apply to these prelimi
nary contracts to sell and convey'title at a
future time. In the latter case the vendee
knows he has not got the title, and that per
haps he may never get it; and if he will go
on and make expenditures under such cir
cumstances it is his own fault; and besides,
these preliminary contracts to convey gen
erally have but a short time to run, and
there is seldom any such opportunity for the
growth of towns, or a large increase in the
value of the property as there is in these
covenants in deeds, which run with the land
through all time.
The supreme court of the United States
has refused to yield its sanction to this
rule when applied to contracts for the sale
of lands, and aflirms the doctrine that the
reason of the rule as to contracts for the sale
of goods and chattels applies with equal
force to these executory contracts for the
sale of lands. Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109.
That rule is where a party sustains a loss by
reason of a breach of contract, he is, so far
as money can do it, to be placed in the same
situation with respect to damages as if the
contract had been performed. Robinson v.
Harman, 1 Exch. 850. This case of Hopkins
v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109, is cited with approba
tion in some of the American cases, and the
rule there laid down aflirmed.
These views are not presented to induce
the court to overrule or repudiate the ad
judged cases in our own courts upon this
subject. They reach back over a period of
more than forty years, and have been too
long sanctioned to‘ be now repudiated.
I have referred to this matter simply as
furnishing an argument against in any de
gree extending the rule, and as a reason for
limiting it strictly where the already ad
judged cases in our own courts have placed
it. It becomes important in this connection
BI:EACH OF AGREEMENT RESPECEPING SALES OF LAND. 213
to inquire what that limit is. The general
rule certainly is that where the vendor has
the title and for any reason refuses to con
voy it, as required by the contract, he shall
respond in law for the damages in which he
shall make good to the plaintiff, whom he
has lost by his bargain not being lived up to.
This gives the vendee the difference between
the contract price and the value at the time
of the breach, as profits ‘or advantages which
are the direct and immediate fruits of the
contract. Grifiin v. Coiver, 16 N. Y. 489;
Durkee v. Mott, 8 Barb. 423; Underhill v.
Gas-light Co., 31 How. 37; Masterson v.
..\iayor, etc., of Brooklyn, 7 Hill, 61, 69.
\Vhere however the vendor contracts to sell
land convey in good faith, believing he has
good title, and afterward discovers his title
is defective, and for that reason without any
fraud on his part, refuses to fulfill his con
tract, he is only liable to nominal damages
for a breach of his contract. Baldwin v.
Mann. 2 Wend. 309; Peters v. .\icKeon, 4
Denio, .346; Conger v. Weaver, 20 N. Y. 140.
,1‘he rule is otherwise however where a par
ty contracts to sell lands which he knows at
the time he has not the power to sell and
convey; and if he violates his contract in
the latter case, he should be held to make
good to the vendee the loss of his bargain,
and it does not excuse the vendor, that he
may have acted in good faith and believed,
when he entered into the contract, that he
should be able to procure a good title for his
purchaser. 2 Par. Cont. 503, 504, 505; Hop
v. Dwight, 17 Wend. 74; Bush v. Cole, 28 N.
Y. 261; Lock v. Furze, L. R. 1 C. P. 441;
Robinson v. Harman, 1 Exch. 849; Hill v.
Hobart, 16 Me. 164; Fletcher v. Button, 6
Barb. 650; Trull v. Granger, 8 N. Y. 115;
Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109; Burwell v.
Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535; White v. Madison, 26
N. Y. 124; Lewis v. Lee, 15 Ind. 499; Dean
v. Raseler, 1 Hilt. 420; Bitner v. Brough, 11
Pa. St. 127; McNair v. Crompton, 35 Pa. St.
23; Wilson v. Spencer, 11 Leigh, 261; Gra
ham v. Hackwith, 1 A. K. Marsh. 429; Dart,
Vendors, 447. This rule, applied to the case
at bar,§*'s,ta.ins the judgment of the supreme
court.
The defendant must be held personally lia
ble on this contract. It is essentially his
contract. In order to exempt the contract
ing party from personal liability, he must so
contract as to bind those he claims to repre
sent. Moss v. Livingston, 4 N. Y. 208; De
witt v. Walton, 9 N. Y. 571; Bay v. Gunn, 1
Denio, 108; Bush v. Cole, supra.
The fact that the party describes himself
as trustee, without stating for whom, does
not relieve him from personal liability, or
change the effect of his engagement. Taft
v. Brewster, 9 Johns. 334; White v. Skinner,
13 Johns. 307; Dewitt v. Walton, supra;
Bush v. Cole, supra. These views lead to the
aflirmance of the judgment.
GROVER, WOODRUFF, JAMES, and
.\iUil.RAY, JJ., concurred with MASON, J.,
and were for aflirmance. DANIELS, J., dis
kins v. Grazebrook, 6 Barn. & C. 31; Driggs | sents.
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éé BROOKS v. BLACK.
(8 South. 332, 68 .\Iiss. 161.)
Supreme Court of Mississippi. Nov. 10, 1890.
Appeal from chancery court, Noxubee
county; ’1‘. B. GRAHA.\i, Chancellor.
G. A. Evans and Brame & .'iIe.v:mder,ior
appellant. Bogle & Bogle, ior appellee.
COOPER, J. This is a proceeding by
attachment in chancery by the appellee,
,
Black, against his remote vendor, Brooks,
to recover damages ior the breach oi war
ranty of title to certain lands. In 1869,
Brooks conveyed the la d, with covenants
of warranty, to one Sp cer. the consider
ation being the sum of $6,296. Spencer exe
cuted a deedpf trust, with power of sale,to one Smith, to secure the payment of a
debt oi.$400 to Graham, Black & (Jo. In
September, 1878, the debt secured being un
paid, the land was sold. as provided by
the trust-deed, and at such sale Black, the
appcliee. became the purchaser. at the
price of $1,000. After his purchase, Black
conveyed to .\irs. Spencer an undivided
one.half interest in the land. Afterwards,
the heirs at law of Mrs. Caroline Daves
and Mrs. Nellson recovered in ejectment
from Black and Mrs.Spencer the undivided
'
one-hall interest in the land, claiming un
der title parnmount to that of Brooks. '
Brooks was not notified oi the pendency
of this action of eiectment. Black, by the
result of that suit, having lost the one
half of his half interest in the land, (the
one.iourth of the whole,) seeks by the
present proceeding to recover from Brooks
one-fourth oi the consideration paid him
by Spencer, and interest thereon, and the
costs of defending the action oi eiectment
against the heirs of Daves & Neilson, in
cluding attorney,s fees. The chancellor
iound as facts that the title of the heirs of
Mrs. Daves and Mrs. Neiison was para
mount to that of Brooks; that the value
of the land at the time ofeviction was
$6,000; and that Black. in good faith, and
in discharge of a legal duty, had defended
the action oi ejectment, and in so doing
had expended in court costs the sum of
$249.91, and the further sum of $200 ior at
torney’s fees, which were reasonable. Up
on these iacts, he decreed that Brooks
should pay to Black the sum of $1,500, the
same being the actual value oi the land
lost by Black, and less than one-iourth oi
the purchase price paid to Brooks by
Spencer, with interest at 6 per cent. from
January 1, 1888, the date oi Black’s evic
tion,and also the said sums oi $249.91 and
$200, the court costs and attorney,s fees,
with interest thereon from the commence
ment oi this suit. Brooks appeals and as
signs ior error (1) that the court should
have not made any decree against him,
because the facts proved show that the
debt secured by the deed of trust from
Spencer to Smith, trustee. had been paid
at and beiore the sale under said deed; (2)
that the measure oi damages should be the
one-iourth oi the purchase price paid by
Black, and not the one-iourth oi the value
oi the land at the time of eviction, nor the
one-iourth oi purchase money received by
Brooks; (3) the court should not have al
lowed the court costs expended in defend
ing the action oi ejectment; (4) the court
should not have allowed attorney,s fee
paid in defending said action.
it is sufficient to say, in reference to the
first assignment of error, that the facts do
not support appellant’s contention.
The second assignment of error presents
an interesting question which has never
beiore been considered b_v this court. and,
so far as our researches have led, has not
often arisen in other states. That ques
tion is, what is the measure of damages,in
a suit by an evicted vendee, upon the cov
enant oi warranty of a remote vendor,
running with land? May he recover the
purchase price received by the remote ven
Kdor, or is be limited by the consideration
he himself has paid? It is supposed by
Counsel ior theappellantthatthesum paid
by the evicted party¢—the value of the land
at the time of his purchase—is fixed as the
measure of damages in this state by the
case of White v. Presly, 54 Miss. 313. But
the question was not raised by the record
in that case; and although CnAum’ns, J.,
yin delivering the opinion of the court, de
iclares that the sum paid by theevicted party, with interest, the same being less than
ithe sum received by the remote vendor, is
‘a correct measure of damages, the decla
ation does not thereby become decisive.
\ In that case, Huntington had sold land
to one Jones, from whom the title had
passed under execution sale to Pressly.
Presslylost the land by reason of title par
amount to that oi Huntington, and sued
Huntington’sadministrator'on the cove
nants oi warranty, and recovered in the
court below the sum he had paid at exe
cution sale’ and interest thereon, the same
being less than Huntington had received.
The administrator appealed. He, as ap
pellant, could not assign as error the fact
that damages less than should have been
awarded had been given; nor could the
appellee raise the point here, that the judg
ment he sought to maintain should have
been for a greater sum. The observation
of thejudge was not upon any question
sought to be raised, or which could have
been decided, and thereiore is not the de
cision oi the court. Among the first cases
in which the liability of a vendor to his
vendee for breach of the warranty for
quiet possession was considered were
Staats v. Il‘en Eyrk, 3 Caines, 112, and
Pitcher v. Livingston, 4 Johns. 1. It was
contended for the plaintiffs in these cases
1 that the covenant was one of indemnity,
and thereiore that the measure of damages
should be the value of the land at thetime
oi the breach. In Staats v. Ten Eyck, re
covery was sought ior the appreciation in
the value of the land above the price paid
by natural causes, and in Pitcher v. Liv
ingston to recover abo ve the purchase price
the value of permanent improvements put
upon the land by the vendee. The argu
ment ior the plaintiffs was rested upon
the rule of damages in breaches of person
ai covenants in other instances, but the
court rejected the contention, and adopt
ed, by anulogy, the measure of damages
applied in the common-law action oi war
rantia chartee. and in suits ior the breach
of the covenant of scisin, viz., the value
of the land,determinable by the price paid
the vendor: and, since the vendee was
liable to the real owner ior mesne profits,
.14n
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he was also en titled to interest on the pur
chase money for the time for which such
mesne profits might be recovered against
him. The measure of damages established
in these cases has been so generally adopt
ed in other states as to have become al
most universal, and it would be superfluous
to cite authorities in its support. It has
been announced as the rule in this state.
Phipps v. Tnrplcy, 31 Miss. 433. We refer
to the cases above not ior the purpose of
announcing the rule which applies as be
tween vendor and vendee, for that is too
well settled to admit of controversy, and
is conceded by counsel ior appellant; we
note them to show that the suggestion
now made that the covenant is one of in
demnity was rejected by the court in the
earliest cases. In a certain sense,all“cov
enants" are ior indemnity; but the sense
in which the word is now used, in argu
ment of counsel’ that redress is to be af
iorded to the extent, and within the limit,
of the actual loss sustained by the vendee,
in an action against his immediate vendor,
it may be confidently asserted, is against
the overwhelming current of authority.
In these cases, at least, the decisions are
V practically uniiorm that, regardless of thevalue of the land at the time of eviction,
the recovery is measured by the value of
the land at the time of the conveyance,
‘which value is conclusively fixed by the
(price paid by the vendee or received by the
vendor. Another proposition may be
confidently stated as supported by an
equally uniiorm current oi authority, that
the covenant for quiet enjoyment runs
with the land, and passes to all subse
quent owners claiming in the chain of
title. The purchaser oi land gets, by oper
ation oi law, not only the land, but also
the covenant oi the first vendor, and that
as well where the covenant is byits words
to the vendee only, as where it is with
him and his assigns. When we come how
ever to theprecise question now presented,
which is whether,a remote vendee may,
recover from the remote vendor the pur-’
chase money paid by the first vendee, or isl
limited to the amount paid by himself to .
his vendee. we find direct conflict in the.
decisions. and, so far as we have iound the5
cases, they are nearly equal in number on
each side. In North Carolina, (Williams
v. Beeman, 2 Dev. 483,) Minnesota,
(.\Ioore v. Frankenfield, 25 Minn. 544),)
Tennessee, (Mctte v. Dow, 9 Lea. 93;
Whitzman v. Hirsh, 87 Tenn. 513, 11 S. W.
Rep. 421,) and Maryland, (Crisfield v.
Storr, 36 \Id. 129,) it is held that such re
mote vendee can only recover what he
has paid to his own vendor. On the other
hand, it is held in South Carolina, (Low
rance v. Robertson. 10 S. C. 8,) Iowa,
(Mischke v. Baughn, 52 Iowa, 528, 3 N. W.
Rep. .3-f3,) and Kentucky. (Dougherty v.
Duvall,9 B. Mon. 57,) that such vendee
may recover theiull consideration received
by the defendant, the remote vendor.
Williams v. Beeman was decided by a di
vided court, Rnrrm, J., dissenting, and
Mette v. Dow (followed by Whitzman v.
i-iirsh) overruled Hopkins v. Lane, 9 Yerg.
79. In. Crisfield v. Storr, 36 \Id.129, the
court declares that it had carefully exam
ined many authorities upon the point, and
that the decided weight oi authority was
\
that the plaintiff could not recover onthe
warrant.v oi a remote vendor more than
he had himself paid to his immediate ven
dor, and in support oi this declaration cites“
the iollowing cases : Booker v. Bell’s Ex’rs,
3 Bibi), 175; Kelly v. Dutch Church, 2 Hill,
116; Bennet v. Jenkins, 13 Johns. 51; Han
son v. Buckner, 4 Dana, 253; Wyman v.
Baliard,12 Mass. 304; Stewart v. Drake, 9
N. J. Law, 142; Wilson v. Forbes, 2 Dev. 39;
Pitcher v. Livingston,4 Johns. 1. We have
examined these cases,and find all of them,
except Kelly v. Dutch Church, to be suits
by the immediate vendee, or his heirs at
law, against the immediate vendor, or his
personal representative. Kelly v. Dutch
Church was a suit by the asslgnee oi the
lessee against the lessors oi his asslgnor.
The trial court had awarded, as damages,
the rent reserved in the lease; thus, as it
seems to us, making the sum paid to the
lessors. and not that paid for the assign
ment, the measure of damages. But the
facts are not very clearly stated, and the
case cannot be held to decide anything up
on the point. The question seems to have
been more fully examined upon principle
in the cases of Williams v. Beeman. 2 Dev.
-I83; Mette v. Dow,9 Lea, 93, and Lowrance
v. Robertson, 10 S. C. 8, than in any oth
ers. In Williams v. Beeman, the majority of
the court thought that the remote vendee
was suing to recover his own damages,
and not those of the first vendee, and
therefore should be restricted to the act
ual damages he had sustained. In Mette
v. Dow, the court compared the covenant
to a penal bond, the recovery on which
would be limited to the actual damages
sustained by the party suing. The die
senting opinion of Burnn, J., in Williams
v. Beeman, is, in our opinion, a complete
reply to this position. His says: “ The
value at the timeof the sale by the first
vendorls themeasureprescribed. Itought
to operate both ways. If the vendor be
not liable ior more, he ought not to be for
less. I understand it to beadmitted that,
if his immediate vendee be evicted, he is
still liable ior that. I do not see why he
should not be equally so to the assignee as
his vendee. Does the assignment change
his covenant? It runs with the land, and
he who buys the land buys the covenant.
He gets the whole of it. But it is said that
the assignor in such case cannot recover
from the first vendor more than the evict-
I
ed vendee gave for the land, because this .
is all the assiguor would be obliged to pay 5
the assignee, and thereiorehe has complete Iindemnity. This is changing the rule es
sentially. It puts it upon the amount of.
the loss, not the price paid. It would "
seem to me that whoever buys land with
a covenant adhering to it takes it with all
the advantages it conferred on his as
signor. It is so in personal contracts, ior
we do not inquire what the assignee of
a bond gave ior it. The obligor must pay
him the whole.” This argument seems to
us uuanswerabie. It at least never has
been answered in any case we have seen /
When it is conceded that, by his covenant,
a vendor binds himself to return the pur- ,
chase price he receives in the contingency
of a failure of the title conveyed, and that
this obligation is assigned, by operation
I/oi law, to wluiever
mav succeed to the
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title, it would seem to iollow, as a corol
lary, that the recovery, by whomsoevzr
had, ought; to be equal to the obligation.
But. under the rule announced in Mary
land. Minnesota, Tennessee, and North Car
olina. the obligation of the covenantor is
variable, and dependent upon transactions
with which he is not connected. In these
states, a man selling an estate to A. ior
$5.000 would be liable to pay A. that sum
ii he should be evicted. But it A. sells the
same land to B. ior $500. the liability oi
the first vendor is reduced to that sum,
and thus B., the purchaser irom A., gets
less than the obligation A. held. But if
B. sells to C. ior$5,000, the original obliga
tion revives, and theabsurdityispresented
oi B.’s tailing to get,and thereioreto have,
what A. owned, and still transierring to C.
that which he never had. The rule an
nounced in Kentucky, Iowa. and South
Carolina is not only commended by its
justice, and by analogy to other wsli-set
tied principles, but possesses the advan
tage oi stability and uniformity. As we
have said, it is quite generally held that,
by the covenant ior quiet enjoyment, the
grantor binds himseli to pay, in event oi
iailure oi title, the then value oi the land,
¢which
value is determined by the price
paid. Appreciation by natural causes. or
by improvements put upon.the property
by the vendec, does not enlarge his liabil
ity; nor is it decreased by depreciation in
value irom any cause. By legal intend
ment the obligation is as though the cov
ennntor should say to the covenantee:
"You, or the person succeeding to the
title iconvey,shall hold the land, or ii you
cannot, by reason oi title in another, the
money I have received shall be restored in
lieu oi the land." We are unable to per
ceive any principle upon which this obliga
tion shall be diminished because oi the
price. in consideration of which it may be
assigned. We thereiore conclude that; the
obligation oi the covenantor is the same
to the assignee that it was to the cove
nantee, and. being such, is governed by the
same measure of damages.
The third and iourth assignments oi er
ror present the question whether taxed
costs and attorney,s lees in excess oi the
purchase price, and interest thereon, may
be recovered on the covenant. We are
unable to discover any just principle upon
which costs, whether taxed or otherwise,
have been allowed to piaintiffs over and
" above the purchase price received by the
covenantor. and interest thereon. WE
readily perceive the justice of the rule by
which the value oi the land at the time of
the sale by him is accepted as the measure
oi the liability of the covenantor, and also
that the price paid shall be taken as con
clusive evidence oi that value. We also
appreciate theiairness oi allowing interest
on the purchase money as compensation
to the covenantee ior so long a time as he
has been held liable to theownerior mesne
profits. But why costs in excess oi the
purchase money and interest have ever been
allowed we cannot conjecture. In 4 Kent,
Comm. p. 476, it is said: “The measure of
damages on a total iailure oi title, even on
the covenant oi warranty, is the value o!
the land at the execution oi the deed; and
the evidence of that value is the consider
ation money. with interest and costs. ”
How costs, which are uncertain in amount.
varying with reference to the character oi
the suit, the number oi witnesses, and the
nature of the issues presented in a pro
ceeding, could ever have been supposed to
furnish any light upon t.he past value of
lands, passes our comprehension. . lint so
it is that. by practically an unbroken cur
rent oi authority, the rule has been estab
lished that they may be recovered in ad
dition to the purchase price and inter
est. Ruwle, Cov. c. 9; Suth. Dam. 302; 4
Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 566. Believing
that the rule allowing: any costs should
never have been established, we decline to
extend it beyond the limits oi the taxed
costs oi the case. Attorney,s ices have
been allowed in some states, and disal
lowed in others. The confiict in these de
cisions will bc iound in the cases cited by
the text writers, and the Encyclopedia,
above referred to. Constrained by author
ity to allow the taxed costs, we return to
correct principles at the first point at
which we may do so, and hold that the
attorney’s ices paid by the covenantee are
not recoverable on the covenant oi the
grantor. In this cause, the court allowed
the deiendant an attorney,s ice which,
added to tho taxed costs and other dam
ages, exceeded the value oi the land at the
time of the sale. and interest thereon, and
taxed costs. But, since the court also
erred in fixing the value oi the land at $6,
000, its value at the time of eviction, in
stead oi $6.296, the price paid to the de
iendant, both errors must be corrected to
make a proper result. The decree is re
versed, and decree here. v
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6 7 POPOSKEY v. MUNKWITZ.
(32 N. W. 35, (3 Wia. 322.)
Supreme Court of Wisconsin. March 1, 1887.
Appeal from circuit court, Milwaukee coun
W.
The action is by a lessee against his lessor
for failure of the latter to give the lessee
possession of the leased premises according
to the covenants in the lease. Under date of
October 22, 1884, the parties executed an in
denture of lease in and by which the de
fendant leased to the plaintiff his store, No.
411 Broadway, in the city of Milwaukee,
from November 15, 1884, to May 1, 1890, at
a yearly renttherein reserved, and therein
covenanted that, on paying such rent, and
performing the conditions contained in such
lease ‘to be performed by him, the plaintiff
should have the quiet and peaceful posses
sion of the leased premises during such terin.
The defendant was unable to give the plain
tiff the possession of the leased store be-
cause he had theretofore leased the same to
Wilde & Uhlig for three years, commencing
May 1, 1883, and Uhlig was lawfully in pos
session thereof under such lease when the
plaintiffs term under his lease commenced,
and so continued in possession thereafter.
The plaintiff paid the defendant rent until
lJecember 1, 1884, at the execution of the
lease, being $41.07, as stipulated in the lease,
and performed all his covenants therein con
tained. The plaintiff also put some goods in
the store with the consent of the defendant,
but.was required by Uhlig to take them
away. This involved an expenditure by the
plaintiff of $14.40. It is averred in the com
plaint that, for 12 years before the making
of the lease first above mentioned, the plain
tiff had carried on, in the city of Milwau
kee, and for the last five years in the vicinity
of the leased store, a wholesale and retail
business in pictures, picture-frames, and ar
tist’s materials, and in manufacturing pic
ture-frames, and had a very large and lucra
tive custom and patronage established in
said business; that be leased the store No.
411 Broadway for the purpose of carrying on
and continuing the same business therein, of
which the defendant had notice; that’such
store was especially well located, and adapt
ed to the requirements of plaintiff,s said
business; that, relying upon having posses
sion of the leased store at the stipulated time
in which to carry on his business, he pur
chased a large stock of goods adapted to the
holiday trade, in December, which is the
most profitable trade during the year; and
that he lost this trade by reason of his fail
ure to obtain possession of the store. Also
that, upon the refusal of the defendant to
give him possession of the store, the plain
tiff diligently endeavored, but without suc
cess, to obtain another store, suited to the re
quirements of his business,and that the rent
al value of the leased store for the term of
the lease is at least $22,000 more than the rent
thereof reserved in the lease. The closing
paragraph of the complaint is as follows:
"That, by reason of the premises, plaintiff,s
said business has been broken up and de
stroyed, and his trade and custom gone, and
his stock of goods purchased to carry on his
business at said store so leased has become
greatly depreciated and destroyed in value,
and plaintiff has lost the profits which he
would and could have made in continuing
and carrying on his aforesaid business at
said leased premises since said fifteenth day
of November, 1884, had said leased premises
been surrendered and delivered up to him as
agreed by defendant, and his said leasehold
interest in said premises been lost and de
stroyed, to the damage of plaintiff in the sum
of five thousand dollars." Judgment for $5,
000 and costs is demanded. The answer de
nies in detail each of the above averments,
except that the defendant owned the store
No. 411 Broadway, and executed a lease
thereof to the plaintiff as alleged in the com
plaint.
The controversy on the trial was confined
to the question of damages. The plaintiff
offered testimony forthe purpose of proving
the special damages stated in the complaint,
but the salne was rejected, and the judge
held that the measure of the plaintiffs dam
ages is the difference between the rent re
served in the lease and the actual rental
value of the store, together with the expense
of removing the plaintiff,s goods (before men
tioned) from the store after the term of the
lease commenced, and confined the testimo
ny to those elements of damages. Only a
single question was submitted to the jury,
which is as follows: “What was the actual
value per annum of the premises 411 Broad
way, Milwaukee, described in the lease from
defendant to plaintiff, from and after No
vember 15, 1884?" The jury answered $1,
200. The rent reserved in the lease until
May 1, 1987, is $1,000, and $1,200 thereafter.
On April 5, 1886, the court gave judgment
for the plaintiff for $272.14 damages, and for
costs of suit. It is recited in the order for
judgment that the plaintiff admitted he went
into possession of the leased store March 1,
1886. It is understood that the judgment is
made up of $200 per annum (being the ex
cess in the value of the rent as found by the
jury, over and above the rent stipulated in
the lease) from November 15, 1884, to \Iarcu
1, 1886, and the item of $14.40 above men
tioned. The item of $41.67 paid defendant
on account of rent was disallowed for die
reason (as stated by the court) that the lease
to plaintiff “assigned, by operation of law,
the premises during Uhllg,s term to Mr. Po
poskey, and he has the right to recover the
rent from Mr. Uhlig." The plaintiff appeals
from the judgment.
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Dey & Friend, for appellant. Jenkins,
Winkler, Fish &. Smith, for respondent.
LYON, J. This action was brought to re
cover damages for the failure of the defend
ant to put the plaintiff in possession of the
store No. 411 Broadway, Milwaukee, leased
by the former to the latter, at the time stipu
lated in the lease as the commencement of
the term. It is substantially an action for a
breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment
.ontained in the lease. 1 Tayl. Landl. & Ten.
309. This appeal presents for determina
ion the question, what is the true rule of
amages for a breach of that covenant in
hat case, in view of the facts proved and of
fered to be proved therein? The rule is un
doubtedly the same as in an action for a
breach of covenants for title in an absolute
conveyance; that is to say, had the plaintiff
purchased the store No. 411 Broadway of the
efendant, and taken an absolute convey
ance thereof, instead of a lease for five or
more years, under the same circumstances
which existed when the lease was executed,
the measure of his damages for a breach of
the covenants for title in such conveyance
would be the same that it is for a breach of
the covenant for quiet enjoyment in the
lease. 3 Suth. Dam. 147; Blossom v. Knox,
3 Pin. 262. Indeed, the covenant for quiet
enjoyment is one of the covenants for title in
a conveyance. Rawle, Cov. 17. It is also
said to be "an assurance consequent upon a
defective title." Id. 125.
The general rule of damages which ob
tains in England and many of our sister
states for a breach of covenant for title was
first authoritatively laid down in 1775, in the
case of the common pleas of Fiureau v.
Thornhill, 2 W. Bl. 1078. The defendant
.covenanted to sell the plaintiff a rent for a
term of years issuing out of leasehold prem
ises, but, without fault on his part, the de-
rendant was unable to make good title there
to. The plaintiff claimed damages for the
loss of his bargain, but it was held that he
was not entitled thereto. De Grey, C. J.,
said: “Upon a contract for a purchase, if the
title proves bad, and the vendor is (without
fraud) incapable of making a good one, I do
not think the purchaser can be entitled to
any damages for the fancied goodness of the
bargain which he supposes he has lost."
Blackstone, J., said: “These contracts are
merely upon condition, frequently expressed,
but always implied, that the vendor has a
good title." The rule oif the above case
has been much considered in both England
and this country; and while its scope has
been more clearly defined, and its applica
tion somewhat limited by later adjudica
tions, the rule itself. as applied to cases in
which the vendor honestly believed he had a
good title, but the title failed for some de
fect not known to him, and of which he was
not chargeable with notice, is now firmly es
tablished in the jurisprudence of England by
the judgment of the house of lords in Bain
v. Fothergill, L. R. 7 Eng. & Ir. App. 158.
As already observed, the rule prevails in sev
eral of the United States, including this
state, uvnder the limitations just men oned, of
(good faith and excusable ignorance of the
vendor of defects in his title. Indeed, these
are scarcely limitations, but rather an inter
pretation of the qualification “without
fraud," in the opinion by De Grey, C. J., in
the principal case. The rule as it now stands
has been applied in this state in Rich v.
Johnson, 2 Pin. 88; Blossom v. Knox, 3 Pin.
262; Nichol v. Alexander, 28 Wis. 118; Mes
ser v. Oestreich, 52 Wis. 684, 10 N. W. 6, and
in other cases.
Under this or any other rule, the piaintift
is entitled to recover the consideration paid
by him on account of the purchase. Hence,
in the present case, whatever may be the
measure of damages. the plaintiff should
have recovered the amount he advanced for
rent, and interest thereon.
en by the circuit judge for excluding this
amount from the plaintiffs recovery, towit,
that he could recover the rent from Uhlig,
the tenant under the paramount lease, is con
ceived to be unsound. The plaintitt did not
purchase a term subject to the lease of Uh
lig, but an absolute term; and while he
might, perhaps, have treated his lease as an
assignment of the rents accruing under the
prior lease, and collected the same from Uh
lig, there is no rule of law which compels
him to do so. Indeed, had he done so, it pos
sibly might have operated as a waiver of
any claim for damages for the breach of the
covenant sued upon.
The limitations of the rule of Fiureau v.
Thornhill, or rather the exceptions thereto,
are well stated in 3 Suth. Dam. 149, as fol
lows: I “Where a lessor knows, or is charge
able with notice, of such defect of his title
that he cannot assure to his lessee quiet en
joyment for the term which such lessor as
sumes to grant;1where he refuses, in viola
tion of his agreement, to give a lease, or pos
session pursuant to a lease, having the ability
to fulfill, as well as where the lessor evicts
his tenant,—he is chargeable with full dam
ages for compensation, and the doctrine of
Flureau v. Thornhili has no application. On
this general proposition the authorities agree.
In such cases the difference between the rent
to be paid and the actual value of the prem
ises at the time of the breach for the unex
pired term is considered the natural and
proximate damages. Where the lessee is de
prived of the possession and enjoyment un
der such circumstances, the lessor is either
guilty of intentional wrong, or he has made
the lease, and assumed the obligation to as
sure the lessee’s quiet enjoyment, with a
culpable ignorance of defects in his title. or
The reason giv-/
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on the chance of afterwards acquiring one.
In neither case has he any claim to favorable
consideration; and he is not excused, on the
doctrine of Flurean v. Thornhill, from mak
ing good any loss which the lessee may suf
fer from being deprived of the demised prem
ises for the whole or any part of the stipu
lated term." This quotation doubtless con
tains a correct statement of the law acted
upon in all the states, as well in those which
have adopted the rule in Flureau v. Thorn
hill as in those which have not.
We are clear that this case comes within
the exceptions. When the defendant leased
the store to the plaintiff, he knew that there
was a valid paramount lease upon the prem
ises, executed by himself to Wilde & Uhlig,
having 17 or 18 months to run after the com
mencement of the plaintiff,s term. There is
no claim that the former lessees had for
feited their lease. Indeed, the defendant aft
erwards made an unsuccessful attempt to
evict them by legal proceedings for an al
leged breach of the covenants of their lease,
occurring after the execution of the plaintiff,s
lease. But it was held there was no breach.
Munkwitz v. Uhlig, 64 “us. 380, 25 N. W.
424. These proceedings are in evidence.
Hence the defendant knew, when be leased
the store to the plaintiff, of a defect in his
title which prevented him from assuring to
the plaintiff the quiet enjoyment of the leas
ed premises. He thus entered into the con
tract on the chance of being able afterwards
to avoid, in some way, his lease to Wilde &
vL'hlig. but having no legal cause for avoiding
it. These facts deprive him of the protec
tion of the rule in Flureau v. Thornhill, and
bring the lease within the rule above quoted
from Sutherland. In other words, the case
is thus brought within the general rule
v’which prevails in actions for breaches of con
tracts, that the plaintiff shall recover the loss
he has proximately sustained by reason of
the breach.
But, in order to determine what elements
of loss come within the general rule, it is
necessary to apply other rules of law to the
particular case. In the present case (per
haps in most cases) the rules laid down in
the leading case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9
Exch. 341, 26 Eng. Law & Eq. 398, which
have many times been approved by this court,
are sufllcient. Shepard v. Milwaukee Gas
light Co., 15 Wis. 318; Hibbard v. W. U.
Tel. Co., 33 Wis. 558; Candce v. W. U. Tel.
Co., 34 Wis. 471; Walsh v. Chicago, M. &
St. P. R. Co., 42 Wis. 30; Hammer v. Schoen- .
felder, 47 Wis. 455, 2 N. W. 1129; Brown v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 54 Wis. 342, 11
N. W. 356, 911; Cockburn v. Ashland Lum
ber Co., 54 Wis. 619, 12 N. W. 49; McNa
mara v. Qlintonville, 62 Wis. 207, 22 N. W.
472; Thomas, B. & W. Manufg Co. v. Wa
bash, St. L. & P. R. Co., 62 Wis. 642, 22
N. W. 827; see, also. Richardson v. Chyno
weth, 26 Wis. 656. See, also, a very learned
1'
and elaborate note on the rule in the princi
pal case, in which a great number of cases
are cited and discussed, in 1 Sedgw. Dam.
218-23-i. These rules can best be stated by
a Quotation from the opinion in the principal
case by Alderson, B. He says: “Where two
parties have made a contract which one of
them has broken, the damages which the
other party ought to receive in respect of
such breach of contract should be such as
may fairly and reasonably be considered ei
ther arising naturally, i. e., according to the
usual course of things, from such breach of
contract itself, or such as may reasonably
be supposed to have been in the contempla
tion of both parties, at the time they made
the contract, as the probable result of the
breach of it. Now. if the special circum
stances under which the contract was actual
ly made were communicated by the plaintiffs
to the defendants, and thus known to both
parties, the damages resulting from the
breach of such a contract, which they would
reasonably contemplate, would be the amount
of injury which would ordinarily follow from
a breach of contract under these special cir
cumstances so known and communicated.
But, on the other hand, if these special cir
cumstances were wholly unknown to the
party breaking the contract, he, at the most,
could only be supposed to have had in his
contemplation the amount of injury which
would arise generally, and in the great mul
titude of cases, not affected by any special
circumstances from such a breach of con
tract. For, had the special circumstances
been known, the parties might have specially
provided for the breach of contract by spe
cial terms as to the damages in that case,
and of this advantage it would be very un
just to deprive them."
Another rule having its foundation in nat
ural justice should here be stated. In any
case of a breach of contract the party in
jured should use reasonable diligence, and
make all reasonable effort, to reduce to a
minimum the damages resulting from such
breach. The necessary expenses incurred by
him in so doing may be recovered in an ac
tion for such breach. This rule was early
laid down by this court in Bradley v. Den
ton, 3 Wis. 55?, and has been followed since.
For a full statement of the rule, and refer
ences to numerous adjudications sustaining
it, see 1 Suth. Dam. 148. Under this rule,
when the plaintiff was informed that the de
fendant could not give him possession of the
store as he had covenanted to do, (which
information was received by the plaintiff No
vember 7th, being eight days before the com
mencement of his term,) it became his duty
to use all reasonable efforts to procure an
other suitable place in which to carry on his
business if the damages which otherwise
would result from the breach of the defend
ant’s covenant would be thereby diminished.
We do not think, however, the plaintiff could
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be lawfully required to take another store
out of the vicinity in which he was doing
business when he took the lease from the de
fendant. By removing to a remote part of the
city, he might, and probably would, to some
extentl at least, have lost the good-will of
his business, which it is alleged he had car
ried on successfully for a series of years in
the vicinity of the store No. 411 Broadway.
Neither was he required to take another
store not reasonably well adapted to his busi
ness.
From the foregoing rules, and the partial
application of them already suggested, we
think the following propositions are estab
lished: (1) The plaintiff is entitled to recov
er the sum he paid as rent when the lease
was executed, and interest thereon; and also
the necessary expense of removing some of
his goods to the store, with defendant,s con
sent, and taking them therefrom after he
failed to get possession of the store. (2) If
the defendant did not know, when he exe
cuted the lease, the purposes for which the
plaintiff hired the store, or the uses to which
he intended to put it, the measure of the
plaintiffs damages for breach of the cove
nant for quiet enjoyment (in addition to the
special damages just mentioned) would be
that adopted by the trial judge; that is, th
difference between the rent reserved in the
lease and the actual rental value of the store,
without regard to what it is used for, which
the jury found to be $200 per annum. All
these are natural and proximate damages re
sulting from the breach. (3) If the defend
ant, then, knew that the plaintiff was carry
ing on the business stated in the complaint,
and hired the store No. 411 Broadway for
the purpose of continuing the same business
therein, and if, in the exercise of reasonable
diligence, the plaintiff might have procured
another store, reasonably well adapted to his
business and in the same vicinity, that is, in
a location in which he could have preserved
and retained substantially the good-will of
his former business, the rule of damages, in
addition to the special items first above men
‘tioned, will be the difference between the rent
.reserved in the lease and the actual rental
value of the leased store for the purpose of
\,carrying on such business therein. In such
Ease
the actual rental value would ordinarily
e measured by the amount of rent the plain
tiff would be compelled to pay for another
store equally well adapted to his business.
if he could obtain another store for the same
rent he was to pay the defendant, or less, of
course he would suffer no general damages
for the defendant,s breach of covenant, and
his recovery in that behalf would be con
fined to nominal damages, in addition to the
special damages first above mentioned. If,
however, the expenses of removing to an
other store would have been greater than
they would have been in removing to the
store No. 411 Broadway, such excess would
also be a proper item of damages. (4) If
the plaintiff could reasonably have procured
another suitable store for his business, he
cannot recover for damages to his business,
because by leasing, and continuing his busi
ness in, such other store, he might have
avoided such damages. (5) But knowing that
the plaintiff hired the store for the purpose
of continuing his former business therein, (if
he did know it,) and having e.vecuted'the
lease with knowledge that he could not put
the plaintiil.I in possession of the store at the
stipulated time because of his prior outstand
ing lease, the defendant took the risk of the
plaintiff being able to procure another suit
able store for his business, the inability of
the latter to do so would render the defend
ant liable for the damages resulting to plain
tiff,s busines by reason of the breach of
covenant complained of. This is plainly
within the rule of Hadley v. Baxendaie, su
pra, because, under such circumstances. the
parties may fairly be considered to have con
templated that the breach of covenant would
necessarily destroy or greatly impair the
value of plaintiff,s business. It should be
observed that, if the plaintiff recovers for
damages to his business, he cannot also re
cover the value of his lease under the above
second or third proposition, because such
value is necessarily a factor in estimating
the damages to the business. Smith v. Wan
derlich, '0 Ill. 426, (433.) He may, however,
in that case, recover the special damages
mentioned in the first proposition, for these
are not such factors.
It follows that the testimony which was of
fered by the plaintiff to show that the de
fendant knew, when he executed the lease to
the plaintiff, that the latter was carrying on
the business before mentioned in the same
vicinity, and took the lease of the store for
the purpose and with the intention of contin
uing such business therein, and that he was
unable, in the exercise of due diligence, to
flnd another store suitable for his business, .
was competent, and should have been re
ceived. Further, after the plaintiff makes a
prima facie case entitling him to recover for
damages to his business, proof should be re
ceived, under the pleadings, to show the
value of such business.
We agree with with Mr. Justice Paine. in‘
Shepard v. Gas-light Co., 15 Wis. 318, that
to ascertain the value of a business an in
vquiry as to the profits thereof is necessary.
Probable “value" and “net profits" are con
vertible terms as applied to a business. Yet
the law in many cases gives damages for
breache of contracts, based on pro,spective
profits, when they are fairly withini the con
templation of the parties, are not t remote
and conjectural. and are susceptib of being
ascertained with reasonable ce . ainty. If
the plaintiff shows himself en tied to re
cover for damages to his busin Qss, the char
acter, extent, and value of in; established
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business when the lease was executed, and
before, will furnish a guide to the jury in as
sessing the prospectlve and probable value
thereof, had the plaintiff been permitted to
transfer it to the store No. 411 Broadway.
Carried on in the immediate vicinity of the
old stand, and by the same person, presum
ably the business would have been equally
prosperous. This presumption may be re
butted by proof of facts and circumstances
tending to show that the business would
probably have been less remunerative had it
been so continued.
.It was said in argument that no case can be
found which gives damages .for the loss of
anticipated profits, because a landlord fails
to give possession at the time agreed upon.
This is scarcely a correct statement. The
case of Ward v. Smith, 11 Price, 19, cited
by Mr. Justice Paine in Shepard v. Gas-light
Co., supra, seems to be just such a case. It
is conceded that if the plaintiff had not a
business already built up and established in
the same vicinity, which, with its good-will,
could have been transferred to the store No.
411 Broadway, there would be no basis upon
which to estimate the prospective value of
the business which the plaintiff would have
done there had he obtained possession, and
carried on the business therein. In such case,
profits would probably be too conjectural and
uncertain to be the basis of a recovery.
Some of the cases refer to this distinction.
In Chapman v. Kirby, 49 Ill. 211, the court,
in speaking of the case of Green v. Williams,
45 Ill. 206, say: “In that case the lessee had
not entered upon the term, had not built up
or established a business, and had not suf
fered such a loss. There was not in that
case any basis upon which to determine
whether there ever would be any profits, or
upon which to estimate them." In the pres
ent case the offer was to prove facts which
would have shown a suflicient basis to de‘
termine whether there would be profits, and
upon which they might be estimated.
For the errors above indicated, the judg
ment of the circuit court must be reversed,
and the cause will be remanded for a new
trial. .
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A linto in good faith.
b i COHN v. NORTON.
(18 Atl. 595, 57 Conn. 480.)
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
Sept. 13, 1889.
Appeal from court of common pleas, New
Haven county; DI.I.\lIl\‘G, Judge.
Action by Louis (John against Samuel L.
Norton, for damages for breach of contract
to deliver possession of premises leased to
plaintiff. Judgment for plaintiff. Defend
ant appeals.
G. A. Fay, ior appellant.
forappellee.
CARPENTER, J. On the 18th day of Au
gust,1885, the defendant leased to the plaintiff
a store and dwelling-house, for one year from
the 1st day of S. pte.uber, with the privilege
of renewing the lease for three years, at a
monthly rent of $50, payable in advance.
One month,s rent was paid. The defendant
failed to put the plaintiff in possession. It
appears that when the lease was executed the
property was in the possession of one Alex
ander. under a prior lease, with the right to
hold the same until February 1. 1890. Ile
refused to surrender the possession. In an
action to recover damages the plaintiff
claimed to recover the sum of $80, amount
paid to clerks for release from contracts, and
the sum of $586.35, amount paid merchants
to take back goods bought, and for deprecia
tion on the goods. The defendant objected
to the introduction of all evidence upon either
of these claims. Theeourt admitted the evi
dence, and allowed both items as damages.
Assuming that the plaintiff is correct in
his claim that these were, or might have been,
R. S. Pickett,
‘ legitimate items of damage, still we think the
testimony was objectionable, unless it further
appeared that the sums paid were reasonable,
and that the obligation to pay was entered
. The mere fact that the
jplaintiff paid them is not of itself
suflicient
to establish either proposition; and it does
not appear that there was any other evidence
tending to establish them, or either of them.
If the clerks employed by the plaintiff had
sustained no damage, or damage to a less
amount, or if the plaintiff was under no legal
obligation to pay, then the payment was un
reasonable. The same is true of the money
paid to the merchants. If these clerks Were
hired after he know of the lease to Ale\,..inder,
it can hardly be claimed that the plaintiff
acted in good faith. How that was, we are
not told. It appears that he had full knowl
edge of that lease on the 23d of August; and
it is consistent with every fact found that all
the clerks were subsequently hired. So. too,
with respect to the purchase of the goods.
Four days after the plaintiff had actual
knowledge that Alexander could legally re
tain the possession, August 27th, he wrote
the defendant as follows: “As I am now sit
uated, I am on the fence, it being high time
for me to buy goods, and 1 don‘t know what
to do about it." On the same day he doubt
less received the defendant,s letter inform
ing him that the prior lease had a year and
five months longer to run. The evidence is
strong, if not conclusive. that he purchased
his goods after that. If so, in no event has
he any legal or moral claim on the defendant.
But the great question is, what is the rule
of damages in cases like this ‘? Before consid
ering that question we will briefly notice an
other claim that the defendant sets up, and
that is, that it was the duty of the plaintiff,
at his own expense, to take measures to gain
possession of the property. Whatever may
be the rule when a stranger wrongfully takes
and holds possession. the principle contended
for can have no application where a person
holding rightfully under the lessor retains the
possession. Nor are we prepared to sanction
the claim that in this case the defendant is
only liable for nominal damages. We can
hardly say that a landlord who knows, or who
has the means of knowing, that his property
is incumbered with an outstanding lease,
which may prevent his giving possession,
acts in good faith in leasing unconditionally
to another. We come back then to the ques
tion, what is the rule of damages? In Had
ley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch.341, the rule is laid
down thus: “Where two parties have made
a contract which one of them has broken,the
damages which the other party ought to re
eive in respect of such breach of contract
hould be either such as may, fairly and rea
sonably, be considered as arising naturally—
that is, according to the usual course of
hings-from such breach of contract itself,
r such as may reasonably be supposed to
ave been in the contemplation of both par
ies at the time they made the contract, as
he probable result of the breach of it."
This rule has been criticised somewhat, as
not being sullicienlly definite; but we appre
hend that any diliiculty of that sort has nec
essarily arisen from the dilliculty in applying
the rule in given cases. It is not an easy
matter, in many cases, to detegmine whether
a given result is the natural consequence of
a breach of a contract, or whether it arose
from a matter which may reasonably be sup
posed to have been contemplated when the
parties entered into the contract. Offentimes
it is aquestion on which men,s minds may
well differ. In that case the plaintiff was the
owner of a steam-mill. He sent the parts of
a broken shaft by the defendant. a carrier. to
a mechanic, to serve as a model for making
a new one. The carrier did not deliver the
article within a reasonable time, by reason of
which the plaintiff,s mill stood still several
days. In an action to recover damages the
defendant pleaded by paying £25 into court.
The case went to trial, and the plaintiff had
a verdict for £25 more. A rule to show cause
was argued, and the court promulgated the
rule we have quoted. In that case it was
contended that the loss of profits was the di
rect and natural consequence of the defend
ant’s neglect. The court did not accept that
view, but placed its decision on somewhat
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different grounds. The court says: “Now,
if the special circumstances under which the
contract was actually made were communi
cated by the plaintiff to the defendant, and
thus known to both parties, the damages re
sulting from the breach of such a contract
which they would reasonably contemplate
would be the amount of injury which would
ordinarily follow from a breach of contract
under these special circumstances, so known
and communicated. But, on the other hand,
if those special circumstances were wholly
unknown to the party breaking the contract,
he, at the must, could only be supposed to
have had in his contemplation the amount of
injury which would arise generally, and, in
the great multitude of cases, not affected by
any special circumstances from such a breach
of contract; for, had the special circumstances
been known, the parties might have especially
provided for the breach of contract by special
terms as to the damages in that case, and of
this advantage it would be very unjust to de
prive them." Thus the loss was attributed
to the failure of the plaintiff to inform the
defendant of the special circumstances, by
reason of which he contributed to the loss;
for, if the defendant had been fully informed,
it may be assumed that there would have been
a prompt delivery, and consequently no un
necessary loss, and because he was not so in
formed the court held that he was not liable
for special damages. The essence of the rule
seems to be that the defendant must, in some
measure, have contemplated the injury for
which damages are claimed. If it was the
direct and natural result of the breach of
contract itself, he did contemplate it; but if
the injury did not flow naturally from the
breach, but the breach combined with special
circumstances to produce it, then the defend
ant did not contemplate it, and consequently
is not liable, unless he had knowledge of the
special circumstances. There may, however,
be cases, growing out of the present methods
of business, in which a promise may be im
plied, from the nature of the transaction, or
the character.of the business in which the
party is engaged, to be prompt, and to use
the utmost diligence in the periormance of .
In such cases the law ‘the duty undertaken.
will not require the party to be specially in
formed, but will deem him to have contem
plated the importance of the business, and
hold him responsible accordingly.
Apply these principles to this case. The
store was hired for a clothing store. That
seems to be all that the defendant knew
about it. He did not request the plaintiff to
hire clerks and purchase goods, nor was he
advised that the plaintiff woulddo so. While
he may have supposed that the plaintiff l
would make suitable preparations to oc
cupy the store, yet he could not know what
preparations were necessary. He may have
n.eded no clerks, or they may have been pre
viously engaged, and the necessary goods
may have been thcn in his possession. As a
matter of law, it cannot be said that the de
fendant contemplated that the plaintiff would
hire clerks and purchase goods under such
circumstances as to incur heavy liabilities in
case of failure for any cause. In no proper
sense. therefore, was the defendant a party
to those arrangements, had no interest there
in, and had no right to interfere; conse
quently he cannot be held responsible. Again,
if these liabilities were incurred after the
plaintiff knew that it was doubtful whether
he could have the store, as they probably
were, then, as suggested in, a former part of
this opinion, they were incurred in bad faith,
and he assumed the entire risk. The En
glish rule, then, as we understand it, will not
justify the measure of damages applied by
the court below. The rule we have been
considering prevails generally in this country.
Closely allied to it is anotherprinciple, which
has some application to this case, and that is,
that profits which are in their nature doubt
ful or uncertain cannot be recovered as dam
ages in such cases. But this principle does
not exclude profits as such, but only those of
a contingent nature. If they are definite and
certain, and are lost by reason of the defend
ant’s breach of his contract, they are in some
cases recoverable. An instance of this is the
1 case of Booth v. Rolling-Mill Co., 60 N. Y.v
487. The plaintiff had contracted to deliver
to a railroad company 400 steel-capped rails
at a given price. The defendant engaged
with the plaintiff to manufacture them, but
failed to do so. The plaintiff was allowed to
recover the profits he would have made had
he been able to deliver the rails. If a loss of
i profits may thus be compensated, we see no
reason why a direct loss of money may not
i be compensated. In either event, however,
the loss must be certain, not only as to its
nature and extent, but also as to the cause
which produced it, and must be capable of
being definitely ascertained. In Grilfin v.
Colver, 16 N. Y. 489, the rule is thus stated:
“The broad, general rule in such cases is
that the party injured is entitled to recover
all his damages, including gains prevented as
well as losses sustained, and this rule is sub
ject to but two conditions: The damages
must be such as may fairly be supposed to
have entered into the contemplation of the
parties when they made the contract,—that
is, must be such as might naturally be ex
pected to follow its violation; and they must
be certain, both in their nature and in re
spect to the cause from which they proceed.”
Here we may concede that the loss sustained
was sulliciently definite and certain as to the
amount, but not so as to the cause from
. which it proceeded. As we have already seen,
it is not probable that the violation of the
contract caused these losses; but, on the other
hand, the plaintiff himself needlessly sub
jected himself to them.
In an Illinois case cited bythe plaintiff,
(Green v. Williams. 45 Ill. 206,) it was held
that necessary losses sustained might be re
covered. The plaintifi’s case will hardly
stand that test. The failure is twofold,—in
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respect to the necessity for hiring clerks, and
purchasing goods, in the first instance, and
also in respect to the payment of the sums
paid. There is no finding, and the facts do
not sufficiently indicate, that there was any
necessity for either.
Thus far we have assumed that the dam
ages recoverable in this case are the same as
in ordinary cases of breaches of contract.
The defendant, however, contends that the
rule in actions on covenants in lenses, ex
. press or implied; is that, where the plaintit‘f
has paid no rent or other expense, only
nominal damages can be recovered. Such a
rule once prevailed. It was adopted in anal
ogy to actions on covenants in deeds of real
estate, and it now prevails to a limited ex
tent in the state of New York. Conger v.
Weaver, 20 N. Y. 140. In that case DENIO,
J., not regarding the rule with favor, with
apparent reluctance considered that it was .\
too firmly established in that state to be dis
turbed. In Mack v. Patchin, 42 N. Y. 167,
b‘.\itTII, J., says: “But this rule has not beeni
very satisfactory to the courts in this countr_v,
and it has been relaxed or modified more
or less, to meet the injustice done to les
sees in particular cases." In Pumpelly v.
Phelps, 40 N. Y. 59, it is declared that the
rule should not be extended, but limited
3
strictly to those cases coming wholly and ex
actly within it. In both those cases the cir
cumstances are enumerated which will take
cases out of the operation of the rule. They
are so numerous as to well nigh abrogate the
rule itself. In l.lngland the rule has been re
pudiated, and such actions are placed upon
the same footing with other actions on con
tracts. Williams v. Burrell, 1 Man., G. & S.
402; Lock v. l:‘urze, 19 C. B. (N. S.) 96.
In this state the rule has not been adopted,
and we are not disposed to adopt it. We
think it better to discard the rule, so as to be
in it position to determine all such cases upon
the general principles applicable to other con
tracts. In that way we think we shall be
the better prepared to do justice in each case
as it arises.
We suppose the correct rule to he that the
plaintiff is entitled to recover the rent paid,
and the ditference between the rent agreed
to be paid and the value of the term, together
‘. with such special damages as the circmn
stances may show him to be entitled to.
,l‘rull v. Granger, 8 N. Y. 115. The theory
upon which the court below assessed dam
ages being inconsistent with these prin
ciples, the judgment must be reveised,and a
new trial ordered. The other judges con
curred.
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‘ 7 KNOWLES v. STEELE.
(61 N. W. 557.)
Supreme Court of Minnesota. Dec. 21, 1894.
Appeal from district court, Hennepin coun
ty; Henry G. Hicks, Judge.
Action by Alfred H. Knowles against
Franklin Steele, .lr., for damages for breach
of contract. Judgment was rendered for de
fendant, and plaintiff appeals. Afflrmed.
George R. Robinson, for appellant. Kit
chel, Cohen & Shaw, for respondent.
MITCHELL, J. The following condensed
statement of the facts will be suflicient for
the purposes of this appeal: In 1881, the
defendant, being the owner of the.premises
described in the complaint, executed a lease
(in which his wife joined) to plaintiff for
the term of 10 years at an agreed annual
rent. This lease contained a covenant that
if the lessee should desire to continue the
lease for another 10 years he should have
the privilege of doing so in the manner fol
lowing. Not less than three months before
the expiration of the original term the lessee
should give to the lessors notice in writing
of his election to continue the lease for an ad
ditional term, and in such notice name and
appoint an appraiser on his part. There
upon the lessors should appoint an appraiser
on their part, and notify the lessee of such
appointment. The two apprais:.rs thus ap
pointed were to appoint a third, and the
three so chosen were to appraise the leased
premises at their then fair market value.
"and thereupon, without any further’ act,
this lease shall thereupon be extended for
the further term of ten years. upon the
same terms and conditions as before, except
that the annual rent for such second term
shall be such sum as is equal to six per
centum of such appraised valuation." In
1891 plaintiff scasonably gave defendant
written notice of his election to continue to
lease for a second term, and in such notice
nominated an appraiser on his part to ap
praise the property for the purpose of fixing
the amount of the rent for the additional
term. On receipt of this notice defendant
sent plaintiff a written communication, by
which. in order to avoid the necessity of ap
pointing appraisers, he proposed to fix the
rent for the extended term at 6 per cent. on
the then present assessed valuation of the
property, $31,000. Immediately on receipt
of this proposition the plaintiff wrote to de
fendant, notifying him of his acceptance of
it. The fact was, although unknown to
plaintiff, that soon after the execution of the
lease in 1881 the defendant had conveyed
the premises, through the medium of a third
party, to his wife, from whom he had no au-v
thority to make or accept the proposition re
ferred to, and shortly afterwards she .wrote
plaintiff, notifying him that she declined to
be bound by the act of her husband, and sug
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gesting that, if they could not agree on the
amount of the rent, they should resort to an
appraisal of the property in accordance with
the terms of the lease. Plaintiff having re
fused to accede to the proposition, Mrs.
Steele brought an action against him to re
cover possession of the property, in which
the court decided that the notice served on
her husband was sufficient to bind Mrs.
Steele, but that she was not bound by the
proposition made by him fixing the rent,
and in accordance with the stipulation of the
parties to the action the court gave Mrs.
Steele further time in which to appoint an
appraiser on her part, which she did. The
two thus appointed by her and the present
plaintiff, respectively, selected a third, and
the three appraised the market value of the
premises at $35,000, on which basis the rent
for the second term was fixed at $2,100 per
annum, at which rate the plaintiff has since
paid, whereas the rent, according to the
proposition of the defendant and accepted
by plaintiff, would have been only $1,914 per
annum. This action was brought to recover
damages for defendant,s breach of his con
tract fixing the rent on the basis of the as
sessed value of the property. No evidence was
introduced as to the actual rental value of the
premises, and, the ejectment suit between‘
plaintiff and Mrs. Steele being res inter alios
acta, nothing done or determined in that ac
tion is evidence against the defendant on
that question.
The plaintiff contends that this is in the
nature of an action for the breach of the
covenant in the lease for the quiet enjoyment
of the leased premises; that plaintiff had a
right to purchase his right of possession
from the true owner, and that his damages
are what it cost him to secure this right.
over and above the rent agreed on between
him and defendant. The rule as to the
measure of damages attempted to be in
voked has no application to the case. Plain
tiffs quiet enjoyment under the lease has
not been disturbed. He has secured a sec
ond term on the exact terms upon which he
was entitled to it under the terms of the
lease. What he complains of is that, if de
fendant had been able to perform and had
performed a certain other contract, he would
have obtained the extension on better terms
than he was entitled to under the original
lease. He was not compelled to take a
second term at all, still less to take it at a
rent greater than the actual rental value of
the premises. Therefore the measure of his
damages, if he is entitled to any, is the loss
of his bargain, viz. the difference between
the rent agreed in the accepted proposition of
the defendant and the actual market rental
value of the premises at the time this agree
ment was made. Therefore, assuming that
the proposition of the defendant and the ac
ceptance of it by plaintiff constituted a bind
ing contract, still the plaintiff was at most
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only entitled, under the evidence, to nominal ders it unnecessary to consider any of the
damages; and a new trial will not be grant- other questions discussed by counsel. Judg
ed for a failure to assess nominal damages ment atflrmed.
Where no question of permanent right is in4
volved. Harris v. Kerr, 37 Minn. 537, 35 N. GILFILLAN, O. J., absent, on account o1'
W. 379; Hill. New Trials, p. 572. This ren- sickness; took no part.
MEN TAL SUFFERING. 227
7‘ SUMMERFIELD v. WESTERN UNION
TEL. C0.
(57 N. W. 973, 87 Wis. 1.)
Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Jan. 30, 1894.
Appeal from superior court, Douglas coun
ty; Charles Smith, Judge.
Action by Fred G. Summerfieid against
the Western Union Telegraph Company for
damages ‘for delay in transmitting a mes
sage. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant
appeals. Reversed.
The other facts fully appear in the follow
ing statement by WINSLOW, J.:
Action for damages for delay in the deliv
ery of a telegram. Plaintifl! resided on a
farm about 10 miles from the village of Iron
River, Wis. His mother lived at Lisbon, N.
D., with plaintiffs brother J. W. Summer
tleld. Defendant had an office at each of
these places. October 23, 1892, J. W. Sum
meriieid left at defendant,s office at Lisbon
a message addressed to plaintiff, care of Burt
Clark, Iron River, reading as follows:
"Mother is dying. Come immediately. J.
W. Summerlieid." The fees for the transmis
sion of the message were paid, but the evi
dence tended to show that the message was
negligently delayed, and was not delivered
to Clark until October 28, 1892, and plaintltt
did not receive it until after noon of that day.
Piaintiifs mother died on the 26th day of
October. Plaintiff claimed that he would
have gone to his mother’s bedside had he re
ceived the telegram in due time, and that,
by reason of his failing to receive the mes
sage until after his mother‘s death, he was
deeply “mortified, grieved, hurt, and shock
ed, and suffered intense anguish of body and
mind, and was thereby thrown into a state
.of nervous excitement and tremor. which ren
dered him sick, and impaired his health and
strength, and that he still suffers from the
effect of the same." Upon the trial, objection
was made to the reception of any evidence
under the complaint, because it did not state
facts sufllclent to constitute a cause of ac
tion, wlhlch objection was overruled, and ex
.ception was taken.
The court charged the jury, among other
things, as follows: “If you find that the
message, in the exercise of ordinary dili
gence, considering all the circumstances of
the case, was unreasonably delayed, and
that, if it had been delivered with reasonable
promptness, the plaintiflf could and would
have responded thereto, and reached his
mother before her death, and that plaintiff
.suffered mental pain from a sense of disap
pointment, sorrow, chagrin, or grief at being
.deprived of being at his mother,s deathbed,
your verdict should be for the piaintiff in
such sum as will fairly compensate him for
his mental suffering and damages, if any, to
his nervous system, caused by the shock of
such mental suffering." A verdict for the
piaintiff for $652.50 was rendered, and, from
judgment thereon, defendant appealed.
Catlin & Butler, Carl C. Pope, and La Fol
iette, Harper, Roe & Zimmerman (Geo. H.
Fearons, of counsel), for appellant.
Mental anguish alone, caused by the negli
gent failure of a telegraph company to
promptly transmit and deliver a message,
will not sustain an action for damages by the
addressee. Wyman v. Leavitt, 71 Me. 227.
230; Bovee v. Danville, 53 Vt. 183, 190;
Canning v. Wllllamstown, 1 Cush. 451, 452;
Paine v. Railway Co., 45 Iowa, 569, 573, 574;
City of Salina v. Trosper, 27 Kan. 5-l4, 564;
Keyes v. Railway Co., 36 Minn. 290, 293, 30
N. W. 888; Clinton v. Laning, 61 Mich. 355,
361, 28 N. W. 125; Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.
S. 22, 26, 9 Sup. Ct. 696; Ewing v. Railway
Co., (Pa. Sup. 1892,) 23 Atl. 340; Railway
Co. v. McGinnis, 46 Kan. 109, 113, 26 Pac.
453; Commissioners v. Coultas, 13 App. Gas.
222, 225.
Mcllugh, Lyons & McIntosh, for respond
ent.
“Mental anguish and suffering occasioned
by the failure to deliver a telegraph message
are proper elements of damage in an action
against the telegraph company by the person
injured, and constitute grounds for recovery,
though no pecuniary loss is shown." Tele
graph Co. v. Newhouse, (Ind. App.) 33 N. E.
800; I Suth. Dam. 260, 645; 37 Cent. Law
J. 61; Womack v. Telegraph Co., (Tex. Civ.
App.) 22 S. W. 417; Bell v. Railway Co., L.
it. 26 Ir. 428; Railroad Co. v. Grifiin, (Tenn.)
22 S. W. 737; Beasley v. Telegraph Co., 39
Fed. 181; Telegraph Co. v. Stratemeier, (Ind.
App.) 32 N. E. 871; So Relle v. Telegraph Co.,
55 Tex. 310; Young v. Telegraph Co., 107 N.
C. 370, 11 S. E. 1044; Reese v. Telegraph Co.,
123 Ind. 294, 24 N. E. 163; Telegraph Co. v.
Henderson, 89 Ala. 510, 7 South. 419; Wads
worth v. Telegraph Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 8 S.
W. 574; Chapman v. Telegraph Co., (Ky.) 13
S. W. 880; Stuart v. Telegraph Co., 66 Tex.
580, 18 S. W. 351; Willson v. Railroad Co.,
(Wash) 32 Pac. 468_
WINSLOW. J., (after stating the facts.)
The exact question presented by the instruc
tion of the court to the jury is whether men
tal anguish alone, resulting from the negli
gent nondelivery of a telegram, constitutes
an independent basis for damages. At com
mon law it was well settled that mere in
jury to the feelings or affections did not con
stitute an independent basis for the recov
cry of damages. Cooley, Torts, 271; Wood’s
Mayne, Dam. (1st Amer. Ed.) § note 1.
It is true that damages for mental suffering
have been generally allowed by the courts in
certain classes of cases. These classes are
well stated by Cooper, J., in his learned
opinion in the case of Telegraph Co. v. Rog
ers, (Miss.) 9 South. 823, as follows: “(1)
Where, by the merely negligent act of the
defendant, physical injury has been sustain
ed; and in this class of cases they are com
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pensatory, and the reason given for their
allowance is that the one cannot be separat
ed from the other. (2) In actions for breach
of the contract of marriage. (3) In cases of
willful wrong, especially those affecting the
liberty, character. reputation, personal se-
curity, or domestic relations of the injured
party." To this latter class belong the ac
tions of malicious prosecution, slander and
libel, and seduction, and they contain an ele
ment of malice. Subject to the possible ex
ccptions contained in the second and third
of the above classes, it is not believed that
there was any case,—certainly no well-con
sidered case.—prior to the year 1881, which
held that mental anguish alone constituted
a sufiicient basis for the recovery of dam
ages. In that year, however, the supreme
court of Texas, in So Belle v. Telegraph Co.,
55 Tex. 308, decided that mental suffering
alone, caused by failure to deliver such a
telegram as the one in the present case, was
sufllcient basis for damages. The principle
of this case has been followed with some va
riations, by the same court, in many cases
since that decision, and its reasoning has
been substantially adopted by the courts of
last resort in the states of Indiana. Ken
tucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Ala
bama, in cases which are cited in the briefs
of counsel. On the other hand, the doctrine
has been vigorously denied by the highest
courts in the states of Georgia Florida, Mis
sissippi, Missouri, Kansas, and Dakota, and
by practically the unanimous current of au
thority in the federal courts. All of these
cases will be preserved in the report of this
case, and the citations need not be repeated
here. The question is substantially a new
one in this state, and we are at liberty to
adopt that rule which best commends itself
to reason and justice. It is true that it has
been held by this court, in \Valsh v. Railway
Co., 42 Wis. 32; that, in an action upon
breach of a contract of carriage, damages
were not recoverable for mere mental dis
tress; but, as we regard this action as being
in the nature of a tort action, founded upon
a .neglect.of the duty which the telegraph
company owed to the plaintiff to deliver the
telegram seasonably, that decision is not con
trolling in this case. The reasoning in favor
of the recovery of such damages is, in brief,
that a wrong has been committed by defend
ant which has resulted in injury to the plain
tiff as grievous as any bodily injury could be,
and that the plaintiff should have a remedy
therefor. On the other hand,/the argument
is that such a doctrine is an innovation upon
long-established and well-understood princi
ples of law; that the difllculty of estimating
the proper pecuniary compensation for men
tal distress is so great, its elements so vague,
shadowy, and easily simulated, and the new
field of litigation thus opened up so vast,
that the courts should not establish such a
rule. Regarding. as we do, the Texas rule
as a clear innovation upon the law as it
previously existed, we shall decline to follow
it, and shall adopt the other view, namely,
that for mental distress alone, in such a case
s the present, damages are not recoverable)
The subject has been so fully and ably dis
cussed in opinions very recently delivered
that no very extended discussion will be at
tempted here. We refer specially to the
opinions in Telegraph Co. v. Rogers, (Miss)
9 South. 823; Council v. Telegraph Co., (Mo.
Sup.) ‘22 S. W. 345; Telegraph Co. v. Wood,
57 Fed. 471. See, also, Judge Lurton,s dis
enting opinion in Wadsworth v. Telegraph
Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 8 S. W. 574. In the last
named opinion the following very apt re
marks are made: "The reason why an inde
pendent action for such damages cannot and
ought not to be sustained is found in the re
moteness of such damages, and in the meta
physical character of such an injury, consid
ered apart from physical pain. Such injuries
are generally more sentimental than substan
tial. Depending largely on physical and
nervous conditions, the suffering of one un
der prccisely the same circumstances would
be no test of the suffering of another. Vague
and shadowy, there is no possible standard
by which such an injury can be justly com
pensated, or even approximately measured.
Easily simulated and impossible to disprove,
it falls within all of the objections to specu
lative damages, which are universally ex- -
eluded because of their uncertain character."
v
Another consideration which is, perhaps, of '
equal importance, consists in the great field
for litigation which would be opened by the
logical appiicatidn of such a rule of dam
ages. If a jury must measure the mental
suffering occasioned by the failure to deliv
er this telegram, must they not also measure
the vexation and grief arising from a fail
ure to receive an invitation to a ball or a
Thanksgiving dinner? Must not the morti
fication and chagrin caused by the public use
of opprobrious language be assuaged by mon
ey damages.? Must not every wrongful act
which causes pain or grief or vexation to an
other be measured in dollars and. cents?
Surely, a court should be slow to open so
vast a field as this without cogent and over
powering reasens. For ourselves we see no
such reasons. We adopt the language of
Gantt, P. J., in Council v. Telegraph Co., su
pra: “We prefer to travel yct awhile super
antiquas vias. If, in the evolution of society
and the law, this innovation should be deem
ed necessary, the leglslnture can be safely
trusted to introduce it, with those limitations
and safeguards which will be absolutely nec
essary, judging from the variety of cases that
have sprung up since the promulgation of the
Texas case."
It was argued that under chapter 171,
Laws 1885, (Saab. & B. Ann. St. § 1770b.)
damages for injuries to feelings alone might
'
be recovered. This law provides that tele
graph companies shall be liable for all dam
ages occasioned by failure or negligence of
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their operators, servants, or employee in re
ceiving, copying, transmitting, or delivering
dispatches or messages. We cannot regard
this statute as creating, or intended to create,
in any way, new elements of damage.
Whether its purpose was to obviate the diffi
culties which were held fatal to a recovery
in the case of Cundee v. Telegraph Co., 34
Wis. 471, or to effect some other object. is
not a question which now arises; but it
seems clear to us that, had a radical change
in the law relating to the kinds of suffering
which should furnish a ground of damages
been contemplated, the act would have ex
pressed thnt intention in some unmistakable
way. We see nothing in the law to indicate
such intention.
Finally, it is said that verdicts for injuries
to the feelings alone have been sustained in
this court, and the following cases are cited.
Wightman v. Railway Co., 73 Wis. 169, 40
N. W. 689; Crnker v. Railway Co., 36 Wis.
657; Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450,21 N. W.
527. Without reviewing these cases in de
tail, it is suflicient to say that there was in.
all of them the element of injury or discom
fort to the person, resulting either from actu
al or threatened force, and they cannot be
relied upon as precedents for the allowance
of damages for mental sufferings alone.
It follows from these views that the instruc
tion excepted to was erroneous. Judgment
reversed, and action remanded for a new
trial. .
CASSODAY, J., dissents.
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‘I / CAHILL v. MURPHY. (No.14,047.)
(30 Pac. 195, 94 Cal. 29.)
Supreme Court of California. March 26, 1892.
Commissioners’ decision. Department 2.
Appeal from superior court, Humboldt coun
ty; G. W. Hunter, Judge.
Action by Mary Cahill against Daniel Mur
phy for slander. From a judgment for plain
tiff, and from an order denying his motion
for a new trial, defendant appeals. Aflirm
ed.
Frank McGowan, for appellant.
Weaver, for respondent.
J. H. G.
FITZGERALD, C. This is an action for
slander. The complaint alleges, in sub
stance, that on or about the 21st day of Sep
tember, 1889, and for a long time prior
thereto, plaintiff, with her children, occupied
certain rooms in an hotel of which the de
fendant was owner and proprietor; that one
of these rooms was situated on the ground
floor of the hotel, and used by her for the
purpose of carrying on and conducting a gen
eral merchandising business; that on said
last-mentioned date, the soot in the chimney
leading from the mom used as a store be
came ignited, causing an alarm of fire to be
given; and it is further alleged, upon in
formation and belief, that the fire was com
municated to the soot in the chimney from a
fire in the stove situated in said store. The
slanderous words, out of which this action
arose, are alleged to have been falsely and
maliciously spoken by the defendant of and
concerning the plaintiff, and are laid as fol
lows: “This is twice you [the plaintiff mean
ing] have tried to burn us [the said hotel
meaning] out to get your fourteen hundred
dollars insurance. But I will report you
[the said plaintiff meaning] to the insurance
company to-morrow morning, and have your
insurance taken away from you." It is fur
ther alleged that the defendant, by the use
of these words, intended to convey the mean
ing that the plaintlff willfully and malicious
ly communicated the fire to the soot in said
chiinney, and that by so doing she was
guilty of an attempt to commit the crime of
arson. and that they were so understood by
. those in whose presence they were uttered,
to the damage of plaintiff,s character and
business in the sum of $10,000. A demurrer
was interposed to the complaint, which, upon
the grounds stated, was properly overruled.
Defendant thereupon answered, specifically
denying the material allegations of the com
plaint, and, upon the issues thus joined,
plaintiff had verdict and judgment for $1,200.
The only error complained of, which we
deem it necessary to consider, relates to the
ruling of the court upon defendant,s objec
tion to the following question propounded to
plaintiff on her examination in chief as a
witness, and after she had testified, without
4
objection, that she had “a family of four
children." “Question. How many of them
are dependent upon you for support?" (Ob
jected to on the ground that the question ‘is
incompetent and immaterial.’ The objection
was overruled by the court, and defendant
excepted.) Answer. Three are dependent up
on me at present" It is claimed that the
effect and purpose of this testimony was to
arouse the sympathies and sentimental feel
ings of the jury, to the prejudice of defend
ant’s case, by the introduction of an element
that did not belong to it, and which the jury
could not properly consider in the assess
ment of damages. In Rhodes v. Naglee, 66
Cal. 681, 6 Pac. 863, the ruling of the court
below permitting the piaintiff, against de
fendant,s objection, to prove that he was a
married man, and had a family, was held
not to be erroneous. And in Dixon v. Allen,
09 Cal. 527, 11 Pac. 179, the mother of the
plaintiff was allowed to testify as to the
number of her children, their ages, and the
death of her husband. The rule laid down
by this court in those cases rests upon the
principle (although not stated) that, as men
tal suffering entitled the plaintiff to compen
sation in cases of this character, such suffer
.
ing may be increased, and the damages con
sequently enhanced, by the fact that the
members of the plaintiff,s family would suf
fer by reason of the disgrace visited upon
her by the slanderous charge. It was there
fore competent in this case, on the question
of damages, to prove the number and ages
of plaintiff,s children; but that they were
dependent on her for support was irrelevant,
and not within the issues raised by the
pleadings; therefore erroneous. But was it
such a material error as would justify a re
versal? The rule in this state is well set
tled that injury will be presumed from er
ror unless the record aflirmatively shows to
the contrary. It was competent, as we have
stated, for the plaintiff to prove the number
and ages of her children, and, if it appeared
from the evidence that they were minors,
the presumption would be that they were
naturally and legally dependent on her.for
support. The effect, therefore, of such evi
dence would be the same as if proven by
direct testimony. The evidence upon which
the verdict was founded shows that the slan
derous words charged were spoken wantonly
and maliciously. The plaintiff was there
fore entitled to recover of the defendant ex
emplary or punitive damages, and the assess
ment of such damages wa almost entirely
in the discretion of the jury. In view, there
fore, of the enormity of the charge. and the
situation of the parties, the plaintiff being a
defenseless woman’ coupled with the amount
of damages awarded by the jury as com
pared with the sum sued for, we are satisfied
that the jury was not influenced by this evi
dence prejudielaily to the defendant,s case.
The verdict might well have been for a much
larger sum, and yet not obnoxious to the ob
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jection that it was excessive. In this case We concur: TEMPLE, C.; FOOTE, C.
we think the evidence immaterial, and its ad
mission by the court a mere technical error. PER CURIAMI For the reasons given in
People v. Fick, 89 Cal. 144, 26 Pac. 759. The the foregoin"g opinion the judgment and or
judgmevt and order should be aflirmed, and der are aflirmed.











(20 s. w. 209, 111 Mo. 506.)
Supreme Court of Missouri. Division No. 2.
Sept. 20, 1892.
Appeal from circuit court, Lewis county;
Benjamin E. Turner, Judge.
Action by Jennie Beck, by her next friend,
Oliver Beck, Sr., against Elijah Dowell, ex
ecutor. From a judgment for plaintiff, de
fendant appeals. Afiirmed.
Blair & Marchand and M. .\lcKeag. for ap
pellant.
0. Anderson, for respondent.
GANTT, P. J. This cause was appealed
from the circuit court of Lewis county to the
St. Louis court of appeals. That court, in
an opinion by Judge Rombauer, affirmed the
judgment of the circuit court, (40 Mo. App.
71;) but Judge Biggs being of the opinion
that the conclusion reached by the majority,
that evidence of the financial condition of the
plaintiff, in an action when the evidence will
justify the jury in awarding exemplary or
punitive damages, was admissible, is in con
flict with and opposed to two decisions of this
court, to wit, Overholt v. Vieths, 93 Mo. 422,
6 S. W. 74, and Stephens v. Railroad Co., 96
Mo. 207, 9 S. W. 589, the cause was, under
the constitution, certified to this court.
1. When the cause was heard in the court
of appeals. the instructions were not in the
record. No efforts were made to supply them
in that court, and that court rightly proceed
ed on the assumption that the trial court had
correctly declared the law to the jury. Since
the case has reached this court, a certified
copy of the instructions has been flied with
the record. The propriety of considering
these declarations of law by this court, under
these circumstances, suggests itself at once.
While this court obtains jurisdiction to “re
hear and determine a cause so certified to
us by either of the appellate courts, as in
cases of jurisdiction obtained by ordinary
appellate process," there is nothing in the
(,onstltntlo1l that justifies parties in assuming
that we will or can take cognizance of mat
tors not in the record. When a record is de
ficient in any material respect, the practice
is uniform that the party desiring the absent
record should suggest the diminution, and
apply for a writ of certiorarl, or file stipula
tions in this court, supplying the record. In
this case nothing of the kind has been done,
but from the brief of the appellant. we take
it he assumes that these instructions are
properly before us. There is no hardship in
requiring parties to govern themselves by
the rules of procedure, established for the
disposition of causes. For the purposes of
this appeal, these instructions are no part of
the record, and the cause will be determined
on the presumption that the trial court cor
rectly instructed the jury. Parties must pur
Clay & Ray, F. L. Schofield, and J.
sue legal methods in perfecting their tran
scripts, and in the proper courts, and in prop
er seasons.
2. The point in this record, then, is that
upon which the court of appeals divided. is
evidence of the financial condition of the
piaintifi? admissible in an action for damages,
when there are circumstances of oppression
or malice? That exemplary damages may he
recovered in actions for trespass or personal
torts accompanied by circumstances of malice
or oppression is no longer open to question
in this state. Buckley v. Knapp, 48 Mo. 152.
Nor is it controverted that it is perfectly
competent to show the financial ability of the
defendant in such a case. The case of Ste
phens v. Railroad Co., 96 Mo. 214, 9 S. W.
589, was an action for compensatory dam
ages alone, and the learned judge who wrote
the opinion expressly says: “There is noth
ing in the case to justify the giving of ex
emplary damages, and the damages should
be confined to compensation for the injuries
sustained." The case of Overholt v. Vieths.
93 Mo. 422, 6 S. W. 74, had no element in it
justifying exemplary damages, and this court
held that it was not improper to exclude evi
dence of the mother,s financial condition in
a suit for the death of her child which had
been drowned in a pond, “in view of the fact
that she had been allowed to state her condi
tion in life, and that she did her own house
work and had no servant." We do not think
either of these cases can be considered as de
cisive of the point in this case. Exemplary
damages are allowed. not only to compensate
the sufferer, but to punish the offender.
Franz v. Hliterbrand, 45 Mp. 121; Callahan
v. Caffarata, 39 Mo. 137. The evidence in
this case tended to show that the plaintiff
was a girl about 16 years old; that her fa
ther was a tenant of defendant; that on the
day she was shot by defendant her father
and his sons were trying to water a cow in a
lot of the defendant; that a difliculty ensued,
—a general fight; that she,was standing in
the lot looking on, unarmed, when the de
fendant turned upon her, and shot her through
the thigh. In other words, the defendant,
with a deadly weapon, shot an unarmed girl
without lawful provocation. We think there
was ample evidence from which the jury
could find willful, wanton injury. In 1 Suth.
Dam. p. 745, it is said: "In actions for torts,
the damages for which cannot be measured
by a legal standard, all the facts constituting
and accompanying the wrong should be prov
ed;. and though there be a legal standard
for the principal wrong, if aggravations exist
1they may be proved to enhance damages; and
every case of personal tort must necessarily
‘go to the jury on its special facts. These
embrace the res gestze and the age, sex, and
status of the parties: this, whether the mse
be one for compensation only, or also for
exemplary damages, when they are allowed."
In Bump v. Betts. 23 Wend. 85, the supreme
court of New York, on a question of excess
FINANCIAL CONDITION OF PARTIES. 233
ive damages, pointed to the fact that the de
fendant had the command of great wealth,
and that the plaintiff was a poor man. In
McNamara v. King, 7 Iii. 432, in an action
for assault and battery, the court permitted
the plaintiff to show he was a poor man with
a large family. The supreme court of Illi
nois, in affirming that ruling, said: “We are
also of the opinion that the circuit court de
cided correctly in admitting the evidence and
giving the instruction. [In actions of this
kind. the condition in life and circumstances
of the parties are peculiarly the proper sub
jects for the consideration of the jury in es
timating the damages. Their pecuniary cir
cumstances may be inquired into. I It may
be readily supposed that the consequences of
a severe personal injury would be more dis
astrous to a person destitute of pecuniary
resources, and dependent wholly on his man
ual exertions for the support of himself and
family, than to an individual differently situ
ated in life. The effect of the injury might
be to deprive him and his family of the com
forts and necessaries of life. It is proper
that the jury should be influenced by the pe
cuniary resources of the defendant.
more aifluent, the more able he is to remuner
ate the party he has wantonly injured." In
Grable v. Margrave, 4 Ill. 372, in an action
for seduction, the trial court admitted evi
dence to show piaintiff was a poor man. The
supreme court, on appeal, said: “The court
therefore decided correctly in admitting evi
dence showing the pecuniary condition of the
plaintiff. This evidence does not go to the
jury for the purpose of exciting their preju
dices in favor of the plaintiff because he is
a poor man, but to enable them to understand
fully the effect of the injury upon him, and to
give him such damages as his peculiar condi
tion in life and circumstances entitle him to
receive." In Galther v. Blowers, 11 Md. 536,
in an action for assault and battery, the trial
court having admitted evidence for the plain
tiff, with a view of increasing his damages,
that he was a laboring man and had a wife
and children to support, the supreme court,
after quoting the language of McNamara v.
King, 7 Ill. 432, says: “This is good sense,
and is sustained by the decisions in most of
the states. An injury done to a person not
dependent on manual labor for the support
of himself and family is in no wise as great
The
’
vand nature of their business.’
as one to a person so ituated." In Reed v.
Davis, 4 Pick. 215, the supreme court of
Massachusetts, in an action for trespass in
forcibly evicting plaintiff from his home,
says: “One of the defendants stated to a
witness, in answer to his inquiry whether he
thought the plaintiff could not make him suf
fer, that ‘the plaintiff had been to jail, and
sworn out, and was not able to do anything.‘
Now, that circumstance was to be taken into
consideration by the jury. There is nothing
more abhorrent to the feelings of the sub
jects of a free government than oppressing
the poor and distressed under the forms and
color, but really in violation, of the law." “It
is found that the dwelling house was small,
but the damages are not to be graduated by
the size of the building. The plaintiff also
was poor. He had seen better days, but had
been reduced in his circumstances. He was
thought not to be able to do anything in vin
dication of his rights at the law." In Dailey
v. Houston, 58 Mo. 361, this court said: "It is
next insisted that the court improperly told
.the jury that, in the estimation of damages,
they might take into consideration the ‘con
dition in life of plaintiffs, and their pursuits
There is no
doubt but that, in estimating damages in
such cases, the jury may properly take into
consideration the pecuniary condition of the
parties, their position in society, and all other
circumstances tending to show the vindictive
ness, or atrocity or want of atrocity, in the
transaction, and which tend to characterize
the assault." This decision of Judge Vories
was concurred in by all the judges. It has
never, to our knowledge and so far as we can
ascertain, been questioned, denied, or criti
cised. It is in harmony, as we have seen,
with the decisions of other courts of great
ability. It is in harmony with the tendency
of the courts to place before the triers of
facts, whether court or jury, every fact that
will aid them in arriving at a correct verdict.
It is evident in this case its effect was not to
create prejudice or passion. There is noth
ing that smacks of either in the verdict. Ac
cordingly we afllrm the judgment of the
court of appeals, as indicated by the opinion
of the majority of the judges of that court,
on this as well as all other points ruled in the
case, and it will be so certified to that court.
All concur.
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7 3 HAYNER v. COWDEN. E. 2; Buck v. Henly, 31 Me. 558; Redway v.
(27 Ohio St. 292.)
Supreme Court of Ohio. c. Term, 1875.
Error to district court, iami county.
James Murray, J. T Janvier, and H. G.
Sellers, for plaintiff a error. Conover 8:
Craighead and Morris & Son, for defendant
in error.
WRIGHT, J. The slander alleged in the
petition consists in falsely charging plaintiff,
a minister of the gospel, with drunkenness.
It is also averred that the words were spok
en of and concerning him in his ministerial
profession and pastoral office. The demurrer
admits all that is averred, and thus this
question is raised: Are words which charge
a minister of the gospel with drunkenness,
when spoken of him in his profession or call
ing, actionable per se? We answer that they
are. We understand the rule to be, that
words spoken of a person tending to injure
him in his ofilce, profession or trade are thus
actionable. 1 Starkie, Sland. 9; Townsh.
Sland. & L. 5 182; 2 Add. Torts, 957 (section
2, c. 17, Edition of 1876 of this book, has a
large collection of authorities on the sub
ject); 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 102; Foulger v. New
comb, L. R. 2 Exch. 327; Demarest v. Har
ing, 6 Cow. 76.
Calling a clergyman a drunkard was held
actionable in McMillan v. Birch, 1 Binney,
176; Chaddock v. Briggs' 113 Mass. 251.
Such words are actionable because they
tend to deprive him of the emoluments which
pertain to his profession, and may prevent
his obtaining employment. It is not, as
counsel seem to suppose, that giving a
clergyman this right of action is because his
office is higher than that of his fellow men.
It is a right which belongs to all who have
professions or cailings, and in this clergy
men are not different from others.
This principle is entirely different from
that upon which proceeded the cases of Ho1
lingsworth v. Shaw. 19 Ohio St. 430; Dial v.
Holter, 6 Ohio St. 228; Alfele v. Wright, 17
Ohio St. 238. In all these, the words im
puted a criminal offense, and did not relate
to profession or calling.
Upon the trial of the case, it was insisted
by defendant that the words were not spo
ken of the plaintiff in his character as a min
ister. The court fairly left this to the jury,
and said if they were not so spoken, they
would find for defendant. The jury find this
issue for the plaintiff, and in the face of
that finding, it is impossible for us, sitting
as a court of error. to say that they were not
spoken of the plaintiff in his character or
capacity as a clergyman. if they were as
we have seen, they are actionable.
In the cases cited by defendant—Lumly v.
Allday, 1 Tyrw. 217; Brayne v. Cooper, 5
Mees. & W. 249; Ayre v. Craven, 2 Adol. &
Gray, 31 Vt. 292; Van Tapel v. Capron, 1
Denio, %0—it was held that the words spo
ken did not touch the plaintiffs in their va
rious trades or employments. But to charge
a minister with drunkenness does have such
an effect. Congregations would not employ
clergymen with intemperate habits, and the
development of such a vice would be cause
for speedy removal from ofllce. When the
question is reduced to a mere matter of dol
lars and cents, the purity, the integrity, the-
uprightness of a minister’s life is his capital
in this world,s business.
Against the objection made, plaintiff o8er
ed evidence of the wealth of the defendant,.
and in the charge the court said this evi
dence might be considered in. connection
with the question of exemplary damages.
We see no error in the admission of the evi
dence or the charge of the court upon the
subject. That punitive or exemplary dam
ages in a proper case may be given is not an
open question in Ohio. In Roberts v. Ma
son, 10 Ohio St. 277; Smith v. Pittsburg, Ft.
W. & C. Ry. Co., 23 Ohio St. 10, the court
allowed the jury to consider the wealth of
defendant in connection with the question of
punitive damages. If, then, punishment be-
an object of a verdict, a small sum would)
not be felt by a defendant of large wealth.
The vengeance of the law would scarcely be-
appreciated, and he could afford to pay and
slander still. There are cases which put
the admission of the evidence upon this
ground. Alpin v. Morten, 21 Ohio St. 536, in
timates that the reason is to enable the jury
to determine how much plaintiff has been
injured. This case collects the authorities
on both sides of the question, to which
might be added McBride v. Laughlin, 5
Watts, 375: Wagoner v. Richmond, Wright,
173; Sexton v. Todd, Id. 320; 2 Greenl. Ev.
249; 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 199, note 6; Horsley
v. Brooks, 20 Iowa, 115; Buckley v. Knapp,
48 Mo. 153. We see no error in the admis
sion of the evidence, or the charge of the
court on the subject.
There are some other questions raised by
counsel, to which.we briefly allude:
The defendant a ed the court to charge
the jury: “If they nd that the words
spoken by the defenda. of and concerning
the plaintiff were untru and that the de
fendant has not reasonab cause to believe
them to be true, yet, if . ey are satisfied‘
from the evidence that
thewxefendant
did be
lieve them to be true, suc state of facts
would not warrant a verdic.‘ for punitive or
exemplary damages, but fo compensatory
damages only." With whi(h request the
court refused to comply, br..l, on the con
trary, charged the jury thattsuch was not
the law, to which the defendant then and
there excepted. ..
We do not understand the [law of slander
to be, that it is a defense that the slanderer
believed his words to be trule, when he had
I
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no grounds for so believing. Belief must
have a foundation in something. Take
away the foundation, and what can be left?
The charge seems to us a soiecism. Belief
can only be claimed as a defense, or in mit
igation, where it is based upon such facts or
reasons as would incline a reasonable per
son so to believe. Inasmuch as this charge
was asked in reference to exemplary dam
ages, and there was evidence tending to
show that the words had been spoken under
circumstances indicating wantonness and
recklessness, the charge was properly re.
fused.
It appears to be seriously argued that in a
minister of the gospel a single act of intox
ication is not a fault, and therefore a charge
of that kind cannot be injurious. We can
hardly assent to this proposition. In a re
ligious teacher one offense of the kind must
be considered a grave departure from pro
priety and duty; and to say that the act has
been committed is calculated to impair use
fuiness.
As to the question of excessive damages:
The verdict was large; still we do not think
defendant can complain, in view of all the
circumstances of the case.
Judgment afllrmed.
SCOTT, C. J., and WHITMAN and JOHN
SON, JJ., concurred. DAY, J., dissented.
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7% GOLDSMITITS ADM’R v. JOY.
(17 Atl. 1010, 61 Vt. 488.)
Supreme Court of Vermont. Bennington.
June 13, 1889.
Exceptions from Bennington county court;
Powrms, Judge.
Trespass for an assault and battery, com
mitted on one Goldsmith, brought by Gold
smith’s administrator against Moses Joy, Jr.
Defendant did not deny that he made the as
sault. It appeared, however, that at the
time. and just before, hot words had passed
between the parties. and defendant claimed
that he committed the wrong under the in
iiuence of the passion induced by the insult
ing and unjustiflable language of plaintiff,s
intestate, and that this fact should be con
sidered by the jury in reduction both of the
actual and exemplary damages. Defendant
was the superintendent and general manager
of the construction of a system of water
works in the city of Bennington, and in that
capacity had in his employ about 100 men,
mostly or all foreigners. It was in reference
to the treatment of these men by defendant
that the Intestate used the alleged insulting
language. He was suffering from Bright’s
disease at the time of the affray, and subse
quently died of it. It was claimed that his
death was materially hastened by the as
sault. '
The court instructed the jury to award
plaintiff actual damages at any rate, no mat
ter what the provocation which led to the
assault might have been. Upon the subject
of exemplary damages the charge was as fol
lows: “Now, then, as to the other question
of damages. In actions of this kind under
the laws of this state, the jury is permitted
(not compelled, but permitted) in their dis
cretion to allow to the plaintiff, in addition
to the ordinary compensatory damages, such
damages as in their judgment the character
of the assault requires, in order that their
verdict may serve as a terror to evil-doers.
This is called ‘exemplary damages,’—dam
ages that are awarded by way of example; a
verdict that the community can look upon as
the wise judgment of the jury, exercised in
a case where it will be calculated to restrain
attacks of this kind in the future. I have
said, gentlemen, that the allowance of the
damages is permitted to the jury. They are
not awarded in any case unless the trespass
—unless the assault and battery—was of
such a wanton, malicious, or aggravated
character as leads the jury to think that an
example ought to be made of the case.
Oftentimes an assault is committed by one
man upon another under such circumstances
that the jury can see honestly that there was
no malice; that there was no wantonness;
that there were no high-handed acts that
would justify the awarding of more than
compensatory damages.
many cases exist where the attack is of a
wanton character, where it is inexcusable,
where it is of a high-handed nature, and the
On the other hand, .
jury, looking at all the facts in the case,
wisely say that the public are entitled to have
an example made in the particular case, in
order that in the future not only the defend
ant himself, but that other persons who get
into affrays, shall be restrained from making
these high-handed, inexcusable, and wanton
attacks upon another. So that, gentlemen,
this question, then, is one that addresses it
self to your wise discretion. Do you think,
in view of what is shown here, that this at
tack was of such a characteras warrants you
in awarding exemplary damages? If you do,
then the amount of these damages rests
wholly in your wise discretion. Whether it
shall be a small sum or a large sum, you are
to judge of; but in any event, gentlemen, if
you award damages of this nature, you are
to do it because you think that this assault
upon Mr. Goldsmith was. under the circum
stances, wholly inexcusable and wanton on
the part of the defendant. Now, then, in
respect to that question, mere words made
use of by one person to another are no legal
excuse whatever for the infliction of personal
violence. It makes no difference how vio
lent the language used may be, no man has
the right to use personal violence upon an
other when he is induced to simply by the
use of words. That is no defense to the ac
tion. But when you come to the question of
whether a particular case is one thatdeserves
the awarding of exemplary damages, then
you are to consider all the circumstances in
the case: the provocation, if any, that the
defendant had; and everything that is calcu
lated on the one hand to aggravate his act,
and on the other hand to palliate his act, is
to be considered.
the main question of compensatory damages,
there is no defense here whatever. No mat
ter what was said, no matter how much
provocation the defendant had, he is bound
to answer for the compensatory damages, at
any event. As to exemplary damages, in
the exercise of a wise discretiorl you will not
allow them unless you are satisfied that the
act of the defendant was high-handed, wan
ton, and inexcusable. and in determining that
question you are to take into view all the
provocation that he had. Now, then, gentle
men, if the provocation was slight, it is quite
different, and it should have less weight in
determining the question whether you shall
award exemplary damages than it would
have if the provocation was great. Then,
again, you may look at the parties them
selves. If Goldsmith was a feeble old man,
in poor health, and physically unable to com
pete with the defendant in a personal en
counter, and the defendant without any
provocation that you in your judgment say
warrants an assault,—a violent assault,—if
he then makes an assault that is altogether
undue, uncalled for, in view of the special
circumstances existing, why, then, it would
be a case that the jury might award exem
piary damages. The law takes notice of the
hot passions that people fall into when they
As I have already said on -/
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are engaged in disputes, not by way of mak
ing a complete defense to an action for dam
ages, but by way of raising a doubt; in the
minds of the jury respecting the awarding
of exemplary damages. And in determining
that question the jury are justified in looking
at the parties as they stand beiore them.
Take an ignorant class of men that we have
in every community,— men who have by
their education and bringing up had less op
portunities to come within the circle of good
order and of good behavior,—the jury might
well say that as to that class of men, if they
fall into disputes and come to blows, there
would be less occasion for setting an ex
ample than there would be if the parties oc
cupied a higher and more prominent position
in society. The influence of an example in a
case of this kind oftentimes depends quite
largely upon the character of the parties in
volved. You can cast about you in your
mind’s eye, in the community, and pick out
men who, if they should fall into an affray
_ of this kind, would draw away very far from
the moorings of good citizenship and good
behavior, and then an example would be de
manded, if one inflicted an assault; upon an
other." Verdict and judgment for plaintiff.
l'Exceptions by defendant.
Martin & Archibald, J. L. Martin, and J.
C. Baker, for plaintiff. Batchelder Sc Bates
and W. B. Sheldon, for defendant.
TYLER. J. The courtinstructed the jury
that there was no defense to the claim for
actual or compensatory damages; that words
were no legal excuse for the infliction of per
sonal violence; thut, no matter how great the
provocation, the defendant was bound in any
event to answer ior these damages. It is a
general and wholesome rule of law that when
ever by an act which he could have avoided,
and which cannot be justified in law, a per
son inilicts an immediate injury by force, he
is legally answerable in damages to the party
injured. The question whether provocative
words may be given in evidence under the
general issue to reduce actual damages in an
action of trespass for an assault and battery
has undergone wide discussion. The English
cases lay down the general rule that provoca
tion may mitigate damages. ’l‘he case of
Fraser v. Berkeley, 7 Car. & P. 621, is often
referred to, in which I.ord ABINGER held that
evidence might be given to show that the
plaintiff in some degree brought the thing up
on himself; “that it would be an unwise law
if it did not make allowance for human in
iirmities; and, if a person commit violence at
a time when he is smarting underimmediate
provocation, that is nmtter of mitigation."
TINDAL, C. J., in Perkins v. Vaughan, 5
Scott, N. R. 881, said: “I think it will be
found that the result of the cases is that the
matter cannot be given in evidence where it
amounts to a defense, but that, where it does
not amount to a defense, it may be given in
mitigation of damages." Linford v L0ke, 3
Hurl. & N. 275; 2 Add. Torts. § 1393, recog
nizes the same rule. In this country, 2
- Greenl. Ev. § 93, states the rule that a provoca
tion by the plaintiff may be thus shown, if so
recent as to induce a presumption that vio
lence was committed under the immediate
influence of the passion thus wrongfully ex
cited by the plaintiff. The earlier cases com
monly cited in support of this rule are Cush
man v. Ryan, 1 Story, 100; Avery v. Ray. 1
Mass. 12; Lee v.Woolsey, 19 Johns. 319; and
Maynard v. Beardsley, 7 Wend. 560. The su
preme court of Massachusetts has generally
recognized the doctrine that immediate prov
ocation may mitigate actual damages of this
kind. Mowry v. Smith, 9 Allen, 67; Tyson
v. Booth, 100 Mass. 258; and Boniuo v. Cale
donio, 144 Mass. 299, 11 N. E. Rep. 98. It
is also said in 2 Sedg. Dam. (7th Ed.) 521,
note: “If, making due allowance for the in
firmities of human temper, the defendant has
reasonable excuse for the violation of pub
iic order, then there is no foundation for ex
emplary dmuages, and the plaintifl‘ can claim
only compensation. It is merely the corollary
of this that where there is a reasonable ex
cuse for the defendant, arising from the prov
ocation or fault of the plaintiff. but not suffi
cient entirely to justify the act done, there
can be no exemplary damages, and the cir
cumstances of mitigation must be applied to
the actual damages. If it were not so. the
plaintiff would get full compensation for
damages occasioned by himself. The rule
ought to be and is practically mutual. Malice
and provocation in the defendant are pun
ished by inflicting damages .exceeding the
measure of compensation, and in the plaintiff
by giving him less than that measure." In
Burke v. Melvin. 45 Conn. 243, PARK. C. J..
held that the whole transaction should go to
the jury. "They could not ascertain what
amount of damage the plaintiff was entitled
to receive by considering a part of the trans
action. They must look at the whole of it.
They must ascertain how far the plaintiff
was in fault, if in fault at all, and how far
the defendant, and give damages accordingly.
The difference between a provoked and an
unprovoked assault is obvious. The latter
would deserve punishment beyond the actual
damage, while the damage in the other case
would be attributable, in a great measure, to
the misconduct of the plaintiff himself." In
Bartram v. Stone, 31 Conn. 159, it was held
that in an action for assault and battery the
defendant might prove, in mitigation of dam
ages, that the plaintiff, immediately beiore
the assault, charged him with a crime, and
that his assault upon the plaintiff‘ was oc
casioned by “sudden heat," produced by the
plaiutiff’s false accusation. See, also, Rich
ardson v. Hine, 42 Conn. 206. In Kiil? v.
Youmans, 86 N. Y. 324, the plaintiff was
upon defendant's premises for the purpose
of committing a trespass, and the defend
ant assaulted him to prevent the act, and
the only question was whether he used un
necessary force. 1_)A.\,FUR,l‘}l, J., said: “It
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siill remains that the plaintiff provoked the
trespass; was himself guilty of the act which
led to the disturbance of thepublic peace. Al
though this provocation fails to justify the de
fendant, it may be relied upon by him in miti
gation even of compensatory damages. This
doctrine is as old as the action of trespass,
* * * and is correlativeto the rule which
permits circumstances of aggravation, such
as time and place of an assault, or insulting
words, or other circumstances of indignity
and contumely, to increase them." In Robi
son v. Rupert, 23 Pa. St. 523, the same rule
is adopted, the court saying" “Where there
is a reasonable excuse for th. defendant aris
ing from the provocation or fault of the plain
tiff, but not sufficient entirely to justify the
act done. there can be no exemplary damages,
and the circumstances of mitigation must be
applied to the actual damages." In Ireland
v. Elliott, 5 Iowa, 478, the court said: “The
furthest that the law has gone, and the fur
thest that it can go, while attempting to
maintain a rule, is to permit the high provoca
tion of language to be shown as a palliation
for the acts and results of anger; that is, in
legal phrase, to be shown in mitigation of
damages." In Thrall v. Knapp, 17 Iowa,
468. the court said: “ The clear distinction
is this: Contemporaneous provocations of
words or acts are admissible, but previous
provocutions are not. And the testis whether
‘the blood has had time to cool.’ * * *
The law affords a redress for every injury.
If the plaintiff slandered defendant’s daugh
ters, it would entirely accord with his natural
feeling to chastise him; but the policy of the
law is against his right to do so, especially
after time for reflection. It affords a peace
ful remedy. On the other hand, the law so
completely disfavors violence, and so jealous
ly guards alike individual rights and the pub
lic peace, that, ‘if a man gives another a
cuff on the ear, though it costs him nothing,
no, not so much as a little diachylon, yet he
shall have his action.’ Per Lord HOLT,
Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 955." The
reasoning of the court seems to make against
his rule that provocations such as happen
at the time of the assault may be received in
evidence to reduce the amount of the plain
tiff’s recovery.
In Morely v. Dunbar, 24 Wis. 183, DIXON,
C. J ., held “that, notwithstanding what
was said in Bil-chard v. Booth, 4 Wis. 75,
circumstances of provocation attending the
transaction, or so recent as to constitute a
part of the res gestw, though not sufficient
entirely to justify the act done, may consti
tute an excuse that may mitigate the actual
damages; and, where the provocation is
great and calculated to excite strong feelings
of resentment, may reduce them toa sum
which is merely nominal." But in Wilson
v. Young, 31 Wis. 574, it was held bya ma
jority of the court that provocation could go
to reduce compensatory damages only so far
as these should be given for injury to the feel
ings; DIXON, C. J., however, adhering to
the rule in Morely v. Dunbar that it might go
to reduce all compensatory damages. But
in Fenelon v. Butts, 53 Wis. 344, 10 N. W.
Rep. 501, and in Corcoran v. Harran, 55
Wis. 120, 12 N. W. Rep. 468, it was clearly
held that personal abuse of the assailant by
the party assaulted may be considerrd in
mitigation of punitory, but' not of actual
damages, which mclude those allowed for
mental and bodily suffering; thata man com
mencing an assault and battery under such
circumstances of provocation is liable for the
actual damages which result from such as
sault. In Donnelly v. Harris, 41 Ill. 126,
the court instructed the jury that words
spoken might be considered in mitigation of
damages. WALKER, C. J., in delivering the
opinion if the supreme court, remarked:
“Had this modification been limited to ex
emplary damages, it would have been correct,
but it may well have been understood by the
jury as applying to actual damages. and they
would thus have been misled. To allow them
the effect to mitigate actual damages would
be virtually to allow them to be used as a de
fense. To say they constitute no defense.
and then to say they may mitigate all but
nominal damages, would, we think, he do
ing by indirection what has been prohibited
from being done directly. To give to words
this eifect would be to abrog.ate, in effect,
one of the most firmly established rules of
the law." See, also, Ogden v. Claycomb, 52
111. 366. In Gizler v. Witzel, 82 Ill. 322, the
court said, in reference to the charge of the
court below: "The third instruction tells the
jury, among other things, that the plaintiff,
in order to recover, should have been guilty
of no provocation. This is error. It is whol
ly immaterial what language he may have
used, so far as the right to maintain an ac
tion is concerned, and even if he went be
yond words and committed a technical assault,
the acts of the defendant must still be limit
ed to a reasonable self-defense." In Norris
v. Casel, 90 Ind. 143, this precise question
was not raised, but the court said, in refer
ence to the instructions of the court below,
that the first part of the charge, that the
provocation by mere words, however gross
and abusive, cannot justify an assault, was
correct, and that a person who makes such
words a pretext for committing an assault
commits thereby not only a mere wrong, but
a crime, and the person so assaulted is not
deprived of the right of reasonable self de
fense, even though he used the insulting
language to provoke the assault against which
he defends himself; but, whatever may have
been his purpose in using the abusive lan
guage, it cannot be made an excuse for the
assault. Johnson v. McKee, 27 Mich. 471,
was a case very similar to the one at bar, and
was given to the jury under like instructions.
The supreme court said: ‘‘In regard to prov
ocation, the court charges, in effect, that if
plaintiff provoked defendant, and the as
sault was the result of that provocation, he
could recover nothing beyond his actual dam
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ag and outlays, and would be precluded
from claiming any damages for injured feel
ings or mental anxiety. In other words, he
would be cut oil.’ from all the aggravated
damages allowed in cases of willful injury,
and sometimes loosely called ‘exemplary
damages.’ As there is no case in which a
party who is damaged, and is allowed to re
cover anything substantial, cannot recover
his actual damages, the rule laid down by the
court was certainly quite liberal enough, and
if any one could complain it was not the de
fendant." The court said in Prentiss v.
Shaw, 56 Me. 436: “We understand that
rule to be this: A party shall recover as a
pecuniary recompense the amount of money
which shall be a remuneration, as near as
may be, for the actual, tangible, and immedi
ate result, injury, or conseqnenceof the tres
pass to his person or property. * * * If
the assault was illegal and unjustified, why
is not the plaintiff in such case entitled to
the benefit of the general rule, before stated.
that a party guilty of an illegal trespass on
another’s person or property must pay all
the damages to such person or property, di
rectly and actually resulting from the illegal
act? * * * Where the trespass or injury
is upon personal or real property, it would
be a novelty to hear a claim for reduction of
the actual injury based on the ground of
provocation by words. If, instead of the
owner’s arm, the assailant had broken his
horse’s leg, * * * must not the defend
ant be held to pay the full value of the horse
thus rendered useless?" The learned judge
admits that the law has sanctioned, by a
long series of decisions, the admission of evi
.dence tending to show, on one side, aggra
vation, and on the other mitigation of the
‘ damages claimed, but he holds the law to be
j that mitigant circumstances can only be set i
vagainst exemplary damages, and cannot be
used to reduce the actual damages directly
resulting from the defendant’s unlawful act.
In a learned article on “Damages in Actions
ex Delicto," 3 Amer. Jur. 287, it issaid: "If
the law awards damages for an injury, it
would seem absurd (even without resorting
to the definition of damages) to say that they
shall be for a part only of the injury." “It
is a reasonable and a legal principle that the
.compensation should be equivalent to the in
jury. There may be some occasional depart
ures from this principle, but I think it will
be found safest to adhere to it in all cases
proper for a legal indemnification in the
shape of damages." Jacobs v. Hoover, 9
Minn. 204, (Gil. 189;) Cushman v. Waddell,
Baldw. 57;t and McBride v. Mt.l.aughlin, 5
I
Watts’ 375,~are strong authorities in sup
port of the rule that provocative language
used by the plaintiff at the time of the bat
.tery should be given in evidence only in miti
gation of exemplary damages, and that un
tFed. Cas. No. 3,516.
less the plaintiff has given the defendant a
provocation amounting in law to a justifica
tion he is entitled to receive compensation
for the actual injury sustained.
If provocative words may mitigate, it fol
lows that they may reduce the damages to a
mere nominal sum, and thus practically jus
tify an assault and battery. But why, under
this rule, may they not fully justify? If, in
one case. the provocation is so great_that the
jury may award only nominal damages, why,
in another, in which the provocation is far
greater, should they not be permitted to ac
quit the defendant, and thus overturn the well
settled rule of law that words cannot justify
an assault. On the other hand, if words cannot
justify they should not mitigate. A defend
ant should not be heard to saythat the plain
tiff was first in the wrong by abusing him
with insulting words, and therefore, though
he struck and injured the plaintiff, he was
only partly in the wrong, and should pay
only part of the actual damages. If the right
of the plaintiff to recover actual damages
were in any degree dependent on the defend
ant’s intent, then the plaintiff,s provocation
to the defendant to commit the assault upon
him would be legitimate evidence bearing
upon that question; but it is not. Even
lunaties and idiots are liable for actual dam
ages done by them to the property or person
of another, and certainly a person in the full
possession of his faculties should be held
liable for his actual injuries to another, un
less done in self-defense. or under reasonable
apprehension that the plaintiff was about to .
do him bodily harm. The law is that a per
son is liable in an action of trespass for an
assault and battery, although the plaintiff
made the first assault, if the defendant used
more force than was necessary for his pro
tection, and the symmetry of the law is better
preserved by holding that the defendant,s
liability for actual damages begins with the
beginning of his own wrongful act. It is
certainly in accordance with what this court
held in Howland v. Day, 56 Vt. 318, that
\
“the law abhors the use of force either for
attack or defense, and never permits its use
unnecessarily." Exemplary damages are not
recoverable as matter of right, but as was
stated by WHEELER, J., in Earl v. Tupper’
45 Vt. 275, they are given to stamp the con
demnation of the jury upon the acts of the
defendant on account of their malicious or
oppressive character. Boardman v. Gold
smith. 48 Vt. 403, and cases cited; Mayne,
Dam. 58-65; Voltz v. Blackmar, 64 N. Y. 440.
The instructions to the jury upon this branch
of the case were in substantial accordance
with the law as above stated. As exemplary
damages were awardable in the discretion of
the jury. the charge was also correct that the
influence of an example in a case ofthis kind
depended on the character and standing of
the parties involved. We find no error in the
charge, and the judgment is aflirmed.
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7"‘LOUISVILLE, N. A. & C. RY. CO. v. SNY
DER.
(20 N. E. %4, 117 Ind. 485.)
Bupreme Court of Indiana. February 21, 1889.
Appeal from circuit court, Clinton county;
Joseph G. Suit, Speoial Judge.
Action by James B. Snyder against the
Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway
Company, for personal injuries. Judgment
for plaintifl?, and defendant appeals.
S. O. Bayless and W. H. Russell, for ap
pellant. T. H. Palmer, W. F. Palmer, B. K.
Higinbotham, and M. Bristow, for appellee.
ELLIOTT, C. J. The appellee was a pas
senger on one of the appellant’s trains,
which, by the falling of a bridge, was pre
cipitated into White river, and the appellee
severely injured.
Dr. Bowles, an expert witness called by
the appellant, gave an opinion as to the na
ture and extent of the injury sustained by
the appellee, and on cross-examination it was
developed that his testimony was in part
based on statements made to him by the ap
.l»ellee. Waiving all questions of practice,
1
and deciding the appellant,s motion to strike
wut as if it were properly restricted to the
lalieged incompetent part of the testimony,
‘we
have no hesitation in deciding that the
\ trial court did right in overruling the motion.
\As we have often decided, the physical or
gans of a human being cannot be inspected
by the eyes of a surgeon, and the statements
of the sufferer must, of necessity, be taken
by the surgeon. It is not possible for any
surgeon, by a mere external examination, to
always discover the character of an injury,
and properly describe or treat an injured
man; and for this reason, if for no other,
the statements of the injured person descrip
tive of present pains or symptons are always
competent, although narratives of past oc
currences are inadmissible. On this point
our own decisions are harmonious, and they
are right upon principle, and are well sup
ported by authority. Railroad Co. v. New
ell, 104 Ind. 264, 3 N. E. 836; Railway Co. v.
Falvey, 104 Ind. 409, 3 N. E. 389, and 4 N.
E. 908; Railway Co. v. Wood, .113 Ind. 544,
14 N. E. 572, and 16 N. E. 197; Board v. Leg
gett. 115 Ind. 544, 18 N. E. 53; Hatch v. Ful
ler, 131 Mass. 574: Railroad Co. v. Johns, 36
Kan. 769, 14 Pac. 237; Quaife v. Railroad
Co0 48 Wis. 513, 4 N. W. 658. From these
decisions we shall not depart.
The fact that the appellee was suffering
from Bright,s disease at the time he was in
jured does not impair his right of recovery.
The rule is this: “Where a disease caused
by the injury supervenes, as well as where
the disease exists at the time of the injury,
and is aggravated by it, the plaintiff is enti
tled to full compensatory damages." Rail
road Co. v. Hecht, 115 Ind. 443, 17 N. E. 297;
Railway Co. v. Wood, supra; Railroad Co.
v. Pitzer, 109 Ind. 179, 6 N. E. 310, and 10
N. E. 70; Railroad Co. v. Buck, 96 Ind. 346;
Ehrgott v. Mayor, 96 N. Y. 264; Jucker v.
Railroad Co., 52 Wis. 150, 8 N. W. 862; Rail
way Co. v. Harris, 122 U. S. 597, 7 Sup. Ct.
1286; Railway Co. v. Rosenzweig, 113 Pa.
St. 519, 6 Atl. 5-15; Railway Co. v. Leslie, 57
Tex.
The rule we have stated is thus expressed
in one of our best text-books: “Though the
plaintiflf be afliicted with a disease or weak
ness which has a tendency to aggravate the
injury, the defendant,s negligence will still
be held to be the proximate cause." 2 Shear.
& R. Neg. (4th Ed.) § 742.
The instructions clearly and properly state
the law on this subject.
The court did not err in instructing the
jury as to the degree of care required of the
appellant; at least, not as against the ap
pellant. The rule is well settled that car
riers are bound to use the highest practicable
degree of care to secure the safety of passen
gers.
There was no evidence of contributory neg
ligence on the part of the appellee, and the
court might well have refused any instruc
tion at all upon that point. Where a passen
ger is in his proper place in the car, and
makes no exposure of his person to danger.
there can be no question of contributory neg
ligence. Decisions like that of Railway Co
v. Greene, 106 Ind. 279, 6 N. E. 603, in cases
of persons injured at a railroad crossing,
are not applicable to such a case as the one
at our bar. The law is, as the jury were
told, that carriers of passengers are liable
for the slightest negligence. Any negligence
on their part is actionable. Railroad Co. v.
Rainbolt, 99 Ind. 551.
The law will not tolerate any negligence on
the part of carriers, although they are not
insurers of the safety of their passengers.
The burden of overcoming the presumption
of negligence arising from evidence of the
occurrence of an accident and injury to a
passenger is upon the carrier. Packet Co.
v. McCooi. 83 Ind. 392; Railroad Co. v. Buck,
91; Ind. 346; Railroad Co. v. .\‘ewell, supra;
Railroad Co. v. Rainbolt. supra; Anderson v.
Scholey, 114 Ind. 553. 17 N. E. 125.
In Railroad Co. v. Pedigo, 108 Ind. 481, S
N. E. 627, the rule was applied in a case
growing out of the same occurrence as that
in which the appellee was injured. The
twenty-second instruction asked by the ap
pellant, and refused. reads thus: “The court
further instructs you that by ‘negligence,’
when used in these instructions, is meant
either the failure to do what a reasonable
person would ordinarily have done under the
circumstances of the situation, or doing what
such person would not have done under the
existing circumstances." This instruction
was properly refused. It is not proper in
such a case as this to define negligence as it
is defined in this instruction. In a case of
this character, the omission to exercise the
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highest degree of practicable care constitutes
negligence, but in other cases the failure to
exercise ordinary care constitutes negligence.
Counsel are greatly in error in asserting, as
they do, that the instruction correctly fur
nishes the standard for the government of
the jury. The appellant was, as we have
substantially said, bound to do more than
prudent men would ordinarily do,v since it
was bound to use a very high degree of care.
The duty of a railroad company engaged in
carrying passengers is not always discharged
by purchasing from reputable manufacturers
the iron rods or other iron-work used in the
construction of its bridges. The duty of the
company is not discharged by trusting, with
out inspecting and testing, to the reputation
of the manufacturers, and the external ap
pearance of such materials. The law re
quires that before the lives of passengers
are trusted to the safety of its bridges, the
company shall carefully and skillfully test
LAW DAM.-16
and inspect the materials it uses in such
structures. This duty of inspection does not
end when the materials are put in place, but
continues during their use; for the company
is bound to test them, from time to time, to
ascertain whether they are being impaired
by use or exposure to the elements. Manser
v. Railway Co., 3 Law ’1‘. (N. S.) 585; Rail
road Co. v. Suggs, 62 Tex. 323; Stokes v.
Railway Co., 2 Fost. & F. 691; Robinson
v. Railroad Co., 9 Fed. 877; Richardson v.
Railroad Co., L. R. 10 C. P. 486, L. R. 1 C.
P. Div. 342; Ingalis v. Bills, 9 Metc. 1; Frink
v. Potter, 17 Ill. 406; Bremner v. Williams,
1 Car. & P. 414; Hegeman v. Railroad Corp.,
13 N. Y. 9; Alden v. Railway Co., 26 N. Y.
102.
The decision in the case 0i.’ Railroad Co. v.
Bwd, 65 Ind. 527, is not in conflict with this
doctrine, for in that case an inspection was
made.
Judgment aflirmed.
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‘a party herein will at all times be made. .
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DILLON’ et al. v. HUNT.
(16 s. v. 516, 105 M0. 154.)
Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2..
June 2, 11591.
Appeal from St. Louis circuit court;
Amos M. TH..\Ysii, Judge.
This is an action ior damages caused by
the negligent pulling down of a brick wall.
upon the building in which piaintiffs‘stock
of goods was stored in the city of St.
Louis on November 17. 1877. The petition |
in this case was passed upon by this court .
in this cause in 82 Mo. 150, and held good
on demurrer. The answer is as iollows:
“ Defendant, ior answer to the petition of
Thomas E. Dillon, Martha Jessel, and Jo
seph Jessei. piainti!fs—I"irst. Denies that .
Joseph Jessei, as husband of said Martha
Jessel, is a necessary or proper party to '
this action, and says objection to him as '.
Second. Denies that said Martha Jessei
and said Thomas E. Dillon were partners, .:
as alleged, and denies ‘said alleged firm or
said plaintiffs, or either of them, was or
were owners of or in possession of any of
the goods, wares, or chattels in the peti- 1
tion mentioned, at the place mentioned, !
or engaged in the business alleged. or that
said chattels were of the value alleged, or
of any value. Third. Defendant admits 3
that Charles L. Hunt was the ownerof the
building and lot in the petition described,
but denies the same was adjoining any
store-room or building occupied by plain
tiffs. Fourth. Defendant admits a fire,
which defendant says was accidental’ and
occurred in his absence. and w as beyond
control beiore it was discovered, did oc- ‘
cur, and his building was in great part .
destroyed thereby, but defendant denies ‘
I
defendant knew.as aiieged,said walls and
chimneys left standing were in unsafe, in
secure,and dangerous‘ condition, or a nnl- 1
sauce. or liable to fall, as alleged, and de
nies that it was defendant,s duty to abate
the same. Fifth. Defendant denies he was
in possession of said premises, walls, or
chimneys, as aileged,or had full or any i
control or direction of the same, and he |
denies he allowed or permitted, either
knowingly, negligently. or in any way,
certain or any persons or person to enter I
upon said premises ior the purpose alleged, \
or any purpose, or that their action in- |
ured to defendant,s benefit. Sixth. De
fendant denies that any person or persons
negligen tlyorunskillfully pushed or threw .
or caused said walls, or portions there- I
of, to fall, as alleged. or that the same i
did so fnll,or that said house was crushed ]
and destroyed, or the chattels contained ‘
therein were covered with the débris.
Seventh. Defendant denies heelther knew
or had good reason to know that said
person or any persons either undertook
to tear down said walls. or intend
ed to adopt or did adopt the method
alleged in the petition, or that defend
ant neglected his duty as alleged, or
permitted the work to he proceeded with
as alleged. Eighth. Defendant denies any
portions of said goods were mutilated
or otherwise injured either in the sum
as alleged or any other sum, or that fixt
ures were damaged as alleged or in sum
. crushed, and the
1 damaged still more.
fi
| alleged, or that said firm expended the
sum alleged, or any sum, for clearing
away débris, or that said firm had a lease
'as alleged, or had paid rental as alleged,
or lost the use of said store-room, or that
the pretended unexpired term oi said lease
was of the value alleged, or any value, or
that said flrm expended the sum alleged,
or any sum, in recovering, handling. DreL
serving, or removingsaid chattels, or that
the plaintiffs were damaged in the sum of
three thousand dollars. or any other sum,
as alicg,c(i. And defendant asks to be
hence dismissed with his costs. "
The iollowing is a concise statement of
the facts disclosed by the record which
raise the questions now presented to this
court ior determination, to.wit: The
plaintiffs as copartners occupied, with a
stock of general merchandise, the first
floor of a three.story building numbered
110 North Fourth street,in the city of St.
Louis. and the defendant,s testator,
Charles L. Hunt,0wned a five-story build
ing immediately adjoining it on the south.
On the night of the 13th day of November,
1 1877, the Hunt buildingcanght fire, and
all the interior combustible portions of it
burned, which left the north wall and a
partition wail running east and west
. standing, but in a very dangerous condi
tion, and liable at any time to fall over
upon the building occupied by plaintiffs.
l Plaintiffs‘ stock of goods was consider
ably damaged by the iire and water on the
night of November 13th. A day or two
after the fire, chief of the fire department
Sexton. notified Hunt that the standing
walls were dangerous, and that he would
have to remove them. After this notice.
Hunt knowingly permitted others to go
upon his premises for the purpose of ta k
ing the walls down, and while these per
‘ sons were so engaged, on the 17th of No
vember, they negligently threw portions
of the north wall mentioned above over
upon the building occupied by plaintiffs,
by means whereof the latter building was
plaintiffs’ stock of goods
This action is ior
the recovery of the latter damage. Plain
tiffs had several policies under which their
stock of goods was insured against dam
age by fire and water. After the fire on
the 13th, and beiore the fall of the wall on
the l7th, the loss under these policies, ex
cepting one, resulting from fire, were ad
justed, and the policies canceled; and after
1 the fall of the wail,nnd beiore the institu
tion of the suit, plaintiffs settled with the
company which issued the remaining pol
icy iora portion oi the losses occurring
thereunder. There was evidence to sus
tain the allcgations of the petition. Mr.
Hunt died after the suit was brought. One
of the principal issues at the trial was
whether or not Hunt authorized or per
mitted the parties who negligently threw
the walls down to go upon his premises
ior the purpose of taking them down; and
during the progress of the trial Fred C.
Ziebig was permitted to testify, over the
objections and exceptions of plaintiffs.
that he, as the agent of Mr. Hunt, had
made no arrangement with anybody ior
taking down the walls: that he did not
at the time know the walls were be
ing taken down, or that anybody had
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‘of T. E. Dillon. had insured the stock of
been‘workingon them. John W. Munson,
‘another witness ior defendant, was also
permitted to testify.. over the objections
and exceptions of plaintiffs, to the effect
that he had a conversation with Mr. Hunt
about the walls after the notice from the
chief of the lire.department, and that he
had told Mr. Hunt not to do anything
with the walls at all that would affect his
.(Hunt,s) or the insurance companies‘ in
terest: that he told Hunt not to do any‘
thing with the pulling down of the walls
until later. Walter C; Butler, another
witness on behalf of defendant, was per
mitted to testify, over the objections and
exceptions of the plaintiffs, to the effect that
the plaintiffs had $6.000 insurance on their
stock of goods, and that the plaintiff Dil
ion made claim to him orally for damages
under the policies. The court also admit
ted in evidence, over plaintiffs‘ objections
and exceptions,a written or printed claim
made by plaintiff Dillon to one of the in
surance companles for loss on plaintiffs’
stock of goods. This. with Butler,s state
ment and other evidence, tended to show
that plaintiffs had received some compen
sation irom the insurance companies un
der their policies for damages resulting
from the fall of the walls. Upon this last
point the courtgave theiollowing instruc
tion on hehaif of thedefendant: " (2) The
jury are instructed, if they find from the
evidencethat the plaintiffs, under the name
goodsinjured by the falling of the walls of
I-Iunt’s building. and claimed and collect
ed irom the insurance companies. or any
of them, damages to such stock caused by
the falling of the walls as a result of the
fire. then the jury are authorized and di
rected to deduct from the gross damage,
if any, which the jury may believe plain
tiffs have sustained in consequence of the ‘
falling of the wall. the amount oi such
damages as plaintlifs are shown to have I
collected from said insurance companies
occasioned by the falling of the wall. " Aft
er the jury had been out some time, con
sidering of their verdict. they sent to the
court the following written communica
tion: “To the Honorable Judge of the
Circuit Court, Room No. 5: The instruc- .
tions of the court seem to have blended ‘
the damage suit with the insurance. We ,
wish to know if the parties having re
ceived insurance bars them out from dam
age from other parties. Please give us the
law upon this subject." Whereupon the l
court, over the objection and exceptions \
of the plaintiffs, gave to thejury the ioi- '
lowing additional instruction: " if the in
rors believe that after the walls fell the
plaintiffs claimed damages from the insur
ance companies that were occasioned by 0
the falling of the walls oi the Hunt build
ing, as well as ior damages caused by wa
ter, and thattheinsurancecompanies paid
plaintiffs ior any part or portion of the
damages so occasioned by the failing oi
the walls. as well as for damages occa
sioned by water, then, in estimating plain
tiffs damages in this case, you should de
duct whatever damages occasioned by the
falling of the walls he has already received
from the insurance companies. In other
words, the court instructs you that plain
titi is not entitled torecoverdamages from
the defendant occasioned by the falling of
the walls that have already been paid by
the insurance companies. At the same time
the court instructs you that, ii any part of
plaintiff,s damages occasioned by the fall
of the walls has not been paid, he is en,
titled to recover in this action such part
as has not been paid, whatever you may
find such amount to be; providing. under
the other instructions, you find that de
fendant is liable in this action for the acts
of the persons who took down the wall."
The jury thereupon returned a verdict ior
defendant. Plaintiffs filed their motion for
a new triai,saving the several points men
tioned above, which being overruled, they
filed their bill of exceptions, and after
wards broughtthe case here by writ of er
ror.
C. P. & J. D. Johnson, for plaintiffs in
error. Noble 4‘. Orrlck, for defendant in
error.
GANTT, P. J., (after statinglhe facts as
above.) W hen this cause was here on the
iormer appeal, this court aflirmed the
judgment of the St. Louis court of ap
peals in reversing the judgment of the
St. Louis circuit court. Without repeat
ing at length the grounds upon which
the court of appeals held plaintiffs would
be .entitled to recover, it is suiiicient to
state that it was then held and sup
ported by the authorities that, where
a proprietor undertakes to do that upon
his land which is in its nature danger
ous to ad_ioininz proprietors, he must
use reasonable care to work no trespass
upon their possession,and it is immaterial
in such a case whether the work be done
by the proprietor or by an independent
contractor. Dillon v. Hunt, 11 Mo. App.
246. So .on the trial of thiscause thecourt
instructed the jury that if plaintiffs’ goods
were destroyed by the falling ofa brick
wall then standing on the adjoining lot
1 of Charles L. Hunt, the present defendant,s
testator; that said wall was caused to
fall upon the store-room in which plain
tiffs’ goods were by and through the neg
ligence of certain persons who went upon
said premises ior the purpose of taking
down said wall by and with the knowl
edge and consent of said Hunt; and that
said Hunt then and there had the custody
and control of the premises upon which
said wall stood,—then plaintiffs were enti
tled to recover of said Hunt’:-i estate. vIt
will be seen at once that one of the most
material facts necessary to plaintiffs, re
covery was the privity of Hunt with the
parties who were pulling down the wall,
and plaintifis offered the direct evidence of
Mr. Sexton,thechlefof thefiredepartment,
tending to show his official notice to Mr.
DHunt of the dangerous condition of the
wall, and directing him to have it taken
down, and of Mr. Fruin of .\Ir. Hunt,s de
sire to have him bid on the work of re
moving the wall, and his recollections of
the men who did the work. Un the part
of the defendant the court permitted Fred
Ziehig to testhy that he was Hunt’s agent
for the collecting of the rents, etc., of this
building, and that he (Ziebigi made no
contract with anybody to remove the
wall, and that he did not know the walls
were being taken down. To this evidence
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plaintiffs objected at the time. and saved
their exceptions. It was clearly incompe
tent. It was wholly irrelevant whether
Ziebig knew anything about the matter.
Mr. Hunt was the owner. it was shown
beyond a peradventnre that he was in the
city the day after the flre; talked with
Sexton in the immediate view oi the wall;
was notified then by Sexton at the time
to have it removed on account of its dan
ger. ln Hunt,s absence. notice to Ziehig
might under some circumstances have be
come notice to Hunt; but notice to Hunt
need never have become notice to Zie
big, as under the facts it was wholly
immaterial whether Ziehig had notice.
Again, the court, over the objection of
plaintiffs, permitted Manson. theinsurance
agent, to testify that he told Hunt not to
pull down the wall. This conversation,
as to plaintiffs, was “res fnteralios acta. "
It had nothing to do with plaintiffs’
rights, nor could it in theleast affect Hunt’s
responsibility. The admission of this evi
dence of Zielflg nnd “unson. tending to
show want of notice in Hunt’ was clearly
erroneous.
But the most serious error committed
on the trial was the giving of the second
instruction on behalf of defendant, set
forth in full in the statement; of this cause,
and the subsequent instruction reiterating
the same idea given by the court of its
own motion. That instruction permitted
the jury, in assessing plaintiffs‘ damages,
to reduce the same by the amount of any
insurance money they might believe from
the evidence plaintiffs had received for
losses occasioned by the falling of the wall
on their goods. If plaintiffs’ goods were
damaged by the negligence of Hunt or his
employes, it was no concern of theirs that 0
piaintiffa were insured, and all the evi
dence of this insurance was irrelevant and
incompetent, and the instructions allow
ing this insurance as mitigating the dam
ages of plaintitfs were erroneous. Few
propositions have been so universally ac
cepted and settled as this. Sutherland
on Damages lays down the rule asioiiows:
“There can be no abatement of damages
on the principle of partial compensation
received for the injury. whereit comes from
a collateral source, wholly independent of
the defendant, and is as to him res inter
allos acta. A man who was working ior
a salary was injured on a railroad by the
negligence of the carrier. The fact that
the employer did not stop the salary
of the injured party during the time
he was disabled was held not available
to the defendant sued for such injury
in mitigation. Nor will proof of money
paid to the injured party by an insur
er or other third person, by reason of
the loss or injury, be admissible to reduce
damages in favor of the party by whose
fault such injury was done. The payment
of such moneys not being procured by the
defendant, and they not having been
either paid or received to satisfy in whole
or in part his liability, he can derive no
advantage therefrom in mitigation of
damages ior which he is liable. As has
been said by another, to permit a reduc
.tion of damages on such a ground would
be to allow a wrong-doer to pay nothing,
and take all the benefit of a policy of in
surance without paying the premium.
“
1
Suth. Dam. (1882,) p. 242. And he is sus
tained by the iollowingauthorities’ Cun
ningham v. Railroad Co., 102 Ind. 478, 1 N.'\
E. Rep. 800; Weber v. Railway Co.. 35 N‘
J. Law, 412: Connecticut Mut. Life lns.Co.
v. New York 8: N. H. R. Co., 25 Conn. 265;
Hayward v. (.‘ain,l05 Mass. 2l3; Briggs v.
Railroad Co., 72 N. Y. 26; Insurance Co. v.
Bosher, 39 Me. 255. and many other cases.
That these errors contributed largely to
the verdict for the defendant is almost
self-evident; and. to the end that they
may be remedied in another trial, the judg
ment is reversed and the cause remanded.
All concur.
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‘77WRIGHT V. BANK OF THE
OLIS.
(18 N. E. 79, 110 N. Y. 237.)
Court of Appeals of New York. October 2,
1888.
Appeal from supreme court, general term,
Fourth department.
About the 7th of January, 1878, one Henry
C. Elliott received from his correspondent in
Rome, N. Y., (B. Huntington Wright,) his
check for $2,000, payable to the order of El
liott, with a request from Wright that he
(Elliott) would meet some drafts Wright
would draw on him. and obtain payment
from the check. He accordingly honored the
drafts, and, having indorsed the check, pro
cured its discount by the defendant. It was
not paid when presented. and Elliott being
unable to learn the reason, went to Rome to
see the drawer of the check. He then learn
ed that the drawer had made a general as
signment for the beneiit of his creditors, and
stated his inability to do anything for Elli
ott. Finally, Elliott succeeded in obtaining
a number of shares of stock in dit1’erent rail
road companies, as collateral security to the
check then lying protested in the hands of
the defendant. The history of the interview
resulting in the procuring of the stock by
Elliott as given on the trial is contradictory,
but the verdict of the jury shows that they
believed that which was given on the part
of the plaintiff. From the evidence thus
given it appears that the stock was in reality
the stock of Benjamin H. Wright, the fa
ther of B. Huntington Wright, and that it was
delivered by him to Elliott voluntarily, and
for the purpose of being used as a collateral
to his own note at six months, which was
to be used to take up the check; but the
stock was not to be sold for six months, as
it was then selling in market much below
what the father thought the stock was really
worth. The stock was owned by Mr. Wright,
as he said, for an investment, and he had no
idea of selling it; _but he allowed Elliott to
take it because he felt sorry for his situa
tion, and wanted to help him, as far as be
reasonably could, out of the difliculty he
was in. Elliott took the stock and went to
New York, and had a talk with the cashier
and vice-president of the defendant. who re
served their decision as to whether they
would take the note and the tock. Subse
quently, and on the 17th of January, the
cashier wrote that the stock being non-divi
dend paying, and the note six months paper,
it would be impossible to get it through the
board; and he suggested it would be much
better to obtain Mr. Wright,s consent to sell
the stock, and to make his (Elliott,s) account
good in that way. Elliott inclosed this note
to Mr. Wright in a letter addressed to “B.
H. Wright;" and in response, and on the 22
day of January. Benjamin H. Wright, the
owner of the stock, wrote Mr. Rogers, the
METROP cashier of defendant, refusing to sell the
stock, or to permit of its being sold. Mr.
Rogers had never seen either of the Messrs.
Wright, and did not know there were two;
and subsequently, and about the 29th of Jan
uary, Eliiott told him that Mr. Wright au
thorized the sale of the stocks, and they
were immediately sold, less commission for
$2,261.50. On the part of the piaintiff it was
claimed that Mr. Wright. the true owner of
the stocks, never gave any such authority to
sell them, and that he was unaware that
they had been sold until May 9, 1878. Feb
ruary 14, 1881, the stock reached the high
est price, down to the day of trial, selling on
that day for $18,003. This action was com
menced October 7, 1879. Mr. Wright, the
owner of the stock, was about seventy-six
years of age in Hay, 1878, and in the latter
part of that year went south, and returned
early in the year 1879. On the 9th of May,
1878, he made a demand upon the defendant
for the stocks, and tendered to it the amount
of the check and interest. being something
over $2,000. The cashier stated the stocks
had been sold by the authority of the owner
thereof, as be supposed, given through Mr.
Elliott, and refused to deliver them or their
value. The original plaintiff died since the
first trial of the case, and the present one
was duly substituted. The court charged the
jury that if they found for the plaintiff he
was entitled to recover the highest price at
which the stocks could have been sold in the
market between the date of their actual con
version and a reasonable time thereafter, and
that the jury should fix the reasonable time,
not arbitrarily or through sympathy or prej
udice; but they were to say what, under all
the circumstances, would be a reasonable
time within which to commence this action,
and also, it may be, reasonable diligence in
prosecuting it; because if the action were
commenced in fact within a reasonable time
after the conversion of the stock. and had
been prosecuted with reasonable diligence
since, then the piaintiff was entitled to re
cover the highest market price that the stock
reached between the date of the conversion
and the time of the trial, less the amount of
the check and interest, and with interest on
the balance. This charge was duly excepted
to. The jury found a verdict for $3,391.25.
There is no evidence which shows when the
stock reached that value. Upon the rendi
tion of the verdict both parties moved to set
it aside, the plaintiii’ on the ground that he
was entitled, under the charge, to the high
est value of the stock down to the trial, and
the defendant on the ground that the dam
ages were excessive and contrary to evi
dence. The court granted the motion of the
piaintiflf, and set the verdict aside on the
ground stated, and denied the motion of the
defendant. The defendant appealed to the
general term from both of such orders. That
court reversed the order setting aside the
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verdict, and ordered judgment thereon, and
affirmed the order made on defendant,s mo
tion, refusing to set aside the verdict. Judg
ment was then entered upon the verdict of
the jury, and from that judgment both sides
appeal to this court. and they also appeal
from the orders of the general term upon
which the judgment was entered.
v
W. E. Scripture, for plaintiff. Joseph H.
Choate and John Delahunty, for defendant.
PECKHAM, J., (after stating the facts as
above.) This case comes before us in a
somewhat peculiar condition. As both par
ties appeal from the same judgment, which
is for a sum of money only, it would seem
as if there ought not to be much difficulty in
obtaining its reversal. It i obvious, how
ever, that a mere reversal would do neither
party any good, as the case would .then go
down for a new trial, leaving the important
legal question in the case not passed upon
by this court. This, we think, would be an
injustice to both sides. The case is here, and
the main question is in regard to the rule
of damages. and we think it ought to be de
cided. By this charge the case was left to
the jury to give the highest price the stock
could have been sold for, intermediate its
conversion and the day of trial, provided the
jury thought, under all the circumstances,
that the action had been commenced within
a reasonable time after the conversion, and
had been prosecuted .with reasonable dili
gence since. Authority for this rule is claim
ed under Romaine v. Van Allen, 26 N. Y. 309,
and several other cases of a somewhat sim
ilar nature, referred to therein. Markham v.
Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235, followed the rule laid
down in Romaine v. Van Allen. In these
two cases a recovery was permitted which
gave the plaintiff the highest price of the
stock between the conversion and the trial.
In the Markham Case the plaintiff had not
paid for the stocks, but was having them
carried for him by his broker (the defend
ant) on a margin. Yet this fact was not re
garded as making any difference in the rule
of damages, and the case was thought to be
controlled by that of Romaine. In this state
of the rule the case of Matthews v. Coe, 49
N. Y. 57—62, came before the court. .The pre
cise question was not therein involved; but
the court, per Church, 0. J., took occasion to
intimate that it was not entirely satisfied
with the correctness of the rule in any case
not special and exceptional in its circum
stances; and the learned judge added that
they did not regard the rule as so firmly set
tled by authority as to be beyond the reach
of review whenever an occasion should ren
der it necessary. One phase of the question
again came before this court, and in proper
form, in Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211, where
the plaintiff had paid but a small percentage
on the value of the stock, and his broker,
the defendant, was carrying me same on a
margin, and the plaintiff had recovered inv
the court below, as damages for the unau
thorized sale of the stock, the highest price
between the time of conversion and the time
of trial. The rule was applied to substan
tially the same facts as in Markham v. Jau
don, supra, and that case was cited as au
thority for the decision of the court below.
This court, however, reversed the judgment
and disapproved the rule of damages which
had been applied. The opinion was written
by that very able and learned judge, Rapal
lo, and all the cases pertaining to the subject
were reviewed by him, and in such a master
ly manner as to leave nothing further for
us to do in that direction. We think the rea
soning of the opinion calls for a reversal of
this judgment. In the course of his opinion
the judge said that the rule of damages, as
laid down by the trial court, following the
case of Markham v. Jaudon, had “been rec
ognized and adopted in several late adjudica
tions in this state in actions for the conver
sion of property of fluctuating value; but
its soundness as a general rule, applicable
to all cases of conversion of such property,
has been seriously questioned, and is denied
in various adjudications in this and other
states." The rule was not regarded as one
of those settled principles in the law as to
the measure of damages, to which the max
im stare decisis should be applied. The
principle upon which the case was decided
rested upon the fundamental theory that in
all cases of the conversion of property (ex
cept where punitive damages are allowed)
the rule to be adopted should be one which
affords the plaintiff a just indemnity for the
loss he has sustained by the sale of the
stock; and, in cases where a loss of profits
is claimed, it should be, when awarded at
all, an amount sufficient to indemnify the
party injured for the loss which is the nat
ural, reasonabie, and proximate result of the
wrongful act compiained of, and which a
proper degree of prudence on the part of the
complainant would not have averted. The
ruie thus stated, in the language of Judge
Rapallo, he proceeds to apply to the facts
of the case before him. In stating what in
his view would be a proper indemnity to the. .
injured party in such a case, the learned‘
judge commenced his statement with the
fact that the plaintiff did not hold the stocks
for investment; and he added that. if they
had been paid for and owned by the plain
tiff, different considerations would arise, but
it must be borne in mind that we are treat-.
ing of a speculation carried on with the cap
ital of the broker, and not of the customer.
If the broker has violated his contract or‘
disposed of the stock without authority, the
customer is entitled to recover such dam
ages as wonld naturally be sustained in re
storing himself to the position of .which he
has been deprived. He certainly has no
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right to be placed in a better position than
he would be in if the wrong had not been
done. The whole reasoning of the opinion
is still based upon the question as to what
damages would naturally be sustained by
the plaintiff in restoring himself to the posi
tion he had been in; or in other words, in re
purchasing the stock. It is assumed in the
opinion that the sale by the defendant was
.illegal and a conversion, and that plaintiff
had a right to disaflirm the sale, and to re
quire defendants to replace the stock. If
they failed, then the learned judge says the
fpiaintiffs remedy was to do it himself, and
,to charge the defendants with the loss nec.
0essarily sustained by him in doing so.
Is not this equally the duty of a plaintiff
who owns the whole of the stock that has
been wrongfully sold? I mean, of course, to
exclude all question of punitive damages
resting on bad faith. In the- one case the
plaintiff has a valid contract with the broker
to hold the stock. and the broker violates it
and sells the stock. The duty of the broker
is toreplace it at once, upon the demand of
the plaintiff. In case he does not, it is the
duty.of the plaintiff to repurchase it. Why
.hould. not the same duty rest upon a plain
tiff who has paid in full for his stock, and
has deposited it with another conditionally?
QThe broker who purchased it on a margin
for the plaintiff violates his contract and his
duty when he wrongfully sells the stock,
just as much as lfthe whole purchase price
.had been paid by the plaintiff.. His duty is
in each case to replace the stock upon de
.mand, and, in case he fall so to do, then the
duty of theplaintiff springs up, and he
.should repurchase the stock himself. This
\_ gdutyit seems to me is founded upon the
.genera.l duty which one owes to another who
converts his property under an honest mis
,take, to render the resulting damage as
light as it may be reasonably within his
power to do. It is well said by Earl, J., in
‘Parsons v. Sutton, 66 N. Y. 92, that "the
.party. who suffers from a breach of contract
must so act as to make his damages as
small as he reasonably can. He must not
by inattention, want of care, or inexcusable
negligence permit his damage to grow, and
then charge it all to the other party. The
law gives him all the redress he should have
1by indemnifying him for the damage which
he necessarily sustains." See, also, Dillon
.v. Anderson, l3 N. Y. 231; Hogle v. Railroad
Co., 28 Hun, 363,—the latter case being an
action of tort. In such a case as this. wheth
.er the action sounds in tort or is based al
together upon contract. the rule of damages
is the same. Per Denio, C. J., in Scott v.
Rogers, 31 N. Y. 676; and per Rapallo, J.,
in Baker v. Drake, supra. The rule of dam
ages as laid down in Baker v. Drake, in
cases where the stock was purchased by the
broker on a margin for plaintiff, and where
the matter was evidently a speculation, has
been aflirmed in the later cases in this court.
See Gruman v.- Smith, 81 N. Y. 25;Colt v.
Owens, 90 N. Y. 368. In both cases the duty
of the plaintiff to repurchase the stock with
in a reasonable time is stated. I think the
duty exists in the same degree where the
plaintiff had paid in full for the stock. and
was the absolute owner thereof. In Baker
v. Drake the learned judge did not assume
to declare in a case where the pledgor was
the absolute owner of the stock, and it was
wrongfully sold, the measure of damages
must be as laid down in the Romaine Case.
He was endeavoring to distinguish the cases,
and to show that there was a difference be
tween the case of one who is engaged in a
speculation with what is substantially the
money of another and the case of an abso
lute owner of stock which is sold wrongful
ly by the pledges. And he said that at least
the former ought not to be allowed such a
rule of damages. It can be seen, however,
that the judge was not satisfied with the
rule in the Romaine Case, even as applied to
the facts therein stated. In his opinion he
makes use of this language: “ln. a case
.where the loss of probable profits is claim
ed as an element of damage, if it be ever
allowable to mulct a defendant for such a
conjectural loss, its amount is a question
of fact, and a finding in regard to it should
be based upon some evidence." In order to
.refuse to the plaintiff in that case, however,
the damages claimed, it was necessary to
overrule the .Markham Case, which was
done. Now, so far as the duty to repurchase
the stock is concerned, I see no difference in
the two cases. There is no material distinc
tion in the fact of ownership of the whole
stock, which should place the plaintiff out
side of any liability to repurchase after no
the of sale. and should render the defend
ant continuously liable for any higher price
to which the stock might rise after con
version and before trial. As the same lia
bility on the part of defendant exists in
each case to replace the stock, and as he is
technically a wrong-doer in both cases, but
in one no more than in the other, he should
respond in the same measure of. damages
in both cases; and that measure is the
amoimt which, in the language of Rapallo, J., .
is the natural, reasonable. and proximate re-v
suit of the wrongful act complained of, and.
which a proper degree of prudence on the‘
part of the plaintiff would not have avert
ed. The loss of a sale of the stock at th
highest price down to trial would seem t
be a less natural and proximate result o
the wrongful act of the defendant in selling
it when plaintiff had the stock for an invest
ment, than when he had it for a speculation;
for the intent to keep it as an investment is
at war with any intent to sell it at any
price, even the highest. But. in both cases
the qualification attaches that the loss shall
only be such as a proiier degree of prudence
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on the part of the complainant would not
have averted, and a proper degree of pru
dence on the part of the complainant con
sists in repurchasing the stock after notice
of its sale, and within a reasonable time.
If the stock then sells for less than the de
fendant sold it for, of course the complain
ant has not been injured, for the difference
in the two prices inures to his benefit. If it
sells for more, that difference the defendant .
should pay.
It is said that as he had already paid for
the stock once, it is unreasonable to ask the
owner to go in the market and repurchase it.
I do not see the force of this distinction. In
the case of the stock held on margin, the
plaintiff has paid his margin once to the
broker, and so it may be said that it is un
reasonable to ask him to pay it over again
in the purchase of the stock. Neither state
ment, it seems to me, furnishes any reason
for holding a defendant liable to the rule
of damages stated in this record. The de
fendant,s liability rests upon the ground that
he has converted, though/in good faith, and
under a mistake as to his rights, the prop
erty of the plaintiff. /The defendant is, there
fore, liable to respond in damages for the
value. But the duty of the plaintiff to make
the damage as light as he reasonably may
rests upon him in both cases; for there is no
more .legal wrong done by the defendant in
selling the stock which the plaintiff has fully
paid for than there is in selling the stock
which he has agreed to hold on a margin,
and which agreement he violates by selling
it. All that can be said is that there i a
difference in amount, as in one case the plain
tiif’s margin has gone, while in the other
the whole price of the stock has been sacri
ficed. But there is no such difference in the
legal nature of the two transactions as
should leave the duty resting upon the plain
till‘ in the one case to repurchase the stock,
and in the other case should wholly absolve
him therefrom. A rule which requires a re
purchase ot the stock in a reasonable time
does away with all questions as to the high
est price before the commencement of the
suit, or whether it was commenced in a rea
sonable time, or prosecuted with reasonable
diligence; and leaves out of view any ques
tion as to the presumption that plaintiff
would have kept his stock down to the time
when it sold at the highest mark before the
day of trial and would then have sold it,
even though he had owned it for an invest
ment. Such a presumption is not only of
quite a shadowy and vague nature, but is
also, as it would seem, entirely inconsistent
with the fact that he was holding the stock
as an investment. If kept for an invest
ment, it would have been kept down to the
day of trial; and the price at that time there
might be some degree of propriety in award
ing, under certain circumstances. if it were
higher than when it was converted. But to
presume in favor of an investor that he
would have held his stock during all of a
period of possible depression, and would
have realized upon it when it reached theQ
highest figure, is to indulge in a presump
tion which, it is safe to say, would not be
based on fact once in a hundred times. To
formulate a legal liability based upon such
presumption I think is wholly unjust in such
a case as the present. Justice and fair deal
ing are both more apt to be promoted by ad
hering to the rule which imposes the duty
upon the plaintiif to make his loss as light
as possible, notwithstanding the unauthor
ized act of the defendant, assuming, of
course, in all cases, that there was good faith
on the part of the appellant. It is the nat
ural and proximate loss which the plaintiff;
is to be indemnified for, and that cannot be
said to extend to the highest price before
trial, but only to the highest price reached
within a reasonable time after the plaintiff
has learned of the conversion of his stock
within which he could go in the market and
repurchase it.
when the facts are undisputed, and different
inferences cannot reasonably be drawn from
the same facts. is a question of law. See
Colt v. Owens, 90 N. Y. 368; Hedges v. Rail
road Co., 49 N. Y. 228.
We think_that beyond all controversy in
this case, and taking all the facts into con
sideration, this reasonable time had expired
by July 1, 1878, following the 9th of May of
the same year. The highest price which the
stock reached during that period was $2,795,
and, as it is not certain on what day the
plaintiff might have purchased, We think it
fair to give him the highest price it reached
in that time. From this should be deducted
the amount of the check and interest to the
day when the stock was sold, as then it is
presumed the defendant paid the check with
the proceeds of the sale. In all this discus
sion as to the rule of damages we have as
sumed that the defendant acted in good faith,
in an honest mistake as to its right to sell
the stock. and that it was not a case for
punitive damages. A careful perusal of the
whole case leads us to this conclusion. It is
not needful to state the evidence, but we can
not see any question in the case showing
bad faith, or indeed any reason for its exist
ence. The fact is uncontradlcted that the
defendant sold the stock upon what its ofli
oers supposed was the authority of the owner
thereof given to them by Elliott. The opin
ion delivered by the learned judge at gen
eral term, while agreeing with the principle
of this opinion as to the rule of damages in
this case, usta,ined the verdict of the jury
upon the theory that, if the plaintiff had gone
into the market within a reasonable time,
and purchased an equivalent of the stocks
converted, he would have paid the price
which he recovered by the verdict. . This left
the jury the right to fix what was a reason
What is a reasonable time .
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able time, and then assume there was evi
dence to support the verdict. In truth there
was no evidence which showed_the value of
the stock to have been anything like the
amount of the verdict, for the evidence show
ed it was generally very much less, and
sometimes very much more. But fixing what
is a reasonable time ourselves, it is seen that
the stock within that time was never of any
such value. The judgment should he revers
ed, and a new trial granted, with costs to
abide the event.
EARL, FINCH, and GRAY, JJ., concur.
RUGER, C. J., and ANDREWS and DAN
FORTH, JJ., dissent. v
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